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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has been long associated with conflict, 
fundamentalism and patriarchy. Thus, in studies tackling the Arab world, women are often depicted as 
either agentless victims of patriarchal oppression or as tools of legitimization for authoritarian regimes 
(Ahmed, 1999; Alloula, 1987). This impression is strengthened by the preoccupation with Islam as a 
marker of cultural identity (Kandiyoti, 1996), which is often perceived to have constrained the scope 
and magnitude of women’s movements throughout the Middle East. 
 
Such an understanding is even more prevalent in academic treatments that highlight the 
authoritarian political structure and supposed abundance of traditionalism in the Arab Gulf States 
(Eickelman & Piscatori, 2013). Many academic treatments have assumed feminist movements are 
absent altogether, especially those that operate beyond the state. Much of the scholarly work that 
dominates the discourses about women in the Gulf States tends to proffer an understanding that is 
contrary to history and dismissive of the region’s local knowledge. It portrays women as submissive 
subjects trapped in the solitude of domesticity and religion without possessing any active agency (Al-
Rasheed, 2013; Lim, 2018). Commenting on such studies, Mohanty (1988, p. 65) elaborates that some 
scholars and feminist writers have promoted a binary, essentialist narrative of third-world difference 
and a universalist discourse that positions non-Western women as traditional, passive and devoutly 
religious. She notes that this approach privileges a particular group as the normative referent through an 
abstract consideration of the non-Western subjects, while simultaneously constructing Western women 
as modern, free, secular, agential and thus fully capable of saving their non-Western sisters (Keller, 
2012). 
 
 Similarly, Basu (1995) argues that much of the available literature “ignore[s] women’s 
movements in the postcolonial world, considers women’s movements as products of modernization or 
development and assumes a sameness in the forms of women’s oppression and women’s movements 
cross-nationally” (p.1). The image of the “other” is built through opposition to the West (which 
considers the “self” the hegemonic epicenter), while the “other” is sidelined and differences are 
disregarded in favor of a simplistic black and white view. To overcome such condescending 
characterization, Mohanty (1988) advocates for contextual analysis that examines women as embedded 
within specific local, historical and social conditions. Far fewer studies have taken seriously the 
different conditions that women encounter in other contexts in the Global South. Taking this into 
consideration, this Ph.D. thesis will endeavor to disturb the ahistorical and monolithic accounts of 
women’s movements in the Gulf States and challenge stereotypes by drawing attention to the growing 




This thesis will focus primarily on feminist activism in the Arab Gulf Region. I aim to provide a 
contingent mapping of women’s feminist efforts within a comparative perspective in two of its states, 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. This entails conducting a detailed exploration of the historical genesis and 
development of women’s organizations in the Gulf, their form of organization and their links to other 
social groups and the state. I simultaneously examine the meandering paths of their growth, evolution 
and transformation.  
 
Perceiving women’s movements in the Gulf States as absent is highly misleading. The Gulf 
States have a rich history of women’s activism. Women have long organized themselves in the form of 
voluntary service groups. They have established women’s organizations and grassroots advocacy 
networks to challenge both state authority and the prevailing oppressive practices shaping their 
everyday lives, even if the means were less visible in dominant historical accounts or if the venues 
were less politically overt. I write in response to accounts that insist there is no women’s movement(s) 
in the Gulf Region. Scholars who make such claims base their arguments on some classic definitions of 
social movements that confine the concept of “movements” to visible street protests. They are 
accustomed to thinking of feminism as a merely Western construct that has no applicability or 
resonance in the MENA region. This thesis will not attempt to argue through simply holding up 
examples of successful feminist activists to counter such limiting narratives; to do so would ultimately 
only assert a sort of exceptionalism. Instead, through careful analysis, it will situate the existing trends 
in Gulf feminisms as part of a complex fabric of political action in the forms of activism, alliances and 
mobilizations that take place within the existing configurations of the feminist movement(s), including 
the digital sphere.  
 
The discussion of the historical context will also serve to shed some light on the significance of 
historical and contextual analysis to better understand and situate the contemporary women’s 
movements that have emerged with greater visibility in the last few years. These movements have 
become particularly prominent in the aftermath of the Arab Spring in 2011, in which women have been 
notably engaged in challenging the existing patriarchal arrangements and the surrounding political and 
legal barriers that are in place. As stated by Sreberny (2015), it is reasonable to suggest that access to 
the internet, the advancement of digital media platforms and the growing widespread awareness of the 
inevitability of change have produced a more conducive environment for women’s activities and thus 
for a broader definition of what counts as feminist activism.   
 
For the sake of examining the contemporary trajectory of women’s movements in Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait, I have limited my focus to two major feminist campaigns: “Women to Drive” and “Ensaf.” 
The grassroots “Women to Drive” campaign in Saudi Arabia materialized over the course of 2011 and 
2013, despite the existence of many hurdles including the highly constrained sociopolitical 
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environment, restrictions on the development of independent civil society organizations and the denied 
visibility of Saudi women in the public sphere.  
 
My other case involves the “Ensaf” campaign, which translates to “Justice” in English. This 
campaign was launched in 2014 by a coalition of women’s rights organizations to claim full citizenship 
rights for Kuwaiti women and demand the right to pass their nationality to their children in case they 
are married to foreigners—a right Kuwaiti men already enjoy. Using a triangulation of qualitative and 
quantitative methods, this research will analyze the use of digital media by feminist activists and 
women’s organizations. It will also evaluate the emergence of feminist discourse online and the ways 
digital-mediated practices are embedded in roles and functions relevant to activists, giving attention to 
the importance of discourse, networks and actors’ agency for the sake of providing a more nuanced and 
more contextual understanding of feminist activism in this context.  
 
I argue that feminist activism, while often pushing the boundaries of existing political 
structures, must also be understood in terms of the deployed agential practices, the discursive 
opportunities structures that are in place and the surrounding networks of exchange. Thus one must 
view the available structures not only as determining a specific action, but also as allowing a certain 
degree of choice. Digital technologies do not exist separately or independently from the situated 
practices of feminist activists, but the two inform and shape each other (Fotopoulou, 2016). 
 
Accordingly, my theoretical framework is informed by an integrated relational approach that 
moves beyond the techno-utopian assumption. It is centered on how digital media and networks are 
deployed and situated in relation to feminist activism.  By placing these three interrelated dimensions—
discursive opportunities structures, networks and actors’ agency—at the core of my theoretical 
framework, I seek to privilege a relational approach that connects the agency of social movement actors 
to digital media use. I will take into account the presence of discursive opportunities structures and the 
content that networks circulate and produce to better comprehend the role digital feminist activism 
plays in advancing feminist claims. I will also reflect on how digital media technologies are shaping the 
contemporary forms of feminist activism in the Arab Gulf States. 
 
1.1 Defining Feminist Activism in This Research  
Examining feminist activism in the Arab Gulf States requires a firm commitment to contextualizing 
specific terms that are associated with this concept. Accordingly, it becomes essential to clarify the 
basic terminologies used, such as “women’s movement,” “feminist movements” and “feminist 




There is no singular women’s movement and no singular definition of “women’s movement.” It 
is difficult to provide a single, overarching definition of women’s movements, which are in fact 
characterized by a proliferation of ideas, concepts, approaches and practices. There is a range of 
competing definitions that have yet to be assessed and culled. Moreover, arriving at an acceptable 
universal definition of women’s movements or of what they constitute is challenging because the 
patriarchal relations against which women’s movements constitute a resistance differ significantly in 
their configuration from one location to another (Franks, 2002). I approach this challenging task by 
elaborating on the different existing definitions of women’s movements in relation to social 
movements. Then I move to the difference between women’s movements and feminist movements, 
followed my definitional approach to feminist activism. 
 
1.2 Women’s Movements within Social Movement Research  
To begin with, many influential comparative studies on women’s movements embrace explicit 
recognition that women’s movements are majorly defined and identified by their core actors: women. 
Women are “the primary constituency who are mobilizing, building organizational and political 
strategies around specific issues of concern” (Tripp, Casimiro, Kwesiga & Mungwa, 2008, p. 14). 
 
Beckwith (2013) argues that placing women at the center of women’s movements allows three 
conceptual distinctions to emerge for research. First, it analytically differentiates between women’s 
movements and women in movements. This distinction allows researchers to examine social 
movements in which large numbers of women are active, but that cannot be identified purposely as 
women’s movements such as the peace movement or revolutionary movements. Furthermore, it allows 
assessment of the circumstances of women’s involvement in various movements and evaluation of the 
strategic differences for female activists and leaders in women’s as opposed to other movements. 
 
Second, it encompasses women’s movements that are rightly recognized as feminist movements 
without excluding movements that are not identified as inherently feminist. And lastly, it pushes 
scholars to reflect on women’s movements as distinct from other political movements. I treat the 
concept of women’s movements as deriving from a broader category of social movements. Women’s 
movements, similar to social movements, are a diffuse and complex set of individuals, organizations 
and informal groups who engage in sustained interactions that persist over time. This aligns with 
Tarrow’s definition of social movements as “individuals with shared collective identities and 
grievances, connected and organized in social networks, who mount organized and sustained 
challenges against powerful targets” (1998, p. 2) as well as Diani’s conceptualization of social 
movements as “networks of interaction between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, 




Social movements and women’s movements are marked by activism that is both collective 
scope and challenging to a certain extent in response to political structural opportunities, established 
social order, new issues or unanticipated events (Beckwith, 2005, p. 591). Like social movements, 
women’s movements rely on social networks for the diffusion of information (King & Soule, 2007) 
and for mobilization purposes and coordination of efforts in campaigns (Banaszak, 2008; Porta & 
Rucht, 2002). This observation is consistent with Banaszak’s (2008, p. 414) account that social 
movements, in general, are most often viewed as a mixture of informal networks and organizations, 
typically outside the realm of conventional politics and articulate claims for fundamental changes in the 
political or social system.  
 
What distinguishes women’s movements is the articulation of gender-based claims that act as 
the basis for activism and mobilization (Beckwith, 2005). The politicization of women’s lived 
experience serves as a common underlying principle that challenges the established order (Alvarez, 
1990). Thus, women mobilize collectively around their expressed identities as women, even if the 
content of these identities may be context-specific. This is not to claim that all women have identical 
identities or interests, nor is it an assertion of any essential, fundamental uniformity of women 
everywhere. 
 
Many women’s movements scholars have become critical of the underlying assumptions of 
mainly male-dominated definitions of social movements that emphasize protest repertoires and 
disruptive action as definitional features. Such definitions fail to take into account the different forms 
of contention that emerge among social movements that might not be necessarily tied to protest action 
alone, disregarding many of the activities of women’s movements (Sawer, 2010). Katzenstein (1999) 
contends the assumption that only massive street protests challenge authority does not apply to the 
women’s movement. Women might be constrained by a limiting political environment, traditional 
stereotypes in relation to gender roles or even a political choice. Others also problematized the 
perceptions of public visibility as criteria for defining movements, pointing to instances of movement 
persistence in abeyance structures (Taylor, 1989) and submerged networks (Melucci, 1989). Narrow 
definitions of social movements have led some academics to interpret the limited use of disruptive 
means to challenge the established order a sign of the decline of women’s movement and feminism in 
overall.  
 
This definitional problem demands some serious reflection about what constitutes a women’s 
“movement” in the current discourse. In some instances, only the visible, collective and persistent act 
of resistance is defined as a movement; in others, scattered demonstrations and a sudden outburst of 
fury over some injustices also fall under the overall rubric of a movement. Intermittently, acts of an 
oppositional nature carried out by a single individual in a particular moment of defiance are also 
regarded as being part of a movement. This covers the general contours in which the literature that 
tackled movements has conceptualized the different manifestations of movements. 
Chapter 1 
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One could apply this variation in the ways that movements have been conceptualized so far to 
draw a general sketch of women’s movements, including the autonomous protests of the 1970s and the 
institutionalized women’s movements of the 1990s, moving to the use of the internet for social change 
by women in the early 2000s. This trajectory necessitates realizing that women’s movements across the 
world therefore operate in multiple arenas, using diverse repertoires, that could include disruptive 
actions but also other, less-public forms of continuous actions. In light of these arguments and the 
contributions of women’s movement scholars, it seems the time to expand the definition of social 
movement to make the concept applicable to the wide range of change-oriented collective action. 
Women’s movements are more than waves, as this metaphor ignores the different crucial conditions 
that women face elsewhere (Staggenborg & Taylor, 2005). Scholars must be attentive to the fact there 
are different rationales for women to mobilize as women in relation to the emergent power relations at 
play. 
 
In short, throughout this research, I view women’s movements as subsets of social movements 
characterized by the primacy of women’s issues, organized by women explicitly as women presenting 
claims in public life based on their gendered identities without necessarily involving disruptive 
collective action.  The relationship of women to these movements is direct and immediate when it 
comes to movement definition, issue articulation and issue resolutions specific to women (Beckwith, 
1996). This definition also allows a certain degree of flexibility as it encompasses individual actions as 
well as collective actions and includes the different ways in which movement objectives can be pursued 
through dealing with institutional as well as non-institutional action. Based on this definition, I believe 
the women’s movements in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have, at one time or another, conformed to these 
characterizations of a movement. They became vocal, active and visible at some moments in 
contemporary history and quiescent in others.  
 
1.3 Unpacking the Difference between Feminist and Women’s Movements 
Women’s movements scholarship often conflates women’s movement and feminist movement, if not in 
explicit terminology then in implicit analysis, insofar as their definitions include substantive shared 
elements involving assertions of women’s rights to equality and critiques of gender-based 
subordination (Banaszak, 2006; Kaplan, 1992; M. Katzenstein & Mueller, 1987). 
 
Some scholars have stressed the importance of drawing some distinctions between feminist 
movements and the larger women’s movement, identifying feminist movements as one but not the only 
form of women’s movement in which women organize explicitly and consciously to defend their 
interests (Alvarez, 1990; Valiente, 2003). The broader definitions of women’s movements therefore 
encompass feminist movements as one type of women’s movement, but also recognize organized 
collective action by women who do not identify themselves as feminists and women who belong to the 




Along the same lines, Alvarez regards women’s movements as “composed primarily but not 
necessarily exclusively of female participants who make claims on the basis of their affirmed 
identities” (1990, p. 23). More recently, the same author has defined feminist movements as 
“characterized by an expansive, polycentric, heterogeneous discursive field of action which spans into 
a vast array of cultural, social and political arenas, in which activists envision themselves as working to 
alter gender power relations that circumscribe their own lives as women” (1999, pp. 184–186). 
Feminist movements are further distinguished by the articulation of “specific feminist discourse which 
introduces gendered power analysis of women’s oppression which contests political, social and other 
structural arrangements of domination and on the basis of gender” (Beckwith, 2001, p. 372) as well 
passionate commitment to diminishing gender subordination (Wieringa, 1995). This distinction implies 
that gender is seen as one of the most significant social cleavages and that the combination of protest 
against male dominance and partial visions of equality is the defining characteristic of feminism; any 
feminist is, at the very minimum level, committed to some form of reevaluation of the position of 
women in society.  
 
For scholars like Molyneux (1985), the distinction between women’s movements and feminist 
movements is rather implicit; she coined the typologies of practical and strategic feminist demands and 
argued that some differences exist between women organizing to meet their basic needs within the 
preexisting patriarchal structures and women who are explicitly organizing to counter systems of 
patriarchy that are in place. Along the same lines, other academics have opted to differentiate between 
women’s movements and feminist ones in terms of aims. Women’s movements’ aims include 
advocating for women and women’s issues, while feminist movements involve posing specific 
challenges to patriarchy and the subordination of women (Ferree & Mueller, 2007). Under this vision, 
the difference between women’s movements and feminist movements ultimately comes down to 
differences in the ideas, aspirations and identities presented by collective actors.  
 
Conversely, other scholars such as Laurel Weldon deliberately incorporate into the category of 
feminist movements the activists or organizations that do not explicitly label themselves as feminists. 
Weldon includes actors who have contradictory understandings of feminism, including conservative 
women’s groups that focus on women’s differences or distinctive roles as mothers or caregivers, as 
long as these groups aim to improve women’s situation. She discounts those who claim women’s status 
does not necessitate improvement (2002, p. 63). Although it is important analytically to separate 
women’s movements and feminist movements, they are in practice interrelated and overlapping. 
Numerous academic studies have indicated that some women’s movements transform themselves into 
feminist movements or spawn feminist movements (Alvarez, 1990). Moreover, in many contexts, 
mobilizations of women in pursuit of feminist goals have historically been referred to as the women’s 





This historical reality led me to use the terms feminist movement and women’s movement 
interchangeably in the context of this Ph.D. thesis. I understand both as networks of social actors and 
organizations that are explicitly feminist by identification who articulate their claims as women or 
insist upon their identity as part of a larger women’s movement. Movements also present a particular 
women’s centered movement discourse (e.g.,Tripp et al., 2008). This definition encompasses a vision, a 
roadmap and a strategy as well as individual and collective actors. Thus, I will explore feminist 
activism in the Arab Gulf States within the parameters of this definition. I understand women’s and 
feminist movements as universal endeavors to overturn injustices against women, while I dismiss the 
mistaken culturally essentialist claims that feminist movements are inescapably linked to Western 
hegemony and ultimately tied to modern Western settings.  
 
I believe that feminist movements in the MENA region, including the Gulf States, fit into a rich 
history of female activism flourishing in social environments that place considerable obstacles to 
female action in the public sphere. The diversity of feminisms also stems from various regions and 
histories that demanded social, cultural and organizational transformations in their own capacities (Al-
Ali, 2008). This observation is consistent with Badran’s explanation that “feminisms are produced in 
particular places and are articulated in local terms” (2009, p. 243); feminist perspectives are strongly 
influenced by each nation’s historical, cultural and religious contexts.   
 
In sum, such movements in the region are characterized by a plurality of feminist discourses 
that reflect women’s status. They adopt various strategies for redefining gender relationships based on 
different means, both religious and non-religious. They rest on the fundamental premise that women 
suffer from inequality and that women engage in contention to change the material conditions around 
them (El-Fadl, 2001). Movements in the region maintain a strong commitment to women’s 
empowerment, while the sources and terms of this empowerment can be different.   
 
I view that, at their core, feminist movements are characterized by a specific kind of women’s 
centered discourse, one that encourages self-reflexivity and focuses on advancing the position of 
women in society. They seek to challenge and change women’s subordination and the structures of 
gender-based hierarchies (Offen, 1988). I also depart from the position that feminist movements my 
case studies concern encompass different positions, many of which are in tension with each other, over 
a blend of piety and choice, religiosity and secular-based rights (Bayat, 2013). Thus, questions of 
whether some forms of feminism are more legitimate than others are avoided here. Just because some 
women’s visions for embracing change are framed through concepts and stances that others might 





1.4 Feminist Activism: What Does it Entail?  
When it comes to feminist activism, the literature has acknowledged that the term is a difficult concept 
to pin down because it has been used in plural ways by a variety of actors. Broadly speaking, activism 
often denotes the organization of individuals around a particular issue of interest in order to demand 
social, political or economic change (Housley et al., 2018). Feminist activism, by extension, is about 
putting feminist interests at the center through action (Sherrod, 2006). 
 
Collins (2000) claims that activism is inherent within feminism, while Alvarez (1990) 
delineates an act as feminist if it attempts to transform social roles assigned to women while 
simultaneously challenging gender power arrangements and advancing claims for women’s rights to 
equality. Taking this challenge into consideration, I attempt to maintain an openness to what constitutes 
feminist activism. I adopt a broad definition that encapsulates a variety of involvements and activities, 
such as advocacy, consciousness-raising and lobbying, that are taken by feminists and organizations 
guided by strong visions of social change at an individual or collective level. 
 
My definition also encompasses the use of digital and network technologies to subvert 
patriarchal norms and practices by raising awareness about women’s issues and generating feminist 
discourses in online spaces, as well as disseminating feminist discourses and producing feminist 
knowledge (Daniels, 2009). Thus, I understand that carrying out feminist action encompasses pursuing 
a common goal and engaging in organized feminist activity in different arenas to draw attention status 
of women’s citizenship and mobility rights. Feminist action demands being taken seriously and 
incorporated in laws and legislation, as seen in my selected feminist campaigns.  
 
This definition is also inclusive of grassroots challengers as well as institutional activists that 
are located in professional organizations. They can engage with conventional politics through lobbying 
or pursue more adversarial strategic tactics. This inclusion paves the way for greater understanding of 
how movement goals can be pursued through dealing with institutions as well as non-institutional 
targets. It is also an indicator of the importance of the inclusion of digital technologies and discursive 
elements to feminist activism. Technology makes it possible to be political at an individual level and 
pursue feminist action through the act of making gendered claims. Digital feminist action is not 
ontologically different, but rather a different mode of being political (Sreberny, 2015). 
 
1.5 Case Studies Justification 
Case selection is the rational selection of one or more instances of a phenomenon as the particular 
subject of research to generate dense, concrete and context-dependent knowledge. It defined by Yin 
(2009, p. 16) as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and 
within its real-life context.” In relation to that, della Porta (2008) affirms that much research, especially 
in the political science field is case-oriented: that is, it aims at rich descriptions of a few instances of a 
Chapter 1 
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particular phenomenon by focusing on a relatively small set of cases, analyzed with careful attention to 
each case as an interpretable whole, with a large number of characteristics being taken into 
consideration, often together with their interaction within long-lasting processes (Ragin, 1987). 
 
So, the key question is how can researchers select cases from a large universe for in-depth 
analysis? Random sampling is often not a viable option when the total number of cases to be selected is 
small (which is the case with the phenomenon that I am researching, that is feminist and digital 
feminist activism in the Arab Gulf States). Hence, attention to purposive modes of sampling is needed. 
Yet, choosing good cases for small samples remains a challenging endeavor (Gerring, 2007). Coyne 
(1997) differentiates between purposeful and theoretical approaches to purposive sampling. Theoretical 
sampling selects cases representative of emerging theory following a grounded theory approach. 
Purposeful sampling on the other hand seeks to identify cases that can be considered of “central 
importance to the purpose of the research” (Patton, 1990).  
 
Furthermore, the reasons for selecting cases vary from an interest in the particular case to 
theoretical considerations and the selection criteria for cases may include geography and type of 
organization, among other factors. Nonetheless, the relevance of the case or cases for the research 
objectives is the most important criterion for case selection (Mills, Durepos & Wiebe, 2010). Case-
oriented scholars may intentionally choose cases that differ relatively from each other with respect to 
the outcome under investigation (Ragin, 2004), focusing in particular on positive cases that are cases 
where a certain phenomenon is present. Meanwhile, della Porta (2008) responds to the question of how 
can researchers select cases from a large universe by illuminating that during the process of casing, 
singling out the degree of homogeneity of the cases (by answering the question, “What is this a case 
of?”) is part and parcel of the research process, which typically concludes with the construction of 
types and the allocation of cases to them. 
 
Since the main focus of this research is feminist and digital feminist activism in the Arab Gulf 
States, I will first lay down the reasons behind choosing this region in particular. Then I move to 
explain the justifications of my purposeful case selection in detail. My motivation of deciding on the 
Arab Gulf States as a region to undertake research about stems from the fact that most studies on 
feminist activism and digital media have seldom dealt with non-Western women’s and feminists’ 
movements, as far fewer studies have taken as their point of departure the conditions and experiences 
of other cultural contexts. 
 
Therefore, little is known about the contemporary forms of feminist activism in the Gulf States 
that have emerged with greater strength in the last years. This blind spot provides a rich understudied 
field for developing theoretical and empirical observations about how feminist activists and 
organizations engage with and make use of new digital media technologies from a particular local 
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context. I view the inability of previous academic studies to shed some light on this topic, in 
combination with my positionality and familiarity with the context, as a promising research opportunity 
to offer genuine, empirically grounded contribution to the under-researched topic of women’s feminist 
activism in the Arab Gulf States that is starting to emerge in relatively constrained social and political 
structures.  
  
By doing so, I aim to examine the new landscape of feminist activism in this region, which has 
been rarely examined using the lens of social movements theories, and counter the existing trends in 
academic research, which have often portrayed women in this context as passive victims of their 
structural patriarchal systems—a view that fails to account for their complex multifaceted position and 
the modes of action that they are taking place. I believe that undertaking systematic comparative 
assessment in reference to feminist activism in this context can help us to make productive inferences 
in relation to the overall picture in which feminist activism emerges and unfurls and identify the points 
of commonality across the selected cases, as well as to untangle the divergences among female 
activists, their different trajectories and the circumstances surrounding their mode of feminist activism 
(Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Also, in attempting to demonstrate the merits of conducting cross-national 
comparisons of contemporary forms of feminist activism lies the potential of expanding our concepts 
beyond the limits of single-case studies and develop standards of comparison—common criteria with 
which we can understand feminist activism in the MENA region overall and potentially beyond 
(Gharawi, Pardo, & Guerrero 2009). 
 
As with regards to the selected cases, I sought to ensure that I followed clear and specific 
criteria, rather than selecting some cases just because they seemed readily accessible or convenient to 
study. Moreover, due to the fact that feminist activism in the Gulf States most often takes the form of 
campaigns, it was crucial that the selected cases of campaigns met specific criteria that were relevant to 
the overall objectives of the research. Therefore, the potential cases were expected to meet at least four 
predetermined criteria: the presence of active or organized feminist efforts and mobilization, the 
articulation of gendered claims that act as the basis for activism, the relative use of digital media as a 
means for activism and the existence of some degree of variation in the socio-cultural contexts between 
the selected cases to ensure variation of findings. 
 
The finalized purposive selection was decided upon after an iterative series of decisions that 
evaluated the characteristics of each case. The cases which met the above mentioned case selection 
criteria included the “Women to Drive” campaign that was launched in full force in the aftermath of the 
Arab Spring in 2011 in Saudi Arabia and the “Ensaf” campaign in Kuwait that commenced in 2014 to 
demand full citizenship rights for Kuwaiti women who are married to non-nationals and advocate for 
allowing them to pass their Kuwaiti nationality to their children. These campaigns were selected 
because they represent two of the most prominent feminist campaigns that were launched in the Gulf 
Region within similar spatial and temporal trajectories that took place post the Arab Spring era, in 
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which women have been increasingly involved as newly empowered citizens in campaigns directed at 
the state against existing legal and regulatory limitations to demand improving women’s position in 
their respective societies. Furthermore, both of the selected campaigns can potentially offer interesting 
insights into the relationship between feminist activism and digital media to a greater or lesser degree. 
 
So while many forms of gender inequality exist in the Arab Gulf States in which women 
struggle on many fronts: against legal restrictions and political barriers, the ban on driving as seen in 
the case of Saudi Arabia and the existing legal and regulatory limitations when it comes to female 
citizenship rights as witnessed in the context of Kuwait. Both are manifestations of a system that keeps 
women restricted in terms of both mobility and exercising agency and choice At the same time, I was 
aware that we cannot assume a sameness in the forms of feminist movements or the deployed feminist 
practices, especially because, contrary to popular belief, the Arabian Peninsula is not a uniform and 
homogeneous region. So, while Saudi Arabia and Kuwait share a tribal background and thus bear the 
imprint of a common value system, these countries vary significantly in terms of national political 
topography, state-society relations, cultural openness, the absence or presence of organized civil 
society organizations, the overall impact of conservative or liberal political environments, as well as the 
centralization or dispersion within the movement itself, potentially leading each feminist movement 
within each country to follow a peculiar course of actions and develop distinctive agendas in response 
to their local circumstances. 
 
So while Saudi Arabia has a distinct profile in terms of being a conservative Islamist clerical 
state, which has pursued sex segregation and many forms of legal and practical discrimination against 
women, Kuwait, on the contrary, is more liberal in orientation. It wouldn’t be inaccurate to describe its 
political system as relatively democratic when compared to other Gulf States. It is not a full democracy 
per se according to Western standards as it is in fact constitutional emirate with a parliamentary system 
of government. Yet, it is the closest example to a democracy in the Gulf Region, as the earliest modern 
elections following the independence from Britain can be traced to 1962, when elections were held to 
elect 20 members to the constitutional convention. 
 
 Kuwait, also unlike Saudi Arabia, is recognized for having a long-established history in 
relation to the establishment of women’s rights organizations. These organizations were formed in 
1963 with the establishment of the first two women’s organizations, the Arab Women Development 
Society (AWDS) and the Women’s Cultural and Social Society (WCSS). Therefore, when it comes to 
answering the question of “what are these cases of?”. In both cases, we see feminist activists and 
organizations challenging social order through gendered claims-making and women-centered 
discourses to draw attention to women’s demands and make sure that they are taken seriously and 
incorporated in laws and legislation. Both cases are also illustrative of the variety of modes of action, in 




The two campaigns also converge on being both initiated and mobilized on the basis of 
confronting gender-based discrimination and calling for securing civil and legislative rights for women, 
providing by that a direct window to women’s mobilization that deploys different tactical repertoires. 
To elaborate further, I have chosen the “Women to Drive” campaign as my first case study because it 
serves as an example through which to examine the relationship between feminist activism and digital 
media; the campaign was characterized by the extensive use of digital media, as evidenced by the 
ability of Saudi women to manage, organize and mobilize during the 2011 and 2013 driving 
campaigns, where the features of digital media in terms of anonymity, speed and transnational outreach 
have encouraged Saudi women to publicize and disseminate campaign-related information for both 
local and global audience, connect to and engage with other feminist networks, sign online petitions, as 
well as raise feminist claims and women’s centered discourse to a wider audience to  foster 
mobilization. 
 
It is worth noting that this campaign represented a milestone to Saudi women and signaled a 
rise in feminist activism in Saudi Arabia by allowing women to maneuver a constraining political 
culture that is characterized by a dearth of channels for civic engagement and lack of strong 
organizational structure capable of articulating women’s claims through institutionalized channels, as 
NGOs and voluntary women’s associations are severely constrained by existing laws and policies that 
do not formally recognize independent women’s established organizations and limit the independence 
of non-state structures.  
 
Alternatively, the development of digital media platforms in English and Arabic and the ease of 
access to the internet have produced a more conducive environment for feminist activism and led 
women and activists to extensively rely on digital media and social media networks for the diffusion of 
information, mobilization purposes and coordination of efforts. Hence, it is the informal networks that 
constitute the alternative locus of activism and the principal mode of women’s mobilization, rather than 
institutionalized channels in the case of Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, the “Ensaf” campaign was selected 
because it represents one of the most important feminist campaigns that have taken place in Kuwait. It 
was initiated by a coalition of women’s rights organizations to claim full citizenship rights for Kuwaiti 
women and demand granting them the right to allow them to pass their nationality to their children in 
case they are married to foreigners through legislation.  
 
The campaign posed direct challenges to the contentious politics of citizenship in Kuwait, in 
which women asserted their personal and collective rights from de facto second-class citizenship 
positions, as Kuwait is one of the only 26 countries in the world that discriminate against female 
nationals in terms of citizenship rights. However, unlike the campaign in Saudi Arabia that was mainly 
operating at a grassroots level, the picture was a bit different in Kuwait. Established women’s 
organizations played an important role in mobilizing for legal and policy changes when it came to the 
objectives of the “Ensaf” campaign. This is because the trajectory of the feminist movement in Kuwait 
differs from the one in Saudi Arabia in terms of being more oriented towards institutionalization and 
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professionalization, in which women’s organizations serve as the main locus of activism instead of 
informal networks.  
 
This made it easier for the campaign to traverse the official terrain of formal politics, work 
much more closely through existing state structures and engage with institutions such as the legislature, 
the judiciary and the state to enhance their collective ability to achieve the movement’s goals and exert 
some pressure on the government to enact policies that respond to the campaign’s demands. The 
campaign was also open to embracing other informal groups and resorted to the use of digital 
networking platforms in its pursuit, complementing by that the activities on the ground with digital 
efforts. Reflecting back on the choice of these cases, the selected campaigns therefore echo the forms 
of resistance that question the status quo restricting women’s rights and lives, in which the 
politicization of women’s lived experiences serve as a common underlying principle that challenges the 
established order, as women are making use of different resources via digital media and beyond to 
promote and advocate for their gendered claims and demands.  
 
These cases are also testimonies of the emergence of a new era that has coincided with the 
increasing prevalence of digital media access and use, in which advocacy networks, digital platforms 
and digital communicative practices are being increasingly manifested, deployed and embraced by 
feminist activists and established women’s organizations alike. Thus, by taking a comparative case 
study approach, this Ph.D. thesis will cover several important aspects of feminist activism by 
examining two feminist campaigns that emerge within different contexts within the Arab Gulf States, 
in which digital technologies are increasingly playing key roles in the emergence and growth of 
activists’ campaigns that are both highly distributed and centrally organized. 
 
1.6  Thesis Significance and Contribution 
Conducting comparative research on women’s movements is indeed a challenging task. Women’s 
movements, however problematically defined, are not beyond comparison, especially in studies that 
clearly formulate their research questions, specify the frameworks of analysis and clearly explain the 
concepts they seek to investigate (Beckwith, 2000). 
 
Accordingly, this doctoral thesis will be adopting a comparative perspective to the examination 
of the contemporary landscape of feminist activism in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait by comparing how 
feminist activists in Saudi Arabia and feminist organizations in Kuwait are making use of different 
social networking platforms to promote and advocate for their causes. My research, therefore, aims to 
offer an original, empirically-driven contribution to the research on the nexus between women’s 
feminist activism and digital technologies, a contribution that moves beyond technology-centered 
perspectives and debunks the commonly-held myth that digital media are used in a universal manner to 
promote sociopolitical change everywhere. This will be made possible by adopting an integrated 
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relational approach around a three-dimensional axis that centers on activists’ voices and accounts, the 
discourses that materialize over the digital sphere and the networks of exchange that are composed in 
the span of the feminist campaigns that I will be examining. 
 
By focusing on actors’ agency, I seek to provide emergent, situated knowledge that is actively 
informed from the standpoint of female activists and privileges their voices as active agents. My 
motivation in doing so rests on the unfortunate reality that their perspectives are often subsumed into 
the dominant academic discourse, a discourse that supposedly considers the absence of women’s and 
feminist movements in these contexts. Such accounts fail to consider the multiplicity of feminist modes 
and practices that exist. Incorporating these women’s voices will, in turn, complicate the current 
debates on women’s roles in feminist struggles beyond reductionist accounts that present women as 
misguided or without agency.  
 
By focusing on the discourse, I intend to explore how feminist discourses are articulated in 
these techno-social spaces and unpack the variations in how feminist claims are discursively 
constructed and negotiated. By paying attention to networks, I aim to capture the essence of the central 
hubs involved at the core of the network and explore the interconnectedness and relational dimension 
between networks and ties as well as the content that these networks of exchange produce for public 
dissemination and outreach. 
 
Departing from technological utopianism as well as Orientalist frameworks, this Ph.D. thesis 
offers nuanced, historically grounded research of the contemporary forms of Kuwaiti and Saudi 
feminist activism by privileging women’s histories, voices, discourses and networks, centrally 
incorporating them into the analysis. The added value of this Ph.D. research is significant for multiple 
reasons. First, there is a dearth of research about the contemporary modes of feminist activism in the 
Gulf States, which offers an intriguing opportunity for developing original theoretical and empirical 
insights about women’s feminist activism.  
 
Moreover, my cases of study will shed light on the deployment of digital media for feminist 
action, as well as the plural and heterogeneous digital practices that take place. They will demonstrate 
how digital media is used as an alternative channel of communication and resistance, making the 
research a valuable contribution to the existing areas of research on digital communication, social 
movements and feminist activism. These strands currently remain disjointed. Finally, I believe that my 
Ph.D. project has wider implications beyond the circumscribed context of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. 
The questions at the heart of my research on women’s engagement in feminist activism have broad 
relevance across several interdisciplinary fields, as my case studies, although very specific, are 
illustrative examples of some of the underlying tensions, problems and contentions that make up the 
backdrop of contemporary women’s activism in the MENA region and beyond. My research will also 
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contribute to solidifying the understanding of how feminist activism is maintained in authoritarian and 
semi-authoritarian settings emerging in highly constrained social and political structures. 
 
1.7 Thesis Outline 
Having given a brief overview of the Ph.D. thesis, I will now outline its structure. In the next chapter, I 
will review the existing literature on Saudi and Kuwaiti women’s movements and feminist activism 
that forms the backdrop to this research. I also provide an extensive reading of the theories in this field, 
question the conceptual separation between digital media and social movements and elaborate on the 
significance of digital technologies for feminist activism from the perspective of social movements. I 
move later to describe my relational theoretical framework within which the Ph.D. project is situated, 
reflect on its applicability and conclude the chapter by stating my research questions. 
 
In Chapter 3, I provide a comprehensive overview of the historical and temporal contexts that 
shaped women’s movements and the status of gendered politics in both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. 
Chapters 4 to 7 represent the epicenter of my analysis. These four empirical chapters derive from the 
analysis of my data and split into themes that broadly correspond to my theoretically informed 
dimensions and research questions. Each chapter contains its data collection procedures, methods and 
data analysis techniques separately. The chapters move progressively from obtaining insights on actors’ 
perspectives, to focusing on the discursive dimension and the networked aspect of the campaigns. 
 
Chapter 4 incorporates extensive semi-structured interviews that are directed towards 
uncovering activists’ perceptions and experiences in carrying out feminist activism, most notably 
during the campaigns that I have identified. Chapter 5 examines the salience of the driving and 
nationality issues in the Saudi and Kuwaiti mediated public sphere and whether feminist activism has 
the potential to disrupt and intervene in mainstream discourses. Just as feminism varies in its mode, 
form and content digital feminist activists also use a myriad of platforms to articulate their claims. I 
examine two main platforms that feminist activists use in Chapters 6 and 7.  
 
In Chapter 6, I analyze the content of the campaigns’ related Facebook pages in order to shed 
light on the local appropriations and online practices that occurred through Facebook in relation to the 
campaigns. In Chapter 7, I move further by adopting a network-centric approach that seeks to identify 
the central hubs around specific popular hashtags and examine the content that is disseminated by the 
Twitter accounts that claim to be representative of the campaigns. The concluding chapter draws on all 
of the preceding material to further reflect on and re-engage with my findings, then consider the overall 
theoretical implications of the research. It also evaluates the limitations of the thesis and considers 
some possible directions for future research. 
 
 
Chapter 2: Current State of Research and Theoretical Underpinnings 
 
The goal of this chapter is to explain the path of the research and ground it firmly in its corresponding 
theoretical constructs. It promises to provide both impetus and direction for the research inquiry. The 
chapter begins by reviewing the literature that forms the backdrop to this research. In doing so, an 
attempt will be made to systematically integrate the seemingly disjointed literature on women’s 
movements and feminist activism in the context of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which belongs to 
different bodies of knowledge with diverse epistemologies and focal points.   
 
Following that, I make an effort to synthesize the existing scholarly work connected to the 
concepts, tenants and theories I have identified as central to my research. I hope to give the reader a 
clear sense that my proposed theoretical approach is grounded in relevant, established work in 
literature. The theoretical underpinnings will also inform my research questions and methodological 
choices and further justify my research problems. Accordingly, three primary literature concentrations 
will be recognized as relevant for my thesis: social movements theories, digital media use and feminist 
engagement in both. Then an assessment of the challenges that digital media pose for the examination 
of activism and movements in the digital age will be made, followed by a general overview of the 
different ways in which digital media platforms have been contextualized and examined in social 
movements literature. 
 
I later elaborate on the proposed integrated relational approach to the examination of feminist 
activism in connection to my case studies. By doing so, I aim to offer an alternative approach that 
examines feminist activism in a situated and contextualized manner and highlight how the current 
literature on social movements, digital technologies and activism can benefit from the application of 
such an approach. Lastly, I put forward my main research questions and how I intend to approach them.  
 
2.1 State of the Art on Feminist Activism in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
Literature that tackles women’s movement and feminist activism in Saudi Arabia is relatively scarce. 
Some scattered snippets about women’s status can be extracted from scholarly work done on Saudi 
Arabia itself. Al-Rasheed (2013, p. 33) explained that a significant hurdle facing researchers is the 
“limited historical knowledge and current research on Saudi women;” most research focuses primarily 
on the history of the Kingdom, its politics, the rentier economy or the Wahhabi strain of Islam 
practiced there. 
 
One can observe some common patterns and thematic trends from the available scholarship on 
Saudi Arabia. The majority of relevant literature either adopts the statist approach, which reduces the 
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Saudi feminism to a feminism initiated and promoted by the state (e.g., Kéchichian, 2013) or relies on 
Orientalist and modernist paradigms, which uphold the clumsy conclusion that a feminist movement is 
absent in this context, either because of Saudi Arabia’s theological dogma or because of the state co-
optation of women’s feminist actions (e.g. Valentine, 2015). 
 
To elaborate further, the first approach argues that a grassroots Saudi women’s movement does 
not exist due to structural constraints arising from religion and culture that ultimately confine women to 
more passive roles. It also presents the Saudi state as the only legitimate agent capable of protecting 
women’s best interests and empowering them. Such an approach also attributes what may be 
considered an instance of women’s agency to historical moments of state-initiated reforms that target 
women (Doaij, 2018). The second approach perpetuates the image of an oppressive regime and 
oppressed women. It holds the state equally responsible for the absence of a women's movement by 
considering the structural factors affecting women, such as society, religion and the state, as all equally 
restrictive and patriarchal, thus resulting in no possible instances of women’s agency. Such statists and 
Orientalist accounts of Saudi feminism have not stood without response. They have been challenged by 
competing literature, particularly from Saudi academics, who draw attention to women’s social and 
familial lives. This literature is more sympathetic in the sense that it highlights the existence of some 
limited form of agency that manifests within and against the existing patriarchic structures in the 
private realm, but could potentially be extended to the public sphere in some ways. 
 
The work of Almunajjed and al-Torki is a prime example of these early attempts to highlight 
Saudi women’s agency. Al-Torki’s (1977) ethnographical studies focus predominantly on 
demonstrating how Saudi feminism occured mainly within the private realm through contentious 
negotiations. She, therefore, located the exercise of women’s agency in social matters of importance, as 
well as in women’s use of religious concepts to their advantage. Another example of research that 
examined Saudi women is the work by Almunajjed (1997), who conducted one hundred interviews 
with women of different classes and backgrounds to present an accurate depiction of Saudi women that 
called into question the dominant narratives of their submissiveness. 
 
However, a noticeable pattern within this line of work is that it is often executed along the very 
modernist lines that they criticize, meaning that such works adopt a Western modernity stance and 
focus on the study of elite, educated, modern Saudi women. In doing so, these works are an exercise in 
“engaging the gaze” and are carried out along criteria set by Western imaginaries of Saudi women, 
modernity and development (Doaij, 2018). There is, however, recent, emerging, subaltern literature that 
seeks to counter both the statist and Orientalist approaches. Such studies had proved to be most 
significant in understanding and situating feminist activism. This approach is exemplified by Madawi 
al-Rasheed’s (2013) work on the intersection between gender, politics and religion in Saudi Arabia and 
Le Renard’s (2014) scholarly research on Saudi women’s transgressions in women-only spaces. Both 




agency from below. They dismiss the earliest claims that Saudi women are unable to posit feminist will 
or agency, as well as the currently upheld stereotypes and abstractions about Saudi women. Both of 
these academic efforts also converge on rejecting modernization theory and Saudi exceptionalism, two 
frameworks historically present in a great deal of writing on Saudi Arabia.  
 
In doing so, al-Rasheed’s work (Al-Rasheed, 2013) explains how the representation of Saudi 
womanhood was central to the idea of the nation and the state’s legitimation. She provides a detailed 
account of how the process of creating a Saudi nation-state based on a pious Islamic nationalist identity 
also created a parallel image of an ideal woman, which was used later as a national symbol to 
distinguish their pious nation “visibly and structurally from the other ungodly polities” (p.16). Her 
work also pointed out that Saudi women were now an emerging divergent constituency as she 
documents the manifestation of their feminist activism in unusual places such as mosques or through 
writing (p.27). Le Renard's scholarship (Le Renard, 2014) was based on extensive ethnographic 
fieldwork in Saudi Arabia. It explored women’s strategies for navigating and negotiating the segregated 
spaces governed by strict gender segregation rules. Her work, therefore, provided a rich, layered look 
into the diversity of actions taken by young Saudi women and demonstrated a commitment to locating 
Saudi women’s agency and feminism to everyday feminisms when it came to negotiating emancipation 
and mobility. 
 
She therefore situated her work as part of “historical and ethnographic evidence that discredits 
the dominant reading of Saudi history in terms of linear progress and modernization, according to 
which all obstacles to women’s advancement are the result of traditions inherited from the past” (p. 
745). She problematized the view that the main structural restrictions on Saudi feminism were that of 
religion and state as she introduced elements such as urbanization and neoliberalism (p. 154); she 
explained how the production of homosocial spaces and the limitations placed on Saudi women’s 
mobility are entirely modern conventions tied to rapid urbanization. 
 
On a different note, the preoccupation with social media in the aftermath of the Arab Spring has 
attracted much scholarly attention about women’s heightened engagement in broad-based social 
mobilizations, as well as on their capitalization on the capabilities of digital media to organize and 
enact change across the Middle East and resist offline patriarchal norms (Khamis, 2011; Landorf, 
2014). Saudi Arabia was not an exception. Some media-based reports and academic studies tackled 
Saudi women’s ability to manage, organize and mobilize during the 2011 and 2013 driving campaigns, 
which signaled a rise in feminist activism in Saudi Arabia. The features of speed, anonymity and 
decentralization encouraged activists to create online groups, connect to and engage with others and put 




A disparate body of research with diverse epistemologies and focal points has since surfaced 
examining the connection between the proliferation of digital technologies and Saudi women’s 
activism, particularly on the digital front. Some studies sought to explore the potentials that digital 
media offered for Saudi women in their struggle against the patriarchal social order (Chaudhry, 2014). 
Others examined the information diffusion processes, including the role of networks (Yuce, Agarwal, 
& Wigand, 2015), along with the process of formation of online collective action by studying the 
diffusion of the campaign’s hashtags (Yuce, Agarwal, Wigand, Lim, & Robinson, 2014). 
 
Work by Tønnessen (2016) and Guta and Karolak (2015) affirmed that digital media platforms 
have become alternative spaces for self-expression and building up online momentum towards the 
quest to abolish the discriminatory legal practice. This academic trend corresponds to a global trend in 
which many academics have presented digital technologies as revitalizing feminism, as well as reviving 
feminist critical thought and action through information dissemination, the initiation of discourses and 
solidarity building (Mclean & Maalsen, 2013; Munro, 2013). 
 
Nonetheless, although these studies—which belong to different strands of literature including 
political communication, sociology and computer-mediated communication—have made valuable 
contributions to further our understanding of the nexus between digital media and women's activism, 
the majority of this scholarship falls short in terms of its ahistorical approach. It neglects to emphasize 
the broader contexts in which feminist activism occurs, shifting attention away from the complexities 
inherent within the region (Alrasheed, 2013). Besides the lack of historical perspective and the removal 
of complexity, much of this work is characterized by a technological determinist stance on digital 
technologies and their implications for activism that can lead us to falsely perceive digital media as 
possessing qualities removed from social actors’ behavior. For example, some early analysis of the 
Arab uprisings overstated and obfuscated the role of social media in change by circulating overly 
techno-utopian, sensationalizing descriptions such as “Facebook and Twitter Revolution” (e.g. Howard, 
2011) for complex political and social dynamics.  
 
Meanwhile, other studies have taken a different route. They have focused on the sociolinguistic 
perspective or critical discourse analysis in terms of how discourse could be effectively deployed 
through digital media. Almahmoud (2015), Alotaibi (2017) and Sahly (2016) used framing theory to 
examine the different ways in which Twitter users have linguistically constructed the women driving 
issue. Almahmoud (2015) analyzed two Twitter-based datasets, one of which was generated by female 
activists and the other by male clerics. She examined the different intertextual references used by each 
cluster to frame the women’s driving issue and found that a vast majority of female activists opted to 
frame the driving ban in an international context that intersected and resonated with a wider 
international audience. In contrast, male clerics framed the issue as a conspiracy against Islam and the 





Alotaibi (2017) directed her analysis to the opponents of women’s driving and found that they 
used a narrative of moral panic over threats to the public order. Similar to Almahmoud (2015), her 
analysis revealed that women’s driving was presented as a threat to religious morality and traditional 
values. Sahly (2016) analyzed thousands of Twitter posts on the topic of women driving using 
linguistic inquiry to examine how Twitter was used to convey meaning, emotion and power. She 
concluded that feminist activists used the language of logic and reasoning more frequently than 
emotional language. Lastly, Altoaimy (2018) adopted a critical feminist perspective and a corpus-
assisted discourse analysis of the Twitter debates on the Saudi ban on women driving to unpack and 
identify the discourses used in tweets published. Through her analysis, she demonstrated the strategic 
usage of Twitter in debates and negotiations.  
 
As for Kuwait, an extensive review of the work previously done on the status of Kuwaiti 
women and the development of women’s movements revealed significant gaps that need to be filled. 
Although academic articles and chapters on women’s issues have appeared, full-length studies have 
been few and far between. I have observed that the vast majority of the work done is overly descriptive, 
focusing more on the dimension of women’s education, employment and professional achievements 
than the emergence of a collective women’s movement over the course of contemporary history.  
 
This assessment includes the work of Amal al-Sabah (1989), who conducted an analytical 
assessment of women’s educational attainment and participation in the workforce. Her work extended 
to discuss challenges to women’s participation and the perceived gender distinctions in employment. In 
the same vein, al-Zaben (1989) carried out a comparative study of the type of occupations that Kuwaiti 
women undertook during the pre-oil era and the changes that occurred after the discovery of oil. Jill 
Crystal (1992) painted a comprehensive picture of the history of Kuwaiti society in her book. In one 
section, she examined the gender division in Kuwaiti society wherein women occupy a position of 
“subordination,” in her words. She also discussed the perceptions of gender-ascribed roles in the 
workforce and the dissemination of the traditional idea that women’s natures make them unsuitable for 
specific jobs. Moreover, al-Sabah (2001), in “Kuwait Tradition: Creative Expressions of a Culture,” 
outlined the structural changes that occurred in Kuwait, the ascribed gender roles, as well as the 
predominant role of family structures as the basic social organization units. 
 
While I found these studies mostly directed their focus on examining the changes that occurred 
in Kuwaiti society and not on how those changes impacted the position of women in society per se, 
there were rare exceptions. The work of the Kuwaiti sociologist al-Mughni (1993) examined the 
pioneer women’s movements and the backlash they received from Islamists and tribal forces alike. Her 
work paid attention to intersectional issues of class, kinship and Islam. She also addressed the pitfalls 
of state-affiliated women’s organizations in Kuwait and their responsibility for “consolidating the 
patriarchal foundations of Kuwaiti society” (p. 138). 
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Similarly, Tétreault, Rizzo and Shultziner (2012) presented an original analysis in which they 
traced the formation of women’s organizations, their structural makeup and how the Arab nationalist 
ideology profoundly influenced them during the early 1970s. Mary Anne Tetreault (1995) also 
examined the women’s political movement in Kuwait before and after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the 
women’s heroic role during the resistance to occupation and the changes that occurred in women’s 
political status. Another thoughtful analysis of women’s movements was put forward by al-Sabah 
(2014). In his work, he identified the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the consequent 1991 war of 
liberation as critical to Kuwaiti women’s activists’ fight for enfranchisement. He also provided some 
explanations for the long delay in granting women their suffrage rights, which did not occur until 2005, 
by highlighting the often-overlooked, unlikely alliances made over the course of decades, such as 
between the ruling elites and Islamists or Islamists and reformists, all at the expense of women’s 
interests.  
 
In her book, al-Sadani (1983) discussed the Kuwaiti women’s suffrage movement and evaluated 
the repertoire of action it adopted in women’s resistance to tribal and Islamist opposition that objected 
to women’s political participation. Her research also analyzed the National Assembly debates on the 
petition for women’s political rights and the differing views of parliament members on this issue. Other 
studies in the literature have focused on the paradoxes and intertwining relationships between feminism 
and Islamic identities. For example, Gonzalez (2014) did extensive research using the lens of Islamic 
feminism to examine Islamist women’s strategies of empowerment in their quest for recognition. 
Kuwaiti women appear in her work as engaged and empowered agents who derive legitimacy from 
within the Islamic tradition. These observations put her book into conversation with other 
ethnographies of Islamic feminism, such as Saba Mahmood’s (2011), that redefined contemporary 
approaches to sociological ideas about the subjectivity of piety. Rizzo (2005) examined the effect of 
Islamic revivalism on women’s organizations and the struggle for women’s democratic rights in 
Kuwait, while adopting Islamic feminism as a framework of action. 
 
When it comes to the issue of gendered citizenship in the Kuwaiti context, few studies 
examined the discrimination against women nationals married to non-nationals. An exception, 
Alsharekh’s (2018) work highlighted the institutionalized norms of exclusion and the attempted to fight 
the social stigma and discriminatory practices that female nationals married to non-nationals have to 
confront. It also noted the attempts made by a few independent civil society organizations to advocate 
for equal citizenship rights, emphasizing that equal citizenship is a focal concern of Kuwaiti women 
and feminists alike. 
 
While a few articles tackled the topic of digital media, these articles lacked a gendered focus. 
Thus, it was unfortunate to witness the scant literature on the intersection between digital media use 
and women's movements. What I have managed to find was the work of Wheeler (2001)  on the early 




gender activism in Kuwait. She supported her claim by referring to how the internet was used to 
articulate discourses that protested a law imposing gender segregation in Kuwaiti universities. She also 
asserted that women were using the internet to empower themselves and negotiate the limits imposed in 
both the private and public spheres.  
 
Al-Roomi (2007) attempted to explore the realities of political activism reflected in Kuwaiti 
women’s blogging by examining the content of blog posts between April and September 2005—one 
month before women received their right to vote through five months after. He revealed that bloggers 
in Kuwait helped unleash a virtual campaign for election reform in April 2005, a campaign that spilled 
later onto the streets. Another study by al-Abdullah and colleagues (2015) examined Kuwaiti female 
students’ political discourse on Twitter. It concluded that, although Twitter seemed to ease the 
obstacles for women to take part in deliberative political discussions, there is no actual difference 
between face-to-face and Twitter for women participating in local political discourse. 
 
Lastly, Alsharekh (2016) stated that many campaigns and female NGOs found the online space 
to be more cost-effective and engaging to introduce new ideas to the public and recruit members. She 
gave examples of Kuwaiti groups such as Abolish 153, which deals with the abolition of honor killing 
laws or “Kuwaiti Women without Borders,” which calls for more inclusive citizenship rights for 
Kuwaiti women. These groups used digital media as a testing ground to gauge the levels of societal 
acceptability of a specific idea before venturing into actual action. Alsharekh hypothesized that digital 
media platforms can become valuable means of pushing forward feminist ideas and claims.  
 
Nevertheless, what I have observed from the existing literature that covers feminist activism in 
the Gulf is an unfortunate dearth of research tackling feminist activism and especially the digital aspect 
of it from a social movement perspective. I believe that the examination of the contemporary form of 
feminist activism can be further leveraged by the use of social movement lenses as a mode of inquiry, 
especially at this time in which we are witnessing an increase of the deployment of digital media 
platforms in activists’ campaigns, including those that are centrally organized or highly distributed over 
the internet.  
 
To begin this pursuit, as already mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, I will first reflect 
on the overall relationship between social movements and digital media as documented in the literature 
in general. I will then move to provide a comprehensive reading of the current studies in this field of 
digital communication, highlighting the significance of communication technologies for activism from 
the perspective of social movements, while also embedding empirical studies on the promises and 




2.2 The Nexus Between Digital Media and Social Movements: Disintegration and Fragmentation 
The proliferation of new digital media in recent years has transformed how political action is perceived, 
performed and planned by social movements (Diani, 2000; Van Laer & Van Aelst, 2010). Sometimes 
the very act of political action is being carried out by traditional social movement organizations 
leveraging on the functionalities of the new digital media, while other times new “digitally-based” 
social movements are stepping into the continuous field (Edwards, 2004). 
  
New questions that tackle the scale of digital involvement in social movements were raised 
when the internet was in its infancy. However, it was not until 2002, when web platforms such as 
Myspace gained widespread popularity that digital media began to take a form that resembles what we 
now know today as social networking platforms. Mattoni and Trere (2014) have indicated that early 
social movement studies gave varying attention to communication processes, but focused mainly on 
state manipulation and propaganda activity conducted by the authorities and elites (Gusfield, 1981). 
 
In the early strands of the political process theory, some social movements scholars touched 
upon the prominence of the communicative aspect when theorizing social movements. For instance, 
McAdam (1982, p. 47) emphasized the presence of a “communication network or infrastructure” to 
coordinate the patterns of diffusion of the movement itself. Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993) positioned 
media as central to their study of the relationship between movements and media as interacting 
systems, identifying three primary explanations of the importance of media to social movements: 
mobilization, validation and scope enlargement. Melucci (1996) asserted that the process of forming a 
collective identity was an act that required visibility and recognition amongst the social movements 
actors and the environment in which they operated. 
 
While both movement and media landscapes have changed dramatically in the last few decades, 
it is believed that the extensive use of digital media during critical junctures starting from the Arab 
Spring, the Occupy movement and other massive protests that subsequently erupted in many countries 
during 2011 constituted a new phase that reframed many discussions on social movements and the 
communication dynamics of dissent. It is perceived by many scholars that these forms of contemporary 
activism have prompted a highly interdisciplinary reflection on how increased communication 
possibilities entwine with the organizational and symbolic dimensions of social movements as well as 
on media practices as forms of resistance in their own right (della Porta & Pavan, 2018) 
 
In this vein, Kavada (2016) stated that digital media destabilized the long-held assumptions 
about social movements and their ability to effect change. Digital media now enable more 
decentralized, dispersed and individualized forms of political action that subvert the notion of the 
collective as singular, unified, homogeneous and coherent. Similarly, della Porta (2012) also contended 




affirmed that digital media usage enabled large-scale communications with newer possibilities of 
deliberation, mobilization and coordination between activists and their audience (Castells, 2012; 
Gerbaudo, 2012). 
 
Nonetheless, some academics contend that the research field of digital media and social 
movements does not constitute an integrated subfield yet (Fominaya & Gillan, 2017), as social 
movement studies have not paid sufficient attention to the nexus between digital media and 
communication practices. The latter has remained at the periphery “in comparison to the study of the 
organizational structure of collective efforts, frame formation, and movements’ action repertoires” 
(Mosca, 2014, p. 219). Murthy (2018) affirmed that—despite the existence of numerous studies rooted 
in resource mobilization theories, political process approaches and new social movement theories—the 
literature on social movements and digital media had not fully grasped how much social media have 
fundamentally changed the landscape of organizational communication. Cammaerts (2015) also argued 
that social media studies had little contributed to understanding the precise role of communication and 
communicative practices in the field of contentious politics, which is surprising due to the significance 
of communication in political mobilizations. 
 
Overall, traditional approaches to social movements appear to only pay partial attention to 
communication and media. Work rooted in resource mobilization theories, political process approaches 
and new social movement theories often evoke media, but never systematically address their role in 
mobilizations (Van de Donk, Loader, Nixon & Rucht, 2004). Others also question the utility of existing 
social movement theories in explaining digital age activism as these theories were mainly developed 
for offline protest action. Such theories might not adequately account for digital activism. Mattoni and 
Trere (2014) have drawn attention to the fact that the majority of empirically oriented studies that 
tackle digital communication suffer from two main biases—the one-medium bias and the 
technological-fascination bias. The one-medium bias refers to the tendency to analyze one medium or 
platform at a time without taking into consideration the overall array of media ecology, which can 
potentially lead to a partial view.  
 
Studies that fall under the one-medium bias paradigm tend to address questions relating to the 
ways a particular medium can contribute to mobilization or contestation or what limitations it might 
pose on social movement actors. At a micro-level, it is challenging to find a broader applicability in 
answers to such questions due to variances in both the media platform logic and the political contexts 
in which it is being deployed, which makes it challenging to develop an overall theoretical insight that 
might stretch to other cases (Treré, 2011). As a result of this type of bias, the literature remains 




Mattoni and Trere (2014) define the technological-fascination bias as the obsession with 
handling the latest technological platform when considering social movements. This tendency leads to 
the fixation on and preoccupation with the most recent technological medium, neglecting the relevance 
and the contribution that other mediums bring to social movements. The adoption of this view can lead 
scholars to neglect the complexity of digital media ecology when it comes to the use of technologies 
during political mobilizations and beyond. Moreover, this can also lead to circulating the same 
unproductive debates that either insist on the radical democratizing features of one medium or the 
reconfiguration of traditional power structures in the new arena. 
  
Thus, a look at the current state of the art in the field shows the fragmentation in digital media 
and social movement studies. In addressing this fragmentation, Mattoni (2017) stresses the need to 
combine different theoretical approaches in social movement studies in order to provide a more varied 
understanding of how social movement actors interact with digital technologies. The first step in 
addressing such disintegration could be to enable positive cross-field interdisciplinary development. 
We need to acknowledge that there is a promising chance in bridging these gaps, especially by 
combining insights from movement scholarship with those of political communication (Earl & Garrett, 
2017), media studies (Mattoni, 2017) and network-centric studies (Pavan, 2017). 
 
2.3 Relevant Literature: An Overview  
Many scholars have addressed, from different angles, how new digital media technologies are 
structurally changing the internal and external organizational dynamics of social movements (Van de 
Donk et al., 2004). According to Cammaerts (2015, p.2), a large body of the literature that tackles 
social movements in the age of digital media focused on how and to what degree social media 
platforms were related to the mobilization and organization of contentious action. He conceptualized 
five critical areas of focus for scholars in digital media, which will later serve as an inspiring entry 
point to my theoretical approach: (1) Types of usage and forms of communicative practices, (2) Roles 
and functions of social media, (3) Networks, ties and the relational dimension, (4) Online spaces as 
contentious fields and (5) Opportunities and structural constraints. 
  
Thus, the studies that fall under the first category tend to be concerned with identifying 
activists’ communication practices, which were presented by Mattoni (2017, p. 496) as both “routinized 
and creative arrays of activists’ interactions with media technologies” in which the communicative 
dimensions of social movements could be observed and explained from an empirical level. In 
connecting that area of focus to social movement research, scholars began to classify the types of use of 
social media by different categories of social movement actors or explore the multiplicity of 
communicative practices that were being deployed (Gillan, Pickerill & Webster, 2011). Some studies 
even differentiated between internet-based practices and internet-supported practices. The latter refers 




the former denotes the typology of practices that exist only because of the internet (Van Laer and Van 
Aelst, 2010, p. 1148).  
 
Other scholarly work draws a distinction between two broad fields of activists’ micro-level 
communicative practices (Mattoni, 2017)—activists’ interactions with the general public, whether 
through public discourse or potential exposure in mainstream media, and their internal communicative 
interactions amongst themselves. This thematic focus was adopted in several studies that examine 
feminist activism. For instance, Brimacombe and colleagues (2018) investigated the digitally-based 
practices of women's rights activists in Fiji in order to highlight how digital media was employed as a 
platform for information dissemination, participation and dialogue. Similarly, Radsch’s (2012) work on 
Arab women’s participation in social movements during the Arab Spring illuminated distinctive 
practices that women deployed for countering state-controlled media and to communicate with other 
activists, journalists and transnational rights groups. 
 
Aljuwaiser (2018) adopted a media-centric focus while exploring Saudi women’s online 
practices across various social networking platforms to challenge the existing patriarchal order, 
including the compulsory Hijab and gender segregation rules. More recent studies have also begun to 
examine advocacy organizations’ digital media practices. Bortree and Seltzer (2009) analyzed the 
dialogic practices of environmental advocacy groups via their social networking profiles; they 
concluded that the investigated organizations failed to capitalize on the opportunity to effectively 
utilize the full communicative potentials embedded in social networking platforms. The conclusion was 
also shared by Waters and Jamal’s (2011) study on public communication of non-profit organizations 
on Twitter, which concluded that such failure was related to the advocacy groups’ tendency to use one-
way models, despite the potential for dialogue and community building on the social networking site. 
 
The functions of digital media have also constituted a stand-alone thematic area of interest for 
scholars. Broadly speaking, focusing on the functionalities of digital media requires examining the 
affordances associated with the use of a specific type of social networking platform. These affordances 
could include the external functions that relate to mobilization, information dissemination and 
recruitment or inward-oriented roles that might cover planning, internal discussion and decision-
making among the members of the social movements (Cammaerts, 2015). 
 
Drawing on this insight, several studies have attempted to connect the functionalities of digital 
media with the resource mobilization theory of social movements, which purports that the success or 
failure of social movements depends on the resources that are available and actors’ efficacy in using 
them effectively (Jenkins, 1983). In this case, some embedded functionalities within digital media 
platforms were viewed from the lens of resource mobilization theory as available technological 
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resources for social movements (Tham, 2016). Empirical studies that adopted this angle have focused 
on the functionalities of digital media for cutting costs (García-Avilés, 2014) or reducing the time and 
efforts invested in resources that social movements actors cannot easily obtain, such as access to 
mainstream media channels, attaining favorable coverage or state funding. Along the same lines, 
Bimber, et al. (2005) indicated that new digital technologies made available to individuals 
communication methods that were previously used exclusively by formal organizations; they enabled 
social movements to take on specific functions of formal organizations, blurring the boundaries 
between traditional, hierarchical forms and flexible network structures. 
 
This approach was steadily adopted following the outpouring optimism about the role of digital 
media in the field of contention after the 2011 demonstrations that swept the Middle East and North 
Africa. Many scholars, therefore, have explored the utility of resource mobilization theory in 
explaining the digital aspect of social movements. For example, Eltantawy and Wiest (2011) asserted 
that digital media introduced a novel resource for Egyptian protesters during anti-Mubarak 
demonstrations and provided swiftness in rapid reach of information; strengthened ties among activists; 
and facilitated interaction among protesters and the rest of the world. The authors also contended that 
mobilization and organization became more efficient via digital media because of the low costs of 
building a large-scale communication infrastructure in comparison with managing the filters of the 
mainstream news media. 
 
The roles and functions of new technologies were also widely celebrated as heralding a turning 
point for feminism as a social movement, mainly because of technology’s perceived speed, 
horizontality and ability to facilitate productive debate. One researcher remarked that technology 
“contributed a new chapter to the history of both Arab feminism and the region” (Khamis, 2011, p. 
784). This assessment was further explored in various research directions about feminist activism in the 
MENA region. Khannous (2011) examined the ways in which women in Saudi Arabia and Morocco 
have leveraged Facebook as a medium for networking with other activists, forming different groups 
and fueling online discourses about controversial topics such as personal status law and women’s rights 
under Islam in the present globalized context. Zlitni and Touati (2012) asserted, while investigating 
women’s mobilization in Tunisia, that the embedded functionalities of platforms such as Facebook 
have enhanced public awareness and facilitated the formation of networks of individuals who 
mobilized and took part in various demonstrations. 
 
Skalli (2014) demonstrated how activists combined on-the-ground action with digital 
campaigns to mobilize against gender-based violence within the broader context of the Arab Spring. 
Finally, Stephan (2013) evaluated the role of the “Arab Women’s Solidarity Association United” 
(AWSA United)—a digitally-based, transnational, dispersed women’s advocacy group—in fostering 





Networks, ties and relational interconnections have also constituted a third thematic area of 
study. The relationships between actors within networks have been considered to be of crucial 
importance to social movements due to their perceived influence and impact on coordinating and 
sustaining social action. The direction of study is rooted in the area of relational sociology, which 
provides the basis for conceptualizing social networks as relational social structures interwoven with 
meaning. This framework followed Tilly’s (1978) adoption of the concept “catnets,” a portmanteau of 
“category” and “network,” to explain the density level of social movement actors (Diani, 2007). Thus, 
a focus on social networks entails a desire to make sense of the relational aspects of mobilization and 
organization.  
 
In this light, social networks have been generally understood as patterns of relations between 
actors made up of collective identities that are “constructed and negotiated by repeated activation of 
relationships that link individuals or groups” (Melucci, 1995, p. 44). Such networks could potentially 
promote mutual interaction and sometimes the development of strong ties. In adopting a network 
perspective, it is essential to ascertain the quality of the ties between various network nodes.  
 
The approach of thinking about social movements in social network terms has proven useful in 
empirical research about large-scale social phenomena, including feminist movements. It traces the set 
of social interconnections among the involved actors, assuming a varying degree of importance of 
relationships that emerge in the online space as a result of digital media use between the interacting 
nodes which could represent individuals, groups or organizations (Hansen, Shneiderman & Smith, 
2011). Consequently, as cited in della Porta and Pavan (2018), a large body of scholarship has surfaced 
that seeks to uncover how online networks contribute to the development of social movements. In 
connection with theories that present collective action as organized through networks (e.g., Diani, 
2015), serial activism among politically angered protesters in the Indignados, Occupy and Brazilian 
Vinegar protest (Bastos, Mercea & Charpentier, 2015), as well as the coordination of offline 
mobilizations (Hussain & Howard, 2013) can be viewed using this lens.  
 
Still, some critical reflections have been raised on the ways digital networks have been 
approached in the literature in connection to social movements. For Pavan (2014, p. 442), digital 
networks were frequently regarded as a product of external environmental conditions, thus as a space 
for action disconnected from offline mobilizations. For her, it was crucial to question the ontological 
separation between media and collective action networks that was assumed to exist between 
communication tools and social networks of collective action; such separation was hard to maintain in 
a context where digital communication mediums were effectively intervening in affecting the relational 




A great deal of empirical research has been conducted that attempts to integrate social 
networking principles and feminist activism, most notably the work of Crossley (2015). In her research 
on contemporary, US-based feminism—in which she draws from the literature on social networks, 
digital mobilization and women’s movements to examine the broader relationship between friendship 
networks and online and offline mobilization—she argued that both Facebook and feminist blogs 
successfully managed to foster feminist networks, expand recruitment potential for online and offline 
mobilization and increase opportunities for online interaction with challengers.  
 
Most recently, Pavan and Mainardi (2018) applied a multifaceted analytical framework of the 
concept of “integrative power” (Pavan, 2017) to investigate how online networks evolve as part of 
broader movement processes by tracing the networks that emerged on Twitter in relation to the Italian 
feminist network “Non Una Di Menonline.” They found that “not only [do] these networks matter as 
they enrich the relational milieu of contemporary mobilizations, but they also nurture collective action 
dynamics insofar as they enable the continuous circulation of ideas, inputs, and frames which are 
integrated and provide an overall shared symbolic universe under which collective action can be 
undertaken” (Pavan and Mainardi, 2018, p. 418).  
 
A network-centric approach was also adopted in few empirically based studies that tackled 
feminist activism in the MENA region. For instance, al-Bunni, Millard and Vass (2018) assessed the 
configuration of Arab feminism on Facebook to uncover the interconnections between Arabic feminist 
networks and other transnational feminist networks. Their analysis revealed that Arab women’s 
networks were grouped into two main clusters—some networks distanced themselves from associating 
with “secular” feminism pages, while others sought the opposite. Their work also supported the 
argument that Arab feminism was inclusive of both secular and religiously grounded feminist 
approaches to women’s issues. Yet, these approaches were characterized by a rigid separation between 
the groups that belong to each ideational framework.  
 
Alsahi (2018) used a network-centric approach to examine how Twitter could serve as an ad-
hoc abeyance structure in relation to the male guardianship system in Saudi Arabia. She concluded that 
certain influential accounts on Twitter could mimic specific bureaucratic organizing functions on 
Twitter and that abeyance could take the shape of ad-hoc, Twitter-based networks. 
 
The study of digital media as a field of contention puts the dynamics of digital protest 
mobilization under authoritarian rule and beyond under closer scrutiny. It is mostly concerned with 
how authoritarian rulers can successfully incorporate digital technologies into their repertoires of 
repression and legitimation. The prominent role played by digital media during the Arab revolutions 




how autocrats worldwide have learned to adapt to the challenges posed by digital media and 
appropriate it to their benefit (della Porta, 2013). 
 
Consequently, many studies on the usage of digital media in authoritarian settings have 
highlighted the severe consequences of internet controls, as well as the use of commercial surveillance 
software and the shaping of public opinion through disinformation (e.g., Rød & Weidmann, 2015). 
Lebert (2013) also reported that state surveillance is a central concern for activists in many countries 
for those spreading human rights-related information. In the case of Iran, it has been reported that 
Iranian activists are not only faced with internet filtering policies, but they are also more easily and 
quickly tracked down by the state when they communicate through social media (Baldino & Goold, 
2014). This kind of surveillance has given rise to new social movements specifically focused on 
defending an open internet and digital rights. 
 
In parallel, the inclination and capability of the state to engage in measures of internet control 
was also demonstrated in the MENA region. The Arab Spring uprisings are among the factors that 
seem to have pushed many authoritarian states to improve their counterinsurgency capabilities for 
monitoring and disrupting online communication. State responses have ranged from technical ones, 
designed to limit or shape access to the internet, to selective repression and overt intervention in online 
communication flows. The outcome has differed considerably between regimes. For example, while 
Tunisia and Egypt failed to act quickly and effectively to control digital networks, Libya and Bahrain 
succeeded (Howard & Hussain, 2013). 
 
There are not many studies, however, that cover the implications of digital repression on 
feminist activism, with the exception of Siapera and Ging (2018). Their research documented how 
online anti-feminist spaces were transformed by the technological affordances of new digital platforms. 
Other research has tackled aspects of online misogyny on popular social media platforms, including the 
work done Lin (2017). Lin examined how the internet fuels anti-feminist sentiment by examining the 
case study of “Men Going Their Own Way” (MGTOW), an anonymous, anti-feminist online group. 
Additionally, it is worth remembering that while networked technologies have the potential to reduce 
participation costs, they continue to pose barriers such as the uneven distribution of access, as well as 
state and market control of the networked infrastructures (Loader & Mercea, 2011). 
 
There have been some attempts to link research on the opportunities and constraints of 
networked technologies to social movement literature using the concepts of opportunity structure and 
repertoire of contentious action to examine the interplay between the structural constraints of 
networked technologies and strategies of agency  (Cammaerts, 2015). Such studies have been rooted in 
the concept of political opportunity structure, which rests on the premise that the capacity to mobilize 
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people depends on opportunities and constraints at an economic and political level beyond the control 
of social movements (e.g., Tarrow, 1994). There is little agreement about the signifiers, but advocates 
of political opportunity structure theory often incorporate measures of elite division, political pluralism, 
regime type and the state’s capability for repression (McAdam, 1996). 
 
The political opportunity structure approach claims that the concept of political opportunity is a 
key determinant of the emergence of a social movement; any change in the elements concerning elite 
division, alliance structures or regime type can influence the acceleration or deceleration of episodes of 
collective action (Wiktorowicz, 2004). Opportunity structures are therefore generally understood as 
“attributes of a social system that facilitate or constrain movement activity. They shape the 
environment in which activists operate, and activists must take them into account when crafting 
actions” (Garrett, 2006, p. 212).  
 
Many social movements scholars and especially feminist scholars found this approach useful in 
explaining the emergence of women’s movements under the authoritarian regimes in Latin America 
and beyond, analyzing the movements’ interactions and situatedness with the surrounding political 
parties and the state (e.g., Valiente, 2015; Waylen, 1993). Some expansions on the concept of political 
structures were later introduced. Koopmans and Statham (1999) developed the notion of discursive 
opportunity structure to link political opportunity structure and framing perspectives on collective 
action that facilitated the reception of specific movement frames and could thereby affect mobilization. 
 
Because media and communication are relevant to the symbolic and discursive realms in which 
social movements operate, several scholars have started to tie the discursive opportunity structure 
(DOS) theory to the discursive opportunities provided by digital media that can determine the level of 
success or failure of social movements (e.g., Cammaerts, 2012). Digital media has been thought to 
increase the capacity to transmit text and visual discourses and potentially provide new opportunities 
for marginalized individuals to bypass state controls and challenge the existing political hierarchies’ 
monopolies on powerful communications media to construct alternative discourse (McCammon, 2013). 
 
Several studies have made efforts to tie the discursive opportunity structure back to the actions 
of digital media and social movements, adopting discursive approaches to feminist activism and digital 
media; tackling the digital media campaigns around issues concerning abortion, harassment and 
misogyny or quantifying the influence of Twitter in terms of digital connectivity and discourse 
creation. These efforts include research by Shaw (2012), who argued that digital discourse can 
represent a new mode of activism capable of triggering sociopolitical change with or without the help 
of collective action offline. Skalli (2006) found that new digital media allowed women in the MENA 
region “to impact and redefine the public sphere despite the often-institutionalized norms of exclusion 




alternative discursive spaces where it is possible to redefine and challenge the existing patriarchal 
gender relations (p. 36).  
 
Landorf’s (2014) research on female reverberations online in Egypt and Tunisia concluded that 
discursive activism online managed to engender new networks of connectivity during the revolution, 
targeted traditional media and was used to organize physical protests, illustrating the expansion of 
physical space into the digital realm. Upon reflection, it appears that attempts to focus on the discursive 
dimension of opportunity structures have made some substantial contributions to the study of social 
movements. They have reversed the assumptions that structures are beyond the control of movement 
actors and made it possible to view them as more dynamic, co-shaped by movements, activists and 
other actors who are engaging in a dialectical fashion with structure and agency (Cammaerts, 2015). 
 
2.4 The Possibility of an Integrated Relational Approach 
As seen from the wide range of different interdisciplinary enquires on the intersection between social 
movements and digital communication technologies, the research strands on the practices of digital 
activism are either dominated by a strong focus on the digital, emphasizing a universal way of using 
certain mediums, or prioritize the very act of activism but lose sight of the specificities of the 
affordances of media technologies (Kaun and Uldam, 2018). 
  
Put briefly, while most researchers are critical of the technological determinism thesis, there is a 
continuum within the field that privileges the role of technologies and perceives them as the driving 
forces of movements (e.g. Benkler, 2006; Bennett & Segerberg, 2012). There is a tendency to 
overestimate the role of the media as agents of change while dismissing the other non-media factors. 
This approach poses a risk of “automatically center-staging media logics and technologies” (Deacon & 
Stanyer, 2014, p. 1033) that might overshadow more complex elements.  
 
On the other side of the spectrum, scholars who focus on social actors and the ways that they 
deploy these technologies can end up privileging the technological practices over digital affordances 
(e.g., Fominaya & Gillan, 2017). While both tendencies have substantial merits, they risk failing to 
adequately address the significance of the intersection between digital media and activism. To address 
this tension, many researchers have emphasized the necessity of combining interdisciplinary insights 
from social movement studies in order to construct a more meaningful understanding of how social 
movement actors approach digital technologies (Mattoni, 2017), bringing diverse perspectives and 




 Accordingly, I follow Kaun and Uldam’s (2018) proposal in examining the very act of activism 
and digital feminist activism by extension in a manner that traverses digital media technologies and 
activist practices, striking a long-anticipated balance between context and media-specificity. I believe 
that it is crucial to explore feminist activism as my case indicated as a deeply situated act that 
materializes within and in response to a specific societal context and does not exist independently from 
the existing larger social and political structures (Terre, 2011).  
 
I also agree with Pavan (2014), who believes that it is essential to acknowledge that digital 
activism is not solely a set of technical practices that are detached from material reality; it is an act that 
is shaped by the cross-dimensional back-and-forth exchanges that take place among individuals, 
groups, organizations and digital platforms. Consequently, I adopt an integrated relational approach to 
the study of digital feminist activism in relation to my case studies. My theoretical modeling efforts are 
mainly concentrated on integrating the major dimensions of literature that were identified by 
Cammaerts (2015), which tackle the nexus between digital media and social movements—the 
opportunities and structural constraints, the relational dimension of networks and ties and finally 
actors’ perceptions. 
 
By placing these three interrelated dimensions—discursive opportunities structures, networks 
and actors’ agencies—at the core of my theoretical framework, I seek to privilege a relational approach 
to the study of feminist activism. So, by first concentrating on the agency of feminist actors, I devote 
attention to the embodied, material and socially situated aspects of carrying out feminist activism. As 
alternatively, the deployment of purely technological-centric approach might instead lead us to a 
skewed reading of the phenomenon at hand and render the actors’ agency invisible. 
 
By focusing on the discursive opportunity dimension, I explore the deployment of feminist 
discourses in these socio-material spaces. Finally, by including networks, I seek to draw inferences 
from the relational milieu that governs the deployment of digitally mediated practices, taking account 
of the content that networks produce through the rapid circulation of user-generated content over these 
networks of exchange. By adopting this approach, I aim to get a better understanding of the 
situatedness of digital feminist activism in advancing feminist claims and reflect on how digital media 
technologies are connected to the contemporary forms of feminist activism in the Arab Gulf States. 
 
2.4.1 First Dimension: Actors’ Agency  
It is crucial to broaden the interdisciplinary nature of digital communication studies to examine the 
activists’ situated perceptions. Doing so will allow us to comprehend better the meanings that actors 




However, the majority of the studies that are carried out in relation to feminist digital activism 
examine one aspect of activists’ communicative social media tactics, either by analyzing a specific 
social media platform (replicating the one-medium bias), the interaction between mainstream media 
and activists or activists’ mobilization and self-mediation. These focus areas are significant, but they 
risk missing the relevance of other aspects. By solely relying on the analysis of existing social media 
data or individual media platforms, one can fail to observe insights about activists' motivations and 
tactics leading up to the visible representation of actions, which could potentially be better understood 
through qualitative inquiries. 
  
Alternatively, by deploying my integrated relational approach, I maintain a focus on the lived, 
material and socially situated aspects of carrying feminist activism. Digital media do not exist 
independently of the situated practices of feminist activists, but the two interact and shape each other 
(Fotopoulou, 2017). The applicability of this theoretical direction stems from the conviction that 
neither technologically centric approaches nor a constructivist view of human agency is alone adequate 
to explain feminist activism (Leonardi & Barley, 2008). 
 
At the center of the actors’ agency dimension is the social actor—which may represent activists, 
bloggers, institutional women’s rights activists affiliated with established women’s organizations, or 
others—who are actively involved in the campaigns that I am examining. The approach highlights the 
agency of social movement actors in relation to media technologies (Mattoni, 2017). More specifically, 
I give attention to activists’ subjectivities as I attempt to uncover their experiences in carrying out 
feminist action to reveal the complex and multifaceted ways that they deploy the resources available to 
them to participate in feminist action. I will also examine the nature of their relationship to feminism 
that materializes over a contested digital media space. 
 
This attention is conceptually crucial for realizing a more nuanced understanding of feminist 
activism and avoiding the mystification of the role of digital media in women’s struggles. It also 
restores women’s voices and portrays them as active agents beyond the reductionist accounts that view 
them as passive subjects. This actors’ agency dimension, therefore, repositions feminist activists, their 
acts and their subjectivities from the margin to the center in my analysis, highlighting the dialectical 
relations between technologies and actors that are often missing from social movement theories on 
activism.  
 
2.4.2 Second Dimension: Looking at the Discourses 
This dimension will cover the dialectic relationship between the strategies of visibility and discursive 
practices enacted by feminist activists and organizations in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. It will also 
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evaluate how actors utilize digital media to create counter-hegemonic discourses, increase the public 
claims-making process and initiate movement messages that are directed towards the public sphere. 
 
This dimension will, therefore, draw insights from the discursive opportunity structures theory. 
In that respect, many theoretical and empirical studies have recently emerged about digital media 
offering activists opportunities not possible through mainstream media. After all, receiving mainstream 
media coverage is not an easy task for activists who are located outside the realm of institutional 
politics, not to mention the severe competition for attention from a variety of alternative sources 
(Pfetsch & Adam, 2011). Breindl (2010), who draws on the literature about information technologies 
for activism, explained that the elimination of intermediaries in online spaces also gives activists and 
groups unlimited editorial control in explaining, informing and developing their narratives. 
 
To this end, Koopmans and Statham (1999) proposed the concept of “discursive opportunities 
structures” (DOS), which is derived from two notions in social movement studies—political 
opportunity structure and framing—in order to incorporate meaning into structural approaches and 
differentiate political from cultural opportunities. The concept also devotes special attention to the 
opportunities and constraints that become publicly visible and can thereby affect mobilization.  
 
Discursive opportunity structures, therefore, refer to the aspects of the public discourse that 
determine a message's chances of diffusion in the public sphere (Koopmans & Olzak, 2004). They 
denote a space where different alternative interpretations about important issues are proposed and 
articulated by competing actors (Koopmans and Olzak, 2004). Simply put, DOS theories seek to 
account for changes in the conversation about the concerned issues because “opportunity” denotes the 
varying chances for an issue to be addressed (della Porta & Diani, 2006). 
 
Traditionally, significant attention has been paid to the role of mass media, which has been 
located at the very core of this overall DOS. Scholars indeed viewed mass media as a master arena for 
the development of public discourses (Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards & Rucht, 2002),  as well as for the 
crystallization of specific interpretative frameworks constituting the public opinion on relevant issues 
(Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). Mass media has therefore been seen as relevant to social movements' 
success first of all in light of their capability of shaping a more or less receptive environment for 
movements and their claims. It was not surprising to observe social movement actors as keen on 
obtaining visibility and support through mass media. 
 
However, the process of getting media attention has proven difficult for multiple reasons that 
can range from the state’s control over mass media to the severe competition and limited carrying 
capacity of the mass media outlets. As a result, only a few attempts to enter the public sphere will be 




mobilization and communication fails to pass through the filter of the mass media to reach to their 
target audience (Koopmans & Zimmermann, 2003). 
 
Mattoni (2017) has elaborated on the subaltern position of activists with regard to mainstream 
media who have no voice in the bourgeois public sphere. She notes that some turn to new digital media 
technologies to be in charge of their own mediated representation. Similarly, Costanza Chock (2012) 
contended digital media now give a chance for interested actors to directly mobilize people, obtain 
public visibility and initiate political claims, without needing to pass through the traditional mass media 
filters. Following these lines of inquiry, I am interested in capturing the role of digital media platforms 
in increasing the visibility of feminist discourse and the public claims-making process by employing 
discursive opportunities structure theories inspired by the theoretical model put forward by Koopmans 
and Statham (2002) and Koopmans and Zimmermann (2003). I expect that incorporating discursive 
opportunity structures theories (DOS) is essential to account for the role of digital media in feminist 
contention and digital media platforms provide somewhat better opportunities for feminist actors to 
carry out feminist action than is possible through the available institutional means or traditional mass 
media. 
 
2.4.3 Third Dimension: Networks, Ties, and Content 
Social movements are distinctive because they consist of independent social actors who are embedded 
in specific settings, exhibit distinct orientations and seek to achieve common objectives, but who are at 
the same time connected through some means of concrete cooperation and/or mutual recognition in a 
bond. This observation aligns with Diani’s (1992) definition of social movement as “networks of 
informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in a 
political or cultural conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity” (p. 13). It also serves as an 
entry point to the third strand of literature that I have turned to, which is based on network theory. 
Network theory generally examines the micro-level connections between involved actors and theorizes 
about how groups and individuals interact with each other (Borgatti & Halgin, 2011). 
 
The basic premise of network theories indicates that through constant interaction processes, the 
boundaries bounding the actors become consistently reconfigured and actors’ togetherness becomes 
built on conversation and connectedness. Thus, for the network to survive, it must persistently initiate 
discourse and share information. Networked studies became widely relevant after recent studies on 
digital media and collective action emphasized the rise of issue-based, distributed networks on the 
expanse of traditional social movements organizations (Bennett and Segerberg, 2013). Such studies 
highlighted the rise of "connective action," an internet-based version of collective action, in which 




These studies indicate that as digital and social media become increasingly prominent, they too 
become networking agents (Latour, 2005) within the movement spaces. Social network structures are 
therefore formed when connections in the shape of links, ties or edges are created in the process of 
sharing texts, images, hashtags and videos among social actors who are represented by nodes or 
vertices. This reality is manifested on Twitter for instance, where the social network is composed of 
users and the connections they form with other users by the tweeting, mentioning and replying to 
relations  (Hansen, Shneiderman and Smith, 2011). 
 
Perceiving movements from a networked perspective can provide us with an entrée into social 
movements through providing a way to look at individuals as well as organizations and the way they 
interrelate within a given field. It can also allow us to capture networks’ essences as cognate forms 
capable of conducting action and reveal interesting insights about the actors’ social position and the 
movement’s overall composition and ecology. This perspective may, among other things, point to the 
larger network of relations involved in a particular event, even if it does not tell the whole story 
(Huberman, Romero & Wu, 2009). 
 
 So, in terms of the overall contribution of networked approaches to the field of social 
movements, research on social media from a social network perspective shifts the focus from 
individual traits to relational ties between social entities. The application of a network perspective 
could generate important insights on the process whereby events become a movement through meaning 
attribution and recognition of commonalities (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 2001). Additionally, 
examining networks can provide us with clues to assess the social location of specific actors and 
identify the general structural patterns from a relational perspective. For instance, exploring how the 
"Women to Drive" campaign unfolded on Twitter can be useful for identifying the core actors who 
were involved and the content that these relevant accounts produced. Thus, both social actors and 
discursive content have an active presence in social networks that can provide us with some insights 
into the organizational dynamics and information sources that were manifested there. 
 
Taking this into consideration, I seek to shed some light on the role of Twitter in aiding feminist 
activism concerning my case studies. I am interested in making sense of the embeddedness of the most 
active Twitter users in the relational context of the campaigns and the content disseminated by the 
Twitter accounts that claim to be representative of the movement. Overall, I hope that this relational 
approach will allow us to rethink the ontological separation between structures, networks and actors in 
the field of movements and digital activism that has so far characterized research in this domain. I hope 
it will also account for the multiplicity of dimensions underpinning feminist activism and the hybrid 





2. 5 Research Questions 
Given this backdrop, a set of challenging research questions underlying the separate case studies stands 
at the center of the Ph.D. dissertation. Just as feminist activism varies in its form, mode of organization 
and conduct, feminist activists also make use of a variety of resources and heterogeneous practices to 
spread out their claims. 
 
 In analyzing feminist activism and especially the digital component of it, I pay special attention 
to the different dimensions that constitute feminist activism (actors’ agency, discourses and networks) 
and the different platforms that activist and feminist organizations use  (traditional media, Facebook, 
Twitter) as well as highlight their deployment. Attempting to answer the following questions will also 
give us a clue of whether digital media platforms provide somewhat better opportunities for feminist 
actors to carry out feminist action than what is possible through the available institutional means or 
traditional mass media. 
 
1) What are activists’ perceptions and experiences while carrying out feminist activism? 
This question, which corresponds to actors’ agency dimension in my theoretical framework, 
will generally cover the overall engagements of Saudi and Kuwaiti feminist activists both offline and 
online, most notably during the campaigns that I have identified in my case selection section. Thus, by 
adopting an activist-centric approach, here I examine women’s perceptions concerning the multifaceted 
ways in which they view the overall trajectory of the feminist movement in each case, as well as the 
multifaceted ways that they are using the resources available to them to participate in feminist activism. 
Moreover, I move further to uncover their experiences in carrying out feminist action to better 
understand their sense-making of feminist activism as an agentic practice, as well as the nature of their 
relationship to feminism that materializes over a contested digital media spaces.  
 
2) How do we capture the salience of the claims made by activists and the publicly visible side of 
their involvement in the mediated public sphere? 
The main aim of this question, which tackles the discursive opportunities dimension of my 
theoretical approach, is to examine the visibility of two of the main issues that are advocated by the 
feminist campaigns that I have included in the case selection (the driving ban and gendered citizenship 
laws) in the Saudi and Kuwaiti mediated public sphere. This assessment will be conducted in relation 
to the media converage of these two contentious issues at different points of time (prior to and during 
the mobilization that took place) to possibly get a sense about the contribution of these campaigns on 




Hence, I devote my attention to the salience of the claims made in mainstream media and 
explore the position of different actors who are involved, the discursive repertoires they deployed and 
the framing process. This evaluation will be made possible by carrying out systematic political claims 
analysis on a set of national newspapers in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and examining media attention 
towards the claims made by the campaigns before and after the mobilization. Doing so will allow me to 
analyze the publicly visible side of activists’ feminist involvement and communication as advocated by 
Koopmans and Statham (1999) and the possibility of the diffusion of feminist claims into mass media. 
 
3) How did activists and feminist organizations deploy Facebook during the feminist campaigns?   
This question will tackle the adoption of Facebook by both women’s organizations and 
activists, in which I will shed some light on the multipurpose use of Facebook and feminist discourses 
are articulated in these techno-social spaces. Hence, in Chapter 6, I elaborate on how Facebook was 
deployed as a platform for claims-making, mobilization and feminist expression in the complex and 
multifaceted context of the campaigns, as well as the arrays of meanings and feminist references that 
emerged and manifested themselves on that platform. 
 
4) Who are the main actors involved in networked action on Twitter and what is the content that 
is being produced and disseminated in these networks? 
Answering this last research question will be made possible by adopting a network-centric 
perspective to shed some light on the deployment of Twitter by feminist activists and organizations in 
both campaigns. Accordingly, I will be mainly concerned with illuminating the deployment of Twitter 
in aiding feminist activism and making sense of the embeddedness of the most active Twitter users. I 
will also analyze the content generated and circulated by the Twitter accounts that claim to be 




Chapter 3: Historical Contextualization  
 
Scholars who work on topics that are related to activism tend to forget that the contemporary forms of 
activism are a result of multiple intersecting factors that are shaped by a set of contextual and historical 
conditions. This chapter, therefore, seeks to provide a comprehensive overview of the historical and 
temporal contexts that shaped women’s movements and feminist activism as well as the gendered 
politics of both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.  
  
I depart from the assumption that an adequately historicized and politicized understanding of 
the configuration of women’s movements requires a detailed examination of the long-term historical 
processes and the embeddedness of the gendered subjects in the complex geopolitical field. 
Considering this aim, after the initial presentation of the processes of state formation that took place in 
Saudi Arabia, I focus my efforts on outlining the contours of the politico-religious alliance on which 
Saudi Arabia is based, dating back to the eighteenth-century pact between the al-Saud and the 
theologian religious reformer Muḥammad Abd al-Wahab  (d. 1792). This alliance has formed the 
ideological backbone of the kingdom up to the present. 
  
I later highlight the transformations that occurred with the discovery of oil and the 
accompanying changes in state-society relations. Then I tackle the effects of urbanization on the 
creation of social tensions between the actors who advocated for modernity and those who wished to 
retain the conservative religious norms. A detailed summary of the changing dynamics that occurred in 
the transformative year of 1979 will later follow, in which I historically sketch the changes that took 
place in Saudi Arabia in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution and the siege of the Grand Mosque of 
Mecca. Then I move to shed some light on the emergence of the Islamist revival movement (al- Sahwa) 
and the shifting alliances that were forged and re-forged in relation to it. 
  
Whereas the 1970s laid the foundation for Saudi opposition, the 1990s turned out to be a decade 
of consolidation due to the Gulf War in 1990. Here, I focus on how the Gulf War was indeed a catalyst 
for radical Islamic anger and politicization due to the Saudi’s alliance with the United States and 
international forces. Then I move to the twenty-first century and the changes that it has brought on the 
political front in the wake of the September, 11 2001 attacks on the United States. After these attacks, 
Saudi Arabia faced mounting political pressure to examine its relationship with the Wahhabi movement 
and introduce a series of reformist measures that opened the political opportunity structure for limited 
reforms that targeted women as direct gendered subjects. 
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And lastly, I present a compact overview of the challenges that were posed by the Arab 
uprisings in 2011 and the obstacles that came with the rule of King Salman in 2015 after the death of 
King Abdullah—from leadership shuffles and sinking oil prices, to regional and international upheaval 
such as the military intervention in Yemen, ending with the rise of his son Crown Prince Muhammad 
Bin Salman to the domestic and international scene. I dedicate the second section to untangling the 
complexities of gendered politics in Saudi Arabia that are conditioned by the political-religious pact 
between the monarchy and the religious establishment. Hence, I view the historical period with a 
gendered lens because Saudi women have been significant to the country’s ideology since its founding 
days. 
  
 Still, up until the 1980s, women remained mostly invisible to the state, depicted as strictly 
pious, religious subjects. This characterization has changed following the attacks of September 11, 
2001 in the United States as well as domestic terrorism in Saudi Arabia; both set off structural changes 
with important implications for Saudi women. Saudi women became the objects of state policy, but this 
time as new faces of modernity. In the final section, I trace the development of the organic Saudi 
feminist movement from its early stages. I begin with the ascendance of Islamist feminists to the Saudi 
public sphere in the 1980s-90s, move to the Gulf War driving campaign in the 1990s, the scattered 
feminist efforts during the early 2000s and then end with the current digital feminist activism that takes 
places in online spaces. 
  
A similar historical overview will be carried in the context of Kuwait. Overall, the historical 
trajectory of Kuwait can be divided into three major periods: (1) the pre-oil era, which began in the 
early eighteenth century and continued to 1960, (2) independent Kuwait from the 1960s to the Iraqi 
invasion on August 2, 1990 and (3) post-liberation Kuwait. I begin by highlighting the rise of al-Sabah 
as a dynastic family of Kuwait and the support that it enjoyed from the merchant families. I will then 
discuss the impact of the discovery of oil on the dynamics of the relationship between al-Sabah and the 
merchant families, followed by the merchant class’s attempts to curtail the power of the al-Sabah 
family and establish a participatory political process where power is shared between them.  
  
The historical overview will show the resistance of al-Sabah to such attempts and their 
willingness to fight to prevent such an eventuality. The discussion of the oil revenue will also extend to 
mention its impact on changing the structure of the Kuwaiti economy. The resulting massive influx of 
Arab and foreign migrants, made the issue of identity and citizenship central and detrimental in the 
maintenance of al-Sabah rule. Later, I contextualize the independence of Kuwait from British 
protectorate status in 1961 and the promulgation of the constitution, as well as the relatively stable 
political environment that was enjoyed inside Kuwait during the era of Arab Nationalism. Then I focus 
on tracing the emergence of the Islamist movement at the end of the 1970s, which became more 




I consider the Iraqi-Kuwaiti crisis as a major turning event that changed the landscape of 
Kuwait’s political life. Then I outline the dominance of Islamists inside the Kuwaiti National Assembly 
and the gendered conflicts that emerged, such as the denial of women’s political rights. I conclude this 
historical trajectory by mentioning the Kuwaiti government’s efforts to re-evaluate its alliance with the 
Islamists. I dedicate the following section to illuminating the different stages of the Kuwait feminist 
movements. Therefore, I begin here by delineating the history of women’s movements from the 1960s.  
Women’s activism has been mostly channeled to create institutionalized forms of women’s 
organizations and associations that address women’s issues from differing, sometimes opposing, 
perspectives. 
  
Closer attention to women’s shifting rules during the late 1970s and early 1980s will follow. 
Similar to the same period in Saudi Arabia, this era marked a change in the status of women in Kuwait 
during the resurgence of political Islam. Prior to that resurgence, women had enjoyed relative freedom, 
so activists moved to tackle the rise of Islamic feminism in Kuwait. Afterward, I offer insights on 
women’s contributions during the Gulf Crisis of 1990–1991, but then show how progress halted, 
followed by a decline in women’s status. I speak about the cross-alliance between secular and Islamist 
women to push for the right to vote after the turn of the millennium. I end by mentioning that there are 
potentials for further collaboration as women are still on their way to achieve further full citizenship 
rights. After relating the national political topography and differing historical and political contexts for 
both cases, I conclude the chapter by elaborating on my case studies in greater detail. I hope that the 
two case studies will contribute to assessing the roots of the present-day continuous politics of gender 
and revealing the specific historical as well as current conditions that shape the current forms of 
women’s and feminist activism.   
 
3.1: An Insight to Saudi Arabia's Modern Political History 
The process of state formation in Saudi Arabia started in the central region of the Arabian Peninsula in 
1744. It went through multiple phases, ending in the establishment of the modern Saudi State under the 
rule of King Abdul Aziz Al-Saud, who united the four disparate regions of the Hejaz, Najd, Hasa and 
Southern Arabia (Asir) in 1932 (al-Rasheed, 2010). The success in forming the Saudi state owes much 
to the historical alliance between the al-Saud clan and a body of religious scholars (Ulama) who 
promoted the teachings of the puritanical, 18th-century reformer Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab al-
Wahhab’s contribution has shaped the type of Islam adopted in Saudi Arabia today (Vassiliev, 2013). 
 
 This alliance succeeded in providing the ideological and political support needed to form the 
Saudi state as it legitimized the regime’s political interests and protected it from the organized political 
opposition. This deal was in return for implementing Abd al-Wahhab’s strict orthodox teachings as the 
religious basis of the Saudi Arabian dynastic rule  (al-Rasheed, 2010). So, with political support, the 
religious establishment gained control over the legal and education systems, helping to expand its 
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vision and practices among rising Saudi generations. It aimed to solidify religious conservatism and 
reinforce the Islamic identity of Saudis. All such practices have helped to uphold the Saudi state as a 
Muslim nation that represents that true Islamic faith. 
  
The discovery and production of oil was a major event in the country as it freed the government 
from the political constraints that naturally come with taxation and set the stage for another major shift 
in state-society relations. More specifically, the economic upheaval arising from the increased income 
from oil led to explosive economic and material developments and gave rise to a trend towards 
education abroad and a change in lifestyle (Yamani, 1996). The religious establishment objected to the 
country’s rapid urbanization and openness to the West, as they perceived both as threats to the 
Kingdom’s commitment to applying Sharia. 
  
These rapid changes also created social tensions between those who advocated for modernity 
and those who intended to retain the conservative religious norms within their communities. This 
tension was first manifested with the opening of the Kingdom’s first television station in September 
1965, which prompted a group of radical Islamists to attack the broadcasting studio in Riyadh. Along 
the same lines, the introduction of girls’ education in a conservative city in Saudi Arabia (Buraidah) set 
the stage for violent protests that came to an end only after the National Guard intervened to protect the 
school (Lawson, 2017). 1979 brought two critical junctures that shaped the nature and the scope of the 
Saudi opposition. First, the overthrow of the Shah of Iran by Ayatollah Khomeini resulted in a Shia 
Islamic Revolution in neighboring Iran. Later that year, the siege of the Grand Mosque of Mecca for 
two weeks by religiously motivated groups critical of the government’s openness to the West and 
tolerance of laxity in public religious practice challenged the legitimacy of al-Saud (al-Munajjed, 
1997). 
  
Afraid of suffering the same fate as the Iranian monarchy and to take the wind out of the 
radicals’ sails, the al-Saud empowered the religious establishment, granting them significant 
concessions in social and religious matters. They promised further financial incentives as a 
precautionary measure to protect themselves from future opposition. As a consequence, the aftermath 
of the 1979 rebellion saw a greater public display of religiosity by the state and embrace of political 
Islam to appeal to the growing Islamist sentiment Also as a response, the authorities increased mosque 
construction, reinforced the Islamic content of the schools’ curricula and empowered the religious 
police officers to crack down on women who violated the dress code (Prokop, 2003). 
 
According to Lacroix (2011), these events provoked the Islamists to start the Islamic 
Awakening revival movement (Sahwa). The movement was developed primarily on university 
campuses after the arrival of large numbers of members of the Muslim Brotherhood (many of whom 




Syria. Henceforth, the religious tenets of Wahhabism were blended with the political discourse of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, giving birth to a social movement that soon gained momentum among Saudi 
youth. It advocated rejection of Westernization and a return to a puritan way of Islam. 
  
The new era was marked by strict social measures. These groups successfully lobbied for more 
religious education in schools and universities as well as restrictions and censorship practices in media 
to conform to religious and social values. New laws barred women from appearing on the Saudi official 
television (al-Fassi, 2016), banned music in any media and marginalized Shiites and other religious 
minorities. From there, the 1980s witnessed increased institutionalization and enforcement of the 
religious establishment and its practices, which have persisted over the years. With the help of oil 
revenues, these practices were expanded in “individual behavior, in government policies, in official and 
unofficial relations with foreigners” (Pompea, 2002, p. 65). In 1986, the king adopted a new title, the 
Custodian of the Two Holy Places and no longer referred to himself just as a king (Lawson, 2011). 
 
This period also witnessed the opening of Islamic universities in major cities in the Kingdom; 
by the late 1980s, these schools accepted more than 15 percent of the country’s university students and 
by 1986, more than 16,000 of the Kingdom’s 100,000 students were enrolled in Islamic studies. By the 
early 1990s, one-quarter of all university students were studying in religious institutions. Whereas the 
1970s laid the foundation for Saudi opposition, the 1990s turned out to be a decade of consolidation 
due to the Gulf War in 1990. Widespread public anger increased over the alliance with the United 
States and the deployment of 500,000 American troops on Saudi soil to coordinate the liberation of 
Kuwait in 1991 (Peterson, 1993). 
  
The opposition perceived the Saudi regime as incompetent and unable to deal with outside 
threats. Sermons and speeches that criticized the al-Saud for relying on the Americans to defend the 
holiest places of Islam circulated widely on audiocassettes and videotapes. In November 1990, 43 
prominent figures in the Islamic Awakening movement signed a petition to the ruler requesting the 
immediate implementation of political and social reforms. The petition coincided with a public protest 
by elite women in Riyadh against the longstanding custom of not permitting females to drive 
automobiles, along with a small rally in Jeddah that called for an end to al-Saud rule (Lawson, 2017). 
The Iraqi-Kuwaiti War served as a catalyst for radical outrage and politicization. Islamist figures 
became more organized than ever before and their demands became bolder and more far-reaching. The 
Sahwa, led by Safar al-Hawali and Salman al-Awda, became the icons of a strong protest movement 
against the royal family. 
 
 They formulated and presented formal political demands to the Saudi government, most 
famously through petitions known as the “Letter of Demands” in 1991—signed by hundreds of 
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prominent religious scholars, judges and intellectuals—and the “Memorandum of Advice” in 1992 
(Lacroix, 2011). The petitions carried an Islamist flavor, but encompassed many demands with which 
liberal critics of the regime could identify with (Meijer & Aarts, 2012). For example, they called for an 
end to corruption and nepotism, the appointment of a consultative council and more freedom of 
expression. 
  
Contrary to the established norm in the Kingdom, that all criticism of the monarchy should 
remain private, the letters were made public. As a result, many of the signatories of the letter were 
questioned while others landed in jail, including the famous sheiks Salman al-Awda, Safar al-Hawali 
and Nasir al-Umar (Lacroix, 2004). The major political and religious challenges of the 1990s led to 
significant upheavals and forced the leadership to introduce a series of limited political reforms such as 
the 1992 Basic Law of Government, which for the most part confirmed the ruler’s right to carry out a 
broad range of duties; the Law of the Consultative Council, whereby the ruler would appoint 
representatives to advise him concerning domestic affairs and the Law of the Provinces, which 
provided for a network of appointed provincial councils (Lawson, 2017). 
  
Many political prisoners were released in 1999, together with hundreds of supporters and 
sympathizers with the Islamists. Other Islamists fled to Afghanistan, where Osama Bin Laden had 
established training camps, or took refuge in London, where they continued their media campaign 
against the Saudi government. The twenty-first century has brought many changes across the country. 
In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, Saudi Arabia faced mounting 
political pressure from the Bush administration to reevaluate its relationship with the Wahhabi 
movement and introduce a series of reformist measures because 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudis (al-
Rasheed, 2013). 
  
These events set off structural changes with significant implications. A mix of repression and 
internal restructuring began shifting the Saudi state from the Islamism of the Sahwa era to a new form 
of nationhood. As a response, the regime has initiated some measures of reform to counter 
radicalization (Niblock, 2006) by reviewing educational materials to ensure the elimination of 
fundamentalist thinking and monitoring the activities of preachers and Islamists. The members of the 
Islamic Awakening movement who had been released from prison in the late 1990s began to distance 
themselves from radical Jihadi groups. While both lacked sympathy for the United States, they disputed 
the theological justification for attacking civilians. They denounced al-Qaidah in the Arabian 
Peninsula, but fell short of openly denouncing Bin Laden. They favored dialogue and rehabilitation 
programs to reform those who had gone astray. They also called for fair trials in order to encourage 





In January 2003, a group of more than 100 Saudi intellectuals submitted a “vision document” in 
which they presented their views about the required changes in the political and social domains in 
Saudi Arabia. The document discussed the promulgation of a constitution based on the principle of 
separation of the legislative, executive and judiciary powers. This was a significant move in a country 
that does not allow public gatherings to discuss political or social issues and petitions are the only 
means by which reformists can communicate with political leadership (Lawson, 2017). Calls for 
revising the religious discourse of the country would continue after 2003, when al-Qaeda, in May, 
began a bombing campaign in Saudi Arabia targeting Western expatriates and Saudi security forces. 
The attacks encouraged some Saudis publicly to question the bases of Wahhabism in unprecedented 
fashion. 
  
The campaign prompted the Saudi leadership to stage national dialogue forums, announce the 
preparation of limited municipal elections, create an international interfaith dialogue center, appoint 
women in limited numbers to official positions and open up the public sphere to quasi-independent 
civil society associations (Thompson, 2014). Moreover, in May 2003, the government established a 
committee as part of a campaign to promote a moderate image of Islam and to uproot extremism from 
the country.With the ascension to the throne of King Abdullah in 2005, some limited opening occurred, 
such as the launch of a nationwide scholarship program to send young Saudis abroad for their 
university education. Moreover, perhaps most importantly, the country held its first experiment in mass 
participatory politics—the 2005 municipal council elections. The move to offer limited advancement 
for women in Saudi Arabia can be traced to this period in which King Abdullah was portrayed as a 
reformer and a campaigner for top-down women’s empowerment efforts (Yamani, 2008). 
  
The Kingdom surprised observers in the wake of the Arab uprisings in 2011 by remaining 
relatively stable. Domestically, the regime appeared intact while confronting multiple challenges from 
active groups, including Islamists, women and religious minorities as some protests erupted 
immediately after demonstrations in Arab capitals. More powers were extended to the Ministry of 
Interior during this period. The anti-terrorism law was enacted by royal decree in December 2013 with 
vague and broadly defined articles of what constitutes terrorist crimes so to silence dissent. Following 
the death of King Abdullah in 2015, King Salman al-Saud assumed the throne. King Salman began his 
rule in 2015 with a series of unprecedented challenges: leadership shuffles; a decline in oil prices and 
regional and international upheaval, such as the military intervention in Yemen. Many political analysts 
attribute the intervention in Yemen to an attempt to rally support among Saudis for the new king and 
establish Saudi hegemony in the Muslim world (Doaij, 2017).  
 
Meanwhile, his son, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, announced plans to introduce 
tourism, social activities and entertainment to the Kingdom. Central to this vision is a new economic 
plan, dubbed Vision 2030, to boost the country’s economy and reduce its reliance on oil (Nurunnabi, 
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2017). The plan promises economic diversification, Saudization, privatization and other social and 
economic initiatives to prepare for the post-oil era. The government also advertised the plan as 
dependent on “social vibrancy that is antithetical to extreme religious values,” giving a clear message 
that economic and social development cannot be achieved alongside religious extremism (Hamidaddin, 
2017, para. 1). Prince Muhammad has called for religious reform and bringing an end to “the post-79” 
era, a term referring to the period of Islamic Awakening. 
  
Furthermore, Vision 2030 calls for developing women’s talents, investing in their productive 
capabilities and enabling them to strengthen their futures, as well as raising the female labor force 
participation rate by 2030. To achieve these objectives, the state lifted the long-standing ban on driving 
by issuing a royal decree on September 26, 2017; women were granted women the right to drive from 
June 2018 onwards. These announcements were followed by the decision to allow women to enter 
sports stadiums for the first time. King Salman also issued an edict instructing the Interior Ministry to 
draft legislation to criminalize sexual harassment (Alsahi, 2018). 
 
3.2: Untangling the Complexities of gendered politics in Saudi Arabia: The State, the Religious 
Establishment, and the Gendered Subject 
Women’s rights have been placed at the center of power struggle between the Saudi state and the 
religious establishment both historically and presently (van Geel, 2012). Al-Fassi (2016) claims that 
part of what has become known in the public discourse as Saudi women’s “exceptional uniqueness” is 
in fact connected to the transition of the traditional state to the format of a modern state. 
 
In the process of forming the Saudi nation-state based on a pious Islamic nationalist identity, 
women became boundary markers and were regarded as key instruments that visibly and structurally 
distinguished this holy nation from other ungodly polities (al-Rasheed, 2013). Operating from this 
logic, the Saudi state has increasingly depicted women as guardians of the moral integrity of the nation, 
producers of future pious generations and markers of the nation’s commitment to Islam (DeLong-Bas, 
2010). In this context, regulating women’s appearances, movements and segregation were deemed to 
be necessary to consolidate the image of the Saudi nation. Traditional roles for women have since been 
transfigured to reflect these ideals. Women have been utilized by the regime as an emblem of its 
Islamic character and to demonstrate a national identity that is uniquely Saudi Arabian. 
  
Al-Rasheed (2013) posits that neither Islam nor tribal ethos is responsible alone for gender 
inequality in Saudi Arabia; instead, she argues that the union between religion and nationalism has 
contributed to the construction of women as symbols for the nation. Religious nationalism in this 
context, therefore, relied on singling out women as pillars of a nation’s image as the state forged a 
convergence of tribal ethos and Wahhabi tradition and ideologues. The state kept women in patriarchal 




political culture constructs an ideal type, one that may be called the “ideal Islamic woman.” The 
version of the ideal woman tends to elevate the public separation of women from men as the hallmark 
of Islamic society. It defines the particular Muslim society of Saudi Arabia as distinct from and morally 
superior to the West as well other Muslim countries where women are less rigidly separated. It is an 
ideology that has been expressed in official government statements, state policy decisions and religious 
opinions issued by the state-supported Ulama (Doumato, 1992). 
 
Women’s roles became an issue of contention between the authorities and religious ultra-
conservatives in the late 1950s over the question of public education for girls. The state under King 
Faisal dealt with gender through the prism of religious nationalism, a homogenizing paradigm that 
invoked common religious bonds between citizens. At the same time, it pushed for mass education for 
girls to depict itself as a modernizing force in society. The advent of formal public schooling for girls 
in Saudi Arabia dates back to the 1960s, when the first official primary school opened its doors in 
Riyadh (al-Munajjed, 1997). However, the process of introducing girls’ education in the early 1960s 
was met with considerable resistance from some religious scholars and preachers, claiming that 
education would corrupt girls’ morals and destroy the foundations of the Saudi Muslim family 
(Hamdan, 2005). 
 
King Faisal decided to work together with religious scholars, quoting the Quran and hadiths 
(narrated stories on the life of the Prophet Mohammed) to convince the ultra-conservatives that Islam 
does not oppose women’s education and that schooling would also positively contribute to girls’ 
Islamic education. Education would make women better Muslim wives and mothers or equip them for 
jobs that suited their nature, such as teachers and nurses (Hamdan, 2005). It was not until the religious 
scholars asserted that girls’ education complied with Islam that traditional families started sending their 
daughters to girls’ schools. Education was the first field in which the progress of women was realized 
by creating separate spaces for them. 
 
 Nonetheless, while men’s education was under the Ministry of Education, women’s schooling 
was under the Department of Religious Guidance until 2002. It was transferred to the General 
Presidency for Girls’ Education and the Ministry of Education after a fire broke out in an elementary 
girls’ school in Mecca, resulting in the death of 15 young girls. Members of the Committee for the 
Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice prevented the firemen from entering the girls’ school 
because both the girls and their teachers might not be wearing their Hijab. The issue was widely 
discussed in the Saudi press and also covered by the foreign press, causing a widespread public outcry 




Ever since modernization began in earnest in the early 1970s, tensions have grown over how 
society wishes to define the standards for Islamic and social values. The role of women is the arena in 
which these standards are most passionately debated. The monarchy and the Ulama have consistently 
promoted women’s domesticity and women’s public separation from men as Islamic virtues. However, 
with the growth in education, population mobility and ethnic and religious diversity, women’s roles 
have changed. The monarch’s legitimacy, however, is still based on this ability to uphold Islamic 
principles  
  
The 1979 Mecca insurrection against Saudi rule illustrates how delicate this balance is and how 
important the role of women in maintaining it. More specifically, the leader of the attempt to seize the 
Grand Mosque at Mecca, Juhaiman ibn Saif al-Utaibi, was a former seminary student and protégé of 
bin Baz, Saudi Arabia’s most influential religious scholar. In a series of pamphlets distributed the 
previous year, Juhaiman had called for an end to Western influence in the Kingdom, television, 
gambling, Western-style universities, conspicuous and extravagant spending and the presence of all 
foreigners (Doumato, 1991). Juhaman’s movement was effectively ended when he and 62 of his 
followers were beheaded, but their yearning to set boundaries around Western influence—symbolized 
most poignantly by the changing roles of women—had struck a sympathetic chord with society 
(Doumato, 1992). Toward the end of 1979, a shadowy organization called the Brothers came to light in 
al-Hasa, compelled the Saudi oil company ARAMCO to close its training program for women and 
vandalized several beauty salons (Lawson, 2017). 
  
The state responded to these acts by giving excessive authority to the religious police officers 
and the agents of the Committee for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice. These 
groups sought to discipline female secretaries working in offices, unmarried couples eating in 
restaurants or riding in cars and “improperly” dressed women who ignored the conventions that 
regulated behavior and dress in public places. The Interior Ministry issued new rulers instituting sex-
segregation in recreation areas of foreign housing compounds. Scholarships for Saudi women to study 
abroad were curtailed. The purpose behind the articulation and zealous enforcement of these rules was 
to undermine and appease the broad coalition that resented Western influence—Juhaiman and his 
group represented only the most extreme fringe—and to do so in ways which would not alienate other 
significant constituencies. By focusing on women’s roles and defining these as Islamic, the monarchy 
could show that it was prepared to act with vigor to uphold Islamic morality against the West without 
actually having to address any of the specific issues Juhaiman’s movement put forward (Doumato, 
1991). 
 
The 1970s were a two-edged sword for women (al-Rasheed, 2013). The surplus wealth allowed 
women’s education and the provision of welfare services, but at the same time, it further excluded 
women from the public sphere. To explain, oil revenues improved living standards and provided Saudi 




longer needed to sustain the household and women’s domesticity became a symbol of both wealth and 
moral distinction; it also differentiated Saudi women from foreign women because they did have to 
work (van Geel, 2012). 
  
The production of gendered spaces therefore has not merely been a means of domesticating 
women in confined spaces. It was affordable due to the “oil curse” and what followed were 
institutionalized policies such as sex segregation in education and the workplace and the ban on 
driving. These policies contributed to defining Saudi women as a unified category encompassing their 
different origins and groups of belonging and promoting “a model of the Saudi woman as pious and 
virtuous, financially comfortable, and devoted to her family” (Le Renard, 2008, p. 613-614). 
Consequently, the first generation of educated Saudi women during the 1970s and 1980s either did not 
work or accepted limited employment opportunities in fields that were considered appropriate for them 
such education; education required female teachers because of the sex segregation policy in schools. 
Some have also linked women’s exclusion from the labor market to the employment of foreign 
workers. As al-Munajjed (1997) explains, after the oil boom in the 1970s, “the growth of employment 
opportunities [surpassed] the number of Saudi entrants into the labor market, thus causing a substantial 
increase in foreign labor” (p. 81). Women were not considered job candidates, however, due to several 
factors such as the lack of public transportation, training and childcare facilities and, most importantly, 
the widespread traditional view that a woman’s role is as a mother or housewife (Ibid). 
 
Saudi Arabia arrived in the 1980s with a more complex society, eager to enjoy the fruits of 
advancement on all social and economic levels. At the same time, there was a determination to preserve 
the country’s religious identity and its social traditions. This balance between the two has been 
challenging to maintain. All three wars affected the whole region in different aspects. Though the 
1990s in the Saudi Kingdom became known as “a decade of silence,” with a heavy crackdown on 
political dissidents and uncertainty in the wake of the Gulf War, many women continued working 
toward women’s empowerment, creating latent networks through community-based activities in private 
spaces (al-Fassi, 2015, 242). 
 
While the state aligned itself more clearly with the Saudi Islamism, Saudi Islamist feminists 
began to emerge as well known figures and respected icons in society (Doaiji, 2017). These women 
were hugely influenced by the Islamist Sahwa movement and assumed roles in guarding the nation 
against the loss of tradition, piety and morality (Doaiji, 2017). In parallel, the political activism of 
liberal Saudi women peaked in the 1990s amid the Gulf War despite the suspension of political life. 
The now-famous driving campaign of November 1990 was the very first example of Saudi women’s 





However, in the twenty-first century, the state has adopted a different approach to women’s 
rights. More specifically, a major shift happened during King Abdullah’s reformist years throughout 
the 2000s. Women became essential to the country’s economic development and “Saudization” plans to 
replace foreign labor with nationals, including Saudi women. Moreover, the post-9/11 era showed the 
state’s attempts to reverse decades of restrictions and promote itself as a champion of women’s 
emancipation, though within limits. King Abdullah’s rule is seen as a time when state feminism began 
to define women’s prospects in the country;  the Saudi state suddenly started encouraging successful 
and educated Saudi women to participate in international forums, appear in media and participate in 
business ventures. As a result, King Abdullah’s image as the emancipator of women was well 
established by the end of his reign (Doaij, 2012).  
  
Nonetheless, Saudi women’s ability to exercise their rights continued to be restrained by the 
male guardianship system. Under this system, women are considered as legal minors under the control 
of their male relatives (e.g. father, brother, husband or son) and are subject to legal restrictions on their 
behavior (Alsahi, 2018). Restrictions were also imposed on women’s movements and mobility; women 
were not granted the right to drive until June 2018. In summary, tracing back through this historical era 
one can observe that Saudi women have been important to the Kingdom’s ideology since its 
establishment, as state legitimacy and national identity were grounded in their protection and control. 
Yet women remained mostly invisible to the state as strictly religious subjects. Eventually, as oil 
revenue improved state capabilities and in the aftermath of September 11 era, Saudi women became the 
objects of state policy, but as new faces and agents of modernity. 
 
This shift illustrates to us that Saudi state policies are far from fixed when dealing with 
women’s issues and that the changing approaches and policies of the state vis-à-vis women’s issues 
have in fact been linked to domestic and international factors. The Saudi state poses a threat even as it 
offers limited resources to women at critical times when it is necessary. A useful concept to be adopted 
here has been put forward by Connell (1990). He refers to the state as embodying “gender regimes” and 
highlights the multiple ways in which the state is implicated in the institutionalization and regulation of 
gender relations. It can work towards the consolidation of existing gender relations, but at the same 
time has the potential to unsettle the existing gender order through reforms when deemed appropriate. 
Furthermore, the shift in the depiction of women by the state is not only limited to the case of Saudi 
Arabia. For instance, Kandiyoti (2000) argues that these contradictions are common in the nationalist 
projects within postcolonial states, which reflect portrayals of women as either victims of social 
backwardness, icons of modernity, or privileged bearers of cultural authenticity. 
 
3.3 From the Bottom-Up: Tracing the Evolution of the Saudi Women's Movements 
Contemporary feminist collective actions taken by women are rooted in structures of opportunity that 
are, in part, the products of women’s past organizing efforts. Marx, Ferree and Mueller (2004) have 




outcomes and dynamics of women’s movements; they claim most social movement theories have taken 
an approach that is too short term—one in which gender relations and repertoires of action appear to be 
stable rather than being embedded in a continuously changing context. 
 
Thus, one needs to take into account that social movements, including women’s movements, are 
historical, social phenomena that are shaped by historical conditions. So, in order to better understand 
their politics, choice of strategies and the meaning and influence of their presence, such movements 
need to be read in their historical context. Following this logic, I believe that understanding the 
configuration of the Saudi feminist movement today first necessitates a reading of its historical 
evolution and that it is crucial to acknowledge that the contemporary feminist movement is embedded 
in its past history and is informed and affected by various socio-political forces and currents. 
Accordingly, the historical background below sets the stage for a more in-depth discussion of the 
contemporary Saudi feminist movement. 
3.3.1 1980s-90s: The Ascendance of Female Islamist Activists  
 Saudi women have been participating in charitable organizations since the 1960s, generally under the 
aegis of princesses. This participation was easily accepted within the parameters of society since it 
required traits that were considered to be typically female, such as generosity and devotion to others. 
The female space within the charity sector first emerged with the creation of the female association 
“Nahda” founded by Princess Sara al-Faysal in 1962, followed by the opening of female sections in 
many charity foundations which were concerned with taking care of poor women, orphans and disabled 
children. This field remained closely monitored by the Ministry of Social Affairs (Le Renard, 2008). 
  
By the early 1970s, the increase of women-only educational institutions nurtured nascent 
political activism among Saudi women. Educational institutions, coupled with efforts to bring more 
Saudi nationals into the workplace due to the oil boom, paved the way for the formation of Saudi 
intelligentsia and opened up new spaces for their activities. Initially, this dynamic played out in mostly 
academic and intellectual circles (Doaij, 2017). Nonetheless, faced with the challenges posed by the 
Islamic Revolution in Iran and the seizure of the grand mosque in Mecca in 1979, the Saudi state opted 
to enhance its religiosity by increasing state resources for the religious establishment and aligning itself 
with the emerging Sahwa movement. 
  
The implication for Saudi women of this state strategy was a weakening of their position in the 
intellectual circles. Thus, the 1980s era, which coincided with the Sahwa movement, is considered by 
many, especially who are within the liberal and secular circles, as a setback for women’s emancipation. 
The rise of Islamism was deemed to be responsible for the process of reversal that erased much of the 
sociopolitical gains for women in Saudi Arabia (al-Fassi, 2016).  
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While this era most evidently served as a temporal deterrence to secular feminism, it also 
conjoined it with different narratives, mainly nationalism and Islamism (Doaiji, 2017). Consequently, 
the increase of the display of religiosity, the strengthening of gender segregation laws and the surge in 
the number of religiously educated led to the emergence of a female sphere of religious activities (Le 
Renard, 2008). As a direct consequence, the religious sphere stopped being a male monopoly after 
female faculties of religious sciences opened, which led to the graduation of increasing numbers of 
female students in religious sciences and the creation of female sections within the religious 
foundations. It is important to emphasize that before the 1980s, women’s religious practice was 
individual or familial, contrary to the practice of men, for whom the mosque is a space for socialization 
(al-Rasheed, 2013). With the opening of religious spaces for women, a religious discourse by women 
and for women emerged; through this process, women became annunciators and subjects of Islamic 
revivalist discourse. 
  
The first generation of female Islamist preachers and activists rose to the surface during the 
early 1990s. With time they became increasingly numerous. Some were descendants of well-known 
religious families, but others were not. The opening up of the religious sphere that came along with the 
expansion of mass schooling and the institutionalization of religious education was mainly developed 
by Syrian and Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood members who had sought refuge from the repressive 
Nasserite and Baathist regimes in Egypt and Iraq (Makboul, 2017). By the 1990s, a new terminology 
has begun to circulate to refer to religious women. The new religious women were known by a generic 
name  (multazimat) or specific labels such as nashitat Islamiyat (Islamist activist), a specific category 
for women who fulfilled a series of interrelated personal and communal activities. At the lower end of 
the religious ranking system, women preachers (daiyat) and defenders of the principle of commanding 
right and forbidding wrong (muhasibat) became standard labels given to women whose worldview was 
defined by Islam and its teachings (al-Rasheed, 2010). 
 
These female preachers began preaching inside university campuses, where they would set up 
gatherings for memorizing the Quran. With time, several female preachers appropriated the Islamic 
rhetoric that had long been mainly developed by men. These included Fatima Naseef, a graduate in 
history and sharia from the University of King Abdulaziz in Jeddah who is believed to have travelled to 
Afghanistan during the anti-Soviet mobilization; Suhhayla al-Abidin, a graduate in Islamic history 
from al-Azhar University in Cairo and Nura al-Saad, who received a Master’s degree in sociology in 
the United States and then a doctorate from the University of Imam Mohammed ibn Saud (Le Renard, 
2010). 
  
These three female preachers wrote newspaper articles and books, including some dealing with 
the issue of women’s rights in Islam. Most of the time, they did not speak beyond what they were 
familiar with, limiting themselves to specifically “female” subjects like women in Islam, women’s role 




conform to the male religious establishment’s interpretation of Islam with respect to women’s issues, a 
discourse they perceive as more favorable to women than to change. Their writings also reveal that 
they viewed that the stricter application of the precepts of Islam to society should lead to greater 
respect between men and women (Le Renard, 2010). They subscribed to the Islamic feminism school 
of thought and the idea that Islam guarantees full equality of all Muslims, male and female alike, in 
both the public and private spheres (Badran, 2001). 
  
What they have in common with male preachers is the defense of Islamic principles and an 
Islamic perspective on different aspects of private and public life. However, unlike their male 
counterparts, they are generally not committed to making particular political claims or protests, except 
(Le Renard, 2010) in their criticism of the Western way of life that could potentially corrupt Saudi 
society and the unnecessary demands of liberal Saudi women, such as the right to drive cars. Al-
Rasheed (2010) offers a valuable contribution to this understudied topic of Islamist female preachers in 
Saudi Arabia. In her work, she acknowledges that some Islamist women are active in transmitting 
religious knowledge and intervening in the public discourse from a religious point of view. However, 
they are dismissed as potential Islamic actors in contexts where both men and women are potential 
audiences, as they enter the public sphere only as women preaching to other women, thus creating a 
parallel yet structurally inferior space for women in order to preserve overall male dominance. 
  
For instance, Islamic women’s preachers’ publications and articles are grouped together under 
sections dedicated to women on many religious websites and their efforts remain constrained in female 
spaces. They complement the role of men as preachers, but do not replace them as their discourses are 
meant to be consumed by women only. The work of sociologist Le Renard also deals with this topic. 
Like al-Rasheed, she concludes that female preachers do not have a significant impact beyond the 
female sphere. According to her, “Saudi female preachers are not considered religious authorities 
generally, but are instead authorities in a parallel female world” (2011, p. 120). She ascribes their 
limitation to what she considers an official Saudi interpretation of Islam—men are not allowed access 
to female preachers’ images or voices so women cannot record their religious lectures on audio or 
videotapes or host their satellite TV programs, limiting their potential audience. Furthermore, much of 
their more accessible material on the internet is specifically targeted to women and therefore may not 
be of an appeal to men.  
 
Today, female preachers can appear on some programs on Saudi TV channels, but for programs 
that target women. For example, in the context of the National Dialogue Forum that started in 2003, 
many female Islamist activists addressed men via microphones during the meetings, seated in a 
separate area of the conference hall. Together with liberal women, they offered their opinions on the 
themes of the conferences: counter-radicalization, youth and women’s unemployment and religious 
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tolerance. Outside the state-initiated forums, it is, however, still unusual for female activists to be 
invited and directly address all-male audiences (al-Rasheed, 2010). 
  
It is important therefore to contextualize the rise of female preachers as both as an outcome and 
a manifestation of the growing tide of Islamic resurgence in the MENA region that occurred in the 
1980s. Despite the fact that the discourse of female preachers and Islamist activists stays confined 
within the boundaries of the category of women and does not clearly contest the established order, their 
practices reveal their personal commitment and some emancipation vis-à-vis their families. With a deep 
knowledge of religious matters, these women shape certain spaces of religiosity and sociability in their 
image, redefine the pious to assert themselves as subjects and to claim rights—even limited ones—in a 
context where religious language, to a great extent, monopolizes debates (Le Renard, 2008). Moreover, 
many men and women in Saudi society find religious women as an Islamic alternative to liberal 
intellectuals. 
 
3.3.2 1990s: The Gulf War Driving Campaign: The First Protest of its Kind   
The activism of Saudi women peaked in the 1990s during the Gulf War. In an unprecedented organized 
act of civil disobedience, 47 women staged a driving protest and drove in the capital Riyadh in 
resistance to the ban. This protest was one of the primary examples of Saudi women’s activism 
reaching beyond intellectual spaces and posing a more overt, organized manifestation of public 
sentiment. The protest was a response to the call for action that was directed towards women who had 
foreign driving licenses they had obtained abroad, primarily while studying. Thus, among the 
protesters, many were highly educated professionals. Many agree that the leading figure behind the 
protest was Aisha al-Maneh, a sociology professor who received her Ph.D. from the University of 
Colorado in Boulder, who is a veteran advocate for women’s rights in Saudi Arabia (Ibrahim, 1990). 
 
The demonstration took place a time when the Gulf Region was witnessing the First Gulf War. 
The presence of American and other Western forces, especially the American women military 
personnel, to defend the country after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was stirring considerable debate 
about whether to bring Saudi Arabia more in tune with the modern world (Lim, 2018). Consequently, 
in September 1990, the King issued an edict calling for government entities to train women volunteers 
to work in civil defense and medical services. The response was one of elation by women who hoped it 
would be the beginning of a more prominent role for women in the workforce. Those who participated 
included not only the Western-educated, but also women of the royal family, who organized and 
attended training sessions at Riyadh hospitals. By early October, hundreds of women in every section 





The King’s political affiliation with the United States and his initiative for women’s civil 
defense work appeared to bring out the possibility of a decline in ultra-religious influence and the 
further pave a way for the opening of Saudi society to the rest of the world. This optimism was strongly 
felt among the Kingdom’s highly educated women. The driving demonstration organizers were 
therefore inspired by the King’s new apparent commitment to increasing women’s involvement and 
participation in the public sphere. A petition requesting permission for women to drive was reportedly 
submitted to the then-Prince Salman bin Abdulaziz by the mayor of Riyadh at the time on the day the 
driving demonstration took place.  
 
The petition began by praising the king’s edict that paved the way for Saudi women to 
volunteer to serve their country. It then appealed to the prince “in the name of every ambitious Saudi 
woman eager to serve her country under the leadership of the Servant of the Two Holy Shrines and his 
wise government to open your paternal heart to us and to look sympathetically on our humane demand, 
to drive in Riyadh” (Doumato, 1992, 31). This language indicates that these women were seeking to 
bargain with the sate.  
  
Nevertheless, the driving demonstration was interrupted by the religious police, who were 
angered that women refused to acknowledge their jurisdiction. The female drivers were later taken into 
custody and freed only after their male guardians signed pledges confirming that they would never 
attempt to drive again. The repercussions of this act were severe. Most of the women were fired from 
their jobs and banned from traveling abroad. Some were subsequently harassed by phone callers 
accusing the women of sexual immorality and of being agents of Western vice (Doumato, 1992). The 
media dimension is also central to this event in terms of how it played out in the Saudi public sphere. 
The women’s reputations were smeared, but they had no outlet to defend themselves or to engage in 
any counter-narrative action. These events were before the existence of satellite television channels and 
the only means of official and mainstream media were the local TV stations and newspapers. 
 
 Apart from one local newspaper, al-Muslimoon, there was no domestic media coverage of the 
event. The state also took an active role in concealing recorded traces of the event; renowned 
photographer and journalist Saleh al-Azzaz, who was present at the demonstration, was arrested for 
several months and the photos that he took at the event were confiscated and destroyed (Jarbou, 2018). 
The Ministry of Interior Affairs and Ministry of Information published official warnings commanding 
the media against conducting interviews or reporting about the event or the topic of women’s driving. 
Thus, the general sentiments could not be captured. The only available media that referred to the event 
were the cassette tapes circulated by the religious police. These tapes spoke against the demonstration 




For this reason, women took upon themselves the mission to document the defamatory flyers 
that were distributed, along with all the international media coverage of the event. They compiled a 
private archive of approximately 70 pages of pamphlets, news and extracts from print media (Jarbou, 
2018). Also following the event, the Ministry of Interior issued a ban on all future political activity by 
women. The state-funded Directorate of Islamic Ruling and Guidance, headed by Shaikh ibn Baz, 
sanctioned the ministry’s ruling by issuing a religious edict that implied that women’s driving goes 
against the morality and chastity of women. The prohibition against women’s driving has no religious 
basis (Mtango, 2004). Nevertheless, the ministry stated, “women should not be allowed to drive 
vehicles, as the Shari’a instructs that the things that degrade or harm the dignity of women must be 
prevented,” thereby making official the previously unofficial ban on women’s driving (Doumato, 1992, 
p. 32).  
  
The question of women’s right to drive was not a new issue, but one that had been publicly 
addressed on several occasions in the past. With the preparations for war consuming public attention 
and the king’s commitment to women’s participation in the war effort, women thought it was the right 
time to press for the right to drive. The demonstration brought to the surface the underlying tensions in 
the country between the moderate factions who envisioned a more liberal, moderate image of Islam and 
those who were committed to maintaining the literal notions of conservative Islam. The regime’s 
reactions to the driving demonstration in 1990, punishing the women and reaffirming the idealized 
version of Muslim womanhood, were similar to those during the period of the Mosque insurrection in 
1979, when the monarchy was facing a challenge to its legitimacy.  
 
One should also take into account that the demonstration took place in the capital Riyadh, 
which is the heart of the conservative religious establishment. Najd, the region in which Riyadh lies, is 
primarily populated by the descendants of the inner tribal desert Bedouins (Ibrahim, 1990). The 
demonstration was an action that could have been perceived by the regime and the religious 
establishment as a call to alter Saudi Arabia’s unique Islamic character. In effect, it represented a 
challenge to the stability of the ruling monarchy in which the traditional roles for women had become 
an emblem of its own Islamic character (Doumato, 1991). 
 
3.3.3 Early 2000s: The Emergence of State Feminism and the Fragmentation of Feminist 
Mobilization Efforts  
This driving campaign served as a powerful catalyst to further liberal feminist actions. Since 1990, 
many active, latent women’s groups from both Islamist and liberal-leaning orientations have emerged 
to form pressure groups for reform. For instance, the Sunday Women Group (SWG) was established in 
Riyadh in January 1994 by a group of academics from King Saud University (KSU). The main aim was 
to create a forum to exchange knowledge and discuss ideas. The events took place in the members’ 




housewives and students alike. The group initially agreed to remain leaderless, but after the first 
decade, a board of ten women, comprised of the most regular participants, was established (Alfassi, 
2015).  
 
The group is one of the oldest continuous groups of its kind in the country, but its attempts to 
officially register have been unsuccessful because the state has refused to authorize it. The political 
claims that came from the group transformed to more refined demands calling for women’s political 
participation. The group would later initiate the Baladi campaign for women’s right to vote and 
participate as candidates in municipal elections and would promote and participate in the women’s 
driving campaigns in the 2000s (Alfassi, 2015). These women’s networks and their ideas would 
provide continuity and support for an emerging generation of activists. 
 
The early 2000s is also perceived by many as an era in which top-down state feminism began to 
emerge in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States and the domestic 
terrorism in Saudi Arabia that followed. These attacks set off a series of structural changes with 
important implications for Saudi women’s activism (Doaij, 2018). Within the context of these top-
down empowerment efforts, limited advancement for women was made possible by King Abdullah, 
who was later described as a supporter of women’s emancipation and rights. Women were provided 
with their national identification cards, allowed to obtain commercial licenses in 2005 and to enroll in 
the King Abdullah’s Scholarship Abroad Program for students in the same year. Under Abdullah, the 
agenda of women’s rights figured in the regime’s discussions and policies (Alsuwaida, 2016). 
 
Moreover, the king also passed regulations that limited the power of the Committee for the 
Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, which has long dominated the enforcement of the 
strictly religious practices and the public condemning of social immorality. Again, changes in the status 
of women have helped these efforts to gradually temper the role of the religious establishment in 
defining gender roles and relations. Nonetheless, the mix of repression and internal restructuring that 
began to shift the Saudi state from the Islamism of the Sahwa era to a new form of modern nationhood 
has unexpected repercussions (Doaij, 2017). 
 
The state’s counterterrorism and repression of Islamist-leaning individuals in the 2000s resulted 
in mass arrests and the emergence of a new grievance group. A new campaign of reformers and 
petitioners called for rights and respect for prisoners’ rights (al-Rasheed, 2013). With regards to the 
feminist efforts to lift the ban on driving, in 2007, Wajeha al-Huwaider and Fawzia al-Ayouni founded 
an organization called the Association for the Protection and Defense of Women’s Rights in Saudi 
Arabia. The association is not formally recognized as an NGO by the Saudi authorities and is 
prohibited from demonstrating (Global Nonviolent Action Database, 2008). Within this organizational 
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framework, the founders established the League of Demanders of Women’s Rights to Drive Cars, 
which later became the main force behind Saudi women’s campaign to lift the driving ban. The 
association began circulating a petition directed at the Saudi government that emphasized that women 
should be given the freedom of mobility in the interest of a more developed society (Judd, 2007). 
 
The petition was later submitted to the Saudi ruler to reverse the driving ban, but the 
government made no serious efforts to accommodate women’s requests. The initial demands of the 
campaign of the league did not materialize. On International Women’s Day in 2008, al-Huwaider drove 
a car in the streets of Saudi Arabia while recording an appeal to the Saudi officials that she later 
uploaded on YouTube. It can be found at this link https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q8GiTnb33wE. 
She was eventually forced to back down and apologize for her actions (Agarwal, Lim & Wigand, 
2012). 
 
In May 2009, Areej Khan, a young Saudi student who studied graphic design in the United 
States, initiated a new online campaign called “N7nu,” which translates to “We the Women” in 
English. Khan made use of YouTube, Facebook and Flickr to promote dialogue on the subject of 
women’s rights and to get Saudis to debate and possibly reevaluate the ban on women drivers in the 
country. The main tactic adopted in the campaign was the use of declaration bubbles and bumper 
stickers with a pictogram of a woman dressed as a man—a common strategy females in Saudi have 
used in the past to get away with driving in emergencies. Those bumper stickers were created as a 
space for self-expression, in which Saudis are encouraged to download from the campaign’s Flickr 
account (available at https://www.flickr.com/photos/36722661@N06), fill in with their thoughts and 
then display. Some people took pictures of what they wrote on the stickers and added those 
photographs to the project’s Flickr set of “Declarations” (Mackey, 2009). 
  
The ultimate goal of the campaign was to make it easier for individuals to express their 
thoughts, listen to and understand each other’s points of view and avoid being censored by the 
government. The campaign also had its Facebook page to facilitate active debate about whether the ban 
should be lifted. 
 
3.3.4 The Arab Spring and Beyond: Feminist Activism Moves Online  
Nonetheless, these earlier attempts of dissent, as well as other scattered efforts, did not manage to 
attract much public visibility and resonance as the “Women to Drive” campaign in 2011, when a 
collective of women activists inspired by the Arab Spring decided to revive the old claims by initiating 






Given the spatial and temporal context surrounding the campaign, it seems that the campaign 
was set off at the right time in a country that did not witness any significant public mobilization during 
the Arab uprisings to overshadow women’s protests. The campaign was also well managed over the 
internet, making it easy for the public and the media to follow the latest tactics of the movement. The 
activists set up a specific Facebook page that was dedicated entirely to the campaign. They also 
deployed Twitter to manage, organize and mobilize, offering the world yet another example of how 
digital media can be cleverly leveraged to advocate for feminist causes and to take locally specific 
issues and promote them as transnational (Chaudhry, 2014). 
 
As part of the campaign efforts, Manal al-Sharif, one of the campaign’s main activists, decided 
to drive and posted a video of herself driving in the Eastern Province city of al- Dammam. The video, 
in which she urges women to learn how to drive, went viral within two days. She was later arrested on 
May 21 for nine days on charges of disturbing public order and inciting public disorder; she was 
released as a result of significant international pressure (MacFarquhar & Amer, 2011). 
 
Consequently, several Saudi women got behind the wheel on June 17, 2011 in major cities 
across the Kingdom, documenting their driving experience online. Some women who drove were 
stopped and arrested, only to be freed after being admonished not to drive again. On the other hand, 
encouragement poured in via the internet that was filled with testimonies of women who drove their 
kids to school, a husband to the airport or themselves on errands. The online momentum was boosted 
by the high internet penetration in Saudi Arabia and revealed the important role of digital media in 
facilitating online action. 
 
In general, the June 17 campaign was a success as it highlighted one specific injustice—the 
restrictions on women’s mobility—and used it to illuminate the other social and political injustices 
inextricably linked to this ban. It also managed to point out the practical necessity of driving and 
signaled a rise in feminist consciousness among Saudi women (Doaiji, 2017). Moreover, the campaign 
made further attempts to politicize the issue, filing a lawsuit against the Saudi Traffic Department for 
denying Manal al-Sharif her driver’s license despite there being no written law against issuing one to a 
woman. It also called on those who were interested in filing a similar lawsuit (Doaij, 2012). 
 
The campaign triggered a variety of responses on domestic and international levels, as it 
resonated globally, increased the media attention to this cause and sparked an outcry from international 
rights groups. Some protests were scheduled abroad in solidarity with the campaign (NBC Washington, 
2011). The reaction domestically ranged from praise to vilification. The movement was not without its 
critics; many religious clerics objected to the very idea of women being exposed to strangers outside 
their homes by driving (Shmuluvitz, 2011). Local state actors, on the other hand, tended to distance 
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themselves from the issue by stating that Saudi society is not ready for women to gain the right to 
drive. The efforts of the campaign continued into 2012; in June, to celebrate the anniversary of the June 
2011 protest, the driving initiative was renewed once again to urge the authorities to look into this 
demand. Moreover, there were some attempts made by the citizens to sue the traffic department in 
Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province for the right to drive (Abu-Nasr, 2011). Saudi women’s efforts 
continued through 2013, when activists arranged another round of campaigning efforts by declaring 
October 26, 2013 a day for defying the state ban on women driving. They also launched a website 
(www.oct26driving.com) calling for women to get behind the steering wheel and drive individually. 
The online petition gathered more than 16,000 signatures within just a few days. The website of the 
campaign was later hacked on October 9, 2013, which led to a surge in Twitter activity (Yuce, 
Agarwal, Wigand, Lim & Robinson, 2014).  
 
Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia’s passage of the anti-terrorism law, as well as the modification of 
anti-cybercrime legislation, combined with the month-long arrest of activists such as Loujain al-
Hathloul and Maysaa al-Amoudi for attempting to drive in that same year slowed the campaign’s 
momentum. This slowdown continued into 2015, reflecting domestic uncertainties, such as the death of 
King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz and the Saudi military intervention in Yemen (Doaiji, 2017). The 
situation did not change until the lift of the ban in 2018 after the appointment of Mohammed bin 
Salman as a new Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia. However, one can not deny the scale and magnitude of 
the continuous efforts that were made by Saudi activists, who demonstrated an ability to cleverly 
maneuver within a restricting terrain using digital networking technologies and online forms of 
communication as digital platforms have become the central location of activism. 
 
3.4 An Entry to Kuwait’s Modern Political History 
Historians maintain that the foundations of Kuwait as a state and as an independent political entity were 
laid in the early years of the eighteenth century, when the al-Sabah family was collectively selected by 
the Bani Utbah merchant families to lead and unify their emerging Sheikhdom of Kuwait (Crystal, 
1992). Modern state-building began under Emir Mubarak (r. 1896–1915). His autocratic reign enlarged 
and consolidated the power of the ruling Sabah family (al-Sabah, 1987). The ruler signed a treaty with 
Britain in 1899 that assured that Mubarak would not sell or lease any territory to a foreign power 
without obtaining British approval in exchange for protection from any external attack. The ruler also 
sought to ensure that the right to rule the country would be transferred to his direct descendants after 
his death (Finnie, 1992). 
 
While the al-Sabah family managed to prove themselves as political leaders of a relatively 
conflict-free state, the merchant class constituted the backbone of its economy as it extracted revenues 
from pearl divers (Al-kandari & Al-hadben, 2010). Merchants paid tax duties to al-Sabah to run the 
sheikhdom’s administrative matters, hired most of his subjects and lent them money on numerous 




parties. The vital economic role played by the merchant class allowed it to keep al Sabah’s political 
ambitions in check. The political power of the merchant class grew from its economic strength; the al-
Sabah ruling family was constrained by its financial dependence on the merchants. The ordinary input 
of the merchants into the decision-making process came from the social institutions of marriage—
intermarriage between merchants and the ruling family were common—and majlis (regular social 
councils for articulating grievances and concerns) that gave merchants informal but daily access to the 
rulers (Crystal, 1995). 
 
The discovery of oil in the late 1930s liberated the rulers from the financial dependency on the 
merchants, but at the same time prompted merchants’ anxiety that Kuwait’s natural resources would 
only go to the personal purse of the sheiks (Al-Kuwari, 1978). With the inflow of massive oil revenues, 
a new kind of economy emerged built on the extraction and exportation of oil. Such an economy is 
heavily reliant on the export of a single raw material, the production of which requires little contact 
with the rest of the economy. Most critically for politics, these revenues and rents are paid directly to 
the state or, in the context of the Gulf, the rulers (Beblawi, 1987). 
 
The immediate implications of oil revenues were the breakdown of the economic ties of the 
historical governing coalition between the rulers and the trading families and the development of new 
unstable arrangements that excluded the merchants from the formal political life. Hence, old alliances, 
forged in scarcity faded away in an environment of financial abundance, consolidating by that the 
power of the state as the ruling families themselves turned inward (Delacroix, 1980). 
 
As a result, the merchants united to create an institutionalized form of bottom-up political 
resistance by establishing the Legislative Council in 1938, along with other institutions to publicly 
counter the political powers of the ruler of Kuwait (Moore, 2004; Tétreault, 1995). Periods of conflict 
were frequent and violent enough to forge a conscious and politically organized merchant elite. They 
were quick to organize—first through educational councils, then through explicitly political institutions 
such as the Kuwait municipality, secret meeting groups and clubs—and to protest, as they did in a brief 
rebellion in 1921 and through the Majlis Movement of 1938. Both movements, especially the latter, 
generated well-organized and articulate political opposition. The 1938–39 movement called for the 
adoption of a parliamentary system and the ratification of a constitution that would establish the 
parameters of the state-society relationship. However, the movement was crushed and dealt with 
swiftly by the ruling elites (Crystal, 1989). 
 
Meanwhile, the role of the ruling Sabah family in governance was strengthened. Oil wealth 
served as a catalyst for the creation of the modern city in Kuwait and the establishment of modern 
infrastructure, including facilities for universal education of both boys and girls (Al-Tarrah, 2002). 
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Subsequently, Kuwait witnessed a period of relative calm, especially during the Second World War 
(1939-1945). This political stability continued until 1950. It was followed by a period of growing 
political consciousness during the Pan Arab movement, in which many civil society organizations, 
ranging from professional associations and clubs, were established and flourished in Kuwait.   
 
Under the rule of Emir Abdullah al-Salim (r. 1950–65), the state initiated several welfare 
programs that were in charge of the distribution of services and income supports directly to individuals 
and families. They targeted the core of Kuwait City first, followed by the outlying areas where tribal 
social formations remained strong. The state’s intervention initiated a wave of modernization that 
effected a fundamental transformation of Kuwaiti society. However, these policies had mixed results 
(Tétreault, 2001). On the one hand, improved education and health services and substantial transfers of 
income and capital to the Kuwaiti population contributed to citizens’ dependence on the state and 
popular allegiance to the ruling elites, who were intent on capitalizing on their bargaining power. 
However, the increased in the level of education also contributed to the formation of human capital that 
provided Kuwaitis from diverse social groups with the resources to challenge the ruler’s autocracy and 
to put forward political claims in relation to their civil and political rights (al-Nakib, 2014). 
 
Another significant development that accompanied the growth in state revenues and the state’s 
development role was the influx of foreign labor. This migration further complicated the political 
demography of the country and the issue of identity and citizenship. Kuwaiti society began to take 
shape along the lines of a minority of Kuwaiti nationals and a majority of foreign workers engaging in 
all aspects of the economy. Foreign labors, primarily Arab, worked in the teaching, medicine, 
engineering and public administration sectors. However, despite their substantial contribution to the 
Kuwaiti economy and the development process, these migrants were not allowed to integrate into the 
social and political fabric of Kuwaiti society and were treated as a distinct and separate group (Alhajeri, 
2004).  
 
In response to these demographical developments, the nationality law of 1959 was issued by 
Sheikh Abdullah al-Salim. Interestingly, Kuwaiti nationality laws were issued before the promulgation 
of the Kuwaiti constitution and before the independence of Kuwait, signifying the centrality of 
citizenship and mirroring the early concern with the flow of foreign labor that accompanied the oil era 
(Longva, 1995). Citizenship became a crucial issue in the development of the Kuwaiti state and the 
legitimization of al-Sabah’s rule. Thus, in order to protect their minority citizens and to maintain their 
dominance, the regime opted to implement a restrictive definition of citizenship and limit political 
participation to a small segment of the population through citizenship and election legislation. 
 
The independence of Kuwait from British protectorate status in 1961 marked the beginning of a 




the sheik and involve citizens in the political decision-making process culminated in the formation of 
the first constitution and parliament in the Gulf in 1962 (Ghabra, 1993). Although the Emir of Kuwait 
continued to hold the right to appoint the prime minister who then assembles the cabinet, the elected 
parliament still had significant powers, including legislating, opposing the legislation or even 
dismissing the government (Louer, 2013). The constitution also guarantees Kuwaitis a long list of civil 
rights, one of which is equal protection. In practice, this principle has been violated repeatedly by 
legislation, the most notable example being an election law that long has denied Kuwaiti women the 
right to vote and run for office.  
 
Alhajeri (2004) argues that al-Sabah, motivated by a desire to create a national Kuwaiti identify 
to thwart the aspirations of Iraq and undermine the Pan Arab feelings that were sweeping the Arab 
region and influencing Kuwait opposition groups, hoped that such an organization of state powers 
would both confirm the separate identity of Kuwait and Kuwaitis and ensure their domination. Within 
this context of reorganizing state powers, citizenship became a central issue in the development of the 
Kuwaiti state and the legitimization of al-Sabah’s rule, a topic that I will elaborate on later in detail. 
 
Nonetheless, the promulgation of a constitution and the reorganization of state power, moving 
away from autocratic rule toward the adoption of a representative system of government, marked the 
break away from the traditional-informal origination to a formal-legal organization of state powers. In 
the aftermath of independence, an urban intellectual elite emerged from among the members of this 
new commercial elite as well as from the older established families. It was education that united these 
two groups. The intellectual elite included university professors, teachers, writers, lawyers, doctors and 
journalists who had been influenced during the 1950s and 1960s by modernist ideas, as well as by Arab 
nationalism. These circles played a crucial role in supervising Kuwait’s parliamentary system after 
independence (Al-kandari & Al-hadben, 2010). 
 
Although Islamist groups had existed in Kuwait since the early 1950s, their influence was 
limited in society. Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, which were characterized by rapid 
modernization and state-building, Islamists organizations played a marginal role in society (Ghabra, 
1997). As elsewhere across the MENA during that time, Arab Nationalism was the dominant political 
ideology among Kuwait’s secular groups, namely the Arab nationalist and leftist groups who led the 
political opposition in parliament (AbuKhalil, 1992). These two groups also had great control over the 
civil society sector and called for political and economic reform, civil rights and the emancipation of 
women. 
 
Nonetheless, by the end of the 1970s, the Salafis became more organized and found a growing 
following in Kuwaiti society, in particular among merchant families. As the 1980s began, the Islamist 
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trend also gained a foothold in labor associations and student unions and reached an unprecedented 
level of organizational development (Utvik, 2014). Pall (2014) explains that three major factors played 
a crucial role in the expansion of the Salafi movement in Kuwait. The first factor was the decline of 
Arab Nationalism and the left and the subsequent Islamic revival that followed in the region. More 
specifically, the popularity of the nationalist and Marxist groups that existed in Kuwait during that era 
suffered following the Arab defeat in the June War of 1967, which facilitated the ascendance of the 
Islamic forces that Nasserism and Arab nationalism had shut out in the early 1950s. The main 
beneficiary of this process in Kuwait was the Muslim Brotherhood, which, by the beginning of the 
1980s, had become the strongest political force in Kuwait. Besides the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafis 
were also able to take advantage of the religious revival because they already controlled several 
religious places and had direct access to the youth who had recently turned to religion 
 
The second factor was the geopolitical shift that occurred in the aftermath of the Iranian 
revolution in 1979, which spawned waves of religious revival and boosted the stature of the Salafis. 
The Iranian revolution constituted a threat to the very existence of the state of Kuwait. Besides the 
military threat that came from Iran, the Kuwaiti ruling elites were fearful that the new Islamic regime 
would attempt to spread the revolution to the Shi’ite communities of the Gulf. They also feared the 
prospect of being overthrown by Sunni Islamists (Boghardt, 2006). 
 
As a reaction, the regime attempted to capitalize on the deep-seated rivalry between the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Salafis to divide the Sunnis and forbade the emergence of a strong Islamic opposition 
under the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood. This strategy is the reason why the state began 
supporting the Salafi movement at the expanse of the Muslim Brotherhood. Thus, the state’s move 
towards the Islamization of society can be read as intended to diminish Islamist influence and power 
(Pall, 2014). The third factor, as argued by Pall (2014), was the Salafi movement’s ability to infiltrate 
Kuwait’s economic elites. At the end of the 1970s, many members of influential merchant families 
became followers of Salafism. These new members helped the movement gain access to the financial 
and trading sectors and to receive increased funding. Given that the merchants were interested in social 
and political issues, the voices that became stronger within the Salafi movement were those that were 
keen to see religious rulings implemented in public life. This enthusiasm is probably one of the 
explanations why Salafism in Kuwait evolved in a unique way and became intertwined in the country’s 
political life at a time when elsewhere, especially in Saudi Arabia, Salafis were mostly preoccupied 
with religious practice. 
 
By the beginning of the 1980s, the Salafi movement in Kuwait had achieved an unprecedented 
level of organizational development compared to the Muslim Brotherhood. Kuwait’s 1981 election 
marked the first time anywhere in the world that Salafis ran for parliamentary elections; they ultimately 
won two seats (Ghabra, 1997). The election was significant because, at that time, Salafis elsewhere did 




religious line, which called for abstention from political involvement apart from legitimizing the 
autocratic rule of the royal family.  
 
The two members of parliament who belonged to the Salafi movement increasingly utilized 
their presence in parliament to Islamize society from the top-down as they pushed to ban public 
Christmas celebrations, limit Kuwaiti nationality to Muslims in 1982 and prohibit the consumption or 
sale of alcohol in embassies in 1983 (Awadh, 1999). The prominence of the Islamists was also reflected 
in the social realm of Kuwait, which manifested new Islamic sentiment. Gradually, they took control of 
the religious places, professional associations, student unions, charitable organizations and Islamic 
banks. Hence they managed in less than a decade to reposition themselves from the margins of society 
to the forefront (Pall, 2014).  
 
Similar to the same period in Saudi Arabia, which also witnessed the resurgence of political 
Islam in the late 1970s and early 1980s, this era marked a change in the status of women in Kuwait. 
Prior to the mid-1970s, women rarely wore the Hijab, joined their male counterparts in classes at 
Kuwait University and were able to participate in sports and many arenas of work. Kuwaitis began 
educating women in the 1930s (al-Mughni, 2010). The overall new conservative attitude of society 
toward women, dress codes and religion exemplified the overlap between social conservatism and 
political Islam and projected a different image that now reflected the Islamization of society (Ghabra, 
1997). The Iraqi-Kuwaiti crisis began in the summer of 1990 with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The 
crisis ended a year later with the defeat of Iraq and the liberation of Kuwait. The Iraqi occupation and 
the events that followed formed an important turning point in the political life in Kuwait. After 
Kuwait’s liberation in 1991, Kuwaiti society went through a critical self-evaluation (Juliá & Ridha, 
2001). 
 
Many young Kuwaitis looked toward the United States as a model for creating a new way of 
life. For instance, exiled Kuwaitis who had lived for almost a year in more open Western environments 
began to appreciate the need for change in their own society and values. Simultaneously, social 
conservatism had also spread among equally large sectors; most Kuwaiti Salafis had fled Kuwait 
during Iraq’s invasion to Saudi Arabia, where they became more involved with Saudi Salafi networks 
(Rizzo, Meyer & Ali, 2002). Salafi activists in Saudi Arabia were angered by the Saudi government’s 
decision to allow the American military into the Kingdom. They demanded broad-ranging political 
reforms and appealed to many Kuwaitis in the Kingdom during the Iraqi occupation: “upon their return 
to their home country after the war, these individuals became pioneers of the activist wing of Kuwaiti 




Consequently, three major Islamist political groups have emerged since liberation to strengthen 
Islamist political power and ensure that they were well represented in parliament. A non-governmental 
association was established by Islamists in order to “direct the public to do good and refrain them from 
doing evil,” similar to the function that is carried out in Saudi Arabia by the morality police. The 
group’s aim was to enlist one thousand men and establish religious police with a branch in every 
neighborhood to patrol, watch over citizens and spread the teachings of Islam. The government 
responded by not allowing the practice to take place, stating that police would not permit any group to 
disturb any citizen or resident in Kuwait in any shape or form (Ghabra, 1997). 
 
Islamists, however, had dominated Kuwait’s Parliament since the first post-war election in 
1992. Their rise to power was partly due to their strong grassroots organizations and community 
outreach programs. Their message of social justice, anti-corruption and religious authenticity had great 
appeal among the electorate, including women. While the Islamists’ call to change the second article of 
the constitution to make Sharia “the primary source” rather than “a primary source” of legislation was a 
contentious issue in domestic politics, they succeeded in passing a number of laws with conservative 
overtones (al-Mughni, 2009). 
 
These efforts include introducing the women’s early retirement bill, which encourages women 
to retire with full benefits at a young age in order to devote more time to their children; a measure 
imposing gender segregation in postsecondary schools; a new labor law that bans women from working 
night shifts and a law that criminalizes cross-dressing (al-Mughni, 2010). Anti-gender sentiment in the 
all-male parliament poisoned the national atmosphere by 1996, making public opinion far less receptive 
to calls for women’s rights. The elected parliament had consistently denied women their political rights 
since women’s rights became politically salient in the 1970s (Rizzo, Meyer & Ali, 2002). 
 
The rulers changed their position from indifference to a favoring view of women’s political 
rights, especially after the Second Gulf War, in which women demonstrated their courage as they 
became involved in the resistance and mobilized support for Kuwait abroad (Tétreault, 2006). 
Women’s rights also became part of a larger set of strategic plan about maintaining a positive 
international image and good relations with the United States (Yetiv, 2002). From the late 1990s, the 
government was also faced with increasing pressures from women’s movement (Shultziner & 
Tétreault, 2011). At the same time, increased pressure to Islamize Kuwaiti society, combined with the 
insistence on social conservatism at the expense of Kuwaiti economic development, resulting in 
unintended complications for the Islamists. In which by the mid-1990s, rulers began to re-consider their 
former alliance with the Islamist groups. They pushed forward the development of modernist Islamic 
discourse and redirected their attention towards the liberal groups that maintained a modernist 





3.5 Sketching the Development of the Kuwaiti Women's Movements: The Early Beginnings  
The beginnings of the feminist movement in Kuwait can be traced back to the 1940s and the 
institutionalization of formal education for girls. In late 1948, some female writers emerged calling 
women to participate in public life. In 1953, a group of young women advocated for the removal of 
Hijab. The group attracted mixed reactions between support and opposition, but their activities were 
restricted to holding meetings and publishing newspaper articles. They, however, indeed encouraged 
women to consider founding their own societies and organizations modeled after other Arab 
associations (Tétreault & al-Mughni, 1995). 
3.5.1 The Formation of Feminist Associations: Taking the Institutionalized Path  
In a climate of rapid modernization and with the rise of the modern state under the new oil economy, 
women’s associations were created, giving Kuwaiti women more chances for access to a public sphere 
from which they had long been excluded. In 1963, when the first parliament was inaugurated, women 
protested the withholding of their political rights. That same year, they formed their first association, 
the Arab Women’s Development Society (AWDS), to focus on the education and development of all 
women (Olimat, 2009). 
 
Meanwhile, returning Kuwaiti female graduate students from abroad and women of wealthy 
merchant families formed the Women’s Cultural and Social Society (WCSS) to provide a social 
gathering place for the educated, merchant-class women with the energy and wealth to indulge in 
charity work. This group extended women’s traditional role of support and nurturing into the public 
sphere without posing a challenge to women’s position of women in society (al-Mughni, 1996). Thus, 
we can see that women’s activism in Kuwait historically intersected with nation-building. It was more 
preferable for women to form their own organizations, taking the institutionalized path when it comes 
to the mobilization for women’s issues. So, although institutionalization has traditionally been seen as 
signaling the end of the social movement in question, this was not the case in Kuwait; the process of 
institutionalization of the feminist movement in the form of more formal professionalized groups 
marked the beginning of the women’s movement. 
 
Both WCSS and AWDS remained the only operating associations for a decade. Licensed 
organizations with government support, these organizations projected an image of educated career 
women who dutifully participated in the labor market, as well as the state-building process. Although 
the two associations had a brief union, their efforts to raise women’s rights issues were hampered by 
class conflicts and institutional rivalry; the AWDS had a larger membership from the middle class than 
the elite-dominated WCSS (Tétreault & al-Mughni, 1995). The AWDS focused on issues that the 
WCSS avoided addressing—namely, gender equality and women’s citizenship rights. It organized 
Kuwait’s first women’s conference in 1971, which culminated in a petition demanding the right to 
equal opportunity in employment, the right of working mothers to child allowances (then provided only 
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to male heads-of-household), the right of women to be appointed as special attorneys to draft a new 
family law and legislative curbs on polygamy (Olimat, 2009). 
 
The AWDS also placed the issue of women’s suffrage on the public agenda. Kuwaiti women 
could neither vote nor stand for election under the 1959 election law, passed before Kuwait’s first 
constitution, in which only Kuwaiti men were entitled to political rights, was ratified in 1962 (al-
Magnani, 1996). In 1973, ten years after its establishment, AWDS succeeded in pressing the all-male 
parliament to discuss an equal rights bill. Opponents of the bill, who made up the majority, sided 
against the bill on the grounds of the necessity of preserving the patriarchal order and division of roles 
in society. Opponents argued that Islam gave men and women different roles and made men superior to 
women. The bill’s supporters, on the other hand, were the liberals and the minority. With support from 
the government, the parliament avoided voting on the bill by transferring it to the Committee of Legal 
Affairs for further study (Shultziner & Tétreault, 2011). 
 
The AWDS held different conferences in 1974 and 1977 on the status of working women, 
continuing by that its commitment to women’s rights, while forming transnational ties to other 
women’s organizations in the region. This strategy included making alliances with Arab nationalist 
groups; the move proved fatal given government concerns that Arab nationalists were attacking the 
very identity and stability of Kuwaiti society (Tétreault & al-Mughni, 1995). The AWDS-Arab 
nationalist alliance allowed opponents to discredit AWDS members as secularists and revolutionaries 
and undermined the group’s relations with the state. So, in 1977, the government dissolved the 
umbrella organization, the Kuwaiti Women’s Union, under which the AWDS, the WCSS and an 
AWDS offshoot “Nadi al-Fatat” (“The Girls’ Club”) had operated. A year later, the government 
removed the AWDS president, Nouria al-Sadani, who had been accused of committing financial fraud. 
She was later forced into exile. The AWDS organization was subsequently dissolved in 1980 
(Tétreault, Rizzo and Shultziner, 2012). With the AWDS dissolved, the WCSS and Nadi al-Fatat 
became the primary advocates for women’s rights during the 1980s. They had some success in pressing 
for women’s employment in state posts, but their successes were constrained by the Islamic revival 
sweeping Kuwait during the 1980s (Krause, 2014). 
 
3.5.2 The Rise of Islamist Activists: Islamic Feminists? 
Another notable manifestation of the Islamists’ continued attempts to confine women’s participation in 
the public sphere was the noticeable rise of Islamic feminism in Kuwait. A small but significant 
number of Islamist women activists have begun to question and challenge the mainstream Islamists’ 





Prompted by the success of the Iranian Islamic revolution, Kuwaiti Islamists sought to impose 
their version of traditional values in Kuwait. By the early 1980s, numerous conservative religious 
groups rose to the surface. Among them was Bayader al-Salam (the Threshing Fields of Peace) and the 
Islamic Care Society. The latter was led by the wife of the Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Kuwait 
Sheikha Latifa al-Sabah, an indication of the state’s efforts to support women’s engagement in the 
Islamization process and perhaps to counter the popularity of Arab nationalism by identifying itself 
with traditional tribal and religious values (Dianu, 2002). 
 
Both of these associations carried out similar activities directed towards women and children. 
These activities include preaching sessions, religious classes, summer camps, a kindergarten and 
conferences and seminars on how to raise a family and spread social awareness. Religious education 
centered on the Quran and Sharia gave women the opportunity to become more knowledgeable about 
religious matters. Moreover, their charitable work was mainly oriented towards the financing of a wide 
range of community-outreach programs outside Kuwait that included building the Hanan Villages for 
orphans in Sudan and occupied Palestine (Tétreault, Meyer & Rizzo, 2009). At a discursive level, the 
Islamic associations were oriented towards the production of a body of discourse that celebrated the 
importance of women’s domestic role and the natural differences between men and women in order to 
rationalize asymmetrical gender relations in society. So, although there was no consensus as to what 
place women should occupy in society, most of the religious groups called for a return to traditional 
female virtues and morality. Women were defined as having moral duties to strengthen family ties, 
raise good children and defend the traditions and customs of society. 
 
Parallel to the expansion of religious organizations was the explosion of writing and debates on 
women’s rights and duties in Islam. The Hijab made its appearance and a new model of womanhood 
surfaced. Many women found resonance in this new Islamized discourse and took part in the 
Islamization process through participation in preaching sessions (Tétreault et al., 2009). Women’s 
Islamic activism also extended to the university campus, where female students played an important 
role in converting women to the Islamic cause and spreading the practice of wearing Hijab among 
them. These women helped the Islamists to take control of Kuwait’s University’s student union and the 
influential teachers’ association (al-Mughni, 2010).  
 
 The appeal of the Islamist movement to a large section of Kuwaitis can be attributed to several 
factors. Nath (1978) argues that the rapid pace of modernization disrupted the equation of traditional 
gender relations and brought new values into the Kuwaiti society. Modernization was widely regarded 
as responsible for generating severe social problems, such as the rise of divorce rates and the 
consumption of alcohol, which became widespread. Also, women’s lives were perceived as changed. 
Kuwaiti women moved from being veiled to moving about freely in public dressed in Western clothes 
and driving their own cars, enjoying by that a mobility that was not available before. The growing 
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involvement of women in the labor force was seen as leading to the neglect of their family 
responsibilities. Both were cited as primary causes of the erosion of family ties and the weakening of 
national unity (al-Mughni, 1993). Many women felt a sense of alienation. Thus, returning to Islam was 
seen as a much-needed means to ease the strains of modernity by preserving traditional values and 
practices and providing a sense of stability in an ever-changing society.  
 
In her study, al-Mughani (1996) maintains that during the period, many female Islamist activists 
emerged as prominent and influential leaders. However, they produced a discourse that reaffirmed 
gender subordination as their emphasis was concentrated on women’s obligations towards their family 
and their community at large. Issues of women’s rights were considered heresy and an imperialist ploy. 
Consequently, during that period, women’s demands for equal rights were silenced and marginalized. 
This left the liberal Women’s Cultural and Social Society (WCSS) struggling on its own to campaign 
for political rights, especially after the disbanding of AWDS. Early female Islamist activists did not 
support the suffrage movement for women. 
 
It was not until the 1990s that female Islamist activists began to articulate new roles for women 
in the public sphere. This shift was partly due to their frustration of being left out of the decision-
making bodies that echoed the unequal patterns of gender relations based on male authority. Women’s 
committees were kept outside the major bodies in the Islamist movements where important decisions 
were taken. Female members did not enjoy any participatory rights. While male members could elect 
their representatives and serve as board members, women could not. Conversely, in most liberal civic 
organizations in Kuwait, women could still fully participate in the elections and occasionally serve as 
founding members or contributing board members (al-Mughani, 2010).  
 
Henceforth, contradictions between women’s contributions to the Islamic cause and their 
marginalized role within the Islamist movement have pushed Islamist women activists to challenge 
male leadership and demand a fairer share in decision-making (Abdellatif, 2008). Their committees 
were kept separate from the major bodies where important decisions were made and their members did 
not have any participatory rights, while male representatives could elect other members and serve as 
board members, in contrast to women. Islamic activists, however, remained trapped in the dynamic of 
being divided along secular and Islamists lines, far from achieving broader gender solidarity around 
common causes. Yet, during the 1990–91 Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, women would forge the gender 







3.5.3 Kuwaiti Women and the Iraq-Kuwait War: Women's Resistance, Hope, and Further 
Dissent 
It is argued that the seven-month Iraqi invasion of Kuwait served as a catalyst for women’s growing 
feminist consciousness. During that period, many women took important social responsibilities and 
were instrumental in the survival of their besieged communities. Some women volunteered in hospitals 
to compensate for the lack of medical staff, others ran shelters. Some smuggled food, money and 
weapons across military checkpoints. 
 
Women participated directly as activists and auxiliaries. They were also central to mobilizing 
opposition. The first issue of the underground resistance paper was produced by women as they were in 
charge of its underground circulation. Some of those who were abroad created one of the first 
resistance groups outside Kuwait, the Women’s Joint Resistance Committee in Cairo (Juliá & Ridha, 
2001). Women also formed part of the underground armed resistance, passing weapons and 
ammunition through checkpoints. Many women became prisoners of war and martyrs (Al-Tarrah, 
2002). For many, women’s performance exposed the fallacies of conventional gender norms and their 
accompanied contradictions. The prevailing crisis at the time provided a situational context where 
women’s participation in non-traditional domains became acceptable for the survival of the community 
at the cost of traditional norms and values. 
 
As Badran (1998) has stated, the abnormal as normal new dynamic during the war freed women 
to perform as citizens and prove their capabilities as equal partners. The defense of the nation and its 
people legitimized all behaviors and normal rules, which were prior to this crisis, were irrelevant. In the 
immediate aftermath of liberation, women wished to maintain the newfound gender consciousness 
experienced under occupation and resistance. Many expressed concerns about losing ground in gender 
equality experienced during the occupation; it had become clear to them that their political roles were 
as important as their social roles. 
 
A new period of the women’s rights struggle began in 1991 after Kuwait was liberated from the 
invasion of Iraq. Women argued that they had proven themselves by their contributions to the 
resistance throughout the brutal occupation, thereby earning full political rights. The government 
appeared to be more sympathetic to women’s rights as they made several public assurances that women 
would play a greater role and make more noble contributions to the country that they had courageously 
helped to defend (al-Mughni, 2010). However, it chose not to confront the strong alliance of Islamists, 
tribalists and conservatives in parliament on this issue.  
 
With the return of normalcy, traditional roles once again rose up as age-old hindrances in the 
path of women’s emancipation. The marginalization of women’s roles had grown to become a major 
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source of dissatisfaction among Islamist women activists themselves (Al-Tarrah, 2002). Not only did 
these women activists feel betrayed by their own organizations, but they also felt frustrated by the 
movement failed to acknowledge their contribution. Other Islamist activists, “Khawlah al-Atiqi” 
publicly addressed her dissatisfaction with the continuing exclusion of women from decision-making 
positions within the Islamist organizations. In an interview with a local newspaper, she pointed out that 
the major obstacle facing a female activist inside the Islamist organization was her position as a 
follower of men. The voices of dissent that belonged to Islamist women made headlines in the majority 
of print media, leading some journalists to ponder whether this was a sign of maturity or mere rebellion 
(al-Mughni, 2010). 
 
When it came to the institutionalized feminist scene that followed the liberation of Kuwait, in 
1994, a new union was licensed, the Kuwaiti Union of Women’s Societies. The union was led by the 
Crown Prince’s wife Sheikha Latifa, who was already the acting chairwoman of the Islamic Care 
Society. All the women’s organizations except the WCSS joined the union; WCSS considered the 
union a manoeuver intended to weaken and restrain the women’s movement. As might have been 
expected, the union was not active on the feminist scene, restricting itself to coordination between the 
Islamic societies, resolving potential disagreements and representing women in and outside Kuwait 
(Shultziner & Tétreault, 2011). 
 
The union gave elite women the chance to speak on behalf of all Kuwaiti women, ignoring the 
many social and economic problems faced by Kuwaiti women in their everyday lives. For instance, 
following the Gulf War, the number of impoverished female heads of households increased and the 
situation of Kuwaiti women married to non-Kuwaitis seriously worsened. To elaborate, foreign 
husbands and children of Kuwaiti women who are married to non-Kuwaitis are denied all protections 
to which Kuwaiti males are otherwise entitled. The patrilineal character of citizenship in Kuwait allows 
the state to disavow any responsibility to support them. Government housing, child allowances and 
welfare assistance packages are provided directly to Kuwaiti men as heads of households. Women who 
faced this problem could not find any alternative but to go to WCSS with their issue, so the WCSS 
embraced the cause of Kuwaiti women married to non-Kuwaiti men (Alsharekh, 2018). 
 
Suffrage politics surfaced again in 1999, when the late Emir of Kuwait, Shaikh Jabir al-Sabah, 
promulgated a decree granting women the right to participate fully in political life in appreciation of 
their efforts in defending Kuwait during the occupation. The decree was issued in the interim between 
the dissolution of the old and the election of a new parliament. The Constitution requires that all laws 
issued in the absence of parliament be approved by the new parliament. However, the Islamist-
dominated re-elected Parliament ruled that the decree was illegal and by a simple majority voted down 





Some liberals rejected the decree on the basis that the decree was an unconstitutional attack on 
the power of the elected parliament. A week later, some liberal MPs who generally supported women’s 
voting rights but opposed the Emir’s action drafted an identical bill, which was rejected as well 
(Olimat, 2009). Kuwait was very polarized politically. All the repeated legislative initiatives and calls 
to enfranchise women introduced in parliament since 1981 failed to obtain the majority of votes 
because Islamist deputies and their conservative allies had coordinated to defeat the bills both in 
committee and on the floor. Those who opposed women’s suffrage rights claimed that Islam restricted 
the leadership of the Muslim nation to men (al-Mughni, 2010). 
 
3.5.4 The Battle for the Ballot: Bridging the Islamist-Liberal Divide 
In response to the decree’s defeat, women attempted to organize themselves and operate as an active 
coalition. A few of the female elite tried to register their names in voter registration centers or to resort 
to the constitutional court to obtain their political rights. The court ruled that this would be 
unconstitutional. Women activists opted to shift the focus of their efforts towards raising awareness 
among the broad-based female population to attempt to win the support of moderate Muslim 
movements and coordinate and cooperate with several civil society institutions to achieve their goals 
(Shalaby, 2015). 
 
Thus, we can observe women’s organizations’ realization of the importance of building 
cooperative links with influential constituencies by moderating their stance and utilizing the “politics of 
engagement” instead of confrontation to maximize the sociopolitical leverage of movement activities. 
Many Islamist activists announced their public support for the suffrage struggle and formed alliances 
with liberal women activists. These alliances angered their male peers and leaders (al-Mughni, 2010). 
Prominent Islamist women activists such as Khadija al -Mahmeed, Khawlah al-Atiqi and Urub al-Riffa, 
joined the suffrage movement. 
 
Together, Islamist women activists organized grassroots working groups to coordinate pro-
suffrage activities, appeared on national television and joined forces with liberal women activists, a 
move which gave greater visibility and strength to the suffrage movement. They also requested 
deputies for support and organized numerous public seminars to which both opponents and supporters 
of women’s suffrage rights were invited. The shift in the Islamist women’s position towards political 
participation can be attributed to their experiences during the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, during which 
they assumed great responsibility for the survival of their besieged community (Badran, 1998), which 




Liberal women activists benefited from the involvement of Islamist women as it enabled them 
to deploy religious-based frames in addition to legal frames based on the country’s constitution and 
international human rights declarations. Liberal women activists had previously framed their demands 
around the Constitution and Kuwait’s democratic principles. Their main argument was that the 1962 
election law that denied women the right to vote violated the constitution, which upholds the principle 
of equality between men and women in all spheres, including politics. Islamist women activists helped 
to extend their struggle via an avenue new to them, “Islamic feminism,” and open up the discursive 
opportunity field to frame and push for women’s rights within an Islamic frame of reference that would 
find resonance (al-Mughni, 2010). 
 
While the suffrage movement was spearheaded by the liberal women’s groups, it regained its 
strength and vitality when many Islamist women who previously opposed the right to political 
participation joined the struggle alongside liberal women’s activists. Such an unexpected alliance 
strengthened the suffrage movement. It gave it greater credibility that eventually led to the 
enfranchisement of Kuwaiti women in 2005. During the fight for the right for women to vote, secular 
feminist activism co-existed, challenged, converged and collaborated with Islamist women’s 
committees and Islamic feminist groups, emphasizing the porous boundaries between secular and 
religious agencies (Buscemi, 2016). 
 
Moreover, the battle for the ballot became a symbol that would pave the way for women to 
achieve further citizenship rights, as despite significant advances, Kuwaiti women continue to face 
discrimination on many fronts. For instance, laws regulating social welfare services and housing treat 
men and women in different, unequal manners. However, many women activists believed that the 
enfranchisement of women would help to redress some of the structural inequalities based on gender, 
including equal citizenship rights for Kuwaiti women who are married to non-Kuwaitis. 
 
3.5.5 Women’s Pursuit to Claim Full Citizenship Rights: The Nationality Issue  
The right of women to equal citizenship rights is guaranteed by the majority of constitutions across the 
MENA region, as well as by international law. Nonetheless, in some countries, women are denied their 
right to pass on their nationality to their children and/or their non-national spouses. Kuwait is one of 25 
countries in the world where women remain unable to confer their nationality to their children in the 
same manner as men (UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 2019), which creates many obstacles. 
These women need to obtain residency/work permits for their children and are bound to renew them 
regularly. 
 
The nationality issue is a contentious topic in Kuwait, because it is also rooted in Kuwait’s 




its independence in 1961. From 1948 onwards, however, the Kuwaiti state defined the original 
Kuwaitis as (a) every member of the ruling family, (b) every resident in Kuwait since 1899, (c) every 
child of a Kuwaiti father and (d) every child born on Kuwaiti soil of an Arab or Muslim father. These 
provisions stood out among other regional legalization for the unique role played by the jus soli in the 
determination of de facto Kuwaiti nationality (Oskay, 2010). 
 
In 1959, an Emiri decree established Kuwaiti nationality and regulated its attribution, 
acquisition and loss. Thus, The 1959 Decree which is in fact pre-dated the constitution assumed 1920 
as watershed for Kuwaiti nationality, since in that year the citizenry gathered to resist the attack of Abd 
Alaziz ibn Saud in the battle of Jahra, a turning point in the shaping of Kuwaiti national identity over 
Saudi expansion (Parolin, 2009). The Nationality Act created several classes of citizenship. The 
primary distinction is between those who are so-called “original Kuwaitis” and those who are 
naturalized citizens. Consequently, different classes of citizenship are maintained today and the rights 
that come with Kuwaiti citizenship vary significantly depending on the article that the citizenship 
category falls into. Full political rights are only given to those who acquire nationality under Article 1 
or 2, within the “original Kuwaitis” category. Naturalized citizens only acquire the right to vote after 30 
years of residence (Refugees International, 2011). 
 
In accordance with the Act, “Article-1-citizens” identifies Kuwaiti nationals as those persons 
and their descendants who resided in Kuwait prior to 1920 and maintained residence there until the 
publication of the decree in 1959. Article 2 provides an automatic right to citizenship for descendants 
of the “original Kuwaitis” provided that descent is through the paternal bloodline. Article 3 grants 
nationality to foundlings (an abandoned child of unknown parentage) and Articles 4 and 5 provide for 
the acquisition of nationality through naturalization. Significantly, naturalization decisions are entirely 




Figure 3. 1 Articles 1-5 of the Nationality Law of Kuwait (UNHCR, 2016) 
One of the main divisions in Kuwaiti society is between Kuwaiti citizens and non-Kuwaiti 
citizens. Those whose families immigrated to Kuwait before 1920 are considered to be first-class 
citizens who enjoy full citizenship rights in contrast to those whose families immigrated to Kuwait 
between 1920 and 1949 or those naturalized after that, who have limited political rights but the same 
access to Kuwait’s generous welfare state as first-class Kuwaitis (Tétreault, Rizzo and Shultziner, 
2012). There have been several amendments to the Kuwaiti nationality law since its implementation in 
1959, notably in 1980, 1982, 1994, 1998 and 2000. The amendments have increased the restrictiveness 
of granting of citizenship, such as by prohibiting non-Muslims to apply for naturalization and limiting 
the conditions in which women can pass their citizenship to their children. The conditions include the 
cases if women are widowed, permanently divorced or if the father is unknown or paternity has not 
been established (Albarazi, 2017). 
 
These restrictions are contrary to the Kuwaiti Constitution, written in 1962, which proclaims the 
principle of equality and human dignity as stated in Article (29): people are equal in human dignity, 
and they are equal in the law in public rights and duties, and the law does not tolerate discrimination 
because of sex, origin, language or religion (al-Nakib, 2006). Several implementation problems and 
discrepancies emerged in practice as other state laws trumped constitutional provisions. Article 2 of the 
1959 Nationality Law states that Kuwaiti citizenship is transmitted through a male citizen, prohibiting 
Kuwaiti women from conferring their nationality on their children or husband with limited exceptions 
such as if the father of the child was unknown. Even in these cases, giving Kuwaiti nationality is 
subject to the discretionary authority of the minister of interior (Maktabi, 2017). Also, depriving 




seriously affects the children’s rights to the inheritance of their mother in immovable funds such as real 
estate, a law intended to control foreign ownership in Kuwait. These children are also denied political, 
economic and social protections to which Kuwaitis are entitled. Moreover, they are normally paid less 
than their fellow citizens who occupy the same jobs and do the same work (Alsharekh, 2018). 
 
This system makes citizenship, which is often referred to as the legal and political relationship 
negotiated between a sovereign state and individuals residing within its territory (Kastoryano, 2005), a 
gendered phenomenon. So, while much of citizenship is connected to juridical/legal status and ensuing 
rights, duties and obligations, it also extends conceptually to include the more constructed notion of 
entitlements, privileges and belongings that are centered on questions of exclusion and inclusion 
(Babar, 2014). Thus, citizenship in the context of Kuwait remains based on a privilege that is built 
around an accepted right to the exclusivity that comes with certain social, economic and political rights 
and privileges. This very right to exclusivity is protected by strictly limiting the possibilities of 
naturalization and institutionalizing patriarchal policies that are targeted towards women in specific 
(Maktabi, 2012).  
 
This system is also a product of the idea of citizenship as established through “blood” that is 
passed along patrilineal lines; only men are capable of passing citizenship on to their children and 
spouses. Thus, questions of how citizenship is gendered in the context of Kuwait provide an example of 
how the social contract, kinship policies and economic logic in this rentier state intersect to regulate 
and delegitimize women’s citizenship and tie the authority of the ruling family and citizens under a 
single umbrella of family patriarchy (Tétreault, 2001). 
 
Alsharekh (2018) asserts that by having different criteria regulating the granting of citizenship 
to spouses and children for Kuwaiti men and women, the principle of equal rights and opportunities for 
Kuwaiti women and their right freely to choose a spouse becomes principally challenged.  
Discrimination against Kuwaiti women married to non-Kuwaitis appears even more severe in cases 
where the non-Kuwaiti spouse is Bidūn, a term that refers to the stateless population in Kuwait. The 
Kuwaiti government claims, that many Bidūn are not really stateless nomads, but rather Iraqis or 
Iranians who deny their nationality as a way to gain entitlements to superior Kuwaiti economic, social 
and political rights (Ali, 2006). 
 
Until the late 1980s, the settlement and participation of Bidūn in Kuwaiti life were welcomed 
because Bidūn men constituted a large pool of willing recruits for Kuwaiti security forces. The status of 
the Bidūn was so close to that of certified Kuwaiti nationals that, in census tallies carried out prior to 
the Iraqi invasion, the Bidūn were counted as part of the Kuwaiti population rather than as non-
Kuwaitis (Tétreault and al-Mughni, 1995).  
 
 88 
In response to the deterioration of the Kuwaiti economy following the collapse of the oil prices 
in the mid-1980s, however, the Bidūn were pushed out from the domestic labor force by demands that 
all expatriate workers show their nationality papers. Since the Bidūn by definition have no such papers, 
they could not produce them for their employers and many were fired from their jobs. The economic 
and social marginality of the Bidūn increased following the liberation in 1991. It deteriorated to the 
extent that the government population statistics were revised in 1992, reclassifying the Bidūn as non-
Kuwaitis (Tétreault and al-Mughni, 1995). 
 
During the early 1900s, an amendment to the Article 3 in the 1959 Nationality Act which 
previously allowed Kuwait mothers married to stateless men to pass on their citizenship to their 
children dropped this provision, erecting yet another barrier between Kuwaiti citizens and the Bidūn 
which leaves children of Kuwaiti mothers and stateless fathers stateless, perpetuating the plight of the 
Bidūn community (Eldemerdash, 2015). Today, an estimated 106,000 Bidūn live in Kuwait, according 
to the conservative estimate of the government body created to review their files in November 2010, 
the Central System to Resolve Illegal Residents’ Status (hereafter ‘Central System’). Estimates of cases 
of mixed marriages between a Kuwaiti citizen woman and a stateless man range from 5,000 to 7,000, 
as asserted by the press (Beaugrand, 2015). 
 
Since the 1990s, the politicization of census figures and the dynamics of inclusion or exclusion 
of residents based on tribal affiliation have played into the politics of citizenship, including women’s 
full nationality rights. Part of the problem regarding the exclusion of Kuwaiti women from full 
nationality rights is related to the constitution of the citizenry and to kinship relations between Kuwaiti 
nationals and stateless Bidūn through tribal alliances and cross-border intermarriages (Maktabi, 2017). 
Therefore, the ethnic conceptions of citizenship are prevalent in the context of Kuwait. Based on Nils 
Butenschon’s (2000) characterizations, we can define Kuwait as ethnocracies, where the identity of the 
state is that of a particular ethnic group.  
 
This conception of citizenship means that those not belonging to the ethnic group in question 
are always excluded from the political community. In the case of Kuwait particularly, the ethnic 
identity represented by the state is that of the “original Kuwaitis” who were settled in the country in 
1920 (Longva, 2005). Citizenship also intersects with Kuwaiti nationalism, based on the concept of a 
united family, which has been a symbol of the nation since the early 1970s. The concept promotes 
national cohesion, where everyone lives securely under the protective wing of the family patriarch and 
shows allegiance to the monarchic state; any deviation won’t be easily tolerated (al-Mughni, 1996). 
Additionally, there is an economic logic behind the exclusion of Bidūn. The inclusion of more 
inhabitants as part of the privileged citizenry is most probably related to the distribution of welfare 
benefits among larger segments of the population. Many are concerned about the potential decrease, or 




3.5.6: The “Ensaf” Campaign for Abolishing Gender Discrimination in Nationality Law in 
Kuwait 
As a result of this discriminatory treatment, Kuwaiti women have mobilized to address the issue of 
granting full citizenship rights for more than three decades. Nonetheless, it was not until Kuwait’s 
liberation from the Iraqi invasion in the early 1990s and the state new policy requiring submitting a 
formal proof of citizenship for every worker that a group of women decided to mobilize on a collective 
basis to improve their conditions after facing deteriorated economic situations that resulted from the 
new policy (Tétreault & al-Mughni, 1995). 
 
Consequently, in April 1991, a group of stay-at-home mothers who belonged to low-to middle-
income classes, along with some highly educated women, attempted to form a civil society association 
that lobbied for full citizenship rights. The state rejected their request, thus denying them the chance to 
operate officially and to be eligible to receive state financial support available to recognized 
organizations (Tétreault & al-Mughni, 1995). However, this denial did not discourage women, who 
kept holding ongoing meetings. As of 1993, of Kuwait’s main women’s organization, the Women’s 
Cultural and Social Society (WCSS), decided to adopt their cause and add the issue of Kuwaiti women 
married to non-Kuwaitis to the top of their priorities (Rizzo, 2005). Since then, WCSS has articulated 
more explicit outward support towards the cause for full citizenship rights and lobbied for laws that 
would permit women to pass their Kuwaiti citizenship to their non-citizen children. They have argued 
that the law is contrary in some of its articles with the constitution and paragraph (2) of Article (9) of 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (Meyer, Rizzo & 
Ali, 1998). The issue of the continued suffering of the children of Kuwaiti women continued to find 
more resonance with the civil society sector in Kuwait and aspiring politicians. The issue has emerged 
more frequently in campaign promises for some male candidates during elections since the early 2010s 
(Alsharekh, 2018). 
 
Nevertheless, it was not until 2014, when a coalition of women’s organizations dedicated to the 
cause came together under the banner of “Ensaf,” which translates to “Justice” in English, to seek 
justice for Kuwaiti women and their families. The first executive meeting for the campaign was held on 
January 2014 and it was decided to form an administrative committee run by the members of the 
WCSS to coordinate the efforts of the participating organizations. Participating organizations included 
the Association of Social Workers in Kuwait, the National Association of Familial Security (Rawasi), 
Kuwait’s Society for Social Education, Kuwait Graduates Society, Kuwait Lawyers Association, 
Kuwait Association for the Care of Children in Hospitals, The Center for Child Evaluation and 
Teaching, the Agricultural Engineers Association and the relevant official and civil authorities (WCSS 




The campaign was officially launched on February 5, 2014 and was depicted as being a first-of-
its-kind coalition to pursue the common goal of raising awareness of the impact of gendered nationality 
law and pushing for its abolition. The coalition also demands equal civil rights for Kuwaiti women and 
raise awareness, as there might be little awareness amongst civil society actors, the media and the 
public that discriminatory nationality laws may leave children stateless and unable to exercise many 
fundamental rights (al-Ali, 2014). More specifically, the campaign called for amending Article 2 of the 
Amiri Decree No. 15 of the 1959 Kuwaiti Nationality Act to permit women to confer their citizenship 
to their sons and daughters on an equal basis with men. It also called for the introduction of permanent 
residence for the foreign spouses and children of Kuwaiti women who choose to hold to their original 
citizenship in addition to equal opportunity in employment for the sons/daughters of Kuwaiti female 
citizens.  
 
The campaign was also divided into two phases. The first phase involved participating in public 
seminars/lectures to raise awareness about the constitutional rights of Kuwaiti women and arranging 
meetings with the relevant officials and stakeholders to politicalize the issue and explain the 
humanitarian aspect to those who were in public office. This was manifested in the efforts to submit a 
petition to the National Assembly and the Office of Prime Minister and to meet with some Deputies 
(WCSS report, 2016). The second phase was concerned with establishing communication with 
transnational bodies, human rights organizations and the United Nations (Janat, 2014). 
 
During the first phase, the tactical actions included holding public seminars, engaging in 
extensive media and press interviews as well as maintaining outreach efforts that targeted the 
legislative and executive branches. The coalition was promised that the parliament would form a 
special working committee to coordinate and follow up with their members in order to work on their 
demands (WCSS report, 2016). Other strategies taken included introducing new tactics to serve the 
cause and welcome new activists and civil society associations to join the forces. More specifically, the 
committee of “Kuwaitis Without Borders,” which is a grassroots voluntarily committee formed by 
Kuwaiti women married to non-Kuwaitis who have come together through the shared experience of 
being denied of full citizenship rights, later joined the “Ensaf” campaign to demand the strengthening 
of citizenship rights. Actors relied on raising awareness about this issue through public 
lectures/seminars and digital networking platforms, complementing by that their activities on the 
ground with digital efforts. 
 
“Ensaf” also filed three separate constitutional appeals in 2016 to look into the issue of 
equalizing Kuwaiti mothers’ housing allowances and allowing Kuwaiti mothers to pass on a rightful 
inheritance to their children in the same manner that is allowed for Kuwaiti men. The court rejected the 
cases in May 2017 (Alsharekh, 2018). Despite the perceived reluctance of the legislatures to amend 




raising claims and making use of the symbolic and material recourses available to them to draw 




Chapter 4: Bringing the Actors Back on Stage: Reflections, Subjectivities and Assertions on 
Feminist Activism 
 
As already discussed in Chapter 2, although there is a growing body of research interested in feminist 
activism, much of it does not attend to the lived experiences of women engaging in feminist campaigns 
in the MENA region. I address this research gap concerning the persistent lack of recognition for 
women’s voices, roles and motivations in the dominant academic discourses by investigating the 
renewed feminist politics in the Gulf States that rose most notably during with the “Women to Drive” 
campaign in Saudi Arabia and “Ensaf” campaign in Kuwait.  
  
By adopting an activist-centric approach, I intend to look beyond the digital media affordances 
thesis and also consider the other contextual factors conditioning activist uses of digital media 
platforms for feminist activism. The chapter will, therefore, be led by the following multifaceted 
research questions: What are activists’ perceptions and experiences while carrying out feminist 
activism? And while admittedly, this question seems to be overly generic, the formulation of this 
question is this way was intentional to allow a degree of flexibility for activists to define, articulate and 
convey their understandings of their feminist involvement in the involved campaigns. 
  
I depart from the assumption that investigating activist’s experiences and involvement in the 
selected campaigns can provide us with situated emergent knowledge that is actively formed from the 
standpoint of female activists and brings us closer to understand their sense-making of feminist 
activism as an agentic practice. To do so, a special effort was dedicated to giving the women whom I 
interviewed, the chance and the space to speak on their own terms about the complex and contradictory 
ways in which they reflect on their involvement with these campaigns. And while it is almost 
impossible to construct a single map of collective feminist genealogies, it is in fact possible to identify 
important, parallel narratives of feminist activism. 
  
Consequently, I have chosen to outline some established insights that run through all responses 
which included their reflections on the intra-movement dynamics surrounding feminist activism, their 
mode of organization, the ways in which they crafted and reflected on their feminist identification, as 
well as the to identify the tactics and practices that they employed to mobilize for lifting the driving ban 
and strengthening female citizenship in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait respectively. I emphasize on the 
importance of bridging the gap between feminism and activism (Reinharz, 1992). Indeed, in this 
research, I adopt the perspective that the unifying purpose of feminism is a combination of political 





By doing so, I aim to enhance our understanding of the overall picture of feminist activism in 
the Gulf Region. This emphasis, in turn, raises questions about the subjectivity, motivations and the 
constitutions of activists who enact agency within larger women’s movements (Bimber, Flanagin & 
Stohl, 2005; della Porta & Diani, 2006). 
 
4.1 Conducting Qualitative Interviews  
Interviews constitute the empirical backbone of much qualitative research in the social sciences. They 
are considered to be fundamental for generating empirical knowledge by asking people to talk about 
certain themes or issues of interest (della Porta, 2014). According to Schostak (2006, p. 23), an 
interview is “an extended conversation between partners that aims at having in-depth information about 
a certain topic or subject of interest and through which a phenomenon could be interpreted in terms of 
the meanings interviewees bring to it.” Maccoby and Maccoby (1954, p. 449) define it as “an exchange 
in which one person attempts to elicit information or expressions of opinion or belief from another 
person or persons.” 
 
At a general level, interviews can be placed on a continuum of structure from “unstructured” to 
highly “structured.” Embedded in this continuum is the question of how much control the interviewer 
will have over the interaction (Qu & Dumay, 2011). Structured interviews are most often organized 
around a fixed set of predetermined direct questions that require immediate, mostly “yes” or “no” type 
responses. In such interviews, the questions are fixed. They are asked in a specific order and the same 
interview script is used in each separate interview. This continuity facilitates easier comparison 
between different transcripts, but does not allow interviewees to shape the discussion (Punch, 2013). 
 
It can be argued that this type of interviewing is similar to self-administered quantitative 
questionnaires in both their form and underlying assumptions. Structured interviews have several 
advantages over surveys, including lower levels of item nonresponse and the ability for an interviewer 
to mitigate inappropriate responses (Boeije, 2002). These interviews are often used when one has a 
large sample size and is looking for data that can be generalized to a large population. Conversely, 
unstructured interviews are closer to observation. In this style of interview, the course of the 
conversation depends on the responses obtained from the interviewees themselves and questions are 
asked spontaneously based on these answers (Bryman, 2006). The interviewer here would be keener to 
let the interviewee elaborate on various issues (Dörnyei, 2007). 
 
As opposed to unstructured interviews, semi-structured interviews have some structure 
embedded in their compilation of topics. These interviews rely on a pre-conceived interview guide. 




interviewee’s accounts. Standard questions are asked in each individual interview, allowing 
comparison and maintaining data quality. Crucially, semi-structured interviews allow depth to be 
achieved by providing the opportunity on the part of the interviewer to probe and expand the 
interviewee’s responses (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). In reflecting on the advantages of semi-structured 
interviewing, Cohen and Manion (1990) maintained that semi-structured interviews are perhaps the 
preferred choice for researchers wishing to explore, discover and interoperate complex social events 
and processes. 
 
Semi-structured interviews have been extensively used in a wide variety of fields including 
social movements studies. Such interviewing strategies have proven to be particularly useful while 
researching about loosely organized, short-lived or thinly documented social movements in which it is 
difficult to gather data through structured questionnaires, field observation or document analysis. More 
importantly, semi-structured interviews can shed new light on the importance that actors give their 
actions, especially when the researchers seek to assess the context of “individual and collective visions, 
hopes, expectations, critique of the present and projection of the future on which the possibility of 
collective action rests and through which social movements form, endure or disband” ( Blee and 
Taylor, 2002, p. 95). They can also facilitate the generation of reflections and representations that 
embody the subjects’ voices, minimizing, at least as much as possible, the voice of the researcher 
(Ragin, 1994). 
 
The use of semi-structured interviews has become the principal means for the study of the 
feminist movements as well (Reinharz, 1992). Scholars have sought to achieve the active involvement 
of their feminist respondents in the construction of data about their lives. For instance, Taylor and Van 
Willigen’s (1996) study of the women’s self-help movement points to a number of advantages of semi-
structured interviewing, including how intensive interviews can maximize description, discovery and 
the active involvement of participants in social movement research; interviewing methods can also be 
used to create new theoretical insights. Finally, they mandate the constant navigation and negotiation of 
decorum and boundaries to elicit meaningful knowledge (Okruhlik, 2018). 
 
Discussing the feminist phenomenological approach to research interviews, Fisher and Embree 
(2000) agree that open-ended questions maximize discovery and description and also facilitate the 
researcher’s access to localized, personal and embodied feminist accounts and perceptions. Taking into 
account these reasons together, the data for this chapter were obtained through qualitative, semi-
structured interviews of women who became involved in the “Women to Drive” campaign and the 
campaign for equal citizenship rights. I opted to use semi-structured interviews to gain insider 
information on specific aspects of the movements and provide more detailed responses about 
interviewees and their experiences. Semi-structured interviews made it easier to identify and pick up on 





Not only do semi-structured interviews provide information about and from activists, but they 
are of fundamental importance for the study of motives, beliefs and attitudes as well as the identities of 
movement activists (Blee, 2013). This information is instrumental for latent and underground 
organizations, where other sources of information are limited or potentially biased (Blee & Taylor, 
2002). It should be noted, however, that semi-structured interviews are not without limitations. Several 
critiques have been posted in response to their use, including the lack of transparency in sampling 
strategy, choice of questions and mode of analysis. 
 
Indeed, Strauss and Corbin (1998) stated that, “there always are constraints of time, energy, 
availability of participants, and other conditions that affect data collection” (p. 16). In the same vein, 
Walford (2007) argued that “interviews alone are  insufficient  to study social life.” That is, both 
interviewer and interviewee may have incomplete knowledge or even faulty memory. Additionally, 
Roulston, deMarris and Lewise (2003, p. 643) spoke about the challenges which inexperienced 
interviewers could encounter in interviews, such as “unexpected participant behavior, dealing with the 
consequences of the interviewer’s own action and subjectivities, constructing and delivering questions 
and handling sensitive topics.” 
 
Therefore, given the foregoing succinct observations, the researchers should weigh the 
advantages and disadvantages of interviews as a methodology in the light of their research agenda and 
question(s), including different styles of interviews (structured, semi-structured and unstructured), and 
must work diligently to ensure the validity and reliability of the interview data. In sum, with regard to 
the advantages and limitations of interviews and to make my position clear, I will follow Robson 
(2002), who maintains that although interviewing is a powerful way of getting insights into the 
interviewee’s perceptions, it can go hand in hand with other methods to strengthen the overall findings. 
 
Although it depends on the research questions, I would argue that using more than one data 
collection instrument would help to obtain richer data and validate research findings. Moreover, one 
should also take into consideration that most often studies based on interviews involve a varying 
number of activists who do not represent the (unknown) universe, but rather important theoretical 
dimensions. As mentioned, the quality of the information collected in this way is influenced by the 
complex relations between interviewers and interviewees, in particular the interviewer’s capacity to 







4.1.1 Interviewing Participants      
Generally speaking, in semi-structured interviewing, interviewees are selected in a deliberate, rarely 
random manner. Sampling choices, therefore, reflect the underlying questions and theories guiding the 
research and the emergent understandings garnered in the study. Rubin and Rubin (2005) suggested 
that sampling for qualitative interviews should follow two main principles. First, sampling should 
strive for completeness. In the field of social movements, researchers most often choose respondents 
who are knowledgeable about the topic under investigation and continue to add new interviewees until 
the topic is saturated. That is, the interviews are garnering the same kinds of narratives and 
interpretations.  
 
Second, sampling should ideally follow the principle of similarity and dissimilarity. 
Interviewees are chosen to see how the interpretations or accounts of similarly situated respondents 
compare, as well as to ascertain how those respondents with very different characteristics or in different 
circumstances contrast. Sampling may proceed in stages when new questions are raised by the 
researcher/s or when new insights need to be captured. Henceforth, for the purpose of this chapter, I 
employed the purposive sampling technique (Sandelowski, 2000), which encompasses the deliberate 
choice of a participant due to the qualities the participant possesses.  
 
It is a non-random technique that does not need underlying theories or a set number of 
participants. Simply put, the researcher decides what needs to be known and sets out to find people 
who can and are willing to provide the information based on their anticipated richness and relevance of 
information in relation to the study’s research questions by virtue of knowledge or experience 
(Bernard, 1994). Purposive sampling, therefore, involves identifying and selecting individuals or 
groups who are well informed with a phenomenon of interest. In addition to knowledge and experience, 
Spradley (1979) noted the importance of availability and willingness to participate and the ability to 
interview participants to articulate their opinions in a clear way. Unlike random studies, which 
deliberately include a diverse cross-section of ages and backgrounds, the idea behind purposive 
sampling is to select individuals with particular characteristics who will better be able to assist with the 
relevant research. 
 
The respondents were accordingly identified due to their notable public profiles or through 
internet searches and pre-existing contacts. They were primarily selected because of their engagement 
in the given feminist campaigns that I am examining, rather than because their experiences are 
representative of the larger population. Twenty-five Saudi women and 20 Kuwaiti women’s activists 
were contacted via private emails, Twitter and Whatsapp. A standardized text was created and was 




included paragraphs appreciating their incredible work and asking them if they were willing to be 
interviewed.  
 
Out of the 25 Saudi activists, 10 of them replied and agreed to be interviewed. Eight Kuwaiti 
activists contacted me and agreed to be interviewed. The sample of Saudi interviewees included six 
women who live in Saudi Arabia and four women who live abroad in European Countries and North 
America, while all the Kuwaiti interviewees happened to reside in Kuwait. The women in this sample 
came from different backgrounds, ranging from advocacy for human rights and children’s rights to 
academia. It was both interesting and telling at the same time that all the interviewees refused to be 
quoted and opted to remain anonymous; their refusals speak volumes about the perceptions of security 
threats that surround activists and activism in this context. 
 
The interviews, therefore, were conducted primarily over Skype, with the exception of two 
interviews that were conducted via Telegram. The justification for using Skype and Telegram to 
interview participants stemmed from the fact that my institution preferred I not travel to Saudi Arabia 
to conduct fieldwork because of the perceived security risks involved. Alternatively, I opted to use 
VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) technologies to reach out to the research participants, which 
provided me with the means to interview the research participants using voice and video internet via a 
real-time connection.  
 
A great advantage of using VoIP software such as Skype and Telegram is that it allows 
researchers to transcend geographical boundaries by nullifying distances and eliminating the necessity 
to visit a specific location for the interview (Rowley, 2012). Researchers can widen the range of their 
sample by connecting with participants from all over the globe, breaking down the barrier of time and 
space. At the same time, I was conscious of the fact that the use of Skype might affect the areas of 
rapport, non-verbal cues and ethics by imposing limitations on the scope  
and nature of communication.  
 
Of the eight interviewed Kuwaiti women, two of the interviews took place while I visited 
Kuwait for conducting research. The rest of the interviews were conducted via Skype. Unlike the Saudi 
interviewees, all the interviewed women from Kuwait with the exception of one woman did not mind 
to be quoted publicly in my research. They stated that they didn’t have anything to hide and that their 
activism was well known to authorities and the general public. All interviews were recorded with a 
recording device and were later listened to multiple times and copied verbatim. The length of 
interviews ranged from 40 minutes to 2 hours, with an average length of 1.25 hours. Participants were 




and ensure their accuracy. For those who took up this offer, transcripts were sent; no participants made 
any substantive changes to their transcript. 
4.1.2 Interview Outline 
Researchers who employ semi-structured interviews often develop a written interview guide in 
advance. The interview guide may be specific, with detailed questions, or it could consist of a list of 
topics to be covered. The interviewer may precisely follow the guide, asking the questions in the order 
they are given or he/she may move back and forth through the topic list based on the participant’s 
answers. In either case, the topics of the interview guide are based on the research question and the 
tentative conceptual model of the phenomenon that underlies the research. Accordingly, all of my 
conducted interviews began with a small paragraph that I slightly modified to suit each interview, 
thanking the interviewees for their acceptance of being part of the research and for giving me the 
opportunity to interview them. I then followed by introducing the research topic to the interviewees and 
providing them with a summary of the main themes that would be covered throughout the interview.  
 
Each interview was composed of a total of 16 questions, divided into four main sections. All of 
the questions were formulated in a way to avoid any misleading interpretations of the questions and 
allow the interviewees to express their true opinions towards the themes. Follow-up questions were 
only asked when the interviewee did not talk about certain topics during the reply to the main question. 
Specific, short questions are not well appreciated during interviews (Jacob & Furgerson, 2012). 
Therefore the follow-up questions only served for the researcher to make sure that the main question 
was answered in the most complete way for the aim of the research questions at hand. 
 
The first section was composed of four questions that were meant to assess the level of 
interviewees’ involvement in the “Women to Drive” or the “Ensaf” campaign. In order to put the 
interviewees at ease, the first question was put for the purpose of starting the interview in a relaxed, 
colloquial manner and allowing the interviewees to talk a bit about themselves. As Jacob and Furgerson 
(2012) state, it is preferable when formulating open and broad questions to encourage the interviewees 
to talk about themselves, to make them feel invited to start talking without being put under pressure 
with uneasy questions. It is a strategy that often allows a flow of information that could go far beyond 
what the interviewer hoped, unlocking particulars that could be beneficial to the outcome of the 
research.   
 
The other questions were more specific and asked the interviewees to reflect on their personal 
experience during either the driving or the Ensaf campaign by raising questions that tackled the main 
reasons behind their involvement, their contribution to the campaign and what were they hoping to 
obtain from their participation. The second thematic inquiry was also composed of four questions that 




women’s movement in general. Within the third section, interviewees were asked concrete questions to 
reflect on how they mobilize and organize themselves. Questions also asked them to enumerate the 
actions and tactics that they opted to use so I could become aware of those actions and strategies.  
 
The last section was aimed at shedding some light on the interviewees’ relationship to feminism 
and whether they self-identify as feminists while carrying out digital or on-ground activism. I made 
sure that every question had its own focus and avoided overloading many concepts within one question 
so as not to confuse my interview participants and concluded the interviews thanking the interviewees 
with the promise that once I finished the chapter, I would send my findings to them. While 
interviewing, these questions were used as thematic guidelines. Not all of the questions were addressed 
the same way for all interviewees. Additional questions tailored for each interviewee during the 
interview in order to better address themes that emerged from each interview. As with regards to the 
language considerations, the majority of the interviews were conducted in Arabic, with the exception of 
three participants who preferred to be interviewed in English.  
 
4.2 Negotiating my Positionality 
Conducting research represents a unique experience, shaped by many influential factors. There have 
been extensive debates over the last few decades about objectivity and positionality when conducting 
research. Researchers across various disciplines have reflected on the impact of researchers’ own 
positionality on the research process and its outcomes. Since I am deploying a mixed research design 
approach with a qualitative component, I gradually understood that conducting qualitative research and 
especially conducting interviews is not neutral. Researchers impart their own subjectivities into the 
practices and processes of conducting research and in the analysis of research findings (Creswell, 
2008).  
 
To mitigate bias complications and protect the “integrity of the knowledge produced” (O’Leary, 
2010, p. 28), it is fundamental for the researchers to identify their own positionality and the impact it 
has on their analysis of the findings. Positionality in this sense is regarded as a lens that signals an 
awareness of the situatedness of the researcher in a particular political and cultural position by calling 
attention to the researcher’s prior knowledge, normative standards and ways in which identities and 
political positions are in place (Lewis & Mills, 2003). Positionality also unveils the complexity of the 
self in relation to the other and how the fluidity of both could influence the analysis of the data 
interpretation of research findings.  
 
Thus, throughout the process of doing my Ph.D. on feminist activism in Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait, I reflected on my own positionality as a scholar born and raised in Bahrain, with research 




feminist. I attempted to pay attention to the socially constructed nature of social concepts and relations 
and engage in researcher reflexivity. Researching about women’s movements and feminist activism in 
the Arab Gulf States meant acknowledging the biases I carry with me, recognizing the impact they 
have on my research choices and how I choose to examine them to conduct research that I genuinely 
believe has value at multiple levels beyond the completion of the doctoral dissertation. 
 
Interviewing women about feminist activism in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait challenged me with 
some unexpected complexities of insider and outsider positions. I initially thought that researchers who 
share similar backgrounds as the group they are examining entails multiple advantages in collecting 
qualitative data over “outsiders” who do not share similar backgrounds or experiences with the group 
under study; I believed overlapping backgrounds afford intimate insights into the perspectives of 
participants (Abu-Lughod, 1988). 
 
I initially thought that my Bahrani origin and identification as a citizen of one of the Arab Gulf 
States as well as my social proximity; familiarity with the context and personal standpoint on the issues 
facing women in the region would ideally position me as an “insider.” I discovered that this process is 
not as straightforward; the combination of not being actually from Saudi Arabia or Kuwait and my 
current affiliation as a Ph.D. candidate who studying in Europe occasionally pushed me to the 
“outsider” position. The effect of this insider-outsider dynamic came to the forefront in two 
contradictory ways that pushed my positionality out into the open. For instance, during an attempt to 
schedule an interview with a Saudi activist, she questioned my motives for conducting research on 
Saudi Arabia and why I was not researching about “my own country?” I could not help but feel that my 
Bahraini origins and Western academic affiliation positioned me as an outsider. Upon reflection, I 
understood that gaining the insider advantage is not an easy feat. It was understandable for my Saudi 
informants to remain guarded about their interactions and personal information unless they were 
familiar with the person with whom they are engaging; it is not uncommon for the academic 
researchers to be seen as government informants in the context of the MENA region. Thus, I learned 
that overcoming the reluctance of informants to speak out and gaining their trust had to be earned and 
not taken for granted, despite my perceived “insider” advantage. 
 
Interestingly, I felt that my perceived position as an “outsider” played out differently while I 
was conducting interviews in Kuwait. In some instances, I felt that my residence and education abroad 
granted me credibility and facilitated my access to interview participants; I was perceived as a potential 
messenger who could disseminate positive information and improve the image of Kuwaiti women in 
the outside world. In sum, throughout the process, I learned that my national identity did not in itself 
designate me with a fixed “insider” or “outsider” position. My experience also made me aware that the 
insider-outsider binary is a boundary that is both highly unstable and subject to the dynamism of 




either as an insider or outsider; instead, I straddled both categories. Thus, it might be more productive 
to perceive this binary in terms of a broader continuum that is neither static nor fixed. 
 
When it came to my ideological position as a secular feminist, I attempted to maintain a self-
reflexive attitude that acknowledges rather than denies my own position. I simultaneously questioned 
how my research interactions and the information I collected are socially conditioned (Dowling, 2005). 
Although I do not personally believe in the notion of the neutral, completely objective researcher who 
conceals his or her ideological views and values, I sometimes found it challenging to authentically 
engage with women in my research whose ideological views I found problematic as a secular feminist.  
 
In principle, I agree with Tohidi’s (2003) contention that we should not equate secularism with 
feminism and religiosity with anti-feminism. Situated experiences lead to situated knowledge. There 
are diverse strands of feminisms which include both secular feminisms and feminisms within religious 
frameworks can all converge in challenging the situated patriarchal configurations: “specific forms of 
feminism are located as a response to the particular manifestations of patriarchal relations within any 
given culture or belief system” (Franks, 2002, p. 5). Overall, I found that embracing my positionality 
was helpful to counterbalance the possible over-personalization of standpoint. Rather than perceiving 
our respective positionalities as an obstacle to be overcome, we should view them as resources.  
 
4.3 Ethical Considerations  
While ethical concerns are present in any type of research, MENA scholars argue that the greatest 
challenges to conducting qualitative research in the Middle East are those related to the authoritarian 
political conditions prevalent in most of the countries of the region. These conditions raise important 
ethical issues and ongoing moral dilemmas (Allam, 2019). 
 
The presence of ethical concerns was definitely acute when I was collecting data for my 
research, while the level of ethical concerns varied tremendously between my two case studies. I 
became aware that these challenges were not exclusive to this setting, but they were acute because of 
the lack of effective protections for political and civil rights, as Okruhlik (2018) rightfully argues. Such 
constraints compound the more universal imperatives of building relationships, sustaining trust, 
navigating secrecy and working ethically. I have experienced great difficulties in obtaining interviews 
with key Saudi female activists. The most ubiquitous reasons cited were the political sensitivity of the 
topic and interviewees’ unwillingness to speak openly due, most commonly, to political repression. 
 
As elaborated in the previous section, gaining access to potential interviewees proved to be a 
challenging task; activists had considerable suspicion and caution about the motivation and creditability 




with activism and fear resulting from speaking out. It also calls attention to suspicions that researchers 
might encounter about their motives or trustworthiness.  
 
To overcome this caution, I introduced myself in the initial emails I sent to potential 
interviewees and attached a sample of academic articles and research pieces that I have previously 
written concerning women’s rights and feminist activism in Saudi Arabia. I hoped these proofs would 
mitigate the degree of suspicion. I also relied on my network of contacts to reach out to the 
interviewees to introduce me and inform them about my research motivation.   
 
Another challenge that I faced was developing a mutual relationship of trust between the 
interviewees and me, especially when it came to the impact that I might cause as a researcher on the 
participants. Reaching out to activists could result in consequences that cannot be dismissed. On closer 
examination, I was aware that by researching a topic that is related to activism in such a volatile 
context might expose activists to surveillance as well as repression, jeopardizing their activities if not 
subjecting them to personal threats. It is, therefore, crucial to consider the ethical obligation to protect 
research subjects from harm, which may necessitate guarantees of confidentiality to protect the identity 
and privacy of activists by negotiating the level of disclosure of sensitive information; such guarantees 
might include avoiding using real names and disclosing information that might facilitate identification 
by third parties.  
 
Nonetheless, protecting the anonymity of interviewees is particularly challenging in times of 
tight digital surveillance schemes. In the case of sustained online exchanges, researchers should 
encourage activists to use email encryption. Above all else, researchers must protect subjects and 
collaborators as much as possible when conducting research in such settings and ensure that the 
information obtained during interviews will not be made public in a way that might expose the 
participants to any harm or expose their real identities (Blee, 2013). 
 
Plummer (1990) suggests that all empirical qualitative studies must meet a number of ethical 
considerations: (1) intellectual property, (2) informed consent, (3) right to withdraw, (4) accuracy of 
portrayal, and (5) confidentiality, among others. For the purpose of carrying out Skype/Telegram 
interviews in my research, I followed standard ethical procedures to ensure that the Plummer’s points 
were met. I obtained informed consent from the interviewees. Informed consent essentially meant that 
the interviewees had received comprehensive information about the research that they agreed to 
participate in. The information given to the interviewees first and foremost concerned my own 





Before initiating my interviews, I made sure that the interviewees approved of the conversation 
being audio recorded. I also informed them about the length of the interview. They were aware of the 
fact that they could stop the interview at any time on request and they could withdraw their 
participation for any reason up until the thesis is made public. They were also given the opportunity to 
choose the day and time of their interview. Moreover, in order to ensure that interviewees felt able to 
discuss a range of issues without fear of reprisal, full anonymity was assured. The anonymity of 
interviewees’ personal details was protected through the careful removal of what would readily identify 
informant names, contact details, places of work or any other identifiers. All Saudi respondents were 
given pseudonyms when quoted from the data. Lastly, I promised that they would be able to access the 
chapter once I finalized it. 
 
The interviews were carefully designed to minimize the risk of causing harm or distress to 
informants; I chose not to reveal the specific individual roles of the activists because of potential 
security risks. This choice brings up the question of how to balance the protection of respondent 
anonymity with the requirements of transparency and descriptive analysis that sufficiently describe the 
phenomena. This question is related to a broader one of how to maintain a balance between anonymity 
and the need for descriptive richness and analytic transparency in empirical work (Masterson & 
Mourad, 2019). 
 
I was also aware that conducting interviews on Skype entails some additional ethical 
considerations. Online interviewing means that there can be uncertainty about how the data is stored 
and whether conversations are monitored (Zimmer & Kinder-Kurlanda, 2017).To meet confidentiality 
standards, once collected, interview materials were transcribed and stored on an encrypted hard drive. 
Only I had access to the research data. The contact information was kept on a separately stored, 
encrypted, password-protected flash drive. To sum up, the emergent ethical challenges for researchers 
often require a carefully considered approach. It is important for us as researchers to continuously 
incorporate ethical commitments into the social scientific research agendas in order to prevent harm 
and protect human subjects and participants. It is especially important in contexts where accessibility is 
hampered by political sensitivities and where control and surveillance effectively limit access to the 
voices of activists. 
 
4.4 Data Analysis: Thematic Analysis Approach  
In semi-structured interviewing, analysis and interpretation are ongoing processes that go hand in hand. 
Researchers make a conscious effort to clarify concepts and categories through successive, alternating 
waves of data collection and interpretation. Such flexibility allows researchers to incorporate new 
avenues of inquiry suggested by respondents’ interview data that might reshape the direction of the 
study, discard some elements that turn out to be unproductive or even to correct theoretical inaccuracies 





This approach is counter to quantitative research, which depends on the completion of data 
collection to begin the analysis; semi-structured interviews most often require researchers to begin 
analyzing data as it is being collected and be open to the idea that these initial analyses may provoke 
changes in the study. To proceed with analyzing the collected materials from the interviews, thematic 
analysis was chosen to carry out the data analysis of the interview data. As its name indicates, thematic 
analysis is defined as “a process for encoding qualitative information that at the minimum describes 
and organizes possible observations, or at the maximum interprets aspects of the phenomenon” 
(Boyatzis, 1998, p. 4).  
 
Themes may be described as “tags or labels for assigning units of meaning to the descriptive or 
inferential information compiled during an interview” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 56). They are 
usually attached to pieces of data of varying sizes. For this reason, themes can be assigned to individual 
words, phrases, sentences or whole paragraphs in each transcript in order to aid the interpretation of 
meaning. Central to the use of themes is the notion that words themselves do not matter. Instead, their 
meaning is more important. This understanding allows the clustering of key issues in the data.  
 
The objective of this process is to identify recognizable themes among the collected materials 
deemed of sufficient significance for the understanding of the phenomenon under study. Researchers 
can also create broader units of analysis from the codes; generally, a set of codes will form one theme. 
Themes may alternatively be integrated into sub-themes or be eliminated after analysis (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006). Thematic analysis can be applied in a variety of ways. On one axis, the search for 
patterns within the data is guided by either a theoretical approach or an inductive approach. The former, 
also known as the deductive approach, is inspired by the researcher’s theoretical concepts drawn from 
existing literature in the field. It is mainly directed towards pre-existing themes and grounded in the 
theoretical background of the research (Braun and Clarke, 2006).  
 
Alternatively, with the inductive approach, themes are generated almost exclusively from the 
data itself, avoiding the influence of the researcher’s own theoretical interests or biases in the subject. 
Ultimately, the researcher is able to generate theories after analyzing the findings (Boyatzis, 1998). I 
adopted the inductive approach as the most suitable form of data analysis due to its exceptional 
flexibility (Braun and Clarke, 2006) and because there is no specific, established research that I am 
aware of on the theme of feminist activism in the context of Gulf countries.  
 
Transcripts were individually reread and patterns in the interviews were searched for. Patterns 
were listed in order to be easily compared. Open coding was the basis of the analysis, while paying 




& Lofland, 1990). Once this process was applied to all the interviews, the categories were congregated 
under more general headings in order not to have many similar groups. Bigger headings themes 
incorporate similar categories. Interviews’ scripts were read once more following the headings and 
categories previously created.  
 
This procedure was performed in order to ensure the accuracy and consistency of the created 
headings. After this process, each transcript was coded according to the created categories and 
headings. Since the analyzed interviews were not many, this process was done manually by 
highlighting the text according to each heading. Once this procedure was finalized, different 
interviews’ items were placed together, so that each category and heading had complete elements of 
each interview. Section by section, each part was then analyzed, commenting on the link between each 
included part. The researcher’s reflexivity is important throughout the process. Statements were 
organized into themes and compared with others within groups and between groups to enable 
elaboration on each theme. The themes that came out of the interpretation of the materials serve as the 
basis of the analysis below.  
 
4.5 Empirical Findings 
Needless to say, the interviewees elicited deep, complex and multifaceted understandings of the 
multiple dimensions surrounding feminism activism. While it was difficult to construct a single 
storyline of the collective feminist genealogies, it was feasible to identify common lines of inquiry. 
Thus, throughout the following sections, rather than summarize or edit responses, I have preferred to 
quote at length from the interview participants to encapsulate some of the common threads that 
emerged in the survey of the feminist activists that I interviewed.  
 
Based on interviews with the participants inside and outside Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the 
findings from the qualitative analysis of the semi-structured interview data are presented below as a 
series of themes. I first tackle the Saudi case and then move to the findings of the Kuwaiti case. The 
analysis addresses four major themes that have been identified from the interviews. They generally 
cover the internal dynamics that surrounded feminist activism, their mode of organizing, feminist 
identification and the types of feminist actions that take place in relation to the feminist campaigns that 
I am examining. By including frequent quotations from participants in reporting the interview’s results, 
I hope to transmit accurately the contributions of the participants to the discussions that took place.  
 
4.5.1 Negotiating Diversity and Cohesion from within: The Intra-Movement Dynamics 




When asked about elaborating on the internal dynamics of the Saudi feminist movement, several 
interviewees demonstrated an awareness of the internal diversity and the differences that exist among 
the participants of the movement. In that respect, many emphasized that the Saudi women’s movement 
is diverse. It is composed of distinctive individuals and groups with different levels of involvement 
who happen to vary significantly in terms of their political complexion, ideological positions and social 
locations. While I do not attempt to provide an exhaustive list, I briefly outline some of the key 
tensions voiced by the interviewees, such as their position on the ideological spectrum and compliance 
with state actors. Reflecting on the heterogeneity of the movement, one of the interviewees has stated 
the following:  
 
            The Saudi feminist movement is not a homogenous movement, mainly because it is not a 
centralized movement. It is being conducted by women who don’t have any direct relationship 
with each other, yet most or all of them identify themselves as feminists, which serves as the 
unifying principle. I have personally come across many feminists whom I fundamentally 
disagree with. Feminists are diverse and everyone has their own set of ideas and ideals. There 
are many of them with whom I don’t even consider myself standing in the same line because of 
the different fundamental values that we hold. I personally support the rights of political 
detainees. I don’t want anyone to be punished based on their opinion, whether they are Islamists 
or not, if they don’t engage in any violent act. This issue though, is very contested between 
feminists in Saudi Arabia. (Interview 10) 
 
The above testimony paints the Saudi feminist movement as a plural field of contesting 
perspectives that have been embroiled in profound disagreements over a variety of issues, rather than a 
unified body of thought and practices. It also further demonstrates that movements, including the 
feminist movements, are amalgamations phenomena that are comprised of “internally differentiated 
actors operating within complex social settings” (Rucht, 2004, p. 197); the Saudi feminist movement is 
not an exception. Social movement scholarship has long suffered from a tendency to treat social 
movements as single, unified entities. The internal heterogeneity within the movement serves as a 
counter-argument to long-standing, essentialist discourses, which perhaps emerge most strongly within 
the very discourse of feminism. The discourse of feminism presumes the unity of its object of inquiry 
(women), even when it is at pains to highlight the differences within this admittedly generalizing and 
imprecise category (Fuss, 2013). 
 
This contradiction is much evident in the current scholarly work on women in the MENA 
region in general and in Saudi Arabia in particular. It tends to homogenize the profiles and experiences 
of women, while placing them under one umbrella and turning a blind eye to the internal diversity of 
women in these locations. Women in this region, to take one example, are often assumed to be 




of agency. Below is a testimony of one activist who eloquently elaborated on the nature of ideological 
differences among women in the Saudi feminist movement: 
 
The movement is diverse; there are Islamist and secular women as well. We may disagree on 
issues such as homosexuality or atheism, but we share similar objectives when it comes to 
abolishing restrictive gender rules. For instance, one feminist would say, “My red line is that I 
don’t support homosexuality,” while other feminists might say, “My red line is that Saudi 
Arabia is for Saudis.” Women claim agency via multiple ways within both camps. We operate 
within an open mindset and we shouldn’t dismiss that some find emancipation in Islamist 
references. Personally, as a progressive woman, I engage in debates with women who are in the 
other camp and try to initiate some conversations. I ask them, does punishing a gay person 
reverse their sexual preferences? Would it do any good? They don’t think so. I think that the 
movement has managed to create a common ground. I think that many women weren’t aware of 
the fact that there are other women who share their desire to change the reality of women in 
Saudi Arabia and change the current status quo. (Interview 5) 
 
Yet again, this personal account invalidates the presumption of sameness among all Saudi 
women that portrays them as unitary actors. It also emphasizes the multiple belongings of women, who 
can be classified as feminists with secular or Islamist leanings or as individuals who refuse to be 
identified with the secular/religious divide. The existence of such plurality, however, can be a source of 
conflict and contention, impeding the formation of collective identities necessary for activists to take 
action and maintain commitment (Miguel & Gugerty, 2005). It seems that these differences are 
perceived by some interviewees as strengthening and complementing to their shared struggle to a 
certain extent.  
 
It also emerged that for some, such differences do not impede mutual practical support expected 
of each other, nor thwart mobilization potential. Instead, they give to the cross-fertilization between 
possible common interests and political claims. Touching upon the theme of the internal diversity of 
the actors within the movement and the difference it entitles on the choice of tactical repertoires, one 
activist stated: 
 
             Feminism is less popular among Islamist women! Conservative women in Saudi Arabia do not 
have much visible media presence! If your media presence is limited, your ability to create an 
impact on society will be limited as well! Our society is more affected by individual media 
presence! In the case of Lujain alhhathlool [a liberal Saudi feminist], what was different in her 
case was her extensive media presence! This is lacking when it comes to conservative women 




In the same vein, one respondent, who is currently holding a refugee status in a European 
country, elaborated on the differences and heterogeneity of actors that she witnessed when she 
recounted her experience of joining the campaign for driving: 
 
I joined a Whatsapp group for mobilizing that was mostly composed of highly educated women 
from upper economic classes. These women had access to governmental channels and knew 
how to mobilize and deal with the state safely. The group also included young women with 
fewer resources who didn’t have anything else to lose. They were more confrontational and 
willing to engage in risk-taking behavior. The group also consisted of old veterans who 
mobilized during the 1990s protest. The group was a melting pot for all three diverse groups. It 
was a learning experience. We collectively learned how to compromise to reach a middle 
ground and to challenge each other in a constructive way. But I need to admit that some women 
only joined this group to take credit, as they wanted to be affiliated with the next big trendy 
thing, which happened to be being an activist. They eventually lost relevance, as the others were 
more willing to take risks. (Interview 6) 
 
From the previous two extracts above, we can see that the recognition of differences underlies 
women’s understandings of the composition of the feminist movement. This realization is not 
relativistic, however, nor does it deny the tensions and contradictions between different forms of 
feminism. It also appeared that many of the interviewees did not feel represented by one or another 
strand of feminism and did not believe that there are easy alliances to be made with these strands. 
Rather, by giving voice and legitimacy to the variety of feminisms that emerge, they make visible 
tensions among feminists and suggest that it is only by taking these seriously that we can collectively 
think through the possibilities and parameters of alliances. During the interviews, the topic of 
compliance with state actors also surfaced as a source of contention. A few interview participants 
pointed out that some women within the movement had shown support to the political establishment. In 
this regard, one activist commented that: “Some women come from a privileged class, that they are not 
trying in any way to subvert the government. They instead work within the existing state structures. 
Those who claim that they are bargaining beyond the state.” (Interview 2) 
 
Similarly, one interviewee expressed her frustration with Manal al-Sharif, who is considered by 
international media to be the face of the driving campaign:  
 
I have an ideological issue with Manal al-Sharif. I don’t see her the way people see her. She is a 
volatile individual who holds a different opinion every day. One day she is against the 




government while praising the crown prince. I don’t view her as an icon of the Saudi feminist 
movement the way that international media portrays her. (Interview 9) 
 
Other facets of difference were also present and constituted significant concerns for movement 
actors. Some interviewees commented on the fact that the movement mirrored an elite structure, 
represented mostly by educated, privileged women, who were university level educated and had 
driving licenses issued abroad; they felt the movement excludes female immigrants and domestic 
labors as well as Saudi women from different socioeconomic classes. Commenting on this dimension, 
one of the interview participants stated 
 
     Ordinary women were excluded from the driving movement. Their roles were confined towards 
discourse and contribution in the ongoing debates. When it came down to ground actions, only 
privileged women were capable of participating in it—women who already knew how to drive 
and had international licenses issued. It was a movement that was led by a group of women with 
special privileges. (Interview 2) 
 
When it comes to the efforts to mitigate differences among movement’s participants, one 
interviewee shared the opinion that the level of experienced repression has encouraged individuals to 
join forces and articulate a broader identity in which their differences were set aside. More specifically, 
she explained 
 
You know! There are great differences that made it highly unlikely for female activists to agree 
on something, until the level of oppression started to increase to the extent that many 
individuals started to feel that they are not capable of expressing their opinions. At that 
moment, women started to act as if these differences are no longer there. (Interview 1) 
 
Other interviewees emphasized the importance of the usage of shared-struggles frames as 
discursive tools to foster a sense of unity among feminist activists. Such frames encompass a wide 
range of ideas that are not confined to particular issues or locales. Additionally, such frames are often 
deployed in conjunction with acknowledgments of intra-movement differences and/or references to 
diversity as explicit movement strengths to tackle the movement in the broader societal context.  
Movement actors have repeatedly disrupted significant boundaries and negotiated cultural, national, 
religious and material differences, ultimately achieving what Manisha Desai (2005) has termed 
“solidarities of difference.” The development of strategic discourses that connect seemingly disparate 
issues has been a vital piece of this process. The majority of interviewees pointed to several challenges 
they encountered that are shaped by intersecting hegemonic systems—familial, legal, economic, 




We can’t think of the Saudi feminist movement in the separation of the composition of Saudi 
society. If we take a look at the layers of oppression that Saudi women are currently 
experiencing, we see that they don’t only originate from political institutions alone, but from 
society, from the economy, from everywhere. This means that even if the economic situation of 
the woman is good, the woman remains subjected to other forms of oppression. For instance, a 
woman can belong to an upper class, but she can still be part of a religiously conservative 
family who doesn’t allow her to work. So she ends up remaining under the mercy of her 
patriarchal family who controls her life. As you know, if someone doesn’t have economic 
independence, then she/he doesn’t have freedom. Let me give you another example. A woman 
might belong to a lower economic class, but she might have the freedom to work. The degree 
and the form of gender-based oppression can be found extremely different in different 
economic classes, different cities and even within families themselves. Every story of struggle 
is unique in its own way. We struggle in different ways and at different levels. Someone is not 
allowed to work; someone is not allowed to travel by herself. Some situations are more severe 
than others. Some women are not allowed to get married; some women are not even allowed to 
leave their rooms. (Interview 5) 
 
What is significant from the previous accounts is the realization of the impact of the multiple 
and overlapping nature of social differences and the fact that women in this context are simultaneously 
located within different social groupings. The central issue for feminist politics is the complexity and 
the partially overlapping and crosscutting nature of social divisions, rather than reified differences 
(Jakobsen, 1998). Thus, systems of oppression related to one’s class, gender, as well as other marked 
identities cannot be understood in isolation from one another; each of these types of inequalities is in 
fact interconnected and therefore they create a new system of domination that reflects this intersection 
of multiple forms of discrimination. 
 
It appears from activists’ accounts that the ban on driving has brought together women from 
different backgrounds, classes and communities who, in spite of their heterogeneity, were at least 
cognizant of differences; differences were put on hold to preserve a collective unity that engendered a 
crucial sense of shared interests and build common understandings of the contentious issues at hand. 
That unity accommodated different orientations in alliances and solidarity networks, stressing 
differences as a positive quality of the movement (della Porta & Diani, 2006). 
 
This difference is not a strange case to feminism because it is an identity‐based movement that 
can potentially encompass a multiplicity of identities, ideologies, issues and organizational forms, often 
eschewing formal structures (Starr, 2005). According to the perceived threats, these actors collaborated 
in different networks that were activated to pursue mobilization efforts and sustain different 




corresponds to studies within the field of social movements that tackle movement actors not as unitary 
challengers, but as a shifting set of actors who share a central identity and have malleable allegiances 
and potentially divergent ideologies. These newer studies contrast with much previous research that 
examined social movements and often assumed stable group boundaries and identities that were 
relatively unified, acting on behalf of bounded individuals.  
 
In sum, the interviews’ data is significant in terms of mapping out the breadth of the Saudi 
feminist movement that emerged as a multivalent and inherently contested site with multiple 
boundaries, identities, tactics and participants. It is characterized by diversity, complexity, multiplicity 
and contradiction, which simultaneously demonstrate insights to visible resistance, cooperation, 
contentious action and opportunities for the articulation of claims. This provides a promising avenue of 
research that looks beneath abstract “unified movements” to groups, alliances, ad-hoc networks and 
even feminist mobilization that takes place at an individual level (Bakke, Cunningham & Seymour, 
2012; Cabezas, 2014). 
 
4.5.2 Locating the Locus of Feminist Activism 
When asked to elaborate on the organizational structure of the Saudi feminist movement, several 
interviewees pointed out that they rely on social networking platforms to coordinate and promote their 
cause. The interviewees also stated that the general landscape for independent feminist activism is 
extremely restricted and regulated, which makes it difficult to channel institutionalized forms of 
activism into routine statuses.  
 
Accordingly, due to the lack of formalized central organizing bodies and women’s rights 
organizations, feminist activism is usually carried out unofficially or virtually using digital means. 
Activists operate in the form of circulation of claims and demands online via writing tweets, Facebook 
entries, blog posts and online petitions. The following extract from an interview with the administrator 
of an active Facebook group is a particularly good example of this dimension: 
 
 We mainly operate as activists who communicate with each other through technological means 
such as Whatsapp and Telegram groups to organize ourselves and promote quality content that 
will get us attention and support. We can’t fully function because of the systematic targeting of 






Similarly, another interviewee elaborated on the virtual nature of her communication practices 
with the other activists 
 
My relationship with the other activists is mediated through social networking platforms. It is 
mainly virtually based! There are some feminist activists whom I have known for ten years, yet 
we haven’t even met face to face! We didn’t even shake hands in real life— activists like Manal 
al-Sharif, etc. With the exception of one activist who used to be my teacher. There is no 
hierarchy, no leaders. Any individual who identifies with our cause can join us and this is why 
there is a diversity of views. (Interview 6) 
 
As seen in the previous quotes, the perception of digital networks as sites of non-hierarchical 
modes of connection (Terranova, 2004), seems to have underpinned the narrations of most of the 
participants. Interviews revealed a belief that the current communication practices run without formal 
ties, commitments to organizations or other forms of group memberships.  Feminist activism in this 
vision is based on a decentralized structure that allows individual women to connect in an optimum 
way. Thus, being part of the network for many interviewees implied belonging to the wider movement.  
 
In addition, an emphasis was put on the organizational functions that are embedded within 
social networking platforms. They were perceived as positive in facilitating the process of participating 
in public discourse and joining networks that are self-organizing and composed of different individuals 
who are loosely connected and may only encounter each other through the digital sphere, yet they 
mobilize toward similar objectives (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012). This observation aligns with the 
recent theories in political communication that expanded on social media’s overtaking of the role of 
organizing agent that used to be exclusively tied to formal organizations, as well as on the horizontal 
communication practices that take place accordingly (Castells, 2012). Other testimonies emphasized 
the leaderless structure of the movement. This feminist movement was described as being horizontally 
organized and more loosely structured than those of the past, allowing individuals to act together with 
little need for prominent leaders and formal social movement organizations. Some groups formed 
sporadically and appeared in reaction to an event, only to be dissolved quickly. Other groups had a 
permanent structure in which members self identify regardless of current events. One Interviewee 
expressed an explicit rejection of hierarchy and centralized leadership, while portraying the movement 
as horizontally structured: 
 
              One needs to take into account that civic activism can get you arrested, which is contrary to 
what happens in Kuwait, for example. Every unlicensed activity can get you in trouble, no 
matter how trivial it is. This is the reason for women’s reliance on digital media. Digital media 




feminist activities make it hard to weaken the movement, to dissolve it, to demonize it, or 
accuse it of treason. It is, therefore, difficult to stop. The strength in our movement lies in the 
fact that it is horizontal and nobody is capable of controlling it entirely. (Interview 4) 
 
Nonetheless, two interviewees drew attention to the fact that, even though formal social 
movement organizations were mostly absent in the mobilization against the driving ban, prominent 
activists and well-known Twitter users acquired a disproportionate degree of influence over the 
movement’s communication and actions. This observation was articulated in the testimony of one 
interview participant: “This is the problem with the Saudi feminist movement. It is run by four or five 
individuals who speak to each other and run the show.” (Interview 3) 
 
These accounts insist that leadership did not entirely vanish, as evident in the digital practices of 
key social actors such as activists, bloggers and journalists. Key actors play an important role in 
producing and sharing of mobilization materials and addressing different targets ranging from the 
youth to international news media. In other words, for some, it appears that the movement relied on the 
engagement of a small number of core activists who were influential in the networks and involved in 
the managerial tasks. So, despite the claimed horizontalism, it seems that some activists are aware that 
some individual actors who are centrally positioned in social media networks come to fulfill many of 
the functions traditionally associated with social movement leaders, such as connecting previously 
separate individuals and groups in common action.  
 
Reflecting on these practices, della Ratta and Valeriani (Ratta & Valeriani, 2014) labeled these 
prominent twitter users and top Facebook admins as “connective leaders,” which suggests that 
connective leadership is becoming increasingly vital to digital political action and even extends to the 
movements that present themselves as leaderless and horizontal. So, whereas social movement 
leadership operates through the mobilization of organizational resources, connective leadership works 
through the construction and activation of digital networks and streams.  
 
Moreover, the portrayal of the Saudi feminist movement as leaderless should be understood in 
the broader context of the ongoing individualization of politics, which has undermined the legitimacy 
of social movements and the overall optimist theories surrounding the capabilities and functions of 
social media networks. As Alberto Melucci (1996) already pointed out more than two decades ago, to 
ensure the survival of social movements, particular tasks that often require some form of leadership 
have to be completed. At the same time, in the current cultural setting of individualization and rejection 
of hierarchy, it is difficult to make leadership explicit as this would lead to the breakdown of the 





According to him, movements attempt to resolve this dilemma by minimizing or concealing the 
decision-making and representative functions (Melucci, 1996). This strategy can clearly be observed in 
the attempts made by connective leaders in social media communication to remain anonymous or at 
least refrain from identifying themselves as leaders. The point here is that leadership functions continue 
to be exercised even in highly distributed forms of social media political communication practices. 
Even though formal women’s rights and feminist organizations are mostly absent in the Saudi context 
and social networking platforms could play a potential role in minimizing the role of movement 
leaders, it is important to not quickly dismiss new forms of hierarchy and modes leadership that could 
potentially emerge via social networking platforms themselves.  
 
The point of departure in this discussion here is to problematize the idea that traditional modes 
of organization in social movements (with structural features like identifiable leaders and persistent 
collective identities) have been largely replaced by more distributed, fluid connective action networks 
capable of self-organization using technology (e.g., Bennett and Segerberg, 2012). We must begin to 
consider that connective leadership within the Saudi feminist movements does not simply imply an 
underestimation of the increased facility with which individuals and groups are able to organize 
themselves today. 
 
These observations allow us to better understand the dynamics of the organization of 
contemporary social movements, avoiding the adoption of the univocal and misleading distinction 
between “leaders,” who often take on an active role, and “followers,” who are perceived as playing a 
passive role (Valeriani, 2011). While this analysis of the articulation of leadership doesn’t necessarily 
invalidate arguments about connective action, it does indeed complicate these ideas. The challenge for 
us as researchers now is not just to explore how these processes take shape through distributed user 
practices, but also to trace how these practices are steered through new forms of leadership. Examining 
these relationships, it is important to see that activist leadership and social media activity are not 
necessarily contradictory but can be mutually reinforcing. Social networking platforms can contribute 
to the rise of new leadership and new organizational practices.  
 
4.5.3 Reclaiming the Feminist Act: Reclaiming the Feminist Label 
Listening to women’s own interpretation of what constitutes to be a feminist activist is important 
especially because of the stigmatization of feminism in the MENA region, where the label feminist is 
not widely used nor is it agreed upon by women working on women’s issues. Other descriptions like 
womanist or women’s rights advocates are more common. Indeed, a large number of women’s 
networks independently work on a variety of feminist agendas but avoid the term feminist activist or 





Until recently, women adopted different labels to describe the objectives of their feminist 
activism (al-Ali, 2000); the feminist paradox is the dissociation between respondents’ personal support 
for feminism and their willingness to identify as feminists (e.g., Scharff, 2010). Part of the explanation 
for this paradox might stem from the lack of a common established definition of feminism and the 
misrepresentation of feminists in the public eye as “deviant, man-hating, unrepresentative radicals who 
represent a threat to society” (Zucker, 2004, p. 425). This misrepresentation might leave individuals 
unwilling to describe themselves as feminists, even though they support the social justice goals that are 
inherent in feminist ideology. 
 
I was therefore interested in getting my respondents’ own definition of what constitutes feminist 
activism and whether they would be comfortable in identifying themselves as feminists to better 
capture how these actors are viewing and giving meaning to feminist activism. Rather than requiring 
participants to respond to a standard definition of feminism to see if they agreed or disagreed with 
embracing it, this inductive approach allowed them to define feminist activism for themselves and 
illuminated the strikingly diverse ways that women think about and practice feminism. 
 
This section, therefore, examines how the participants conceived of feminism and the reasons 
they offered for their self-identification or the lack of it, what it means to be a feminist in these times 
and how they understand their position in relation to feminist activism. What emerged was a diverse 
sample that not only defined and engaged with feminism in multiple ways, but also used online spaces 
and social networking platforms in different capacities with differing levels of engagement. I was 
surprised by the high number of respondents who self–declared that they had begun identifying 
themselves as feminists, especially throughout their online engagement. The definitions that were given 
to me varied to a great extent. Most respondents agreed that their feminist activism addresses the 
structural inequality and oppression arising from gender-based discrimination, such as the one that 
occurred with the driving ban. In some instances, respondents provided simple, clear and direct 
statements reflecting their identifications: “I am a feminist because I believe in the basic concept of 
equality between the sexes.” (Interview 5) 
 
Some offered more pragmatic reasons: “In our region, people identify themselves by their 
profession. Thus, labeling yourself with the term feminist activist allows journalists, media outlets and 
human rights organizations to contact you based on that capacity.” (Interview 7). While for others, the 
question elicited a longer and more in-depth explanation: 
 
 I remember that I was naive and not aware of people’s struggles. Women’s driving was a trivial 
issue to me. When women launched the driving campaign here in 2011, I thought about our 




for this trivial demand to be able to drive. I was young at that time and I didn’t understand that 
women’s driving has a direct impact on women’s independence, their socioeconomic situation, 
their status at home, their economic autonomy and their chances of finding employment, 
accessibility for healthcare. All these things. I was furious and I genuinely thought that we need 
to call for more important demands. Why? Because I had a private chauffeur. My school was 
right next to our home. Even if the driver was late for 10 minutes, I could have easily walked 
back home. This didn’t change until I had enrolled in university, when I started to interact with 
different people. I started to acknowledge and realize women’s struggles. I had experienced 
situations when my driver was late, was late for hours and I needed to arrive at university before 
my classes began to be on time. The implications of why I am dealing with this started to sink 
in. Even when it came down to the choice of university, I didn’t choose a relatively far 
university that is located in another province because I didn’t want to deal with the long- 
distance. I picked a major to specialize in based on the courses that were offered in the closest 
university to my hometown, which was one hour away. Thank God my decision regarding the 
choice of major has proven to be the right one, although it was not based on the right factors at 
that time. At this moment, I realized that the ban on driving is really affecting me and I need to 
fight. (Interview 2) 
 
Others embraced more radical identifications. One activist has stated the following:  
 
            I am an anarchist! I am against authority! I am a feminist and I am a leftist! I identify myself in 
this way! I know three or four women who would agree with this label. There are not a lot of us. 
And what is ironic is that many people already assume that I am an Islamist just because I 
refuse to endorse the oppression of Islamists, while Islamists view me like a whore or 
something like it. (Interview 10). 
 
Three respondents provided on an intersectional definition of feminism that links gender 
oppression to other forms of inequality with some actively focusing on issues of economic oppression, 
commitment to LGBT rights and other transnational concerns. Thus, claims were made in an 
intersectional fashion, combining feminism with concerns about national, class, or sexual oppression 
(Crenshaw, 1989). Correspondingly, these interview participants demonstrated an awareness that 
women’s social position—such as nationality, socioeconomic situation, family background and other 
axes of power—cut through women’s lives. A united women’s movement cannot survive in a society 
riven with other hierarchical distinctions, but only in tandem with the elimination of other social bases 





As one respondent noted, “I don’t believe in feminism within a capitalist state structure! It is all 
about tackling oppression in all sorts and forms! Inequality doesn’t only come from men! It comes 
from wider structures that need to be questioned! This is the kind of feminism that I am into.” 
(Interview 4). The linking of different systems of oppression which is central to intersectionality 
appears to form a central element in many feminists’ beliefs. The following extract also exemplifies 
this tendency: 
 
            I am a leftist feminist; being half Palestinian had a major effect on me when it came down to 
my identity on how I define myself. I identify myself as an intersectional feminist. I am not 
only interested in defending or supporting causes that merely support women. I believe that 
there are many intersecting layers of injustice and oppression. Every day I struggle and I resist. 
Two weeks ago, I managed to convince my family to accept me moving out of the house. This 
is a major victory for me, especially because I came from a typical Bedouin family on my 
father’s side. Most of the injustice that is faced by women around me—my friends, my sisters, 
my mother—is because they are women. I think it is logical for me to be a feminist. (Interview 
8) 
 
Thus, it appears that feminism in this sense is perceived as a set of values and beliefs that 
embody an awareness of the persisting gender inequalities and provide some critical accounts on how 
social norms disadvantaged women; it is also perceived as explicitly pointing to the instrumental role 
that feminism plays by offering a set of lenses for examining and understanding gender discrimination 
in the inequitable society they inhabit and aims to dismantle it. Feminists activists are, therefore, those 
who are embracing feminist critiques and activism and have greater involvement and determination 
than individuals who are just adherents to a cause.  
 
As regards women’s relationship with technology and the role that social networking platforms 
play in their understandings and practices of feminism, the majority of the respondents stated that they 
perceived social networking platforms as allowing a more nuanced form of activism. Almost all of 
them agreed that they used digital media for specific political causes and they engaged with diverse 
acts of digital activism. Moreover, they reported that any information regarding the driving campaign 
or any related online connective action was conveyed to them through social networking platforms. 
They also confirmed having used Twitter or Facebook to engage with and mobilize people.  
 
The level of engagement also varied. Most of the respondents stated that they used social 
networking platforms on more or less a daily basis as a sort of individualized “everyday form of 




feminist activism as self-motivated and self-organized. She engaged in specific actions on an 
intermittent basis (Interview 4). Others reported that they used it mostly as part of a collective. 
 
Most respondents stressed their commitment towards creating an egalitarian society through 
their actions, including their engagement with digital technology, such as the launch of movements’ 
specific hashtags to generate a wider feminist consciousness amongst them. The respondents also 
pointed out the expanding possibilities of linking social media activism to offline initiatives. What was 
brought up by the interviews is the recognition that new digital technologies have accelerated and put 
forward a new kind of political activism that enabled women to form networks of solidarity and be part 
of consciousness-raising groups. It also emerged from activists’ accounts that cyberfeminist activism 
involves critical reflection of the ways in which oppression faces women and the perception that 
technology has facilitated their political engagement.  
 
Hence, women’s feminist activism that is being carried out online has extended not only the 
nature, but also the content of what is thought of as “political.” Concerning this aspect, Mouffe (2002) 
argued that there is no inherent distinction between what constitutes the social and what constitutes the 
political; rather, she argues, social issues become political when they are brought into the public sphere 
for discussion. That is what feminist digital activism is doing—putting new issues into public 
contention, which can serve to critique the existing dichotomies between Saudi feminism and Saudi 
political activism. 
 
The interviewees seemed guided by strong visions of social change in which digital and 
network communications featured prominently. Digital feminist activism, in this instance, represented a 
new iteration of feminist activism, offering new tools and tactics for feminists to utilize in order to 
spread awareness, disseminate information and mobilize constituents. Like feminist activism at large, it 
is based on a larger critique of structural inequalities and issues and may have much to offer to the 
overall movement. It became clear when coding the transcripts of the interviews that the sample truly 
reflected interdependent and fluid trajectories of feminist identifications of women with diverse and 
unique lived experiences that shaped their understanding of feminism. Independently of their feminist 
identification, the ways and means of political participation also varied tremendously among 
participants. This variation goes in line with Harris’s (2010) argument that women’s feminisms and 
activisms are practiced altogether differently within the marginalized spaces they can safely occupy. It 
also supports Baer’s suggestion that digital media offer great potential for reconstructing feminist 
discourse and nurturing new modes of feminist activism (2016). Thus, it appears that digital media are 





As this section demonstrates, the diversity of such understandings is important because feminist 
engagement and communicative activity in digital networks is not just a matter of transmitting 
information. It also redefines what it means to be a feminist activist by facilitating the construction of 
feminist public spheres where the voices of marginalized actors can be heard. The small sample size 
and the highly context-specific case prevents the formulation of any generalizations and is in no way 
representative of all feminist activists using social media. The predominance of an English-educated, 
city-based population belonging to an upper-middle-class necessitates a reflection on questions of 
unequal reliance on digital technologies. 
 
Taken together, this section highlights the changing definitions of feminist activism facilitated 
by digital technology and the diversity of conceptions of feminist activism. I understand women’s 
sense-making of digital feminist activism as an agentic practice. The research is arguably indicative of 
a wider rejection of unitary conceptions of feminist identity and an increased emphasis on what has 
variously been called “transversality” or coalitional understandings of feminism (Yuval Davis, 2006). 
 
4.5.4 The Multiple Modalities of Feminist Activism 
When asked about the employed tactics, it became apparent that activists had utilized a wide array of 
actions which included crafting messages to the public, gaining outreach, posting explicit calls for on-
ground action, sending press releases to international media outlets, collecting signatures for online 
petitions, sending collective emails to authorities, making buzz online and promoting particular 
hashtags as well as connecting and collaborating with other activists. 
 
When it came down to the drafting of public messages to the masses, several interviewees 
stated that their ultimate goal was concentrated on making visible the imperceptible aspects of the ban 
on driving. Consequently, they were keen on developing strategies to ensure that their claims were 
seen, read and widely circulated. One activist stated that she focused on building up her presence on 
social networking platforms and on television because she began to recognize the “power of been 
seen,” which is empowering. She further commented, “I felt part of something bigger when I became a 
public figure in 2011. I realized that I am not only addressing policy-makers, but the general public as 
well.” (Interview 4) 
 
The expectations for digital media to produce visibility were high. Numerous interviewees 
indicated that they gained the opportunity to represent themselves and affirmed that social networking 
platforms had provided them with a reach that they could hardly gain via print media alone. The 
interview analysis also indicated that, for Saudi feminist activists, online platforms had been 




our access to the press was becoming more and more limited. So, online platforms were the only place 
through which we could have our say.” (Interview 7) 
 
The notion that digital media has the potential to amplify the voices of activists who could not 
pass press restrictions is further clarified through two additional testimonies. Both of the interviewed 
activists asserted their marginalization by traditional media and described their reliance on digital 
activism; they explained how all the official information sources did not distribute reliable information 
about the events. They also revealed, through personal accounts, that while the press might publish 
some articles about the driving ban, these articles usually featured the opinions of journalists or 
institutional actors and that they often portrayed the issue in a way in which they don’t agree, 
neglecting the inclusion of their voices. Tacking this aspect, one interviewee asserted 
 
            If digital media did not exist, very few people would have known about us, what we are aiming 
for and what we do. Social network platforms enabled us to present ourselves to the public, as 
our voices were not given enough of a presence in the mainstream media coverage. And now 
the reverse is happening. Our discourse on digital media helps to attract mainstream media 
coverage, mostly internationally though. (Interview 9). While the other interviewee revealed the 
following: 
 
We soon realized while disseminating the news concerning the arrest of women who challenged 
the driving ban that covering the news from activists’ perspectives is a defiant act on its own. It 
is an act that challenges the mainstream narrative and claims ownership over it. We became 
aware that the government couldn’t control the overall narrative surrounding the events. It can 
only control it is own narrative, not the narrative of the UN, the international community or the 
the narrative of international media. (Interview 6) 
 
As these quotations demonstrate, activists realized the importance of gaining control over their 
own narratives and producing credible self-managed alternative, activists’ centered perspectives to 
mainstream media coverage of events. Indeed, this realization suggests a far more substantial role for 
digital media than the existing literature on meaning-making indicates (e.g., Milan, 2015) because 
digital media use enables movements and campaigns not only to create a shared narrative, but also to 
challenge the existing narrative that is portrayed by the mainstream discourse (Mundt, Ross & Burnett, 
2018). It also corresponds with my theoretical expectation that digital media now gives a chance to 
interested actors to bypass the traditional mass media filters and to mobilize people directly, obtain 
public visibility and start the political claim process. It also highlights the agency of social actors in 




goals. They can exert horizontal pressure on information flows that previously were organized 
vertically to reflect the interests of the most powerful class of actors (Costanza-Chock, 2012). 
 
Activists have also asserted their reliance on counter-hegemonic discourses to intervene in the 
public discourse to open up new spaces of engagement. Platforms such as Twitter, for example, have 
been extensively used in the discursive debate on women’s right to drive. Commenting on the impact 
of their counter-hegemonic discourses, one interviewed activist stated that the “Women to Drive” 
online campaign resulted in the emergence of public discourse that pushed the topic of women’s 
driving to the agenda of the Consultative (Shura) Council. She also recalled the international 
condemnation that the campaign managed to call down on the government after the arrest of one 
activist who received lashing sentence; it was later overturned as a result of public outrage and the 
international media pressure that was exercised (Interview 2). Additionally, another interviewee 
expressed the following: 
 
Twitter is the most popular and mostly used political medium by Saudis to express social and 
political concerns and start discussions. While many people in other nations use it for 
socialization, we use it to discuss politics. The discourse on Twitter can cause real changes on 
the ground. This is huge! Also, the use of Twitter in initiating feminist related discussions has 
led feminist thinking to find resonance among the public. (Interview 5) 
 
Hence, it appears that activists have attempted to create alternative discursive spaces where it is 
permissible for them to engage in counter-hegemonic discourse as well as redefine patriarchal gender 
roles while questioning the socio-cultural and political institutions limiting them. It is possible to use 
social networking platforms to increase public claims-making and initiate movement messages that are 
directed towards the public sphere. One commonality observed in all the interviews is the respondents’ 
view of digital media as a facilitator of connection and communication. Interviewees valued new media 
for its flexibility, accessibility and ability to reach large groups of individuals. There was a degree of 
awareness among those who had mobilized digitally of the fact that digital media contracts the time 
between the production and the representation of events, which can be quasi-simultaneous. The 
respondents also reflected on their ability to document, almost in real-time, unfolding events and to 
instantly share their opinions about what is going on (Poell and Borra, 2012). 
 
Scholars including Papacharissi and de Fatima Oliveira (2012) use the term “instantaneity” to 
depict the instant online recording and communication of unfolding events as well as the tone and 
urgency of the language that activists deploy on digital platforms. These real-time features and 
ubiquitous forms of political communication are of great strategic importance to activists. To this end, 




and Twitter pages to publicize a steady stream of their tactical strategies and on-the-ground actions. 
Several activists described announcing local events on social networking platforms as an important 
tactic. For example, one activist described the responsibility she felt toward disturbing accurate 
information: 
 
Disseminating informing was a crucial mission for me. I definitely use Twitter to let other 
people know what is going on. The lack of full information affects everybody’s judgment, 
especially because our access to independent sources of information is limited. There is no free 
press and no media freedom! This is why I rely on social networking platforms to provide 
information as accurate as possible to the public. (Interview 7) 
 
As with regards to setting up online actions, some interviewees represented themselves as 
experts in organizing and mobilizing. They claimed to have mastered the art of the production of visual 
content and creating online buzz. These interviewees thought that appropriating the codes of the digital 
culture is essential for allowing creative modes of dissent to emerge and to produce positive visibility 
for the activists’ cause. This scale of activism was made possible by allowing individualized forms of 
action to emerge in order to circulate original content; for example, they urged women to participate in 
certain trending hashtags and submit videos of themselves driving in defiance of the driving ban. 
Hence, we see the activists capitalizing on the promotion of virality (Papacharissi, 2015) and for 
encouraging users to like, share and retweet the content that they create. While most respondents were 
unequivocal in their opinion of how digital networking platforms aid the process of organizing 
individuals for the driving cause, envisaging online feminist activism independent of offline modes of 
action drew polarizing opinions. 
 
 Some respondents were confident that digital technologies have the potential to be the future of 
feminist activism and gave digital media activity primacy over “offline” practices. Emphasizing this 
point, one interviewee argued, “On-ground activism can only take you to a certain place in terms of 
visibility. With digital technology, you have networks from all around the world participating.” 
(Interview 8). Another interviewee stressed that activism carried out solely on digital media cannot be 
viable and needs to be supplemented by offline action as well. It is important to rely on activists on the 
ground, although she admitted that due to the involved risks few women are willing to be involved in 
on-ground action in comparison to women who mobilize in the digital sphere. (Interview 10). 
Commenting on a related point, one interview participant stated that 
 
             Giving credit to the activists who only took on-ground action and drove their cars is unfair. Let 
me explain. When one woman drives her car, she is only seen by 100 individuals at most. The 




it and to normalize this act.  And here comes the role of social networking platforms in 
circulating this content and creating discourses about it. So, on-ground actions are part of the 
campaign, but they don’t constitute the overall actions that are carried out throughout the 
campaign. All types of actions, whether online or offline need to complement each other. 
(Interview 4) 
 
What also emerged throughout the interview was the significance of sharing personal narratives 
and naming the oppression that women experience in their daily lives as an important form of 
consciousness-raising, while attributing it to the larger patriarchal structure that affects them. It also 
became clear that illuminating the individual struggles experienced by women is an empowering act 
that demonstrates the interplay of individual stories and collective modalities enabled by digital 
platforms; it shifts their framed positions from victims to activists with agencies. One interviewee 
insisted on her commitment to creating small-scale ideational change:  
 
            Right now, I seek to make people rethink what ideas they hold. I do this on a smaller scale. This 
is much more doable and realistic than creating a hashtag and thinking that I will speak to the 
entire world and that 100,000 individuals will be influenced by my writings and change their 
opinions accordingly. I am focusing more on changing people’s perceptions at a smaller scale, 
one by one. So that when these ideas started to be disseminated, everyone spread it in his/her 
own surroundings, community, etc. This will create a more lasting and meaningful impact. I am 
focusing on spreading awareness and making people aware of the existing power relations 
surrounding us. I prefer using doable tactics, things that I am actually capable of and see their 
direct impact on my own surroundings. (Interview 1) 
 
Overall, these accounts shed some light on how social networking platforms have been 
interpreted as a sociotechnical space of connected visibility in which coordination of physical actions, 
remote participation, mobilization, solidarity networks and information dissemination all occur on a 
continuum. It became clear from the interviews that activists employed different tactics individually 
and collectively to inform, motivate and produce positive visibility for their cause, mobilize political 
action on behalf of other women and critique the content of traditional media. This diversity of such 
practices is important because, as witnessed, feminist engagement and communicative activity in 
digital platforms is not just a matter of transmitting information or calling for some concrete action. 
 
Digital platforms can assist in feminist campaigns as well as in the struggle against gender 
discrimination to negotiate the boundaries imposed upon them by the state and society and disrupt the 
power dynamics present. Nonetheless, some of the accounts that I obtained from the interviews were 




reported benefits, digital media can significantly exacerbate some risks associated with the high 
visibility of their feminist digital activism. Hence, several interviewees articulated a long-standing 
concern about digital surveillance by national security forces as well as concerns about arrests as a 
result of their digital activism. Some interviewees stated that being cautious is necessary because 
anyone can take a snapshot of their posts and report it back to authorities. For example, one interviewee 
recalled a significant incident that occurred to her: 
 
For me, there was a particular incident that changed the way I tweet. I was very active during 
the Arab Spring in 2011, when everything seemed possible. My Twitter account was very 
controversial as I was very politically outspoken. At that time, I was a student in Canada. One 
day, I received a call from the educational attaché that someone reported me in relation to my 
activity on Twitter. They threatened to withdraw my scholarship unless I signed a pledge to 
delete my Twitter account and never talk about these issues again. (Interview 4) 
 
Interviewees also recounted numerous experiences with cyberbullying and harassment in online 
environments, ranging from discomforting remarks to threats of physical abuse and arrest. One activist 
stated 
 
One of my friends was arrested! After that, I closed off my public Twitter account due to the 
threats that I received. My account is now private with a small number of followers. But when I 
had a public account, whenever I posted something against the government or against 
patriarchy, I used to receive so many inappropriate comments and racists remarks because I 
made it public that I am half Palestinian. The series of arrests affected the feminist movement 
and reformist political movement because everybody became afraid of speaking out about any 
cause. I have many friends who closed off their accounts permanently. It was not just out of 
fear… it was hopelessness. You know, the feeling that nothing could change. (Interview 8) 
 
Similarly, one activist commented on the phenomenon of hiring trolls to force activists to be 
self cautious:  
 
Today, it is important to realize that the government has started to hire trolls to flash out our 
hashtags. This has entirely changed how Twitter functions. I am afraid that nowadays, Twitter 
is no longer representative of the voice of people. The credibility of information that can be 
found on Twitter is now compromised. The majority of activists have been arrested. And those 
who have not been arrested yet were forced to sign pledges not to post any critique against the 
state online. Many activists now self censor and prefer to remain silent. Also, they shifted to 





It was not surprising to hear that activists have experienced online defamation campaigns, 
censoring of online activities and discrediting in the mainstream media. One activist brought attention 
to the challenges of building alternative spaces using corporate social media: 
 
We need to realize that platforms like Twitter are not primarily made for female activists per se. 
They are made for profit. Al-Waleed Bin Talal [a Saudi businessman] used to own 40% of it 
and now they transferred his shares to the Saudi State. Activists’ voices are now drowning in 
the sea of bots, trolls and fake accounts. We should realize that Twitter is not the way to 
connect, but it is one of the ways to connect. For me, for example, I don’t entirely rely on 
Twitter per se, but I use it to disseminate the work I do. I also took extra steps and managed to 
verify my Twitter account in order to protect my account from being hacked. I am afraid that 
we are currently facing a battle in which platforms such as Twitter have started to lose their 
influence. (Interview 9) 
 
Overall, these testimonies demonstrate activists’ realization of the double function that is taken 
by digital platforms as sites of empowerment on the one hand and of surveillance on the other because 
of the climate of media censorship and the harsh consequences associated with speaking out 
(Carstensen, 2013). Interviewing Saudi activists also revealed the complexity of activism in 
authoritarian regimes. We realize social networks are not unaffected by censorship and control policies 
or the media’s corporate character. It is easy to forget that platforms, above all facilitate systemic 
collection and analysis of user data to enable various forms of targeted advertising and services 
(Couldry, 2015). The business model of social networks can cause tension between these embedded 
techno-commercial features and activist tactics and values. 
 
4.5.5 The Kuwaiti Feminist Movement: Between Hegemony and Contesting Pluralisms 
Interviewing and obtaining reflections of members of the Kuwaiti feminist movement was a necessary 
step to grasp the structural features of organized feminist action in Kuwait. Accordingly, questions 
were asked that relate to the overall configurations and the intra-movement dynamics of the Kuwaiti 
feminist movement. In what follows, I present the reflections that emerged out of interviews with 
various activists who occupied different positions in the political spectrum and held differing views. 
Thus, I draw on accounts recorded during semi-structured interviews with eight Kuwaiti activists.  
 
What was observed from the interview data is that in Kuwait, similar to the case of Saudi 
Arabia, feminist activists are simultaneously located within several different social groupings and are 




multiple complex hierarchies that exist among them in contrast to the simplistic portrayals of them as 
homogenous actors or simply as liberal versus Islamist women. This nuance posed a direct critique of 
the common depictions of Kuwaiti women as unitary actors who are either progressive or inspired by 
Islamism and traditionalist precepts. The most urgent concern voiced by Kuwaiti interviewees was the 
lack of a cohesive feminist movement that is currently united on all the fronts. Moreover, they pointed 
out that the efforts to improve the status of women through women’s organizations are inevitably 
permeated by the divisions extant in society. The divisions may actively, even if inadvertently, work 
against the creation of a united women’s movement. Some were also convinced that strong patriarchal 
class and kin structures still prevent women from forging large, effective gender solidarity.  
 
Dr. al-Khatib, a Kuwaiti academic and prominent activist in women’s issues, stated that, 
although secular feminist activism has co-existed, challenged and collaborated with the Islamist 
women’s groups in the past over the issue of suffrage rights, something so seemingly simple as a united 
women’s movement is difficult to develop in a society riven with other hierarchical distinctions. It can 
only be done in tandem with the elimination of other social bases of subordination besides gender. She 
continued:  
 
Currently, the women’s movement seems to be shattered. You probably read the work of 
Simone de Beauvoir. She talks about how we lack the “We” that brings us all together as 
women. Unfortunately, we are a society that mixes religion with customs and traditions, which 
makes it difficult for women to unite considering differences among us in the level of 
commitment to modernization and economic development or the commitment to traditional 
norms. (Interview 11) 
 
The complexity of women’s intersecting social positions was also mirrored in the structural 
makeup of women’s organizations in the Kuwaiti civic sector, which is made of two main types of 
organizations—ad-hoc voluntary groups and professional organizations (Rizzo, 2005). Different types 
of organizations might adopt liberal, Islamist, moderate or government-aligned orientations. What 
emerged from the interviews was the perceived dominant role of the liberal WCSS within the Kuwaiti 
civil society sector. This perception is not surprising due to its long historical role within the women’s 
rights movement beginning with its establishment in 1963, right after Kuwaiti independence. WCSS 
continues to be perceived by many as an effective player in the Kuwaiti civil scene and one of the main 
forums for women to engage in public activity. 
 
Nonetheless, a common thread was a criticism of WCSS. It was described as an organization 
that is primarily run by elitist, upper-class women who tend to speak on behalf of the movement as a 




WCSS or that it has worked to empower those who are already in power. Another criticism brought up 
by one of the interviewees, who did not wish to be identified, was that leadership in WCSS is already 
agreed upon and determined in advance; there is little competition or renewal in the leadership posts. 
She mentioned that WCSS has had only six or seven presidents in its 56-year history and that a small 
core of established members could be guilty of this inner circle promotion. (Interview 12) 
 
Al-Dulami is the coordinator of the voluntary group “Kuwaiti Women without Borders”, which 
is a grassroots voluntary group that solely campaigns for the nationality issue. She stated the group was 
established because they “did not feel represented by other established women’s organizations 
including WCSS”. During her interview, she affirmed that her voluntary group was formed to be 
autonomous and develop claims and discourse that speak to the needs of women who have nowhere 
else to go. She maintained the position of recognizing the rights of other activists to take different paths 
in voicing their demands and that the “Kuwaiti Women without Borders” group is not against 
collaborating with the other organizations that operate in the civic sphere in Kuwait if it will end up 
benefiting women in the end. (Interview 14) 
 
Another interviewee, Dr. al-Khatib, who was a former board member of the WCSS, ‘did not 
deny the tensions and contradictions in the Kuwaiti feminist movement and criticized the 
predominance of elitist feminism. In her opinion, more legitimacy is given to feminism(s) that emerge 
as a response to women’s struggles because a struggle is what creates a movement. Elaborating on the 
configuration of the Kuwaiti feminist movement, al-Khateeb stated 
 
My issue with organizations such as WCSS is that it is led by elitist women who become in 
charge of the executive board for many years to follow. This puts distance between the 
organization and everyday women, women who live in areas like Al-Jahra or Solibiya [cities 
with underdeveloped infrastructure in Kuwait], although I have to admit that WCSS had tried to 
reach out to them by attempting to establish branches there. Let’s face it: WCSS is led by not, 
your “everyday women,” but by women who come from certain socioeconomic classes and 
hold certain educational backgrounds. On the one hand, I understand that in this particular field, 
you need powerful individuals who have resources with good networks and connections. 
Otherwise, how are you supposed to handle the work? But on the other hand, you can see this 
pattern turning into an obstacle that prevents the formulation of a powerful women’s movement 
that truly responds to women’s needs. I have many reservations about the position of WCSS, 
although many members are friends of mine. (Interview 11) 
 
The above account aligns with the reflections made by the Kuwaiti historian Al-Mughni (1993), 




solidarities that challenge gender discrimination. In her analysis, in order to maintain class privileges, 
women of the elite classes tend to preserve their kinship organization; for them, privileges of class 
replace gender issues—intentionally or not. Women’s organizations in Kuwait have historically 
supported this elite group to the detriment of women from low-income groups; it is the latter who are 
most affected by the state’s discriminatory policies, as well as patriarchy in both the public and private 
arenas (Al-Nakib, 2015). 
 
For their part, leaders of the WCSS did not share this point of view and dismissed the claims 
that members of WCSS do not suffer from the same obstacles as the women they claim to represent. 
WCSS Chairwoman Lulwa al-Mulla says she sees no issue in the fact that most members of WCSS 
come from privileged socioeconomic backgrounds. For her, it is an enabling factor as these women 
were able to travel, see the world, interact with other cultures and bring back the best of that knowledge 
to serve their fellow countrywomen. As with regards to the leadership positions, she correlated 
leadership positions with seniority in the organization. She also insisted on clarifying that WCSS is in 
fact in touch with the marginalized groups in society and that they serve as an umbrella organization 
that is open for everyone—for the youth, university students and different factions of society. Al-Mulla 
took great pride in mentioning some of the organization’s achievements throughout the Middle East 
and beyond in the fields of social development, cultural activities, charitable care and fighting for 
women’s political rights—which proved to be agonizing processes that consumed their energies for 
more fifty years. (Interview 13) 
 
The contradiction between the official discourse of WCSS and the discourse of other women’s 
groups could be seen as an indicator of how social imaginaries of a unified feminist identity are often 
problematic when they are at odds with the material reality from which feminisms are constructed and 
demonstrated. Nevertheless, even though these fragmentations and differences might be seen as 
threatening to splinter the Kuwaiti feminist movements, several activists appeared to be committed to 
finding common paths to solidarity. Despite the tensions that some interviewees made visible among 
women’s organizations, interviewees also suggested that it is only by taking these differences seriously 
that they can think through the possibilities and parameters of forming alliances. It appears that the 
issue of nationality has found resonance with the civil sector in Kuwait due to its urgency. Al-Khatib 
commented on the urgency of this matter: 
 
The problem is severe! There are documented cases of women who legally obtain a divorce 
from their non-Kuwaiti spouses just to appeal to authorities about their case and attempt to 
request Kuwaiti citizenship for their children! There are cases of women who live with their ex-
husbands under the same roof under temporary marriage contracts [alternative forms of 




secret community, a community within a community, as these women are being considered 
adulteresses in the eye of Kuwaiti law. (Interview 11) 
 
Many groups have come together under the umbrella of the recent campaign “Ensaf,” which 
was launched in 2014 by a coalition led by WCSS and ten other Kuwaiti associations and public 
interest groups dedicated to the cause. These groups included the Kuwaiti Human Rights Society, the 
National Association for Family Protection (Rawasi), the Islamic Al-Bayader Al-Salam Women’s 
Association, as well as the Kuwaitis without Borders grassroots group dedicated solely to this cause. 
This alliance sought to mount an active campaign for full citizenship rights for women and lobby for 
laws that would permit them to pass their citizenship to their noncitizen children and enjoy equal 
opportunities in education, employment and welfare benefits. Commenting on this issue, al-Hindi, a 
Kuwaiti engineer and the founder of the Kuwaiti Women without Borders group stated, “Once we 
speak about the nationality issue, I see that our differences start to vanish. We, as different groups and 
organizations, unite when we pursue a similar goal.” (Interview 16) 
 
For some, the coalition between different organizations and groups has signaled that WCSS has 
started to adopt a more cooperative model with other civil society organizations and groups; it has 
shifted its position from sole centralization towards cooperation through advocacy and coalition 
building. Activist al-Mekaimi argued that for the sake of achieving unity, it is crucial for women to 
develop a strategic discourse that is grounded within constitutional frameworks; they must target 
governmental institutions because the current violated rights are civil rights. Moreover, she claims that 
everyone, despite their different political and ideological leanings, agrees that Kuwaiti women have a 
constitutional right to be treated equally with men according to the constitution. (Interview 15) 
 
Other accounts obtained from the other interviewed activists also converged on the importance 
of framing arguments in constitutional terms. Using constitutional language not only targets 
governmental institutions in a language they understand, but also fosters a sense of unity among the 
involved women who belong to different organizations or classes or hold disparate ideological leanings 
or declared objectives. It also promotes the notion of citizenship as built on logical civic ideas and not 
on tribalism or gendered prejudice. 
 
To sum up, while some interviewees voiced some tensions arising from differences among 
feminist activists themselves—from their disparate ideological leanings, class or declared objectives—
it appears that the women’s movement in Kuwait had the potential for finding some paths to unity over 
the nationality issue. This unity was made possible through the ad-hoc alliance that was formed to 
pursue the common cause of fighting against gendered citizenship. Feminist activism took the form of 




recognized that cooperation had the potential for realizing more rights for Kuwaiti women. Moreover, 
it also emerged that common discursive framing practices were deeply implicated in forging solidarity 
and fostering broader mobilization, transcending the dichotomy between the secular and the religious 
while maintaining the recognition of differences as well as respect for the choices that women make. 
This framing is an indicator that it was the partially overlapping and cross-cutting nature of social 
struggles that was the central issue for feminist action, rather than that of reified differences (Jakobsen, 
1998). 
 
4.5.6 Mapping the Terrain of Feminist Activism in Kuwait  
When interviewees were asked to elaborate on the organizational structure of the Kuwaiti feminist 
movement, several pointed out that the women’s movement began pursuing “institutionalization” in the 
early 1960s because of the establishment of several women’s organizations which addressed the 
improvement of the status of Kuwaiti women from differing, sometimes opposing, perspectives. The 
same observation was made by Meyer et al. (1989), who argued that women’s organizations 
characterize the first stages of women’s efforts to bring about social change for women in the Middle 
East, which applies to the case of Kuwait. Since the 1960s, the feminist movement in Kuwait has 
operated within organizations and structures in pursuit of voice, recognition and publicity, as well as to 
deal with established structures of institutional power, where issues on the agenda were already set and 
defined by powerful actors. Commenting on this aspect, Dr. al-Mekaimi, who is now a consultant for 
and member of the Kuwaiti Women’s Union stated 
 
 We have a strong and deeply rooted institutionalized civil society. Kuwaiti society is a civil 
society to begin with. Women are working within the concept of civil society more than acting 
on behalf of a stand-alone feminist ideology. Civil society is the overall umbrella that 
accommodates different points of view. (Interview 15) 
 
Several interviewees commented on the fact that the majority of women’s organizations are 
professional and bureaucratic in the pursuit of reaching out to institutional actors. They saw the 
rationale for the setting up of women’s organizations in the creation of enduring structures to pursue 
sustainable social change. For instance, Chairwomen of WCSS Lulwa al-Mulla stated that collective 
protest action is not always suitable in the case of Kuwait and that it is better for women’s claims to be 
adopted by institutions that are capable of carrying feminist claims forward.  
 
In her opinion, the professionalization of movements gives women’s claims more legitimacy. It 
is important to be included in established state structures and maintain links with policymakers in order 




conflictive and/or cooperative approach towards the state by shifting the politics of contention with the 
politics of engagement to maximize their sociopolitical leverage. (Interview 13) 
 
The mainstream strand of literature in social movement studies has traditionally treated 
institutionalization as synonymous with the end of social movements or equated it with co-optation. 
For instance, Meyer (1993, p. 157) argued, “movements end when they reach some sort of 
accommodation with the state and/or are either no longer interested or able to mount extra-institutional 
challenges.” Since routinization is considered to be in opposition to emotion and enthusiasm, 
theoretical specifications of the stages of social movement development have usually stressed emotion 
in the early stages and institutionalization in the later stage (Hiller, 1975). Under this logic, the state 
exemplifies the “co-opting body” and embraces a particular movement in order to echo its own 
legitimacy and to avert threats to its stability. Once movements are institutionalized, they change their 
goals in ways that make them attainable through bureaucratic, legislative and judicial procedures; they 
regularize and moderate their overall stance to pressure the government to enact policies and laws that 
reflect movement areas of interest (Suh, 2011). Such movement institutionalization is thus regarded as 
detrimental to social movements. By defining institutionalization in similar ways, social movement 
scholars tend to view it in terms of its (negative) impact on the capacity of a movement to sustain extra-
institutional challenges. 
 
Katzenstein (1998) argues that this line of thinking presumes the existence of fundamental 
differences in the form, location and content between the domain of movement politics and institutional 
politics. Movement politics are viewed as disruptive rather than peaceful; they take place in the street 
rather than in institutions and they seek radical rather than incremental change, as opposed to 
institutional politics. What appeared from the interviews, though, is that the institutionalization of 
women’s organizations in the case of Kuwait is generally understood by the interviewees as the 
creation of established channels of advocacy and activism on the part of women’s organizations who 
opt to be more formal and professionalized in structure. Such organizations are usually headed by 
highly accomplished women. 
 
This pragmatic approach of commitment to institutionalization is shared by many women’s 
activists and committed individuals from a variety of political factions and schools of thought. Some 
women might criticize the leadership of these institutionalized organizations, yet they still believe that 
institutionalization is beneficial overall. One interviewee pointed out that it is “difficult to imagine their 
movements succeeding without having to deal with institutional actors to introduce their feminist 





The institutionalization of the women’s movements in the Kuwaiti context is therefore not 
necessarily the outcome or the end-stage in the life cycle of a social movement that routinizes over time 
and comes with the risk of co-option as many social movements theorists argue (Kriesi, Jan Willem 
Duyvendak, & Giugni, 1995). Instead, it is a process that signifies the origin of Kuwaiti women’s 
movements and creates the impetus for social change. Taking these testimonies into account, it might 
be useful to view institutionalization not as just a predestined stage in a ‘movement’s trajectory, but as 
a strategic choice made in relation to the ‘movement’s particular political climate and external 
environment.  
 
If we agree that social movements frequently entail both confrontation and collaboration with 
power holders (Tilly, 1994), movement institutionalization can be understood as one possible outcome 
of that process, especially because the relationship between the social movement and the state is by 
nature interactive—neither static nor unilateral. Nonetheless, it is not accurate to imply that forming 
professional organizations is the only available means for feminist activists in Kuwait. Another 
alternative is the creation of informal voluntary groups that are incorporated within the broader 
spectrum of Kuwaiti civil society. 
 
The skepticism concerning the utility of formalized organizations offers some insights into why 
informal civic spaces have started to gain traction in recent years. It is worth mentioning that informal 
voluntary groups have been observed in multiple post-Arab uprising contexts in which an increasing 
section of the citizenry has come to regard formal organizations as slow in channeling grassroots 
activism in opposition to the state. Many people have therefore turned to informal civil society groups 
(Khatib and Lust, 2014). One primary explanation for the emergence of informal groups is their 
potential ability to improvise and circumvent the conditions imposed by the state on formal 
associations. Unlike formal women’s organizations, these voluntary groups are not fixed institutions 
with designated functions. Rather, because of their casual arrangement/format, they have ad-hoc 
configurations and functions. Accordingly, voluntary groups can be identified and distinguished from 
professional women’s organizations by the characteristics they do not possess—i.e. formal structure, in 
the sense that they are not registered and have not obtained official legal status from the Kuwaiti 
Ministry of Social Affairs to operate as a recognized professional entity.  
 
These voluntary groups share the perception that formal organizations, although still capable of 
fulfilling an important function, have certain constrained capabilities to tackle sensitive issues. Yet, 
they do not mind engaging in collaborations with them on a variety of matters of public concern, 
including most notably the “Ensaf” campaign. Meanwhile, al-Hindi, founder of the grassroots 
voluntary group “Kuwaiti Women without Borders”, was enthusiastic while explaining that their group 
is completely independent because it was formed by Kuwaiti women who had experienced the struggle 




the Kuwaiti Women’s Union or any other organizations, but preferred to operate at a grassroots level 
and remain autonomous. Nevertheless, she still expressed the importance of maintaining links with 
policymakers and access to institutional means; the group has cooperated previously with the Women’s 
Committee of the National Assembly and some members of the executive branch to advance for their 
interests. She also expressed that they rely on social networking platforms and especially Twitter to 
make their presence noticeable and articulate their claims.  
 
Al-Hindi’s testimony emphasizes that, despite the fact that the structure of voluntary women’s 
groups is different from professional women’s organizations, they also embrace and reconfigure the 
commitment to deal with state institutions. Overall, what we can understand from the interviews is that 
institutionalization is perceived positively by some social actors as a dynamic, complex process that 
does not always entail the risk of depoliticization or demobilization of contentious feminist claims. It 
enables women’s claims to acquire stable platforms and channels the otherwise underrepresented 
collective interests to the policymaking domain. Movement institutionalization is not always perceived 
as associated with co-optation or as signaling the end of the movement. This understanding goes in 
tandem with some of the underlying observations concerning many developing countries, in which 
non-governmental women’s organizations constituted the first manifestation of a nation’s feminist 
movement; that is, the institutional form of a nation’s feminist movement at its outset may be as an 
NGO (Alvarez 1999). In contrast, this dynamic is less common in Western contexts, in which the 
institutionalization process may come at a later stage as be part of a movement’s cross-time 
transformation or as a response to internal changes. 
 
The majority of the testimonies illuminated that institutionalization in Kuwait is perceived to be 
beneficial in building cooperative links, allowing moderate tactics to achieve the movement goals and 
spanning the boundaries of a politics of identity and politics of engagement (Reinelt, 1995) in which 
women’s organizations serve as institutional fixtures in which counter-hegemonic discourse emerge. 
By comparing these testimonies with those in the Saudi case, it appears that the obtained reflections 
demonstrated that both cases vary significantly in terms of their level of engagement with 
institutionalized politics and autonomy from state structures. Organizations with explicit structure and 
decision-making bodies exist side by side with more loosely organized groups in one case; ad hoc 
networks mobilize around specific issues of concerns in the other. 
 
4.5.7 Pathways to Feminist Identification  
Similar to the case of Saudi Arabia, I seek to interrogate the genealogy of feminism and capture the 
meaning of feminist identification for the interviewed participants. Hence, I am interested in examining 
whether my interviewees embrace the feminist label and what it means to them. I sought, therefore, to 




feminist activism in Kuwait. One commonality, which I found, was that most of them stepped on the 
path of activism at a young age and were encouraged by their family members.  
 
Another commonality was the influence of their experiences studying abroad and their 
involvement in the student body politics on their feminist identification. Many of them agreed that they 
perceive feminism as the rejection of gender-related inequalities and found it interchangeable with 
women’s rights activism. For instance, al-Mulla, who describes herself as one of Kuwait’s “pioneering 
women’s activists,” stated that she was brought up in a supportive environment that contributed to 
forming her current political and social leanings. She fondly remembers her two-years of study abroad 
in Lebanon, where she took an active part in the vibrant political environment there. Al-Mulla recalled:  
 
The liberal atmosphere there affected me tremendously. I was part of the Arab Cultural Club. I 
attended all of their seminars and took part in the protests they organized. I helped to organize 
charity events to raise funds for Palestinian refugees. When I came back to Kuwait and resumed 
my studies at the University of Kuwait after I got married, I continued my activism and ran for 
the students’ council. When Kuwait was invaded, my husband took us to Cairo, which was the 
closest destination from which we could do something meaningful for our country. In Cairo, I 
insisted on working for the 30,000 Kuwaitis who had been relocated there. Together with some 
friends and colleagues, we established an association that dealt with the needs of the Kuwaitis 
in exile. We formed different committees and I was the head of the committee that looked after 
children and women. (Interview 13) 
 
Upon al-Mulla’s return to Kuwait after its liberation, she and a group of women restarted 
WCSS and held their first election of new board members. She was elected as vice president of the 
organization. Her activism continued during the following years through her call for women’s suffrage 
rights. For example, she camped with fellow activists outside the places where male-only campaigns 
and political debates were held, determined to be allowed to take part in the discussions and to insist on 
their presence. They also entered the elections registration centers and attempted to register themselves 
as voters; when they were not allowed, they even took the legal route by filing lawsuits in court. Their 
efforts continued throughout the years and did not stop with them gaining their political rights. 
(Interview 13) 
 
Similarly, activist al-Mekaimi affirmed that she does not have any problem with identifying 
herself as a feminist and find the term synonymous with being a women’s rights activist. She revealed 
the most significant factor for her becoming a feminist activist was her political involvement in the 
students’ front during her university years abroad; she took part in running the Kuwaiti Student Union 




Muslim Brotherhood, the Kuwaiti liberal democrats’ fraction she belonged to managed to take over the 
union because of the 9/11 attacks in the States. Following her return to Kuwait, she became an active 
part of the Kuwaiti feminist movement until women were granted their long-awaited suffrage rights in 
2005. She was also one of the 30 female delegates among those who traveled with the former ruler of 
Kuwait to France, the United Kingdom and the United States to speak about their experience in 
advocating for women’s rights in Kuwait. (Interview 15) 
 
When asked about her feminist identification and the factors that led her to embrace it, al-
Khatib explained that she finds feminism to be interconnected with political activism. She became 
interested in the public political scene at an early age due to the influence of her father, who was a 
member of parliament. Following her university graduation, she became a member of WCSS, in which 
she worked for a couple of years. For her, it was hard to pinpoint a particular moment in which she 
realized that she is a feminist. Emphasizing this point, she stated: 
 
Those who carry women’s issues at heart. It is hard for them to pinpoint the moment when they 
started realizing it. It seems that these principles were always with you. They were always a part 
of your character. I am very much comfortable with identifying myself as a feminist and I hope 
that I deserve it. As much bad reputation [the term] has gotten, I don’t shy away from 
embracing it. Feminism is still perceived somehow negatively in the Gulf. It is perceived as 
connected with homosexuality, which I personally don’t have any problem with. There is no 
clear definition of what feminism is. The general public thinks of it as men-hating, which is 
simply inaccurate. Women in Kuwait and the in the Gulf who embrace the feminist label are 
being accused of two main things. First, being slaves to Western ideas and second, putting out 
trivial issues ahead of important issues. Most often, whenever we bring up a feminist issue, the 
typical answer is, “Oh, we have so many important things and you are bringing that up?” And it 
is always women’s issues that stand at the end of the line, perceived as being less important. 
There is a trend of trivializing women’s issues, not understanding that every single reform in 
society starts with women. If women’s status doesn’t get better, it doesn’t improve; nothing will 
move along. This is a realistic reading of the situation. Familial issues take precedence over 
women’s issues; tribal issues are prioritized before women’s issues. (Interview 11) 
 
The above testimony reflects al-Khatib’s frustration about the lack of seriousness taken by 
politicians in regard to tackling women’s issues once they are in the office and no longer need women’s 
votes. It also identifies that the most common accusation leveled at self-identified feminists is their 
perceived embrace of a nefarious concept imported from privileged intellectuals of the West, an 
accusation that excludes the utility of feminism on the basis of its Western origin and its perceived 
destructive repercussions on the structure of the family in the MENA region. Al-Khatib also stressed 




often conflate citizenship and nationalism and construct an exclusive, singular and fixed cultural 
identity with other affiliations presented as threats to national hegemony. She proposed providing 
human rights education as a potential solution and interruption to the nationalistic and Islamic 
hegemony in Kuwait because it might provide opportunities for more inclusive ideas of citizenship. 
(Interview 11). 
 
Wafa al-Obaid, the head of the women’s committee in the National Association of Familial 
Security (Rawasi), identified herself as an Islamist feminist who sees a great deal of overlap between 
authentic Islam and women’s equality. When asked to elaborate on her position, she expressed that she 
generally advocates for women’s active participation in the public sphere as active citizens who still 
adhere to the moral code of Islam. She expressed that women had greater rights and public involvement 
in early Islamic history, including roles as political leaders, religious scholars and teachers. Hence, she 
understands feminism as being able to emphasize women’s rights as part of the broader commitment to 
human rights and religious devotion at the same time. (Interview 18) 
 
Her reasoning implies that, for some, it is important to develop a local indigenous solution to 
the woman question. Proponents of this reasoning most often see the justification for their fight for 
women’s rights and gender equality in their own interpretation of Islam’s sacred text. Their aims are 
therefore at once theological and socially reformist to confer on feminism an Islamic character. 
Unsurprisingly, these ideas have found a great level of resonance within Kuwaiti society, starting from 
the early 1980s. The 1980s coincided with the rise of Islamist women’s organizations and their alliance 
with the state in promoting its model of ideal women both within the family and in society at large. 
Such ideas have gained a foothold within the Kuwaiti community since then, creating another strand in 
the evolving struggle for women’s rights that demands women’s rights as stipulated by Islamic 
tradition. 
 
Al-Dulaimi sees feminism as a set of economic, political and social solutions that enable 
women to emancipate themselves from the injustices arising from the discriminations that occur. She 
attributed her involvement with feminist activism to two intersecting factors—her personal struggle, 
further complicated by having children who are denied citizenship and her usage of social networking 
platforms in relation to this issue. Elaborating on this point, she explained that she used Twitter to vent 
about the unjust citizenship laws in Kuwait, only to be later approached by some women who faced 
similar struggles. They offered her encouragement and brought up the idea of organizing themselves to 
advocate on this issue. This encounter was the starting point of establishing the Kuwaitis without 





Thus, we can witness that the deployment of Twitter enabled al-Dulaimi, who is a non-
institutional actor, to expose her viewpoints to the public, which played a factor in her involvement 
with the feminist scene. This experience is consistent with previous research that found social media to 
be useful in providing a counter space for individuals whose voices are typically marginalized or 
silenced in mainstream media (Bonilla and Rosa, 2015; Yang, 2007). Al-Dulaimi stated that the 
absence of many voices, especially non-institutional voices, from the current socio-political debates 
was upended by the frequency and prevalence of social media use. She later expressed that she sees 
great potential in platforms such as Twitter to broadly disseminate feminist ideas, shape new modes of 
discourse about gender and citizenship, find solidarity networks and allow creative modes of dissent to 
emerge. Her optimism highlights the renewed feminist politics arising from the conjunction of digital 
platforms and activism by individuals and activists who draw on the opportunities that social 
networking platforms provide to embrace new understandings of activism and even feminism itself. 
(Interview 14) 
 
Nonetheless, unlike the interviews that were conducted with Saudi feminist activists, many 
Kuwaiti respondents expressed that, despite their awareness that social networking platforms do not 
serve solely individualistic functions, they prefer not to rely exclusively on social networks to advocate 
for their cause. They believe their cause is better addressed, or better be complemented by relying on 
institutional channels. For instance, al-Khatib stated 
 
There are good feminist voices on Twitter. But we have to realize that concentrating on Twitter 
is not enough. There are several feminist writers who write in electronic magazines like 
Manshoor or Raseef22. Their content is amazing. But the problem is that shattered voices on 
Twitter don’t take us anywhere. If you write a tweet and I write a tweet, what will happen? This 
is just venting; we better complement this by organizing ourselves in other ways. (Interview 11) 
 
Unlike the respondents in the Saudi case who attributed the emergence of digital feminist 
activism to a direct response to civil society deficiency and low levels of media development, it seems 
that activists in Kuwait still believe in the efficacy of institutionalized feminist politics and channels. 
Their confidence is not surprising because formal civic spaces have long been a feature of the Kuwaiti 
civic and institutional landscape. In sum, the interviewees demonstrated that the independent 
trajectories of feminist identifications are incredibly complex and potentially contradictory. Some adopt 
secular feminist thought; others believe that Islam is compatible and in harmony with the main 
principles of women’s rights and deploy religious arguments in addition to the medley of arguments 
based on the constitution and international human rights declarations and conventions. Some even turn 
to digital activism and draw on the opportunities that the internet and social networking platforms 





It is hard to reach a consensus about one definition of feminism, as feminism does not form a 
unitary clearly defined category (Skeggs, 1997). It also became apparent that the perceived contributors 
to feminist self-labeling were the positive evaluation of feminists and previous exposure to political 
thought as well as the recognition of discrimination and support of feminist goals. This section sheds 
some light on how feminists define feminism and the plural and heterogeneous visions of feminism that 
emanate from the identity and subjectivity of women themselves. It also shows that what unites the 
feminist activists in the case of Kuwait is their embrace of feminism as a set of attitudes and beliefs that 
support gender equality and actions that promote the advancement of women.  
 
4.5.8 How to Proceed? Strategies, Actions and Tactics 
When speaking about their implemented strategies and actions taken in relation to the “Ensaf” 
campaign, the interviewees stated that they utilized a wide array of action repertoires that included 
arranging extensive media interviews and T.V. appearances, reaching out to both the legislative and 
executive branches, organizing seminars for the public, filing up reports to transnational organizations 
including the United Nations and articulating their claims via social networking platforms.  
 
The interviewees who were members of women’s organizations expressed that they 
concentrated their efforts on lobbying the National Assembly as soon as they became aware of the 
importance of targeting the legislators to induce change regarding this matter. Echoing this point, al-
Mulla stated that WCSS has maintained a level of cooperation between several members of parliament 
and the executive branch in order to sustain cooperative links with these institutional actors and 
ministers. She later revealed “not all politicians are supportive of changing the existing legislation for 
the advantage of women on the grounds that it will change the demographics of Kuwait, which is a 
prejudiced opinion.” (Interview 13) 
 
Al-Dulaimi pointed out that the “Kuwaiti Women without Borders” group has worked with the 
Women’s Committee in parliament for years. They prepared and sent to all members of the National 
Assembly a bill prepared for the introduction and implementation of permanent residence of the family 
members of Kuwaiti women married to non-nationals. She later stated, “We tried to get the approval of 
the deputies to hold a meeting to discuss this proposal and we got some support, but many of the 
deputies told us that such a case is bigger than the capabilities of the National Assembly because it is 
linked to a sensitive matter.” (Interview 14) 
 





            Women are becoming increasingly frustrated. For instance, a group of women approached me 
recently to tell me about their plan to organize a rally near the ruler’s palace to appeal to him. I 
told them that with all due respect, “We are a civilized country. What do you mean that you 
want to appeal to your ‘father’ to give us our rights? This will not benefit anyone. It is better to 
deal with this issue as a civil matter. Plan it ahead of time. Give it a long-term plan.” (Interview 
11) 
 
This example is significant because it mirrors al-Khatib’s preference to address the issue 
through civil channels and her refusal to engage with the state in a patriarchal bargain that would not 
resolve the issue at a structural level. Rather than simply calling on the state to save them, these 
feminists prefer to use other means that focus on how the state is not their “savior.” In this way, 
although they are ultimately referring to the state in their demands, as any other movement must, I 
argue that they increasingly seek to do so on their own terms rather than those of the state. 
Complementing this argument, it appeared from the interviews that the activists have increasingly 
embraced constitutional and legal arguments while seeking to endorse a female citizen’s right to confer 
citizenship to her children by emphasizing that the current nationality law violates article 29 of the 
constitution: “people are equal in human dignity, public rights, and duties, and… there is no distinction 
between them on the basis of sex or language” (Constitute project, 2019). They also emphasize that the 
current nationality law violates the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), that Kuwait has signed which prohibits such 
discrimination in nationality laws. 
 
Additionally, the campaign resorted to legal means when it bankrolled three separate constitutional 
appeals in 2016 to look into the issue of equalizing Kuwaiti mothers’ housing allowances and the rights 
of their children to inherit with those of Kuwaiti men; the court dismissed the cases in May 2017. It 
was also discussed in the interviews that the campaign has opted to form partnerships with other 
transnational organizations, such as Equality Now and the Global Campaign for Equal Nationality 
Rights, that urge the Kuwaiti state to comply with its international legal obligations and commitments. 
Moreover, the National Association of Familial Security (Rawasi) was involved in writing regular 
reports for the Universal Periodic Review by the United Nations Human Rights Council and inviting 
members of international embassies in Kuwait to attend their publically held seminars. ( Interview 18) 
 
One activists reported on her usage of social media platforms to coordinate the “Kuwaiti 
Women without Borders” activities and further advocate for their cause. She recalled sending an 
emergency appeal to the members of the National Assembly via Twitter, urging them to take any action 
regarding the nationality issue. She viewed social networking platforms as a site of struggle for 
addressing women’s issues and a communication venue through which their concerns could reach 




This understanding was also shared by the head of the main organization WCSS, who believed 
that mastering the skills of online communication among women’s organizations is necessary. For 
instance, Al-Mulla stated that Twitter could be useful for the organization in disseminating and sharing 
relevant information (Interview 13). However, she brought up the importance of diversifying the 
campaigns’ tactics. Lastly, interviewees expressed that their involvement with the campaign has 
contributed to getting rid of the stigma that was attached to women who marry non-Kuwaiti nationals. 
One Interviewee stated, “Women used to shy away from mentioning that they are married to non-
Kuwaitis. Now we are proud of our choices; there is no stigma about it. Among us, you would find 
doctors, teachers and engineers. We give back to our society.” (Interview 12) 
 
To summarize, it came to light that the topic of gendered citizenship is probably one of the most 
politicized issues in the Kuwaiti scene and that women’s activists have mobilized to affect legal and 
policy changes under conditions of both authoritarianism and democracy in order to strengthen female 
citizenship laws in Kuwait. Activists were aware that the merits of assertive versus acquiescent 
strategies are contingent on economic and political situations. In their pursuit, they used a wide variety 
of actions that included resorting to legal and institutional channels within the realm of formal politics 
to avert gender discrimination, blending the politics of contention with the politics of engagement. 
They also sought to raise awareness about this matter and took advantage, to a lesser degree than Saudi 
Arabian activists perhaps, of new digital technologies. It also emerged that matters that only a decade 
ago were regarded as sensitive, such as gendered citizenship, are discussed now in public in a new way. 
A discourse that is built on constitutional and legal arguments opens new opportunities for activism and 
mobilization. 
 
4.6 Conclusion  
This chapter sought to better situate activists’ sense-making of feminist activism as an agentic practice 
by adopting an actor centric approach to uncover activists’ perceptions in the context of two case 
studies that included the “Women to Drive” campaign in Saudi Arabia and the “Ensaf” campaign in 
Kuwait. The analysis of interview data was therefore encapsulated into four main themes that covered 
the interviewees’ reflections on the overall configurations and the intra-movement dynamics 
surrounding both of the Saudi and Kuwaiti feminist movements, their mode of organizing, the ways in 
which activists define their feminist involvement, in addition to the array of tactical actions that they 
have undertaken during the campaigns that took place.  
 
The findings of the interviews revealed the majority of interviewees in both cases have 
emphasized on the internal diversity and multiple belongings that characterized the conduct of the 
campaigns, in which activists have converged on viewing their respective feminist movements as a 
multivalent and inherently contested field with various boundaries, identities, complexity and 




representations of women in the Gulf Region that hold the presumption of sameness among all women 
in this context. By comparing and contrasting the testimonies made by several activists in Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait, it appeared that women could not be lumped into one monolithic group, but instead 
referred to in the plural, inserted in quite diverse contextual arrangements and happen to hold different, 
often conflicting ideological leanings about religiosity, secularism, the role of the state and how they 
view the emancipation of women.  
  
Given this tremendous diversity, caution needs to be exercised before generalizing the 
trajectory of women’s and feminist movements or assuming that they are the same in this complex 
region. However, one should bear in mind that while plurality is a positive phenomenon, it can 
simultaneously be a source of conflict that may hinder the formation of solidarity or collective 
identities necessary for activists to take action and maintain a commitment to their causes. The 
interviewees did not deny or attempted to conceal the tensions and rifts among the campaign 
participants. For instance, some interviewees have acknowledged that Saudi activists had profound 
differences among themselves and they disagreed on important issues such as compliance with state 
actors on their relationship with the political establishment. A similar view was held by the adherents 
of the Kuwaiti feminist movement who were critical of the predominance of elitist feminism. It 
emerged from the taken interviews that activists appeared to be committed to finding common paths to 
solidarity and that such differences did not impede mutual practical support expected of each other nor 
hinder mobilization potential, giving way to the cross-fertilization between possible common interests 
and political claims. 
  
It came to light from activists’ testimonies that the issue of the ban on driving and the existing 
restrictions on female citizenship rights as seen in the case of Kuwait have brought together women 
from different backgrounds, who in spite of their heterogeneity, have managed to produce a crucial 
sense of urgency and build shared understandings of the contentious issues of concern. Concerning the 
mode of organization’s aspect when it comes to the running of the campaigns, the majority of Saudi 
interview participants have disclosed that their activism is generally carried out virtually using digital 
means, as feminist activism often takes the shape of ad-hoc collective networks mobilizing around 
specific issues or tasks that are formed and dissolved by activists.  
  
Given the absence of visible developed civil society sector in Saudi Arabia which makes it 
challenging for activists to channel their efforts into institutionalized structures, the interviewees 
perceived digital media as alternative spaces for activism and asserted that platforms such are Facebook 
and Twitter are indeed fulfilling the functions of independent women’s organizations, as they allow 
activists to interact with each other through a decentralized and leaderless structure and circulate claims 





This finding is unique to the case of Saudi Arabia, where prior to the advancement of digital 
media, the level of authoritarianism had led to repress any attempt to broad-reaching feminist activism 
that reached any sort of meaningful scale in terms of public outreach as seen with the “Women to 
Drive” campaign. In contrast, interviews with a cross-section of activists in Kuwait have painted a 
different picture to the Kuwaiti feminist scene, in which they referred to it as characterized by the 
existence of formalized women’s rights organizations that were established since the early 1960s, with 
clear structures and decision-making bodies, which exist side by side with more loosely informal 
organized groups.  
  
Many interviewees also elaborated on the central role that established women’s organizations 
such as the WCSS has played in the Kuwaiti feminist movement, while pointing out that the ad-hoc 
alliance that was formed in 2014 and launched the “Ensaf” campaign, led by the WCSS and ten other 
Kuwaiti associations dedicated to improving female citizenship rights, has signaled that the WCSS has 
started to adopt a more cooperative model with other civil society organizations and groups. By 
contrasting the testimonies of the Kuwaiti and Saudi activists, it emerged that both cases had to contend 
with drastically different engagement patterns with institutionalized politics. In which unlike Saudi 
activists, the Kuwaiti interviewees have acknowledged that the Kuwaiti feminist movement has been 
able to maintain sustained and concentrated engagement with state institutions and work much more 
closely through existing state institutions as pathways to realizing their goals.  
  
So while Saudi activists described digital media platforms as the central locus of feminist 
activism and acknowledged its pivotal role into the development and continuity of Saudi feminist 
movement, the majority of Kuwaiti interviewees acknowledged that women’s organizations constituted 
the first manifestation of a national women’s movement and put an emphasis on formalized women’s 
organizations as enduring structures to pursue sustainable social change in incremental steps. Yet, 
activists testimonies have principally converged on that feminist activism in relation to the examined 
campaigns has generally taken the form of organized collective campaign that mobilized more through 
activity than ideology as soon as they realized that this has the potential for realizing further rights for 
women. 
  
Furthermore, although the mainstream strand of literature in social movement studies has 
traditionally treated institutionalization as synonymous with the end of social movements and equated 
it with co-optation. What appeared from the interview data with Kuwaiti activists is that the 
institutionalization of women’s organizations is generally understood by a large number of interviewed 
activists as the creation of established channels of advocacy and activism on the part of women’s 
organizations, who opt to be more formal and professionalized in structure. Despite the tendency to 
view institutionalization as signaling the end of the potentially transformative phase of political action, 




process that signified the origin of Kuwaiti women’s movement and viewed it as a mean for realizing 
pragmatic objectives. 
  
While the majority of Saudi interview participants have stressed on the leaderless structure of 
the movement, in which the feminist movement was referred to as being horizontally organized and 
more loosely structured with little need for prominent leaders, other accounts problematized the idea of 
digital media as non-hierarchical modes of communication. To elaborate, some testimonies have 
brought up the uneven influence in digital space and drew attention to the fact that even though 
women’s rights and feminist organizations are mostly absent in the mobilization against the driving 
ban, digital media platforms did not entirely manage to replace the role of movement leaders, as 
prominent activists remain to acquire a disproportionate degree of influence over the movement’s 
communication and actions and that leadership has not entirely vanished, as evident in the influence of 
prominent actors who happen to play an essential role in terms of the production and sharing of 
mobilization materials.  
  
As with regards to their feminist identifications, despite the fact that feminism is quite a highly 
charged concept in the Arab Gulf States and viewed as a Western phenomenon, the interviewees in 
both case studies embraced being identified as feminists. Within the interviewees, activists differed in 
terms of their personal motives for becoming actively engaged, their ideological orientations, their 
proclaimed aims and their scope of engagement with feminist activism. The interviewed activists, 
therefore, have demonstrated independent trajectories of feminist beliefs and varying ideological 
positions (secular, religious, liberal) that are incredibly complex.  
  
So, while arriving at a universal definition of feminism is challenging because the patriarchal 
relations against which feminisms constitute a resistance differ in their configuration from one location 
to another. The obtained fluid trajectories of feminist identifications have converged on the centrality 
of embracement of feminism as a set of attitudes and actions that advocate for gender equality and the 
advancement of women. Some testimonies that commented on the Saudi case, even capitalized on the 
opportunities that social networking platforms provide to embrace new understandings of feminist 
activism, as they embraced visions of social change in which digital and network communications have 
been featured prominently. 
  
Taken together, these accounts contributed to shedding some light on the multifaceted 
understandings of feminism and activism in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. However, it is worth mentioning 
that the varying entries into feminist activism shared here only provide a small glimpse into the range 
of experiences and trajectories of feminists identifications in overall. Regarding activist’s employed 




developed a sophisticated interrelated practices carried out on digital media platform and beyond, such 
as to creating and spreading out content, mobilizing constituent, promoting particular hashtags, 
diffusing of feminist discourses and claims and documenting ongoing events. 
  
The personal accounts of Saudi activists went beyond the often-uncritical celebration of digital 
media platforms, in which they have reflected on their experiences with cyberbullying and surveillance 
and demonstrated an understanding of the double functions of digital media as sites of empowerment 
on the one hand and of surveillance on the other hand, in which patterns of exclusion and oppression 
such as patriarchy continue to be replicated in online spaces. Similarly, when the Kuwaiti respondents 
were asked about the employed tactic repertoires in relation to the “Ensaf” campaign, they revealed that 
they have utilized a wide array of action which included: policy advocacy, resorting to legal and 
institutional channels, filing periodic reports to transnational organizations. They also expressed that 
they started coupling their policy advocacy efforts by using digital media platforms to disseminate and 
articulate their claims. As the comparison between the two cases has shown, the “Ensaf” campaign has 
relied on digital media for mobilization and to get their message across, in which Kuwaiti activists have 
expressed hesitation towards completely relying on digital media to advocate for their cause, since they 
believe that it is better to be addressed through institutional channels and that digital media can be a 




Chapter 5: The Discursive Visibility of Feminist Claims in the Public-Mediated Sphere 
 
Struggling to get media attention is a significant challenge on the part of feminist movements. Many of 
their demands and claims are perceived as not being of sufficient size or scale to warrant mainstream 
media coverage. Because of the political sensitivities associated with their demands, mainstream media 
outlets are reluctant to report on any potentially polarizing topics. And while discursive opportunity 
structure theory suggests that activists nowadays are  harnessing the power of digital media and 
becoming increasingly enabled by digital media to inform their public independently (Cammaerts, 
2012), numerous studies have pointed out that activists still compete to push their issues into the 
mainstream media agenda in order to reach a broader audience (Cammaerts, 2016). 
 
According to Rucht (2004), traditional mass media remain important as “pre-selectors of 
credible information and as serious political commentators” (p. 26). Some researchers paid attention to 
the agenda-building potential of digital media in terms of influencing the mainstream media agenda. A 
key premise about activists’ ability to influence mainstream media coverage is around the inter-media 
agenda-setting impact of digital media platforms. For instance, Pfetsch and Adam (2011) focused on 
the nature of online-offline inter-media diffusion from the perspective of the “interplay and dynamics” 
(p. 7) between these two communication realms. From this approach, they explained two types of 
online-offline spillover of challengers’ issues and frames. According to them, the first direct spillovers 
happen “when messages from the discourse of challengers get selected by journalists of mainstream 
media” (p. 7). The second type occurs through involvement with challengers’ issue networks and when 
their claims and discourse resonate with the public. 
 
Subsequently, the main objective of this chapter is to examine the salience of the claims made 
by feminists activists and organizations whom I am investigating in the Kuwaiti and Saudi mediated 
public sphere prior and during the mobilization that took place and possibly the contribution of feminist 
activism to the formation and diffusion of feminist discourse in the mass media by employing 
discursive opportunities structure theory. This will be made feasible by analyzing the coverage, 
salience and media attention of the issues at different points of time before and during the mobilization. 
For instance, how many times (e.g. a year prior to the women’s to drive movement in Saudi Arabia) did 
a mainstream Saudi newspaper pick up the topic of women’s right to drive and in what context? Did 
the issue of driving receive low-profile press coverage? Does the newspaper coverage imply a 
preference towards featuring the position of institutional actors who are against it? And if conventional 






What this chapter offers is a close examination of the media coverage of the contentious issue at 
hand to assess feminists’ visibility in mainstream media by exploring the position of different actors 
who are involved, the action repertoires they used and the framing process (Beyeler & Kriesi, 2005). I 
employ a form of quantitative content analysis that is Political Claims Analysis (PCA). I first intend to 
conduct a preliminary political claim analysis both in Arabic and in English on newspapers articles in 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait regarding two of the main issues advocated by the feminist campaigns I have 
included in the case selection, the “Women to Drive” campaign in Saudi Arabia and the “Ensaf” 
campaign in Kuwait. 
 
The time frame of this political claims analysis is set one year prior to the actual 
mobilization/turning point events that took place in each of these cases, followed by a further political 
claims analysis which extends to subsequent periods in order to assess the salience of the concerned 
issues and find out if there is any degree of variance among the two in terms of the nature of the 
position of actors, competing frames, etc.  
 
The structure of this chapter goes on in this particular manner: I first conceptually define 
political claims and provide an operational definition for them, present the article and claim-level 
variables that have been coded, the move to discuss the findings of my analysis for both cases. This 
analytical venture is significant as it offers a glimpse into the mediated context within which women 
carried out their feminist activism. It also draws attention to how the claims advocated by feminists and 
organizations are predominately portrayed in broader society and presented to the local and possibly 
the international audience. 
 
5.1 Defining Political Claims  
PCA originates within the field of social movement studies and is generally associated with Ruud 
Koopmans (Koopmans and Statham 1999, Koopmans and Statham 2002, Koopmans 2002, Koopmans 
and Erbe 2004, Koopmans et al. 2005, Koopmans 2007). It has been developed to bring together the 
two relevant methodological strands of social movement studies, protest event analysis (PEA) and 
(qualitative) frame analysis (Snow et al. 1986). PCA tries to establish the missing link between actors 
and contents by employing a distinct set of methods, particularly a classification of actors as well as 
frames on a one-dimensional pro/contra scale and time-series graphs of discourse activity. 
 
This method was originally proposed by Koopmans and Statham (1999) to overcome the 
weaknesses of protest event analysis and to expand its scope by collecting data not just on the actors 
and forms of action, but also on the interpretations by actors involved in political encounters. PCA goes 
beyond traditional media content analyses. The latter often focus on newspaper articles as the unit of 




Traditional approaches to content analysis are media-centric and neglect the role of other political 
actors in shaping the nature of public discourse and contestation. PCA, on the other hand, examines the 
relations between actors, their role in public debates and the positions they take with regard to issues. 
Therefore, it manages to capture information about who addresses whom, on which issues and in the 
name of whose interests. It takes as the central focus instances of claims-making, where claims-making 
refers to “a unit of strategic action in the public sphere that consists of a purposive and public 
articulation of political demands, call for action, proposals, criticism or physical action that addresses 
the interest of the claimants and/or other collective action” (Koopmans et al, 2005). Thus, claims must 
be the result of purposive action and political in nature. 
 
Accordingly, the act of claims-making is normally broken down into such elements as a 
claimant, an actor who makes a demand, proposal, appeal or criticism; an addressee, who is the target 
of the criticism or support; an object actor, whose interests are affected by the claim and finally the 
substantive content of the claim, which states what is to be done (aim) and why (frame) (Koopmans & 
Erbe, 2003). Each time an actor makes a claim, this action or statement is manually coded along with 
various other variables containing information about the actor, the context, addressees, opponents, aims 
and frames, among others. Consequently, the main objective of PCA is to “trace the shifting alliances 
and oppositions between actors that evolve in the dynamic process of political conflict” (Koopmans & 
Statham, 1999). 
 
I draw on the PCA codebooks developed for large-scale comparative European projects, 
notably, The Transformation of Political Mobilization and Communication in European Public Spheres 
(Europub) (Koopmans 2002); Mobilization on Ethnic Relations, Citizenship and Immigration (MERCI) 
(Koopmans et al. 2005); Finding a Place for Islam in Europe: Cultural Interactions Between Muslim 
Immigrants and Receiving Societies (EurIslam) (UNIGE 2010); Support and Opposition to Migration: 
A Cross-National Comparison of the Politicization of Migration (SOM) (Berkhout and Sudulich 2012) 
and Multicultural Democracy and Immigrants’ Social Capital in Europe: Participation, Organizational 
Networks and Public Policies at the Local Level (Localmultidem) (Palacios and Morales 2013). My 
constructed codebook can be found in Appendix C. 
 
It is worth mentioning that PCA has come under criticism for its reliance on newspaper data 
which makes it vulnerable to selection and researcher bias (Mügge, 2012). Due to editorial preferences, 
contentious and large-scale events are more likely to be covered. Moreover, there may be errors in the 
reporting of events and researchers may interpret codes differently regardless of the sophistication of 
the codebook. Mügge (2012) suggests combining newspaper data with ethnographic research to tackle 
these three biases and provide more depth. Thus, this project does not rest wholly on PCA and this 





Political claims analysis (PCA) has been set to be the appropriate empirical data analysis 
method to be used to systematically examine the visibility of the issues of women’s driving in the 
public sphere, assess the position of different actors who are involved, the action repertoires used as 
well as the framing efforts. In this part of the research, an attempt will be made to code the related 
claims made by interested actors as reported in the newspapers in order to measure the publicly visible 
side of their political involvement and communication and to study political contention produced by 
actors’ contributions to public discourses in the media through interviews, press conferences, petitions, 
digital protests and by other visible acts of political mobilization, such as protest demonstrations 
(Koopmans and Statham, 2002).  
 
Thus, a “claim” is defined as a unit of strategic and purposeful communicative action in the 
public sphere that consists of public articulation of political demands, calls for action, proposals, 
criticism or physical actions that address the interest of the claimants and/or other collective action 
(Koopmans et al, 2005). Each time an actor makes a claim, this claim is considered to be the unit of 
analysis. The action or statement is manually coded along with a range of variables containing 
information about the actor, the context, addresses, aims and frames, among others. PCA was 
conducted on two major Arabic newspapers in Saudi Arabia in addition to a third English-speaking 
newspaper in order to examine the coverage of the campaign in the mediated public sphere.  
 
The time frame for conducting the PCA was set to be one year prior to the actual mobilization 
that took place (2010) in order to get a picture of the situation before the actual mobilization through 
analyzing the salience of the issues and constructing timelines of media attention towards these matters. 
I follow with another year (2011), which marks the actual mobilization. As a result, a total of 250 
articles have been coded and analyzed, covering the concerned time period under investigation and an 
Intracoder reliability measure has taken place after the initial coding procedure to ensure that the 
coding procedure has been reliable and consistent. The same process was also duplicated in relation to 
the Kuwaiti case.  
 
5.2: Data Collection and Sampling 
5.2.1: The Women to Drive Campaign in Saudi Arabia  
As with regards to the Saudi newspapers, a total number of 250 articles were coded for a reference 
period of two single years, stretching from 2010 till 2011. 2010 marked the year before the actual 
campaign that took place. The articles were selected according to full online sampling criteria. I had 
relied on the built-in search query function in the official websites of the selected Arabic speaking 
newspapers in order to retrieve the articles. As regards the English speaking newspapers, I used 
ProQuest, a digital news archives service that provides a single source for newspapers, reports and 




procedures were complemented by conducting a further data retrieving procedure through the restricted 
domain search feature available through Google. What is clear from Table 5.1 below is that, as 
expected, the number of articles that covered the driving issue prior to the actual campaign that 
occurred in 2011 was significantly lower than the number of articles that were collected in 2011. They 
only constituted 27.20% of the overall collected sample. 
 







Table 5.1: The number of articles coded per year    
 
Table 5.2 demonstrates the breakdown of the articles that were retrieved from the main three 
newspapers that served as a source. Of the two Arabic-speaking quality daily national newspapers one 
was conservative and one relatively liberal for the sake of having a broader overview of different 
political opinions and views. One point to be made is that the press in Saudi Arabia, which consists of 
approximately 13 daily newspapers, is privately owned. But it is in fact controlled by individuals 
affiliated with the government (Freedom House, 2015), which undermines the relative freedom of 
expression that is supposed to be enjoyed by the press.  
 
The majority of the retrieved articles within the two-year period stemmed from Al-Riyadh 
newspaper (50.50%), one of the leading Saudi daily newspapers with a circulation of around 140,000 
copies in the Kingdom (Kraidy, 2012). It is well known for its pro-government and relatively liberal 
views.  32.80% of the overall sample came from Al-Jazirah newspaper, which has been issued by Al-
Jazirah Corporation since the 1960s. It is known for its conservative and pro-Islamic editorial line. 
While lastly, the remaining articles were collected from Arab News, a subsidiary of the Saudi Research 
and Marketing Group (SRMG) that is currently chaired by Prince Badr bin Abdullah Al Saud. It is 
recognized as being a pro-government, yet liberal newspaper in the Saudi context that distinguishes 
itself for being Saudi Arabia's first English-language newspaper that aims to provide a Saudi 
perspective in English on a wide range of national and global issues.  
 
Moreover, the ex-editor of Arab News, Khalid Al-Maenna, was well known for his sentiments 
favoring greater political participation in Saudi Arabia. He openly admits to having tested the accepted 
boundaries by carrying stories on the role of women in Saudi society and also highlighting coverage of 
the proclaimed Kuwaiti commitment to democratization. The articles which were retrieved from Arab 




observe that Arab News gave more concentrated coverage in 2011 on the “Women to Drive” campaign 
in comparison to the other two newspapers in the sample. 
 
Year Paper Number of articles (%) 
2010 Al-Riyadh 12.00 
Al-Jazirah 11.20 
Arab News 4.40 
2011 Al-Riyadh 38.00 
Al-Jazirah 21.60 





Table 5.2: Articles by newspaper 
 
Table 5.3 illustrates that the vast majority (84.00%) of all the collected articles were found to be 
relevant for the study and contained new claims. Only 12.80% of all articles found in the three different 
newspapers contained mere factual texts on the selected topics with no specific inserted claims. Also, 
3.20% of the retrieved articles contained claims that have already been coded in other articles. Overall, 
a total number of 276 claims have been identified and coded within 210 articles, meaning that the 
statistical average number of claims per article is 1.3. It is worth noting, though, that there is a 
noticeable increase in the number of claims in 2011, the year of the campaign; 2011 accounted for 
67.39% of the overall sample as demonstrated by Table 5.4. 
 
Articles Number of articles (%) 
Articles without claims  
 
12.80 
Articles with claims (new claims) 84.00 




















Table 5.4: The number of claims coded per year: total, full sample 
 
5.2.2: The Ensaf Campaign in Kuwait  
Print media coverage of the expressed political claims regarding permitting Kuwaiti women to pass 
their nationality to their children in case they are married to non-nationals was used as the data source 
for our research. Table 5.5 shows that a total of 190 articles have been retrieved from the relevant 
Kuwaiti newspapers and coded to trace the discursive trends over the nationality issue over a two-year 
period from 2013 until 2014. 2013 was the year that preceded the campaign, which took place in 2014. 
 
It is crucial to mention that the results we have obtained are counter-intuitive to our original 
expectation; the total number of articles collected prior to the actual campaign exceeded the number of 
articles that covered the campaign in 2014. Articles from before the campaign represented 67.89% of 
the overall sample. 
 







Table 5.5: The number of articles coded per year 
 
The influx of relevant articles in 2013 and the more salient coverage of the issue can be 
attributed to the fact that the year 2013 coincided with Kuwait’s third parliamentary elections since 
February 2012. Many parliamentary candidates and politicians adopted the nationality issue in their 
reported claims and pre-election policy agendas in an attempt to appeal to female voters. My approach 
in selecting the relevant articles was identical to the approach applied in the Saudi case. Articles were 
collected according to full online sampling criteria. We relied on the built-in search query function in 
the official websites of the selected Arabic-speaking newspapers in order to retrieve the articles. While 




conducting a further data retrieving method which is available through Google’s restricted domain 
search feature. 
 
Table 5.6 below shows the breakdown of the national newspapers according to the number of 
articles coded for each paper in total. The newspapers selected were (1) Alanbaa, a leading pro-
government daily newspaper that is owned and published by Bab Al-Kuwait Press Co. and one of the 
most circulated publications in Kuwait; (2) Al-Rai, a widely distributed liberal newspaper published by 
Al Rai Media Group and (3) Kuwait Times, the oldest English-language newspaper in the Gulf, which 
delivers an all-round news coverage of both local and international issues. It is clear from the Table that 
more relevant articles were identified and coded from the pro-government broadsheet Alanbaa, than the 
other two newspapers. Alanbaa accounted for 58.93% of the overall retrieved articles in 2013 and 2014 
combined. 
 
Year Paper Number of articles (%) 
2013 Alanbaa 41.57 
Alrai 23.15 
Kuwait Times 3.15 
2014 Alanbaa 17.36 
Alrai 10.00 





Table 5.6 Articles by newspaper 
 
Meanwhile, Table 5.7 illustrates that the vast majority of articles (80.52%) contain political 
claims, while only 14.73% of all articles which have been found in the three different newspapers 
contained mere factual texts on the selected topics with no specific inserted claims. Moreover, only 
4.73% of the sample contains claims that have already been coded in other articles. Table 5.8  outlines 
the number of political claims that were coded for each year in the study. It is apparent 176 claims were 
found in 153 articles. A higher number of claims were coded in 2013 (68.75%) than 2014 due to the 
parliamentary elections that occurred in 2013, which led to the adoption of the nationality issue in the 








Articles Number of articles  Percentage  
Articles without claims  
 
28 14.73% 







Articles with claims (already 
coded claims) 
9 4.73% 
Total 190 100% 
Table 5.7: Articles with and without claims 
 
Year Number of claims Percentage 
2013 121 68.75% 
2014 55 31.25% 
Total 176 100%  
Table 5.8: The number of claims coded per year: total, full sample.  
 
5.3 Discussion of the Findings of Political Claim Analysis in the Saudi Case 
5.3.1 The Depoliticalization of The Issue of Women's Driving 
The findings of political claims analysis showed that women's driving is a complex and multifaceted 
issue that encompasses various interrelated political, social and religious discourses. It was observable 
that states’ actors who are associated with the executive, legislative and judicial powers were less 
visible in the discussions. They merely constituted 6.15% of all claim makers in 2010 and 2011 
combined (Appendix C).  
 
Additionally, most of the official and state actors’ claims that were analyzed in relation to the 
ban on female drivers tended to portray the issue as a “societal issue” that had little to do with state 
policies and ultimately fell beyond the realm of the government. Such actors placed blame on the 
country's ultra-conservative culture, which they claim does not seem ready to accommodate the idea of 
female drivers. Clear examples are manifest in the following coded press statements:  
 
 His Majesty Prince Sultan al-Suad announced that the approval of women’s driving is up to 
society… which means that is up to the fathers, husbands, and brothers of women and not up to 




it. Otherwise, the government won't impose anything that goes against the will of people. 
(Baltyor, 2011) 
 
The Deputy Minister of labor, Dr. Abdulwahed Al-Hameed, stated that society stands between 
women and driving. Hence, there is an urgent need for making society more accepting of the 
necessity and urgency of allowing women to drive. (Khazndar, 2010) 
 
This discursive tactic of removing the agency of political actors and placing the political 
responsibility on an indigenous system of customs and cultural rituals could be understood as an 
attempt to downplay the role of the state in this matter and overlook holding the government 
accountable for the ban. Hence, such tactics contribute to the “depoliticized” label that is attached to 
the issue—politicians tend to distance themselves from it, leaving it to society. A similar trend was 
observed while examining the content of the circulated claims that emerged from other actor 
categories, such as media and journalists. Individuals—not religion or the government—were directly 
pointed out as the main hindrances in the way of allowing women to drive. Saudi society was targeted 
and held responsible for the persisting stigma against female drivers. Such claims are mirrored in the 
newspapers extracts below: 
 
           “I believe that the issue is a social one. I think that men and women should be taught in school 
and at home from an early age how to respect each other. If everyone knew how to respect each 
other as Islam states, then women’s driving would be more socially acceptable and it wouldn't 
cause any problems in relation to sexual harassment,” said Aymen Red. (Sarah, 2011) 
 
            Driving is an individual need that has societal implications. We need to distinguish between 
driving for the sake of luxury and driving out of necessity. I think that driving in the cities is 
different than rural villages and it will cause many cultural and safety-related problems. 
(Alkhoshiabn, 2011) 
 
Intuitively, the usual addressees of public claims are often state actors and the institutions that 
are associated with executive powers granted by the constitution. However, the most noticeable target 
of claims in this case as reported in Appendix C was “society.” “Society” served as the main addressee 
for more than a half (55.80%) of all reported claims in 2010 and 2011 combined; the government only 
accounted for 26.50% of all the cases. This phenomenon could be explained by examining the 
characteristics of the media system in Saudi Arabia. Most of the newspapers are privately owned, but 
are subsidized and regulated by the government. The 1992 Basic Law concerns mass media. It gives 
the authorities broad powers to prevent any action that may lead to disunity or makes any direct 




self-preservation for Saudi media outlets. 
 
Also, while looking at the evaluation of the addressees (Appendix C), who are often held 
responsible for implementing the claims and are the target of either support or criticism, our results 
show that on average, criticism predominates in public political communication, as is suggested by the 
negative average evaluation (-0.28 on a scale ranging from -1 to +1). In that respect, the actors who 
were perceived negatively were activists (-1), media and journalists (-1) and religious figures and 
organizations who hold extreme views and ideologies (-0.46), in addition to society, which was 
targeted in a negative way as well (-0.41). The government was viewed positively (0.08), which goes in 
line with our interpretation. 
 
5.3.2 The Absence of Civil Society Actors, and the Rise of Grassroots Activism  
The absence of civil society actors (i.e., NGOs) was clearly reflected in the findings of the analysis 
(Appendix C). Only two instances of claims-making made by the state-sponsored “Saudi Society for 
Human Rights” were coded. This finding resonates with the configurations of Saudi Arabia's political 
system—a monarchy with no formal democratic process nor elected institutions, where the king is both 
the head of state and the head of government. Traditional representation and consultation mechanisms 
intersect with the country’s Islamic code and tribal customs and influence the ways in which gender 
roles are assigned in society. 
 
This finding indicates the limited presence of associational life in Saudi Arabia, which is still 
curtailed by a legal system that does not leave great space for NGOs to operate outside state control. In 
fact, the Saudi government has constantly delayed publishing a long-promised civil society law and has 
made registering an association difficult. Most of the NGOs that are registered with and approved by 
the government tend to be charity oriented and engaged with the state through full-scale patronage 
networks. And while there are a few women-led NGOs, these for the most part do not engage in the 
issue of women’s political and legal rights due to the difficulty of establishing independent 
organizations that address such issues freely. 
                                  
Neither human rights NGOs nor women’s NGOs have played an active role in reported claims 
made in the Saudi press, either as actors or as addressees. The results show how far the Saudi press is 
from presenting a stage for already fragmented civil society actors. Many observers suggest that this 
vacuum, which is created by the lack of active civil society organizational structures and 
representations, has forced the media-savvy, young educated generation to move online looking for 
alternatives. Social media has been utilized as an alternative locus of association of activism that could 






This reality was particularly observed in 2011, which also coincided with the Arab Spring and 
marked the emergence of new actors’ category, the “cyber activists.” Cyber activists started the 
“Women to Drive” campaign and injected more claims regarding the issue in the Saudi mediated public 
sphere, where there was no significant public protest during the Arab Spring to overshadow women’s 
claims. The following coded claims describe the beginning of the driving  campaign: 
 
The campaign, Women2Drive, called on Saudi women to begin driving their cars on June 17. 
Although there is no law against women driving in Saudi Arabia, women cannot obtain drivers’ 
licenses. The arrest and release of Manal Al-Sharif a few weeks ago for driving in the streets of 
Alkhobar did not discourage women from pressing this issue. The campaign was about enabling 
women to carry out their regular errands, similar to Saudi men. (Al-Mukhtar, 2011) 
 
Hariri, in her 40s, drove for the first time in Jeddah last May. This was the second time she was 
breaking the rules banning women from driving. She told Al-Watan newspaper that if she was 
forced by circumstance to get behind the wheel, she would do it again. The newspaper said 
Hariri was part of an Internet campaign titled “Women2Drive” on the social networks Twitter 
and Facebook in which a number of Saudi men and women call for the right of women to drive 
cars in the Kingdom. (“Najla Hariri released after arrest for defying driving ban”, 2011) 
 
Consequently, digital activists constituted 8.06% of the main claimants in 2011 (Appendix C), 
which reflects the rise of grassroots digital activism. The move online was not surprising due to the 
rapid growth of digital media usage. Overall internet penetration rate has reached over 91% among 
Saudis. Saudi Arabia has over 17.2 million active Twitter users, the highest number of any Arab 
country, accounting for more than 40% of all active Twitter users in the Arab world. However, the 
results are not enough to conclude that a large scale “direct spillover” (Pfetsch & Adam, 2011) 
successfully occurred in this case or that activist claims became a  primary source of information for 
mainstream media journalists.  
 
5.3.3-The Relatively Low Number of Reported Emancipatory and Feminist Supporting Frames 
In the claims structure, frames are defined as the justification of a claim made by its initiator, i.e., the 
answer to the question of why the claim is made or why it should be implemented. In that respect, 
about 89.13% of the reported claims contained frames related to the support of or opposition to 




press (and again measured on a scale from -1 to +1, indicating opposition or support, respectively, for 
the campaign) shows general support for the campaign (0.64) as reported in Appendix C. 
 
The codebook lists various frames that belong to five broad types of categorical frames, 
introducing few modifications to the categorical classification of arguments as proposed by Habermas 
(1993): (1) Instrumental/pragmatic related frames; (2) Collective identity related frames; (3) 
Emancipation and Human rights related frames; (4) Moral principles related frames and (5) 
Constitutional and institutional related frames in addition to other types of frames.  
 
While analyzing the most dominant broad types of frames, as reported in Appendix C, I found 
that instrumental/pragmatic related frames came first and accounted for 40.52% of the reported claims 
that contained frames, followed by the collective-identity based frames (31.25%). Emancipatory and 
human rights related frames came third as they accounted for 15.45% of frames-based claims which 
came mostly from media and journalists, respectively. Frames can be used in different ways. For 
instance, they can reflect what allowing women to drive stands for in the view of the speaker or what it 
does not stand for but ought to. Thus, in the coding procedures, the direction of a specific frame and the 
actor’s position should be taken into account to determine if the frame is being used to support or 
oppose the issue at hand or as a description of a status (is/is not now) or a wish (should be/should not 
be). 
 
Consequently, when I examined how those specific frames were used to justify the support for 
women’s driving (Appendix C), I found that the most frequently utilized frames were defensive and not 
proactive in nature. They were used so as to conform to and negotiate between the needs of women and 
the existing socio-cultural norms and customs. Frames such as aligned societal based frames (16.30%) 
and religious compatibility frames (10.59%) gained dominance. They sought to confirm that driving 
already conforms with the existing societal norms that govern the behavior of women in society or that 
women’s driving is not religiously forbidden in Islam and that there is no religious justification behind 
the ban. Examples of that are illustrated in the coded extracts below: 
 
            We should come up with proposals to allow women to drive according to certain conditions that 
fit the specificity of the situation in our country. These conditions can vary and they can include 
the following: (1) the woman has to be an employee, responsible for a household or a 
contributor to it, (2) the woman has to be at least 30 years old and (3) women won’t be allowed 
to drive their cars on the highways unless the situation is urgent. (Alsarami, 2011) 
 
Allowing women to drive is only a matter of time because society, in the end, won’t be able to 





We can observe the relatively small role of frames that are directly emancipatory and related to 
women's rights in nature (8.69%), such as the following: 
 
              “I'm just doing this to support women on this issue,” she told Arab News as she drove down 
the streets within eyesight of families strolling by the Red Sea on a calm Friday afternoon. 
“They need our help and this campaign is all about standing together to earn our right to drive. 
When I drive, I feel that I’m free and in control of my life. Sometimes I feel like I have to get 
things done all by myself and this is what I’m aiming for. People don’t care who is driving,” 
she said, “And Saudi society is supportive of this cause. I can only think of a few people who 
are against this, not the whole society. I believe the Saudi streets are ready for women to 
drive.” (Al-Mukhtar, 2011) 
 
The relatively low number of emancipatory frames falls in line with the findings of previous 
studies, which concluded that in the past, Saudi women’s rights discourse has often been framed within 
the rubric of societal norms, both tribal and religious. For instance, the demand to expand women’s 
rights has been justified by the desire to develop more capable and competent wives, revered mothers 
or supportive daughters (Al-Dosari, 2016). Furthermore, the low number of emancipatory frames 
shows us that the issue of women’s driving has been rarely featured within a women’s rights lens in the 
Saudi mediated public sphere; the adoption of women’s rights-based discourses is often criticized for 
being anchored in the Western, liberal tradition.  
 
The effort to present universal women’s rights as “foreign” or “Western” concepts represents a 
political dismissal of women’s claims, attempting to deny local women’s movements national 
legitimacy. This dismissal is the consequence of the general reluctance and skepticism that defines the 
attitude towards featuring and circulating human rights and therefore women’s rights-based discourses 
in the press. It is particularly reflected throughout the next coded press extracts: 
 
We will not allow anyone to harm our national unity. Speaking to international media about our 
domestic matters is not acceptable. It is not a patriotic act. Women are allowed to demand their 
rights by relying on Islam as a framework and not by relying on others, women’s NGOs, etc. 
Everything is mentioned in the Quran. Our government supports this activism and endorses it. 
Hence, we don’t need any outside support. (Almaneea, 2011) 
  
Relying on [Hillary] Clinton for help is not acceptable. Our issues and problems should be 




to being resolved without these feminist screams on the internet and on the streets. Those 
activists should accept that our society needs to be ready for that on a gradual basis, as our 
society is full of contradictions. Women already drive in rural villages and it will be only a 
matter of time before society allows them to drive. (Al-Hoshani, 2011) 
 
The dismissal could also be explained by examining the general perceptions and attitudes 
towards feminism, which is deemed a threat to society and perceived as loosening morals and 
threatening family cohesion. However, it would be interesting to examine if the recent campaigns about 
women’s driving have altered the public discourse about feminism over time. It should be taken into 
account that media are the only claim makers who decide themselves on the final output of their claim 
in the mass media. Other involved actors may have used other types of frames in their discourses, but 
these may have been reported only partially in the media. 
 
5.3.4    The Lack of Legal Dimension 
Although the Saudi Ministry of Interior banned women from driving by decree on the basis of a  
religious fatwa in the 1990s, the fact remains that there is no written law that technically bars women 
from driving per se. However, since the locally issued licenses that are required to drive are in fact not 
issued to women, driving is effectively illegal for them. 
 
What is paradoxical in this case is that the absence of an official legal ban has, in fact, made it 
easier for state actors to trivialize the prohibition, rather than to treat it as a serious legal obstacle. This 
has also been reflected in the finding as reported in Appendix C as well, in which only 6.10% of the 
reported claims have relied on legal and constitutional frames that refer to the rule of law. This can also 
be seen in the following extract: 
 
The issue of women’s driving doesn’t require laws or religious verdicts to legitimize it. Our 
political leaders are observing the situation and waiting for a rational collective decision that 
comes from society itself regarding this matter, which could be turned later into a policy. 
(Alkhamis, 2011) 
 
As already discussed in Chapter 4, it is worth noting that the “Women to Drive” campaign made 
an attempt to overcome this ambiguity and encourage people to rely on the legal aspect; the campaign 
filed a lawsuit against the Saudi Traffic Department for denying Manal al-Sharif (the first activist who 
drove her car in 2011) her driver’s license, despite the fact that there is no written law against issuing 





5.4: The Ensaf Campaign in Kuwait  
The findings of the results of political claims analysis for the Kuwaiti case is structured along three 
main themes: 
 
5.4.1 The Politicization of the Nationality Issue 
Evidence from PCA points out the extensive politicization of the nationality issue in the Kuwaiti public 
domain. On average, state actors such as ministers, civil servants and current MPs accounted for 
39.20% of the reported claim makers, as shown in Appendix C. Parliamentary candidates constituted 
29.55% of the reported claimants in total. The prevalence of political actors can be attributed to the fact 
that 2013 marked Kuwait’s third parliamentary elections since February 2012 and the sixth since 2006. 
This particular development was the result of a June 16 constitutional court ruling that disbanded the 
previous parliament, which was followed by calls for new elections to take place.  
 
The elections also contextualize the counter-intuitive results that I obtained: the total number of 
articles collected from the year 2013 tended to be higher than the articles that covered the “Ensaf” 
campaign that occurred in 2014, which only constituted 32.10% of the overall sample. Thus, the vote-
seeking behavior can explain the salience of the nationality issue in the Kuwaiti mediated public sphere 
through the adoption of the issue—at least rhetorically—by the aspiring parliamentary candidates in 
their pre-election pledges and policy agendas in an attempt to secure women’s votes. This observation 
goes in line with Hillygus and Shield’s (2008) idea of issue-targeted messages as an effective micro-
targeting technique. It shows how claims targeted gender-related issues—such as the nationality issue 
in this case—are being employed to influence certain niches of voters and obtain their support. 
Examples are illustrated in the following coded claims: 
 
            Al Shamali pointed out that he will look into the problems of Kuwaiti women married to non-
Kuwaitis once he reaches the parliament, as those particular problems have been severely 
neglected by the government. He affirmed that he will focus on eliminating discrimination 
between men and women. (Nasser, 2013) 
 
           The parliamentary candidate Yaqoob Al-Sanea has promised to find convenient solutions 
through parliament that can ensure a better life for Kuwaiti women in general—whether they 
are divorced, widowed or married to non-Kuwaitis—in addition to granting citizenship and 
providing employment opportunities for the sons and daughters of Kuwaiti women who are 
married to non-nationals in order to ensure a stable life for Kuwaiti women and their families. 





The sampled coded claims exemplified the attempts made by several candidates to appeal to the 
female electorate, who account for more than half of those eligable  to vote. It is worth mentioning that 
Kuwait’s parliament had been the sole reserve of men and excluded women from all political 
processes; it was not until 2005 that women were granted the right to vote and run for elected office. 
 
When analyzing the forms of action and the overall composition of public claims in national 
newspapers, it was noted that in general that a higher proportion of political actions and decisions is 
found (22.73%) in the Kuwaiti case than in the Saudi case; these claims mainly consisted of legislative 
proposals, parliamentary motions and committee reports. The second-highest proportion was of 
meetings (11.93%), such as constituency meetings with voters. These findings contrast with the 
findings of the Saudi case, where political actions and decisions only accounted for 0.72% of the acts 
of claims-making. Examples of these particular political forms of actions follow: 
 
            MP Ahmed Lari has proposed a new law regarding naturalizing the children of Kuwaiti women 
who are married to foreigners according to certain criteria, which are based on the points system 
that will qualify the requester to get his or her case approved. (“Lari suggests the naturalization 
of children of Kuwaiti women married to non-Kuwaiti based on the points system,” 2013) 
 
            MP Masooma Al Mubraka has made a proposal to amend the provisions of the Emiri Decree 
No. 15 of 1959 of the Kuwaiti Nationality Act. This amendment is designed to avoid the 
shortcomings that dogged the implementation of the law and the problems that originated from 
the restrictions on allowing women to pass their nationality to their children based on certain 
criteria. (“Masooma is in favor of granting Kuwaiti citizenship for the children of Kuwaiti 
women,” 2013) 
 
The descriptive statistics in Appendix C shows us that most of the addressees targeted by claims 
regarding the nationality issue were state actors in 2013 (90.08%) and 2014 (80.00%). This data lines 
up with the standard premise that the usual addressees of public claims are state actors and the 
institutions that are assigned to the executive powers by the constitution. 
5.4.2 The Role of Civil Society Actors: From Centralization to Cooperation 
As illustrated in Appendix C, the aggregate category of women/human rights NGOs as active claimants 
came in third place and accounted for 8.52% of the total claim makers in 2013 and 2014 combined. 




without Borders, the Women’s Cultural and Social Society (WCSS) and the National Association for 
the Management of Domestic Security (Rawasi). 
 
While analyzing the overall configuration of the civil society sector as mirrored in the 
newspapers’ coverage of the nationality issue in the Kuwaiti mediated public sphere, we found that the 
majority of claims came from the WCSS. This reflects its central role in covering most of the structural 
makeup of women’s organizations in the Kuwaiti civic sector, which is made of two main types of 
organizations—service (voluntary) and professional (activist) organizations (Rizzo, 2005). Moreover, 
we noted the overall degree of dominance enjoyed by WCSS over the campaigning, mobilization and 
claims-making processes.  
 
As already discussed in Chapter 3, the centralized scope enjoyed by WCSS within the Kuwaiti 
civil society sector is not surprising due to its long-established, historical role within the women’s 
rights movement that started in 1963. Accordingly, WCSS remains an effective player in the Kuwaiti 
civil scene and one of the few legitimate forums for Kuwaiti women to engage in public activity. 
However, today we can witness that WCSS has started to adopt a more cooperative model with other 
civil society organizations and voluntary groups through shifting from sole centralization towards 
cooperation throughout coalition building. WCSS’s cooperative model was reflected in its recent 2014 
campaign, “Ensaf.” It coordinated with ten other associations and public interest groups in order to 
mount an active campaign for full citizenship rights for women and lobby for laws that would permit 
them to pass their citizenship to their noncitizen children.  
 
WCSS also continued welcoming new organizations and committees to join the campaign, such 
as the “Kuwaiti Women without Borders” committee, the grassroots voluntary group that solely 
campaigns for the cause of Kuwaiti women’s citizenship rights using a variety of means, particularly 
social networking websites. The following extracts shed light on the claims made by “Kuwaitis without 
Borders” in the reported media coverage: 
 
              The coordinator of the activities of the committee, Alia Al-Dulaimi, has stated that they 
[“Kuwaiti Women without Borders”] concentrate their efforts on social networking platforms, 
organizing seminars and reaching out to different media outlets to advocate for their cause. She 
also pointed out their cooperation with some members of the National Assembly on the issue 
of Kuwaiti women married to non-Kuwaitis. They are currently targeting the executive branch 
and cooperating with legislators; she also mentioned that there is existing coordination with 





            The representative of “Kuwaiti Women without Borders” has stated that they are working in 
two parallel lines—the pragmatic use of media and working with some members of the 
legislative and executive branches. They also submitted a proposal to amend Article II of the 
Constitution and they are trying to obtain the support of a majority of MPs. (Atef, 2014). 
5.4.3 The Frequent Usage of Constitutional and Institutional Frames 
Framing has been described by Benford and Snow (2000) as “meaning work.” It is a process in which 
social movements actors are “actively engaged as agents in a struggle over the production of 
mobilizing and counter-mobilizing ideas, concepts, and meanings.” It is also a contentious process, 
insofar as “it involves the generation of interpretive frames that not only differ from existing ones, but 
that may also challenge them” (Benford and Snow, 2000). 
 
While analyzing the deployment of frames in the case study at hand, it was observed that that 
majority of actors have relied on legal and constitutional frames (35.52%), which can take on an 
inherent legitimacy, followed by emancipation and human rights related frames (29.18%), such as 
individual civil rights, freedom of choice and women’s rights (Appendix C). Constitutional and 
institutional related frames appear to trigger the highest rate of framing efforts through the reference to 
the “rule of law,” arguing that women have a constitutional right to be treated equally with men 
according to the constitution and to be considered as “equal citizens.” This type of frames can be seen 
in the following extracts: 
 
             Despite the fact that the Constitution of Kuwait, like any constitution in any civil state, is 
dedicated to organizing the rights and duties of every citizen without discriminating between 
male and female citizens, the Kuwaiti Nationality Act works differently. So while it allows 
male citizens to pass their nationality to their children regardless of the nationality of the 
mother, it doesn’t allow female citizens to do the same. The concept of citizenship does not 
accept masculinization or feminization, so the duties towards the nation are outside the orbit of 
masculinity and femininity. We believe that the granting of rights shouldn’t discriminate 
between them. Those who are concerned should work to achieve justice for Kuwaiti women 
and their children and propose new amendments to the current laws in order to change them 
for the better. (Al-Mahmeed, 2013) 
 
             Kuwaiti female citizens are not treated on the basis of full citizenship and they don’t enjoy the 
same rights that are enjoyed by men, despite the fact that Article 29 of the Kuwaiti 
Constitution asserts that the rights and duties of male and female citizens are equal. However, 
in reality, different interpretations of laws are applied that give preferential treatment towards 





Meanwhile, frames that have relied on emancipatory discourses were also used: 
 
She asserted that she would seek to empower Kuwaiti women to get their full civil and social 
rights such as adequate housing, monetary compensation for domestic work and the ability to 
pass nationality to their children. (“Corruption is widespread, and we lack adequate mechanisms 
to implement equality and Justice,” 2013) 
 
Fajar Al Saeed stated that the rights of women are being taken away and that she will work hard 
to grant women their full rights, such as the ability to pass their nationality to their children. She 
indicated that she is preoccupied with women’s rights as she identifies with their suffering. 
(Alfarhan, 2014) 
 
Also, when analyzing the type of actors using frames to debate the nationality issue, it emerged 
that the majority of claims with frames (94 of a total 281) stemmed from parliamentary candidates, 
who appear to make the most often use of frames (33.45% of all cases), followed by state actors 
(28.46%). Refer to Appendix C. 
 
5.5 Conclusion  
This chapter explored the publically mediated side of the issues advocated by both the “Women to 
Drive” and the “Ensaf” campaigns. I applied political claims analysis as a method of inquiry to 
examine the media coverage of these topics, the position of different actors involved and the target of 
their claims, as well the framing processes. 
  
 The findings of this chapter indicate that, when we look at the coverage of the topic of 
women’s driving within the sampled Saudi newspapers, we find it received far more media attention in 
2011, the launch year of the official driving campaign. In contrast, counter-intuitive results were 
obtained concerning the Kuwaiti case; the issue of female citizenship rights was more extensively 
covered in the press during 2013, which in fact preceded the launch of the “Ensaf” campaign. 
  
As regards to whether the newspapers’ coverage in both cases implied a preference towards 
featuring the position of certain institutional actors, it appeared that the claim makers who were most 
prominent in the Saudi press were those already involved with the media and journalism field. 
Journalists and media practitioners constituted the dominant aggregate category of claim makers both 
in 2010 (33.33%) and 2011 (48.38%). Their dominance may be attributed to their proximity and 
involvement with the newspapers at hand, which often makes the process of inserting their opinions 





Assessing feminist activists’ visibility in mainstream media, it was noted that the category of 
established civil society actors as claim makers made few appearances in the Saudi sampled 
newspapers. Neither human rights nor women’s rights organizations played an active role in the 
selected claims that have been analyzed, either as actors or as direct addressees. However, we noted the 
emergence of grassroots activists as a new encompassing category of claim makers that did not exist in 
the sampled newspapers that covered 2010.  
  
Nevertheless, claims put forward by grassroots activists were rare, which could indicate the 
challenges that activists face to having their voices represented in mainstream local media. This low 
level of activists’ representation in mainstream media aligns with scholarly discussions that emphasized 
that receiving mainstream media coverage of the voices of independent activists was a challenging 
process due to their marginal position outside the realm of elitist media (Pfetsch & Adam, 2011). 
  
The absence of state actors as direct addressees of public claims was also notable, which 
reinforced the idea that the ban on driving was framed in the Saudi mediated public sphere as a societal 
matter that has little to do with state policies. In comparison, the analysis that was conducted in relation 
to the coverage of female citizenship rights on the Kuwaiti press pointed to the extensive politicization 
of the nationality issue, most notably during 2013, which coincided with Kuwait’s third parliamentary 
elections since February 2012. Evidence from the political claims-making analysis can pinpoint which 
types of actors were featured in the mediated public sphere. Hence, when I turned to address the very 
same inquiry, whether the newspaper coverage in the Kuwaiti press indicated a preference towards 
featuring the position of certain type actors, it emerged that state actors, including ministers and current 
or aspiring MPs, accounted for the majority of claimants. 
  
The coding of articles showed that many parliamentary candidates included the issue of 
women’s citizenship rights in their pre-election manifestos to potentially appeal to female voters. This 
separate category of actors empirically accounted for 36.36% of the main claimants in 2013 and mainly 
targeted state or other governmental actors as direct addressees for their claims. While women’s and 
human rights organizations constituted 7.44% of the total number of claim makers, journalists and 
media establishments in Kuwait made few claims (2.27%). This outcome potentially illustrates that the 
nationality issue was not an issue field where media actors played a major role, a finding that contrasts 
with the results that we obtained in the Saudi case (Appendix C).   
  
The degree of politicization or depoliticization of the issues that are advocated by the selected 
campaigns has also intersected with other dimensions. For instance, when comparing the overall forms 
of public claims within both cases, it emerged that there was a relatively higher proportion of forms of 
political claims found in the Kuwaiti case, which mainly consisted of legislative proposals, 




for female Kuwaiti citizens. However, verbal statements remained the most widely used form of action 
employed by different actors in the Saudi case.  
 
On average and for all actor types, instrumental/pragmatic related frames such as public 
interest, economic interest and necessity-based frames triggered the highest rate of framing efforts in 
public debate, in addition to the frames that sought to assert that female driving conforms with existing 
societal norms. However, there was a relatively low number of reported emancipatory and feminist 
supporting frames in the Saudi press (Appendix C). 
  
Meanwhile, frequent usage of constitutional and institutional frames appeared to trigger the 
highest rate of framing efforts through reference to the “rule of law” in the Kuwaiti sample. Actors 
frequently argued that women have the constitutional right to be treated as equal citizens, followed by 
emancipation and human rights related frames that articulated their claims within individual civil 
rights, freedom of choice and women’s rights discourses.  
  
In sum, the overall findings of this chapter shed some light on the mediated context, structural 
constraints and dominant ideological frameworks that can influence the ways in which women carry 
out their feminist activism. Additionally, the effort of different social actors and pressure organizations 
to become visible in the mediated public sphere was also touched upon in the findings; we found that 
activists remain underrepresented as subjects and actors in the media, especially in the Saudi case. 
Obtaining visibility, more particularly fair media representation throughout mainstream media outlet, is 




Chapter 6: Feminist Activism on Facebook: Untangling the Multipurpose Uses and Feminist 
Discourses 
 
This chapter which is led by the discursive dimension in my integrated relational approach to the study 
of feminist activism will attempt to answer the research question of how did activists and feminist 
organizations deploy Facebook during the examined feminist campaigns? Hence, I will elaborate on the 
multipurpose use of Facebook, as well as the arrays of meanings and feminist discourses that emerged 
and manifested themselves by looking at the expressive discursive conten published through this 
platform. 
  
The first part of this chapter will present an analysis of the content of the campaign’s related 
Facebook pages for the “Saudi Women To Drive” (SWTD) Facebook page, which was one of the most 
active English-speaking pages in the Saudi driving campaign, with more than 37,000 users. It will also 
evaluate the Arabic-speaking “My Right To Dignity; a call for solidarity with the rights of Saudi 
women” (MRTD) Facebook page, which has over 17,000 followers. These particular Facebook pages 
were selected due to their active involvement in the campaign and their large following base. 
Moreover, the decision to examine Facebook pages that are in English, as well as Arabic stemmed from 
the desire to obtain a more representative and inclusive dataset and to detect any possible variations in 
terms of contents that might occur in relation to the language that is being used and the influence of the 
targeted audience domestically and internationally. 
  
I started out my research inquiry from a specific research interest that mainly concerned the 
ways these pages served as means for feminist expression, claims-making, coordination and 
mobilization in the complex and multifaceted context of the campaign. So, to answer the research 
question, an elaborated strategy had to be developed consisting of three steps, in which the first step of 
the analysis was performed to get a broader sense of the unfolded dynamics that occurred on the 
examined Facebook pages and it included assessing the progression and development of content over 
time, followed by examining the characteristics of users engagement, classifying the various types of 
posts (links, status updates, photos, videos and events), as well as the composition of the participating 
audience. 
  
The data was acquired using the Netvizz application v1.44 for Facebook (Rieder, 2013), which 
is a data collection and extraction application that allows researchers to export data in standard file 
formats from different sections of the specified Facebook page/s, including the complete list of posts, 
number of likes, shares and comments during a specific time period. The collection of the data 




posting activity from the day of the creation of the FB page on May 22, 2011 until the end of December 
2013, which marked the end the second round of the driving campaign which started in October 2013.  
 
Focusing on this particular period was deemed most appropriate for the sake of tracing the 
development of the campaign from its inception, reaching peak activities and later stabilization at the 
end of 2013. The two-and-a-half-year period in question represents a good trajectory and a snapshot of 
the events that unfolded during the course of the campaign. The data from “My Right To Dignity” 
Facebook page was collected from the date that also marked the creation of the FB page on January 10, 
2012, until 31 December 2013 as well. It is worth noting though that all the Arabic-speaking 
campaign’s related Facebook pages I have sampled were created during the year 2012, almost half a 
year after the launch of the campaign.  
 
 I retrieved all the posts from both pages, as well as the comments and likes these posts 
received. While researchers often use counts of these elements as indicators for resonance or 
engagement, one can rightfully wonder whether ascribing “a single meaning to any of these behaviors 
masks the complexities of users’ actual intentions” (Driscoll & Walker, 2014, p. 1747). Consequently, 
the second step of analysis involved conducting a systematic in-depth qualitative analysis of the 
individual posts by the administrators of the Facebook pages, which were treated as the coding units. In 
sum, an overall of 449 posts published by the page administrators from the SWTD Facebook page, and 
1,736 posts in the case of the MRTD Facebook page were retrieved and were read several times before 
being qualitatively coded.  
 
As a final step, as the qualitative content analysis revealed the predominance of feminist-related 
posts, a further in-depth examination of the empirical materials that were classified as feminist took 
place to shed some light on the ways feminism has been discursively constructed within these pages 
and to examine how activists understand and base their feminism on. The same process was also 
applied to analyze the Facebook page of the Women’s Cultural and Social Society (WCSS) in the case 
of Kuwait, in which I will elaborate on in detail in the second part of the chapter. 
 
6.1 Tracing the Development of Content Over Time on Facebook 
The development of content over time was reflected by the number of posts published throughout the 
data collection period, including posts by the page administrators and posts by users that include any 
form of contribution, be it visual or textual, which was uploaded straight onto the wall of the page. In 






Figures 6.1 and 6.2 tackle the monthly frequency of the posts made by the page administrators 
and by users and the development of their engagement indicators over the data collection period. 
 
 
The analysis of the monthly development of Facebook engagement as illustrated in Figure 6.1 
and 6.2, shows a general intermittent rise-and-fall pattern in user engagement, as well as three obvious 
peaks during the months of June 2011, July 2012 and October 2013. A total of 827 posts were 
published by page administrators (15) and page users (812) in June 2011—the month that coincided 
with the launch of the driving campaign that took place on June 17, 2011—which have received a total 
of 1,438 likes (represented by the red dot in the figure) and 288 comments (green line in the same 
figure).  
 
 Figure 6.1: The monthly development of Facebook engagement indicators on the posts made by the page administrators of the SWTD Facebook page 
Figure 6.2: The monthly development of Facebook engagement indicators of the posts made by the page users 





Such nuances become particularly visible when focusing on the shorter period between June 17, 
2011 and June 30, 2011 as shown in Figure 6.3. We can see the spike in the number of posts on June 17 
(338 posts) and the posts on the day that followed it (259), which points to the existence of an increased 
level of Facebook posting activity and users’ involvement during the first active days of the campaign. 
Nevertheless, after the activity peaked, a slow decline ensued as user engagement progressively tailed 
off shortly afterward.  
 
Figure 6.3: The development of Facebook engagement indicators of the posts made by the page users of the 
SWTD Facebook page during June 2011. 
	
After an initial period of relatively slow growth, the page experienced a rapid acceleration of 
user engagement in the month of July 2012, which broke the record in terms of the level of Facebook 
interactions. And while only 16 posts were posted during the entire month by page administrators, 
those posts managed to attract a total of 31,267 likes and 1,211comments. This enormous increase in 
activity in terms of likes and comments pushed me to conduct a more fine-grained analysis to 
determine the types of posts that were the source of the unexpected rise of user involvement. It 
emerged that the rise of user engagement during that month had coincided with Saudi Arabia’s 
participation in the 2012 Summer Olympics in London.  
 
This marked a breakthrough for Saudi women because of the participation of the first two Saudi 
female athletes, Judoka Shaherkani and Sarah Attar, and generated a great deal of online support. 
Hence, the posts that attracted the highest number of likes and comments in that period were mainly 
focused on supporting Saudi’s female athletes’ participation in the Olympics. For example, the most 
liked and commented post during that period was “YES we did it. The first female athletes are 
representing Saudi Arabia at the Olympic Games! Go girls go, we’re so proud of you”, which resulted 

















Taking this into consideration, it appears that the scope and the content which was featured on 
the campaign’s Facebook page had expanded from the original single-issue—the ban on driving—to a 
variety of other, broader women’s issues that relate to women’s achievements and presence in the 
public sphere.  The third peak occurred in the month of October 2013, in which a total of 21 entries and 
204 posts made by page administrators and page users respectively received over 7,959 likes and 832 
comments overall. This period was characterized by posts that consisted of calls for action and 
motivational content to carry out challenging activities to defy the ban in the second round of 
mobilization that was set to start from October 26, 2013. The mobilization also clearly explains the 
plunge in engagement levels and posting activities that took place at the end of the month.  
 
As regards the Arabic-speaking “My Right To Dignity” Facebook page, Figures 6.5 and 6.6 
capture the monthly frequency of the posts made by the page administrators and by users as in terms of 
the development of engagement indicators, starting from the day of the creation of the page on January 
10, 2012 until 31 December 2013. Accordingly, I observed the occurrence of four general peaks. The 
first occurred during the month of July 2012, followed by a second in December 2012. The third peak, 
on the other hand, occurred during the month of May 2013, followed by the final peak in October 2013.  
 
Similar to the results obtained by the SWTD English-speaking Facebook page, the first peak in 
the level of user engagements coincided with Saudi Arabia’s participation in the 2012 Summer 




Olympics in London. Ninety-seven posts by page administrators managed to attract 11,831 likes and 
5,319 comments in total.  
 
Figure 6.5: The monthly development of Facebook engagement indicators of the posts made by the page 
administrators of the MRTD Facebook page. 
 
Figure 6.6: The monthly development of Facebook engagement indicators of the posts made by the page users of 
the MRTD Facebook page. 
 
The second peak in December 2012 did not correspond to any campaign-related event. 
Nevertheless, while analyzing the content that attracted the most likes and comments, I found that the 
two most-liked posts were: 1) admiration for the behavior of a husband who shaved his hair in 
solidarity with his wife who was undergoing chemotherapy because of cancer and 2) a link to a story of 
a Saudi man who proposed to marry his colleague in a supermarket. The third peak in May 2013 





















































































































































































































October 2013 coincided with the renewed calls to re-activate the campaigning efforts again on the 26 
October, which was declared and promoted as the day to drive in 2013. 
 
6.2 Examination of the Posts 
Regarding the sources of the posts, in the case of the SWTD page, it emerged that out a total of 449 
posts published by the page administrator(s); such posts comprised 22% of the overall sample. Page 
users posted 1,620 posts, which constituted 78% of all posts. Concerning the MRTD page, a total of 
1,736 posts were published by the page administrator(s), which comprised 30.5% of the overall sample. 
Page users posted 3,951 posts constituting 69.5% of all posts.  
 
Facebook’s default built-in classification of post types (links, status, updates, photos, videos 
and events) made possible further in-depth examination of the administrators’ posts and users’ 
reactions. Thus, when comparing the five types of posts used on the FB campaign page, I find a 
number of significant differences, pointing towards the idea that they indeed played different roles on 
the pages.  
 











































































































Table 6.1 summarizes the posting activity and the use of different post types over time. We can 
clearly observe that the posts made by SWTD page administrators published over the examined period 
received on average 139 likes, with a high standard deviation (SD) value of (1305.4) which is almost 
ten times greater than the mean and mainly caused by high SD value of the photos category that is 
1948.2 and 19.2 comments on average with a 52.6 value of SD. The posts in the MRTD Facebook page 
received a total of 115 likes and 93.4 SD value and 47.8 comments with 50.6 SD value on average. 
Here, we can notice the heavy usage of photos. They comprised 44% of the overall composition of 
posts types in the case of the SWTD page, where they received 359.5 likes and 32.3 comments on 
average. Photos played a similar role on the MRTD page, in which photos comprised 59% of the 
overall composition of posts types and received 123.4 likes and 56.5 comments on average.  
 
This finding supports similar research that concluded the frequent usage of visual hooks (photos or 
videos) is often emotionally rousing and thus particularly appealing to individuals (Cowart, Saunders & 
Blackstone, 2016). Consequently, the majority of the posts that contained photos provided material 
evidence of the success of the campaign. Photos often showed women responding to the calls of the 
campaign either by driving in the streets or visualizing instances of transnational solidarity from 
women around the globe.  
 
The SWTD Facebook page widely used links. Direct links connected users to articles citing and 
reporting the activities of the campaign in various news outlets such as english.alarabiya.net or 
arabnews.com (see Table 6.2). Other links showed videos of Saudi women driving in defiance of the 
ban. This tactic, using content produced by some type of traditional media, comprised 33% of the 
sample and received 63.4 likes and 10.5 comments on average with 105.1 and 14.1 SD values, 
respectively. Links were used much less on the MRTD page. They only comprised 8% of the overall 
sample and received 57.5 likes and 29.1 comments on average with 42.2 and 33.6 SD values, 
respectively. 
 












Link domains Frequency (N) 
youtube.com 55 
alriyadh.com   14 
ksa.daralhayat.com 12 
facebook.com 8 
okaz.com.sa   6 
Table 6.3: The top 5 most frequently used link domains in MRTD Facebook page 
 
Videos accounted for respectively 14% and 13% of the sample in the SWTD and MRTD 
Facebook pages. They included recorded footage of women who responded to the calls of the campaign 
by driving in the streets of Saudi Arabia. Status updates, which are often short comments, updates 
about the campaign or propositions inviting users to react, comprised 7% of the overall sample in the 
SWTD page. MRTD used status updates more often and they constituted 20% of the collected sample. 
Administrators often used this post type to express themselves and engage in a dialogue with the page 
users, either by posting calls for action or asking for users’ opinions and feedback. Finally, the category 
of events was the least used in both cases. It constituted respectively 2% and just 0.1% of the overall 
content of the two FB pages. Nevertheless, I was cautious against adopting fixed interpretations of 
content types. These observations need to be complemented by the qualitative assessment of the items 
that follows. 
 
6.3 Conducting Content Analysis on Facebook 
Further in-depth qualitative analysis of the types of Facebook posts was undertaken. The applied 
method is a systematic, rule-guided technique for examining information and content in written or 
symbolic materials (Mayring, 2004). This method is used when some degree of interpretation is 
required to understand the meaning of data. Henceforth, content analysis can be applied to a wide range 
of materials: documents, websites and entries on social media sites, other textual materials, etc. 
 
The strength of this method lies in the fact that it generates observations that are valid, rigorous 
and replicable (Sampert & Trimble, 2010) because it involves systematic classification and description 
of communication content according to certain usually predetermined categories (Wright, 1986). 
Hence, given the type and amount of material available on Facebook, content analysis can provide an 
effective way to describe and summarize it because it allows organizing the volatile information stream 
in a meaningful way and making inferences about the discursive practices (Neuendorf, 2002).  
 
As stated earlier, the collection of the data was conducted over a period of two years and six 
months, starting from the launch of the SWTD Facebook page and ending with the second round of 




that systematically examines how the page administrators tried to direct general communication on the 
page by advancing particular ideas, proposals and topics. The overview also reveals how these 
examined Facebook pages were used to advocate for the driving campaign and possibly disseminate 
other women’s related or feminist ideas.  
 
The content of social media pages (Facebook in this instance) was the unit of analysis, while the 
individual posts by the administrators of the page were the coding units (Graneheim & Lundman, 
2004). In sum, a total of 449 posts published by the page administrators from the SWTD FB page and 
1,736 posts from the MRTD page were gathered via Netvizz v1.44 and were read several times before 
being coded. Following that, I used a manual, inductive open coding approach based on the analysis of 
posts’ usage types (intents) and content (Mayring, 2000).  
 
First, I identified major themes that emerged from the intents and content of the sample I had. 
These themes were then coded into one or more categories according to a coding scheme. Posts that did 
not fit the codes formed new categories and some earlier categories were also merged and refined. This 
approach is in line with the classification scheme developed by Qu, Wu and Wang (2009), as well as  
Miles, Huberman and Saldana (2014) recommendations for iterative coding. It is worth mentioning that 
the posts made by page users were not qualitatively analyzed because I believe that the research 
questions are best answered by analyzing the posts made by page administrators. Feasibility was also 
an issue.  
 
The analysis revealed four relevant categories of posts explained by the other 14 subcategories 
and their traits. Hence, this process identified the following four broader categories of posts: 
information-related, mobilization-related, feminist-related and emotional-related and user engagement. 
The fifth category of tweets (Others) was also identified but omitted in the analysis as it included posts 
not fitting in the other categories such as general articles that talk about Alzheimer’s disease, climate 
change and anti-Bashar Al Assad posts. The general classification scheme for Facebook posts can be 
found in Appendix D. 
 
6.4 The Main Findings of the Qualitative Content Analysis  
The results of the content analysis (Table 6.4) display the detailed breakdown of the number of FB 
posts per post general category, sub-category and their percentage. We can see from the table that in 
both the SWTD and MRTD Facebook pages, feminist-related posts constituted the majority of the 
overall sample as they accounted for 52.3% and 66.1% respectively. After feminist-related posts, the 
next most common on the SWTD Facebook page were action-related posts (19.5%). The second-
highest number of Arabic-speaking MRTD Facebook posts were information-related posts (21.7%). 




emotional-related and user engagement content (7.7%) and other (3.7%). Action-related posts came in 
third place in the MRTD Facebook page (6.5%), while the emotional-related and user engagement 
category represented 3.6% of the sample followed by other (1.9%).  
 
Both pages converged on the issue of providing feminist-related content, either by sharing 
general feminist-related news or articles, featuring news that highlights Saudi women’s achievements, 
providing empowering and motivational content and offering feminist critique. Nevertheless, the 
content in the case of the SWTD page was more action-oriented in comparison with the MRTD page, 
which was more focused on the ideational aspect of the campaign and the broader issues of women’s 
rights in the Saudi context in general. As with regards to the time dimension, the number of posts made 
page administration in the case of the SWTD page increased over time, starting from 29 posts in 2011, 
198 in 2012 and reaching 222 posts in 2013. The increase suggests an active involvement and 
investment in the campaigning efforts over time. There wasn’t a clear-cut change in the MRTD case, as 
the number of posts made by page administrators went from 1010 posts in 2012 to 726 in 2013. It is 
worth mentioning that no clear trend has been detected in terms of the variance of posts types over 
time.  
Category SWTD MRTD 
(%) (%) 
A- Information-related 16.4 21.7 
1- Providing/sharing campaign-
related news or information 
 
10.9 8.5 




3- Sharing of news articles on 
international issues 
1.7 0.2 
B- Mobilization -related  19.5 6.5 
1- On-ground Mobilization 4.6 5.0 
2- Online action 
 
4.8 1.4 




C- Feminist-related 52.3 66.1 
1- Sharing general feminist-related 
news or articles 
 
27.8 28.1 




3- Empowerment and motivation  4.8 5.2 
4- Feminist critical posts 7.7 30.1 
 
D- Emotional-related and user 
engagement  
7.7 3.6 
1- Expressing gratitude 1.3 0.5 
2- Expressing solidarity 1.1 0.2 
3- Occasional greetings  4.8 0.7 
4- General quotes 0.4 2.0 
E Other 3.7 1.9 




Table 6.4: The breakdown of Facebook posts per the identified categories  
 
The results from content analysis suggest that both Facebook pages have played an 
informational role through broadly distributing and circulating information. The posts which were 
concerned with disseminating campaign-related news and information reached 10.9% and 8.5% 
respectively. They included circulating articles that reported the individual cases of women driving on 
the roads in defiance of the ban, the arrest of women who were caught driving, statements by 
government officials and commentary pieces and opinion articles that talk about the driving issue. This 
shows us that Facebook has been used instrumentally as a low-cost channel for the circulation of 
information and sharing real-life updates about the campaign (Earl & Kimport, 2011).  
 
The posts that shared other local news articles comprised 3.7% and 12.9% respectively and 
included the sharing of articles that referred to general topics that are related to the Saudi local context. 
These included news about the government’s social assistance schemes and the release of political 
prisoners as well as editorials and commentary pieces that stress the importance of maintaining national 
unity and adopting an anti-sectarian perspective. The sharing of other international news articles was 
less prominent in both cases as well (1.7% and 0.2%), but included news articles about the United Arab 
Emirates allowing women to receive pilot licenses and freedom of the press worldwide and Tunisian 
youth resistance of the Islamist Government (Enahdah Party).  
 
Communication on Facebook may also catalyze mobilization, which was clear in the posts that 
were under the mobilization-related category as they were either (1) calling for on-ground mobilization 
through asking Saudi women to start driving in the streets in challenge of the ban; (2) calling for online 
action by urging the users to use the web for action through spreading the message, sharing the link to 
the page, or sending collective e-mails to the members of the Shura’ consultation’ council in Saudi 




messages and organizing international marches near the Saudi embassy in many countries around the 
globe. Examples are provided below: 
 
We are creating a petition to be sent to international organizations and media. The Saudi 
Government did sign on the CEDAW agreement, yet didn’t make any efforts to stop the 
violence and discrimination against Saudi Women! We hope they will be penalized. We just 
need your suggestions now and signatures later. Thanks. (Saudi Women To Drive, 2013) 
 
Civil disobedience or social activism or whatever you call it, WE DID IT. Women of all ages 
went out and drove their cars on October 26th. 15 violation tickets were given to some women. 
We appreciate your help and support. Thanks to our supporters around the world. And the fight 
is still on... For our daughters and the new generation... <3.   (Saudi Women To Drive, 2013) 
 
While analyzing the content of the posts which called for on-ground mobilization in the Arabic-
speaking MRTD page, we observed types of on-ground action that were not talked about in the SWTD 
page, such as the calls to meet the Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh, the top-level religious 
cleric of the Kingdom, to explain the situation to him from the perspective of women. The activists 
behind the MRTD Facebook page also filed a lawsuit against the Ministry of the Interior (Traffic 
Department) demanding the issuance of a driver’s license to women, announcing the willingness of the 
campaign to hire a lawyer (without fees) on behalf of women who want to file a suit against the Traffic 
Department for not granting them driver’s licenses.  
 
Within the MRTD page, the types of actions were elaborated and discussed in greater detail. 
Furthermore, the performed online activities ranged from issuing organized statements under the name 
of the campaign to requesting the followers to have a unified banner of the cause on their social media 
profiles. This greater detail can be exemplified in the extracts below: 
 
We renew the call for women and men to take the lead and urge the authorities to 
accommodate the campaign’s demands in one of these ways: Women can go ahead and 
start driving in the case of their possession of international driving license’ and document 
their actions on 17 June 2012; men can drive while accompanying their wives, sisters, 
mothers or daughter and documenting this action in support of women’s right to drive on 
June 17, 2012. Even if you can’t drive, please send us a picture of you behind the wheel 
with any message in support of Saudi women’s right to drive. Also, if you are a man who 
supports the right of Saudi women to drive, you can show your support by sending a 
video or picture with an encouraging message or even teaching your female relatives how 




by adding this logo (She has the right to drive) on your photo on these media platforms 
http://twibbon.com/join/Women2drive-7. (My Right to Dignity, 2012)  
 
Traffic Police Lawsuit update: We just got the news that three Saudi women in the 
Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia (Nassema and Afrah al-Sadah and Enaam Alasfour) 
have applied today for driver’s license. Mr. Mofarih Ali Alzahrani, the director of the 
traffic police officer was very understanding and welcoming. But their applications were 
rejected. We again emphasize that there is no written law anywhere that forbids women 
from applying for a driver’s license. These three women have sent objection letters to 
the General Directorate of Traffic in Riyadh, but they were told to wait for an official 
reply within 90 days. If by then they haven’t gotten a reply, they can file a lawsuit 
against the General Directorate of Traffic in the Administration Court. My Right to 
Dignity  (the campaign) will provide free legal consultation to any woman who wants to 
file a lawsuit against the General Directorate of Traffic. (My Right To Dignity, 2012) 
 
Notably, the English-speaking SWTD Facebook page focused on the transnational aspect of the 
campaign, encouraging international supporters and empathizers to perform symbolic acts of solidarity 
like contacting Saudi diplomats or honking near the Saudi embassies and consulates in their respective 
countries. The following examples show SWTD’s more transnational focus:  
 
            Dear friends, now we are close to June 17th. Could you please send collective e-mails to the 
Saudi embassy, with this headline  “Let Women Drive in Saudi Arabia” so we can get their 
attention? You can find all of the e-mails in the link below. Thank you. 
http://embassy.goabroad.com/embassies-of/saudi-arabia. (Saudi Women To Drive, 2012)  
 
            Just in case if you do not get our Honk for Saudi Women Campaign. We will appreciate any act 
of support to us, like in this video when Maria from Mission Free Iran org. honked for us in 
front of the Saudi embassy in Washington DC to show the Saudi officials that the world is 
waiting. (Saudi Women To Drive, 2012) 
 
Thus, through the formation of transnational ties and the ability to promote offline events, the 
“Saudi Women To Drive” page demonstrates the potential online spaces offer for the creation of 
feminist alliances with women all over the world. These attempts to attain international support are 
potentially being pursued for the sake of giving the campaign external legitimacy and acknowledgment 
and for the sake of disseminating its claims and practices beyond the local scope. Moreover, the use of 
the page to organize offline events and actions contributes to the development of the grassroots 




clearly show that Facebook is pragmatically used to create new dimensions and opportunities for 
action. On the contrary, the transnational aspect was missing in the MRTD Facebook page, which can 
possibly be explained by the fact that it was in Arabic and mainly directed to the domestic audience in 
particular. 
 
By the same token, the posts which were under the emotional-related and user engagement 
broader category carried expressive and emotive evaluations of the actors and events. They were 
mainly devoted to (1) expressing gratitude by thanking the supporters for the campaign for their 
enthusiasm and dedication; (2) expressing solidarity and evoking a ‘we-feeling’ through the posts that 
commended the dedication of the campaign’s supporters; (3) posting greetings during special occasions 
and events; (4) sharing general quotations from a text or a well-known figure, usually with 
acknowledgment of the source. The following extracts are examples of emotional-related and user 
engagement category:  
 
Good morning, friends. Much love and appreciation from your sisters in Saudi Arabia <3. 
(Saudi Women To Drive, 2012) 
 
A year ago, we made these English pages to support Manal Alsharif when she was detained and 
spread her story internationally. And to defend our cause. Thank you, everyone, for your 
support and the fight is still on. (Saudi Women To Drive, 2012) 
 
These emotive posts are not surprising and go in line with the results of some of the studies 
which concluded social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter have a strong emotional aspect; 
“digital, among other media, sustain effective feedback loops that generate and reproduce effective 
patterns of relating to others” while bolstering the level of emotional solidarity (Papacharissi, 2014, p. 
23). Hence, reaching out to the supporters of the campaign represents an attempt to solidify internal 
cohesion. Social media and emotions nexus is particularly important in the case of grassroots 
campaigns. The tendency to target the Western audience was also witnessed through the inclusion of 
the names of world-renowned international figures or global events as references:  
 
Happy birthday Marie Curie, the first female to win a Nobel Prize. November 7th, 1867. (Saudi 
Women To Drive, 2011) 
 





These posts point to the administrators’ attempts within the English-speaking  SWTD to 
connect to and build bridges with the international audience through the use of references that it can 
easily identify and relate to. The feminist-related posts, on the other hand, were mainly concerned with 
(1) posting and disseminating general feminist-related news or articles that draw attention to the 
ubiquity of sexism, misogyny and violence against women; (2) covering news that relates to Saudi 
women’s achievements in specific; (3) posting status messages that carry empowerment and 
motivational content; (4) providing critical opinions or evaluation of certain economic, political and 
ideological aspects of society from a feminist perspective. Examples of posts that embody these 
characteristics are shown below:    
 
Saudi Arabia has one of the lowest female participation rates in the workforce in the region. A 
recent World Bank report has found this. http://www.arabnews.com/news/445991. (Saudi 
Women To Drive, 2013) 
 
After three years of petitioning the Ministry of Justice, Arwa Al-Hujaili (25 years old) has 
finally received her registration to practice as a trainee lawyer, she became the first woman to 
do so. “People tell me I’m a pioneer, and I feel I need to live up to what they expect of me,” 
says Al-Hujaili. “There is a great sense of responsibility. From now on, people will look at 
everything I do.” http://edition.cnn.com/2013/05/09/business/saudi-arabia-first-female-
lawyer/index.html. (Saudi Women To Drive, 2013) 
 
A large majority of the posts belonging to this category contained links to articles or videos 
relating to topics of concern for women and feminists from news sources, feminist publications or 
personal blogs from all over the world. The topics of these posts were diverse, including women’s 
political representation, their participation in the labor force, continued inequalities experienced by 
women and domestic violence. Three major themes emerged while analyzing the feminist critical posts 
category, which was mainly concerned with providing critical opinions or emergent issues from a 
feminist perspective. I found that the criticism was mainly devoted to religious, political and social 
targets. Correspondingly, posts that were directed towards regime used a highly charged critical tone 
towards some of the state officials, manifested in the following posts:   
  
I’m a Saudi girl, and I say this country is a big joke. The regime is distracting people with 
women’s and religious issues so they can steal as much as they want from the wealth of the 
country. We are just scapegoats. (Saudi Women To Drive, 2012) 
 
Let me introduce you to our oppressors. The former minister of interior Prince Naif Bin 




them was included in the post]. They’ve been arresting, torturing and jailing more than 30,000 
people in Saudi Arabia for years without trials! If you ever saw the little criminal in your 
country, please spit and throw eggs on him. May he follow his dad to hell soon. Amen (Saudi 
Women To Drive, 2012) 
 
           To our rulers, we are tired of hearing mere justifications. Women need a fair political decision 
from you and not from society. You are the ones who are in charge, and it is not right to blame 
it on society. We are witnessing great division between the Islamists and the liberals… Sunni 
and Shiite… the Northerners… the Easterners… the Central and the Westerners! Women in 
Saudi Arabia have become like a ball that is being thrown between those who hold different 
ideologies. We refuse to be a tool in your hands. We got tired of hearing the same rhetoric in 
every international speech. We want a real solution inside the country, not only improve our 
image to the international community. (My Right To Dignity, 2012) 
 
As shown above, we can see page administrators’ efforts to invoke a sense of “we are the 
people” and “we are the scapegoats.” They set up “the people” versus “the regime” and “oppressors,” 
placing their positions at opposite ends of the spectrum. Moreover, we can observe the diversity of the 
topics on the FB page, as these are no longer limited to the driving issues; they extend to human rights 
violations and political oppression. The political posts also contained calls for the installation of 
modern mechanisms that take people’s opinions into consideration and guarantee a system of checks 
and balances, as displayed in the following posts:   
 
            In case the government does not lift the ban on driving while not providing justifications for the 
continuation of the ban, we demand that the government provide modern mechanisms in which 
members of society can express their opinions about it, through ballot boxes and a public 
referendum supervised by judicial and governmental bodies, and independent personalities 
recognized for their credibility and integrity. (My Right To Dignity, 2013) 
 
            When decision-makers state that women’s driving is left to the wish of society, do these 
decision-makers wonder how individuals in society would express their desires? If elections are 
forbidden, while demonstrations are out of the question, and where online action and hashtags 
are considered to be heresy—how can we then understand what society truly desires? Is there 






As far as the feminist posts that contained a religiously-oriented critique are concerned, page 
administrators in the English-speaking SWTD Facebook page adopted a critical stance towards the 
religious establishment who projected patriarchal attitudes towards women’s emancipation, the 
feminist critique towards religious authority is reflected in the extracts below:   
 
            This is [referring to the picture of] Abdul Aziz al al-Shaikh, the current Grand Mufti of Saudi 
Arabia [which is equivalent to the position of the Pope in our country]. This hypocritical man 
strongly opposed the presence of women in the Shura Consultive Council and then supported it 
when the king appointed 30 women in the Council!! He believes that he can solve all of our 
problems with some religious Fatwas! What do you want to say to him? (Saudi Women To 
Drive, 2013) 
 
            Yesterday around 50 religious men have gathered by King Abdullah palace in Riyadh to protest 
the appointing of women in Shoura council. What do you want to say to those cowards? (Saudi 












            
 
  
            Mohammed Al Arifi is a Saudi preacher. He hates women, and he doesn’t like seeing women 
working in public, to appear on TV or mix with men; he wants us all covered up. This 
misogynistic preacher is enjoying his life, traveling everywhere freely while we, Saudi women 
can’t do the same. He’s in London now enjoying his summer break after he asked the Muslim 




youth to go and fight (Jihad) in Syria!! Why didn’t he go and fight as well!! Please, England, 
kick him out. He is too sick to be in a free country. This video shows him teaching some Saudi 
youth how to beat their wives!! https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XOj9_X8lrC4. (Saudi 
Women To Drive, 2013) 
 
We can observe the strong language that is used against several religious figures. Moreover, the 
vocabulary is clearly directed to the Western audience, exemplified by the fact that the position of the 
‘Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia’ has been translated to a Western equivalent, the “Pope”. Posts also use 
certain expressions such as “misogynistic preacher” and call on London to expel the Saudi preacher 
Mohammed Al Arifi because he should not be allowed in a “free country”. The appeal to a Western 
audience reflects the fact that the Western-based audience constitutes a larger percentage of the overall 
audience of the page as reflected in Figure 6.8, retrieved on July 12, 2017. The largest proportion of 
page followers are based in the United States (24%), followed by Saudi Arabia (14%), the United 
Kingdom (9%) and Germany (6%). All other countries that only constituted 1% of the sample were 
aggregated in the “other countries” category.  
 




























































Figure 6.8: Breakdown of page followers per country 




In contrast, of 17,437 total followers of the MRTD Facebook page, the domestic Saudis 
constituted the largest percentage (46%), followed by Egyptians (14%) and Malaysians (5%), 
according to page statistics which from 19 September 2017 (refer to Figure 6.9) which was retrieved on 
August 25, 2017. Despite the largely Saudi audience, the same tendency of criticizing religious 
extremism was witnessed in the Arabic-speaking MRTD Facebook page: 
 
            After the religious cleric who claimed that driving harms women’s ovaries, here comes the 
religious cleric Sheikh Alareifi stating why a woman’s testimony is worth half that of a man due 
to the composition of the brain. (My Right To Dignity, 2012) 
 
            Those who follow how the “Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice“ 
(which is the morality police in Saudi Arabia) treats women would think that their mission is to 
suffocate them with religion. And then people wonder about the spread of atheism! (My Right 
To Dignity, 2013) 
 



















Finally, the majority of feminist posts that carried social commentary and critique were concerned with 
criticizing the existing social norms that are perceived to be no longer relevant: 
 
Imagine if you bought a new laptop and then you installed Windows 95 on it. This is exactly 
what customs and traditions are doing. (My Right To Dignity, 2013) 
 
Our society sees the slip of females as crimes, while dismissing the mistakes committed by 
males although God perceives guilt in the same way. We are one hell of a discriminatory 
society. That’s scary. (My Right To Dignity, 2012) 
 
6.5 Examining the Embedded Discursive Construction of Feminism   
Because the majority of posts in both pages were classified as feminist-related, this section is mainly 
concerned with shedding some light on the ways feminism has been discursively constructed within 
these Facebook pages. As it became clear that the feminist centered discourses that surfaced with the 
“Women to Drive” campaign was being linked to a wider set of feminist claims that do not end with 
women’s mobility rights. 
 
Until recently, a significant part of how feminism is understood by the public and processed by 
individuals is based on the way it is framed in media and mass communications. Media often represents 
and echoes the existing ideology and power that is embedded in social reality. Thus, traditionally, the 
gatekeepers who discuss feminism through media frame the subject however they deem beneficial to 
them by picking and choosing the way it is portrayed. Their portrayal is then consumed and understood 
by an audience.  
 
Feminism as a theoretical perspective and practice that criticizes gender inequalities and aims at 
women’s empowerment has struggled to find footing within the Saudi society. It has been associated 
with negative anti-religious and neo-colonial connotations. Consequently, feminism was widely viewed 
as a Western phenomenon, deemed as a threat to society and perceived as loosening morals and not 
necessarily inclusive of family values, gender complementarity and community needs. Furthermore, the 
issue of whether Islam is compatible with feminism has been a subject of debate among women 
activists and scholars for a long time. The majority of the scholarly writings about feminism in this 
particular context tend to claim an inherent tension between Islam and feminism and often refer to the 
two as being ideologically incompatible.  
 
An examination of the empirical materials centered around the representations and 




understanding of feminism and investigate the potential role that could be played by these platforms in 
the discursive production of feminist discourses that are connected to the driving campaign. Hence, I 
am particularly interested in providing a nuanced and detailed analysis of the different ways that 
feminists engage in the reclamation and re-appropriation of discourses concerning the expressions of 
feminism and the discursive references that they drew on to construct their own version of feminism.  
6.5.1 The Emergence of Secular Feminist Discourse within the WTD Facebook Page 
Given its mutability, secular feminist thought in and outside Muslim communities has been comprised 
of a cluster of discursive strands, including secular nationalist as well as the more generic Universalist 
human rights and the liberal strand of feminism, though there is often an overlap among them as well.  
 
A clear manifestation of universalist human rights feminism can be observed in the description 
page of the SWTD campaign: “dedicated to the citizens of the world who support women’s freedom in 
Saudi Arabia, starting by allowing them to drive.” This Universalist discourse and display of inclusivity 
is the same approach used by secular feminists. It moves away from using religion as a framework to 
define gender roles, while basing the rationale for women’s rights on Universalist and human rights 
discourses that seek to enable and empower the individual. Thus, women’s rights and human rights 
presented as best promoted and protected in an environment of secular thought and secular institutions, 
including a state that defends the rights of all its citizens. 
 
 




Also, the emphasis on secular thought and the allocation of religious authority to the state and 
its institutions of law was stressed through the posting of direct quotes by the founder of the modern 
Turkish Republic Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who governed Turkey by strictly secular principles. The 
activist behind this Facebook page faced criticism for defending her choice to quote him. She defended 
herself saying, “There is a crucial need for such as a secular extremist in Saudi Arabia, as there is no 
time for a slow change.” 
 
The Page administrators also wove a humanitarian discourse into their feminist articulation, 
calling for equality and emancipation, as typical of secular feminists. They also called for the 
enjoyment of justice by all, naming women among the “all.” Thus, the framing of demands around 
“rights” and the reliance on universal secular discourses for gender equality reveal a liberal ontology 
that reproduces an approach to feminism assuming an individualistic premise. Liberal individualism is 
a key part of the secular metanarrative that informs feminist scholarship today. 
 
They also announced their support for the LGBT community, exemplified by their pro-
marriage-equality stance. However, they were careful in the comment section that marriage equality is 
not directly related to women’s issues in Saudi Arabia, nor in the Arab World. Instead, they stressed 
that equality is a basic principle that should be fully integrated and respected in the transnational realm; 
this language attempts to pass the stable (and binary) gender definition through demonstrating 
transnational solidarity and facilitating conversations about homosexuality and marriage equality that 
are often absent from discussions due to the lack of support for LGBT issues. This topic remains a 

















In light of this taboo, such a particular notion of inclusiveness seems to be based on a desire to 
accommodate women of different statuses, ethnic-racial backgrounds and socio-economic positions, 
which appears to be motivated by the concept of intersectionality. Intersectional thought arose as a 
direct response to the exclusionary nature of much of mainstream feminism. It is built on the idea that 
women experience oppression in varying configurations and in varying degrees of intensity due to their 
race, class and ethnicity. Thus, cultural patterns of oppression are, in fact, not only interrelated, but are 
bound together and influenced by the intersectional systems of society. In other words, an intersectional 
approach to one’s identity rejects the notion that gender is the primary criterion upon which feminist 
approaches should be based, It instead strives to achieve an understanding of how the myriad 
differences in women’s lives and facets of one’s identity intersect (rather than accumulate) to construct 
their social positioning(s).  
 
Some attempts at demonstrating intersectional ties of feminist solidarity and enabling new kinds 
of intersectional conversations were apparent on the English-speaking page. For example, posts called 
for the protection of rights of domestic workers in the Arab Gulf and Lebanon and abolishing 

















What emerged from analyzing the content of the English-speaking page is the constant 
preoccupation of the Western secular model (in all its complexities and contradictions) as the primary 
referent, as well as the uncritical assumption of its direct applicability and strict correspondence to the 
context. Hence, secular feminism was treated as if it holds positional superiority towards the others and 
was depicted as being modern and progressive, as opposed to “other” models perceived as backward 
and traditional. The result reinforces the same theoretical assumptions about secular feminism which 
have also been called out as Western-centric for associating the decrease of religiosity to the rise of 
modernity and assuming that such transition had universal validity (Casanova, 2009). Overall, these 
discourses dismiss ideas of “multiple modernities“ (Eisenstadt, 2000) and “multiple secularities“ 
(Burchardt & Wohlrab-Sahr, 2013) as their paradigm assumes there is an immanent essence of female 
oppression within Islam; Muslim countries are presented as strong patriarchates characterized by 
gender inequality, which is seen as a foundational pillar of Islam in direct opposition to feminism and 
gender equality. 
 
However, despite the reliance of this page on the concept of intersectionality, religion has 
received relatively little attention within the intersectionality framework as an axis of difference and 
was never conceptualized as a positionality but was disregarded otherwise. This points out to the fact 
that despite the recent wave of scholarship on intersectionality, feminist research has yet to adequately 




engage with the role of religion within discussions of intersectionality, other than to occasionally list 
religion as one in a list of relevant differences among the other collection of social divisions (gender, 
race, class) that are typically taken into account. This means that when movements such as Islamic 
feminism emerge, the response has been to either label them as further proof of false consciousness, or 
to not engage with them at all. The key tension remains the unwillingness to engage with religious 
women on their own terms, instead of the a priori assumptions of religious patriarchy that rely on the 
homogenization of religions. 
 
This also echoes similar conclusions by feminist scholars in which Saba Mahmood for example, 
has observed that although there have been “serious attempts at integrating issues of sexual, racial, 
class and national difference within feminist theory, questions regarding religious difference have 
remained relatively unexplored”, so the religious/secular divide remains to be rarely integrated into the 
collection of social divisions (gender, race, class) that are typically taken into account (Mahmood, 
2005, p.1). Thus, there is the risk that intersectional approaches could still reproduce the assumptions 
present in much of mainstream feminism. 
 
6.5.2 The Manifestations of Islamic-reformist Stance of Feminism in the MRTD Facebook Page 
In contrast, the page administrators on the Arabic-speaking page were more attentive to the tensions 
and changing meanings of “the secular” and “the religious” binary in terms of their frames of reference 
and the ways they intersect in the different modes of feminism. Thus, they contrasted the 
religious/secular divide exemplified by the open, inclusive nature that often typifies secular feminism 
with the failure of religious frameworks to eradicate injustices against women and safeguard their 
rights, as exemplified below: 
 
The advocates of women’s rights are being classified as “secularists or liberals”, this implies 
that religion and society have failed women and the “secularists” have come to salvage them. 
(Women To Drive, 2013)  
 
The Arabic-speaking page also had a relatively Islamic-reformist stance of feminism; it posed 
some criticism towards certain practices in Islam while attempting to reform the religious discourse 
about gender equality. The concept of women’s rights become rooted in discourses of religious 
righteousness. In this framework, Islam and interpretations of it become the center points for 
concentration. The MRTD approach constitutes a challenge to the monopoly over the divine held by 
the Saudi government and religious clerics. For instance, we can clearly observe from the extracts 
below the page administrators’ attempts to criticize several practices that are normally justified by 




inheritance laws in which men inherit more than women, despite the fact that the unequal division of 
inheritance has now been superseded by the contribution of women to economic activities and 
household incomes; the male guardianship system; the segregation of work duties by gender; and 
men’s right to polygamy: 
 
Don’t tell me this is fair 
that you inherit more than me 
that you act as my guardian 
that you are entitled to what I don’t get 
Not because of your educational qualifications… or your wisdom 
but because I was destined to be born as a female. (My Right To Dignity, 2013) 
 
What is a virtue and what does it mean? What are morals that give the man the right to marry 
more than one wife publicly? I never expected to find an advertisement on my phone that 
promotes temporary marriages… this sort of practice is similar to human trafficking. I don’t 
want to hear anyone who speaks proudly about the fake virtues of the East and the sins of the 
West. (My Right To Dignity, 2012) 
 
The most discriminatory law against women in Saudi Arabia is depriving them of making their 
own decisions, which eventually distorts their view about themselves so they view themselves 
as inadequate. The guardianship system is being exploited to treat women badly. (My Right To 
Dignity, 2013) 
 
As we can see above, the male guardianship system, for instance, was criticized for facilitating 
abuse and misconduct against women. With this in mind, we can observe the efforts made by the page 
administrators to reconstruct and unpack the meaning of male guardianship. To them, it does not mean 
or translate to the absolute obedience from women for male’s authority, but the decision making should 
be borne by those who are up for it either “men or women”, or together according to the circumstances. 
It was evident throughout the Facebook page that women were navigating and negotiating issues of 
feminism and religiosity, criticizing and demanding a different reading of Islam that articulates new 
feminism in a modernist voice. Such a reading would transform the religious discourse on women. 
Page administrators also call for new theological interpretations of Islamic texts in order to challenge 
laws and policies that are based on orthodox, literalist, or misogynist interpretations. They push to 
deconstruct Sharia-related rules in a women-friendly, egalitarian fashion regarding issues such as 
marriage, polygamy, personal status law and inheritance. Hence, this call for the re-interpretation of 




considered the domains of men that have dominated for centuries. The re-interpretation would create a 
version of Islam that is compatible with feminism.  
 
The activists behind the MRTD Facebook page, made a strong statement about the need for a 
modern version of Islam that does not pose restrictions on women. It also advocated that Islam should 
be reformed by each generation in order to be relevant to the lives of Muslims, navigating the issue of 
Islam and modernity. Examples of that can be seen below: 
 
We need to transform the religious discourse on women to a discourse that makes them full of 
confidence and pride. Why do they insist on portraying their presence and role in the public 
sphere as being sinful? (My Right To Dignity, 2012) 
 
 Men always remember the Quranic verse which says that “Men are in charge of women”, and 
forget to mention the verse which states that “And they [women] have rights similar [to those of 
their husbands].” (My Right To Dignity, 2013) 
 
Discrimination against women has reached a new low, in which religious clerics have started 
discriminating against them even in the afterlife. As there is a dispute among many religious 
clerks including ibn Taymiyyah, ibn Kathir regarding whether God sees women in paradise as 
he sees men there. (My Right To Dignity, 2013) 
 
There have been also some attempts to expose some of the commonly circulating female-hostile 
hadiths (sayings and deeds attributed to the Prophet Muhammad) as spurious by showing their 
historical contradictions within hadith literature and how they were framed through patriarchal societal 
lenses. By doing so, a case was made for the necessity of reforming certain patriarchal claims and 
practices that were insinuated into Islam and transforming what has passed as Islam through a 
realignment with the claimed Quranic message of gender equality and social justice.  
 
Correspondingly, it emerged that the administrators believe that what appears to be religiously 
ordained is in fact not and should be debunked. The discriminated plight of women has its roots in the 
male-dominated culture prevailing in these societies, not in Islam. Page administrators are attempting 
to reconstruct the “authentic” message of Islam in order to liberate it from its distorted male elitist 





Is there anything in our religion that states that women are the root of all evil and sins? Or that 
women are blindly following their emotions and desires without using their minds or morals? 
Please help me to figure this out. This is the source of this religious Fatwa which was found in 
the website of the religious scholar Saleh al-Fawzan http://www.alfawzan.af.org.sa/node/10263.  
Let’s dismantle this! (My Right To Dignity, 2012) 
 
            “Every woman who dies while her husband is satisfied with her behavior… enters heaven.” 
This is a weak saying of Prophet Mohammed that Alalabi and Ibn Al-Jawzy—who happen to be 
prominent Islamic scholars—have stated is it inaccurate and should not be circulated by 
preachers. Why do preachers keep referring to it? (My Right To Dignity, 2012) 
 
            Oh, these silly religious verdicts! Religion is being used to control women and exercise some 
sort of intellectual oppression. The Saudi religion is based on social customs, not the Qur’an 
and the guidance of Prophet Mohammad! (My Right To Dignity, 2012) 
  
Moreover, the issue of Hijab has emerged as a major theme in the data, which was not 
surprising due to the nature of the headscarf as a highly contested, political gendered symbol within 
Muslim societies and the global political arena. Some posts critically sought to question the Hijab by 
stating that it is not originally rooted in Islam;  
 
What’s the first corner in Islam? 
-Hijab 
Does God forgive all sins except? 
-Taking off the Hijab 
What are the seven major sins? 
-Taking off the Hijab, indecency, wearing short skirts, exposing the face, wearing the Abaya on 
the shoulders, wearing pants, wearing tight clothes 
What are the causes of natural disasters like an earthquake? 
Women wearing short dresses. (My Right To Dignity, 2013) 
 
Also, several posts criticized the preoccupation with policing women’s dress and the coercive 
nature of forcing women to wear the veil despite the fact there are different readings and interpretations 
of the Qu’ran. (Verse 31 is often cited for requiring women to cover.) Hence, posts argued that no one 




obvious that the page administrators knew that Hijab is not merely a religious practice or individual 
choice, but also one of the most visible markers of differentness. It carries multiple meanings and is 
used to construct various collective identities and gendered boundaries between men and women, as 
well as between the global West and political Islam. 
 
It is worth clarifying again that what they criticized was not the Hijab per se, but the social 
practice or/and parental pressure of forcing women to wear it. Thus, the free choice by women to wear 
the Hijab was presented as a personal choice that should be respected and the Hijab should not be 
thought of as a hurdle in the success or professional advancement. This is demonstrated in Figure 6.15, 
which translates to “As if they are saying that our religion Islam, which is valid for all times and all 
places, is a religion where decency and modesty are not inconsistent with freedom and life”. 
 
 
These assertions challenge the stereotyped images of women in the veil as being dependent or 
oppressed; it remains an open question to what extent the semiotics of veiling align with the process of 
women’s emancipation. This idea raises important observations about choice feminism, which has 
come to dominate critiques of mainstream Western feminism. The choice feminist argument assumes 
that choices exist and can be made outside of power relations. Choices are never “free” in the sense that 
they are never made outside of power structures or hegemonic systems and ideals. Nevertheless, it is 





clear that certain choices have been designated as feminist or emancipatory, while others have been 
designated as oppressive such as the choice to wear the Hijab for example.  
 
Following this idea, women who make choices that are seen as oppressive, suffering from false 
consciousness and thus have not reached the stage of liberation other women have reached—again 
reproducing the linear view of time where progress is measured as a continuum, with Western women 
as the most advanced. Moreover, the way certain choices have been designated as emancipatory and 
others as oppressive is in itself enmeshed within power relations stemming from both (various forms 
of) patriarchy and Western mainstream feminism (Salem, 2013). The theme of women’s visible role in 
society and the culture of shaming and concealing the presence of women stood out; some posts (Fig. 
6.16. and 6.17) put an emphasis on the role of women in public life, the prominent historical role of 
women in the era of Prophet Mohammed and the disadvantages of entirely relegating women’s 
presence to the domestic sphere. Posts also touched on different social roles assigned to men and 
women due to their different standing in society, roles that are in effect defined in accordance with the 
existing hegemonic, masculine ideals in society. An example of that is demonstrated below: 
 
             When Obama won the elections, he posted a picture of himself and his wife Michelle Obama 
hugging. The choice of his particular picture is interesting. How beautiful to witness women 
being praised by their husbands in front of millions. The culture of shaming and concealing the 
presence of women, or equating women with precious belongings that should be hidden in a 
box should be rejected because it takes away my humanity as a woman. I reject being someone 
















Moreover, the post “We keep hearing in Saudi Arabia that women should not hold leadership positions 






Again the following sarcastic post, which states, “Only in Saudi Arabia, a women’s targeted 











Figure 6.18: Breast cancer awareness brochure (My Right To Dignity, 2012) 




These examples imply a critique of women’s exclusion from society and a desire to position 
them as fully visible citizens and emancipated individuals who are capable of taking leadership roles. 
The critique questions the assumed complementary gender model that presents women as emotional 
beings and natural caregivers (either mothers or wives) who place their family’s needs before their 
own; in contrast, men normally fulfill their role as breadwinners. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that 
the page administrators were vocal and clear in stating the importance of women’s role in the home as 
well. For example, they criticized the statements made by some women who consider women’s interest 
in their homes and children a form of slavery. 
 
In essence, the findings show us that the feminist centered discourses that have been articulated 
in the Saudi context and rose with the driving campaign are being articulated within a wider set of 
demands that do not end with women’s mobility rights. Moreover, the discourse embedded in the 
MRTD page sheds light on the attempts to challenge the existing knowledge production and meaning-
making of feminism; its applicability to Muslim societies; and the possibility of carrying out the efforts 
toward women’s advancement and gender equality within an Islamic reformist discursive framework 
that accommodates direct feminist critique of certain religious practices that adversely affect women.   
Their religious legitimacy reminds us that there is not one Islam but different forms and interpretations 
of it; the determinant role of the application of religious order in society should be constantly 
questioned. The analyzed textual material also pushes us to reflect on the call for forging new critical 
engagement with secular feminists and religious thought as normative principles, especially in complex 
settings where the secular and religious both intersect and diverge.  
 
Thus, the metanarrative of secularizing, which is built on the assumptions underlying much of 
mainstream Western feminism, should also be evaluated in order to address the agency of 
religious/spiritual women in non-simplistic terms. It also demonstrates the need for a more inclusive 
and cross-cultural understanding of feminism and the global women’s movement. Nevertheless, 
comparing the constructed versions of feminism embedded in both the English-speaking page and the 
Arabic-speaking one raises the issue previously brought up by scholars like Fairclough (1995) 
regarding what is ultimately the consequence of all the different construed versions of feminism. That 
is, whether such a construction is determined by the “authors” of feminism, or the “audience” 
perceiving their discourse and if they were crafted in this specific way to seek domestic or international 
resonances. Thus, the dialectical tensions stemming from locality and universality and the potential role 
of audiences should also be taken into account rather than left out from the overall equation. 
 
6.6 Examining WCSS’s Facebook Page in the Kuwaiti Case 
Several studies on digital media campaigns and advocacy demonstrate that the world of today, which 
witnesses a more individualized society, as well as a more digital one, carries serious implications for 




implications are especially clear with youth, who are no longer as keen on being members of 
organizations and instead want opportunities for individualized action with the freedom to choose 
which issues to engage in (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012).  
 
Social networking platforms, therefore, provide opportunities for these organizations to increase 
their community presence, impact and effectiveness because they offer embedded infrastructural 
capacities that reduce the costs of mobilizing supporters, maintaining activist networks and employing 
varying tactics in advocacy and activism. One of the most significant added values that digital 
networking platforms have also brought about for civil society organizations are the increased 
opportunity to gain support for their campaigns. They also have the ability to reach a much larger 
audience than their usual supporters by allowing individualized action frames (Katz-Kimchi & 
Manosevitch, 2015). Similarly, digital media platforms allow users to participate in virtual 
communities because they provide functions of sharing, communicating, collaborating and interacting 
with others with a click of a button (Nah & Saxton, 2013). Waters, Burnett, Lamm & Lucas (2009) also 
found that organizations use social networking platforms for activities related to fundraising and 
volunteering. 
 
As a result of these advantages, digital media platforms, including Facebook and Twitter, have 
become popular within and beyond the NGOs and women;s organizations context. Among other social 
media sites, Facebook remains the dominating social networking platform with over 2.38 billion 
monthly active users as of 2019 (Statista, 2019). Kuwait has more than 3 million Facebook subscribers 
as of 2019 (Internet World Stats, 2019). Still, the ways feminist organizations use particular social 
networking platforms such as Facebook for their online presence are still relatively unexplored. Thus, 
the exploratory aim of this section is to understand how online communication unfolds on Facebook by 
examining how did the WCSS utilized  the potential embedded functionalities within Facebook to carry 
out its programs and services and engage with its members, sympathizers and the general public, as 
well as the ways that the WCSS Facebook page has been used as a means of claims-making, 
coordination and mobilization in relation to the “Ensaf” campaign.  
 
It must be taken into account that, in contrast to the Saudi case analyzed in the previous section, 
there hasn’t been a dedicated stand-alone Facebook page specifically assigned to the “Ensaf” campaign 
per se. The campaign’s efforts were included within the official Facebook page of WCSS because of its 
role as the main women’s rights organization that advocated for the “Ensaf” campaign. Also, no 
Facebook page could be traced to the Kuwaiti Women’s Without Borders group. In order to answer the 
research question, I decided to analyze not only the Facebook posts that specifically concerned the 
“Ensaf” campaign, but instead to take into consideration the full sample of all the Facebook posts 
published by the WCSS’s page administrators starting from January 2013 until December 2015. The 




development of the overall WCSS activities as well as the Ensaf campaign that was officially launched 
in February 2014.  The three-year period in question represents a good trajectory as well as a snapshot 
of both the overall activities and the events that unfolded before, during and beyond the course of the 
campaign. It provides a good vantage point from which to examine how the page administrators 
engaged the public through the Facebook page by advancing particular ideas and topics. It also reveals 
how the FB page was utilized to advocate for the Ensaf campaign in particular and possibly 
disseminate other women’s related or feminist ideas. 
6.6.1 Conducting Content Analysis  
This section is based on close monitoring of the WCSS’s Facebook page between January 2013 and 
December 2015. Thus, in a similar manner as that applied to the Saudi case, the development of 
contents over time was assessed, followed by an examination of the characteristics of users’ 
engagement and an evaluation of the various usage types, the type of content disseminated and the 
composition of the participating audience. 
 
While collecting data concerning the three-year period chosen, one striking difference that we 
observed is that, in comparison to the Saudi case, the posts made by page supporters only made up 2% 
of the overall posted content—11 posts made by page users were published on the WCSS Facebook 
wall and these were mainly advertisements to events. On the SWTD and MTRD pages, users created 
the majority of posts (respectively 78% and 69%). Thus, I have decided it is best to not include page 
user posts in the analysis as including them will not result in any added value. The collection, which 
was made via Netvizz v1.44, revealed a total of 492 posts by page administrators that were mostly in 
Arabic which were coded and analyzed in a later stage. Figure 6.19  tackles the development of content 
over time by displaying the monthly frequency of FB posts made by the page administrators and the 
development of their engagement indicators summing up all likes and comments over the data 










Figure 6.19: Monthly development of Facebook engagement over the course of the campaign     






















































































The analysis of the monthly developments of Facebook engagement levels shows generally low 
user engagement levels within the page, as evidenced by the low numbers of likes (an average of 18 per 
month) combined with a low number of comments in reaction to the posts; the total number of 
comments for the whole page didn’t exceed 26 over the three-year examined period at hand. What was 
also notable is the occurrence of a sudden spike in July 2014, when page administrators shared 79 
posts. This sudden increase necessitated conducting a detailed analysis to determine the types of posts 
that were published during the period. It emerged that the rise of the number of posts coincided with 
the Israel–Gaza conflict from July of that year. Many of the posts published over that period by WCSS 
declared WCSS solidarity and support towards the Palestinians. WCSS has historically been involved 
with lobbying for the Palestinian cause; it founded the Kuwaitis for Jerusalem Internal Committee in 
conjunction with the Kuwaiti Graduates Society in 2000. This July 2014 spike also sheds some light on 
the transnational action dimension incorporated within WCSS activities that we will elaborate on in the 
upcoming sections.  
 
The low user engagement levels mostly indicate that WCSS hasn’t fully utilized all the potential 
that is embedded within and afforded by Facebook. Also, the striking differences between these 
indicators in contrast to the Women to Drive Facebook pages can be interpreted as a consequence of 
the different configuration of the two campaigns. The Women to Drive campaign began as a grassroots 
campaign that has depended on social media due to the limited presence of associational life in Saudi 
Arabia, where the legal system does not leave space for NGOs to operate outside state control.  
 
While there are few women-led NGOs in Saudi Arabia, these, for the most part, do not engage 
in the issue of women’s political and legal rights because of the difficulty of establishing independent 
organizations that address such issues freely. This vacuum, therefore, forced the media-savvy, young, 
educated generation to move online looking for alternatives. Social media has been utilized as an 
alternative locus of activism. The situation is entirely different in Kuwait, where the legal system 
accommodates an active associational life and lively civil society; women’s NGOs have emerged there 
since the 1960s. It is possible for Kuwaiti women’s NGOs such as WCSS to assign more value to 
coordinated behind-the-scenes advocacy work, rather than its being solely mediated over Facebook.  
 
A further in-depth examination of the administrators’ posts and users’ reactions towards them 
was made possible by Facebook’s default built-in classification of post types (links, status updates, 
photos, videos and events). Thus, when comparing the different types of posts used on the WCSS FB 
campaign page, we identified a number of significant variances, indicating that they have played 








Types of posts  
% of posts types 
Mean likes (SD) 
 
Mean comments (SD) 
 
Links 4.4  0.5  
(0.8)  
0  

























Table 6.5: Overview of the different post types made by page administrators in relation to the likes and 
comments they received 
 
Table 6.5 summarizes posting activity and the use of different post types over time. We can see 
that the official WCSS Facebook page received a total of 649 likes and 26 comments over the three-
year period. The median of likes for an individual Facebook post was 1.3, while the median for 
comments on a post was 0.05 with a standard deviation (SD) value of 1.4 and 0.24, respectively. The 
inclusion of photos was the most prominent type of post, as it comprised 81.3% of the overall 
composition of posts types. Photos received an average of 1.46 likes and 0.06 comments. This finding 
aligns with the statistical data that we computed in the Saudi case and falls in line with similar research 
results in the field of online communication that suggest the attachment of photos is an essential 
communicative action to make a message more powerful (Castells, 2009). 
 
Conversely, videos, status updates and links were much less frequently used on the page; they 
only constituted 7.6%, 6.7% and 4.4% of the overall content, respectively. Nevertheless, the level of 
user engagement for all these types of posts remained relatively weak, as there was little engagement in 
relation to users’ interactions with their content.  
 
6.6.2 Analyzing the Audience of WCSS Page  
Digital networking platforms attract a segmented, differentiated audience. Although it is potentially 
massive in terms of numbers, it is no longer a mass audience in terms of simultaneity and uniformity of 




sending a limited number of messages to a homogeneous mass audience. Because of the multiplicity of 
messages and sources, the audience itself becomes more selective. The targeted audience tends to 
choose its messages, deepening its segmentation (Nonikashvili, 2013). 
 
Audience segmentation is a process of identifying groups of people within a larger population 
who are homogeneous with regard to certain attributes (e.g. beliefs, behaviors, political ideology) that 
are most relevant to the objectives of a public engagement campaign (Slater, 1995). Thus, we can 
assume that the members of this Facebook page are individuals who support WCSS’s work and 
mission. At the time of collection of the data, the WCSS Facebook had 554 fans, a relatively modest 
scale. Moreover, the detailed breakdown of page followers per country was as expected: the largest 
proportion fans were based in Kuwait (28%), followed by Egypt (17%) and then Algeria (7%).  
 
So, the majority of the audience of the page turned out to be based in Arab countries, which is 
not surprising because the administrators of the page utilize mostly Arabic while communicating their 
messages out to the public. All countries that constituted 1% or less of the sample were aggregated in 









6.6.3 Conducting the Qualitative Content Analysis  
The question of how WCSS is using Facebook requires an analysis of the content it disseminates. A 
more exhaustive qualitative content analysis was employed as a systematic technique for analyzing 
written materials to better understand the communication processes and their implications (Budd, 
Thorp & Donohew, 1967). For each Facebook post, I have analyzed the text embedded in the posts and 








































in this instance) was the unit of analysis (Graneheim & Lundman, 2004), while the individual posts 
made by the administrators were the coding units.  
 
In total, I have repeatedly read all the retrieved 492 posts. As suggested by Crang and Cook 
(2007), I have used both pre-defined coding (derived from the theory) and open coding (derived 
inductively from the empirical material) in order to produce an analysis as comprehensible as possible. 
This technique was in line with the classification scheme developed by Qu, Wu and Wang (2009). The 
open coding was used to minimize the risk of missing important patterns. After the initial analysis, I re-
read each post to find new patterns and apply new codes derived from the first read of the material. The 
analysis revealed four relevant categories of posts explained by the other 11 subcategories and their 
traits. Hence, this process identified the following four broader categories of posts: information-related, 
activities-related, feminist-related and user engagement. The fifth category of tweets (others) was 
omitted in the analysis as it included heterogeneous posts not fitting in the other categories. The coded 
general classification scheme can be found in Appendix D. 
 
6.7 The Main Findings of the Qualitative Content Analysis 
The results of the qualitative content analysis (Table 6.6) display the detailed breakdown of the number 
of Facebook posts per general category, subcategory and their percentage. The Information-related 
category, which relies on the most basic functions of social media—the ability to share news stories 
and information with others—accounted for 18.1% of the overall content. It included posts that 




A- Information-related 18.1 
1- Providing information about WCSS  9.7 
2- Visiting delegations and collaborations 4.2 
3- WCSS in the media 4.2 
B- Activities-related  32.9 




2- Transnational activities 25.4 
C- Feminist-related 43.8 
1- Promoting full realization of women’s rights 13.6 
2- Capacity building and empowerment 11.2 
3- Nationality campaign 6.5 
4- Combating Violence against women 4.8 
5- Feminist critical posts 7.7 
D-Users engagement 1.6 
1- Occasional greetings 1.6 
E-Other 3.0 
Total posts  100.0 
(492) 
Table 6.6: Detailed breakdown of the number Facebook posts per post general category, sub-category and their 
percentage 
 
Nonetheless, as communication in this category is mostly informational-promotional, the posts 
were formal in nature. The posts concerned with disseminating current or historical information about 
WCSS comprised 9.7% of the collected data, while posts that concerned spreading information about 
the recent visiting delegations and collaborations accounted for 4.2%. The same goes for posts that 
provided links to external news stories about WCSS’s activities in local media outlets. 
 
The activities-related aggregate category comprised 32.9% of the overall content and contained 
posts that tackled the set of implemented programs and activities conducted by the WCSS aimed at the 
local Kuwaiti community (7.5%) or those that targeted the transnational arena (25.4%). For example, 
posts provided information about local initiatives such as spreading health awareness through lectures 
and symposiums, particularly ones related to women’s and children’s well being; launching 
countrywide awareness campaigns about breast cancer; founding Al-Bustan’s Nursery in 1998 with the 




The posts that concerned transnational action mentioned WCSS’s involvement with providing 
charitable activities and social services to the disadvantaged populations in Palestine, Syria and Sudan. 
Examples are manifested in posts that announced WCSS’s efforts in raising awareness about the 
Palestinian cause; supporting the occupied Palestinian territories by assisting long-term projects of an 
educational, health-oriented nature; and cooperating with projects to rehabilitate wounded and disabled 
Palestinians. Another example of transnational action is represented by the posts that mentioned 
WCSS’s organization of fundraising events for the victims of war in Syria and the provision of social 
services, such as the building of a village for disadvantaged people in Sudan. 
 
One of the main differences that set the Kuwaiti case apart from the Saudi case is that WCSS’s 
Facebook page did not involve any direct or indirect calls for action—either on-the-ground or online. 
Instead, it included the promotion of the actions that are carried out by WCSS. On the other hand, the 
fact that feminist-related posts as an aggregate category constituted the majority (43.8%) of the overall 
content implies that WCSS had a more explicitly feminist agenda than a service-providing women’s 
organization. Posts related to promoting women’s rights comprised 13.6% of the collected sample and 
mainly concentrated on mentioning the symposiums, training courses, workshops and regional 
conferences on women’s rights that WCSS held or was invited to. In addition, posts raised women’s 
awareness of their rights and opportunities in the arena of political rights, women’s status in 
employment, access to welfare and familial matters such as marriage and divorce. One such initiative 
“My Paper Project” (in Arabic, “Wraqati project”), was an initiative funded by United Nations 
Development Program and the Regional Bureau for the Arab States. It was later implemented by 
WCSS to address the deficit of legal knowledge by facilitating access to legal information through the 
use of ICTs.  
 
The women’s empowerment and capacity-building category comprised 11.2% of the overall 
content and included disseminating information about WCSS’s efforts in providing knowledge, 
techniques and tools for working women to develop their professional skills through the organization of 
workshops or seminars that specifically seek to enhance their professional capacities in work-related 
settings. Since I am particularity interested in the “Ensaf” campaign in this section and how it was 
mediated over Facebook. We found that only 32 posts (6.5%) explicitly mentioned WCSS’s efforts in 
carrying out the “Ensaf” over the three-year period, averaging 0.9 posts per month. Examples of such 
posts included coverage of WCSS activities in relation to the “Ensaf” campaign in the press and news 
about the meetings of the campaign representatives with state officials.  
 
The subcategory of posts that sought to combat violence against women made of 4.8% overall. 
These posts protested the lack of systematic data about this phenomenon and the inadequacy of laws 
concerning criminalizing domestic abuse and marital rape. The last subcategory included feminist 




a feminist perspective. Posts criticized the state’s apathetic approach towards granting women their full 
rights or the new proposed legislation to govern civil society organizations. This subcategory overall 
accounted for 7.7% of the total posts. Finally, posts that were classified under the users’-engagement 
subcategory included posts that contained occasional greetings from the Facebook page administrators 
to the page audience and accounted for 1.6% of the content. The “other” category (3%) included posts 
that did not belong to any other established categories, such as posts that promoted events conducted by 
WCSS’s allies.  
 
6.8 Reflections and Findings about WCSS's Use of Facebook 
Digital media can be an effective way of mobilizing individuals and promoting discussions and 
reflections around key topics while guiding target audiences to possible solutions. Yet, the qualitative 
content analysis revealed that WCSS has not entirely embraced the full capacities offered by the new 
social interaction technologies, as it did not manage to fully incorporate the interactive elements and 
two-way communication into its Facebook page.  
 
 Social media networks are potentially capable of exposing large audiences to messages, but 
much smaller numbers of people engage in activities. An even smaller number of people take concrete 
actions. WCSS’s use of Facebook resulted in a very limited reach and extremely restricted engagement. 
Speaking of the WCSS overall Facebook page content at a general level, there was no sign of WCSS 
attempts to reach out to its audience, ask questions, recruit new members or activists or involve the 
page supporters in active dialogues or online discussions—apart from a few posts that sought to greet 
the page-members during public holidays or occasions of celebration and one post that urges the 
followers to change their display pictures to show support for protecting women against violence. 
Using relational functions to develop online communities geared toward women’s issues may 
effectively promote contextual mechanisms to feminist action, specifically through developing a sense 
of community. Such was not the case with WCSS, as the low engagement level indicates that the 
majority of Facebook page members were mostly perceived as a passive audience with no intention of 
involving them in the NGO’s activities. 
 
It was difficult to measure involvement because WCSS provided little information on providing 
methods for Facebook fans to become active members and volunteers. Thus, I name a major part of 
group members as sympathizers, supporting WCSS’s activities just by liking their Facebook page. 
However, there is no sign of communicative involvement, as evidenced by the low number of 
comments. There is also no sign of antagonism from those standing in opposition to the movement’s 
values and beliefs. It appeared that WCSS was mainly concerned with creating a presence online, 
making people aware of its activities and promoting its events in pursuit of their social missions. It did 
not appear concerned with engaging and mobilizing the general public or their regular supporters to 




With regards to the ways in which the “Ensaf” campaign was mediated online on Facebook, it 
was observable that WCSS did not manage to transform its passive supporters into active participants 
among the wider public or target the general public to take part in the campaign activities. This 
conclusion was evidenced by the fact that the affordances of Facebook (such as likes, shares and 
events) were not used in a novel way to form e-tactics or mobilize and organize the supporters of the 
campaign into action. The administrators of the page rarely posted calls to action or encouraged their 
followers to take part in any offline activities; they did not even post summaries of the campaign, 
which would have been helpful in detailing the campaign evolution and success.  
 
The entire discourse of the campaign was promotional in nature and close-ended, without 
providing opportunities for substantive debates or engagement or to create an active community online 
around the campaign that feels ownership of it. Cox’s (2010) classic strategy of mobilizing a secondary 
audience (usually the public) to influence the primary audience (the decision-makers) remains a crucial 
element in campaigning and advocacy work. Nonetheless, through tracing the manifestations of the 
“Ensaf” campaign online, I haven’t found indications that WCSS used Facebook to mobilize the public 
or “secondary audience” in order to reach the primary audience.   
 
It seems that WCSS mainly used Facebook in a complementary way, say as a broadcasting 
network, to support a more traditional campaign pinned to traditional media, target addressees and on-
the-ground events. It was not a campaign that used Facebook and social media on either of these levels. 
This echoes the same results of previously conducted research: that although most NGOs have websites 
and engage with technologies such as social networking platforms, many organizations simply use the 
internet to enhance existing programs and activities. Organizations are far less likely than individual 
activists to undertake cutting-edge, creative activities that utilize the potential of new technologies 
(Kingston & Stam, 2013). 
 
Moreover, WCSS hasn’t provided its supporters with a space for individualized action as 
elaborated in Bennett and Segerberg’s (2012, 2011) ideas about how a more individualized society has 
changed the ways NGOs should work to engage the public: many (especially younger) people are not 
as keen on being members of organizations anymore, but instead want opportunities for individualized 
action with the freedom to choose which issues to engage in. Overall, the analysis reveals that WCSS 
used Facebook to inform and not to mobilize, as it did not capitalize on the interactive nature of 
Facebook. While reaching out to like-minded individuals, it did not give individual users a role in 
advocacy efforts or a dialogical platform to express their opinions. It used Facebook as a one-way 






6.9 The Discursive Construction of Feminism in the WCSS Facebook Page 
Because the majority of posts in the WCSS page were classified as feminist-related posts, this section 
is mainly concerned with shedding some light on the ways feminism has been discursively constructed 
within the page. While analyzing the content of the feminist-related posts, it was observed that the 
majority of posts under the women’s rights and feminist-critique category have (1) adopted a liberal 
feminist, rights-based discourse on gender equality; (2) referred to the rule of law and constitutional 
frames while advocating for a secular rule. These findings were not surprising because of WCSS’s long 
historical involvement within the Kuwaiti context as a liberal feminist organization that has an 
orientation quite different from that of the more conservative Islamist or tribalist associations. 
 
To begin with, it was noted throughout the collected materials that there is a pronounced 
tendency to use the human rights framework to promote the achievement of women’s rights in the 
interrelated areas of political, civil, economic, social and cultural rights. Moreover, posts that carried 
out a liberal feminist, rights-based discourse on gender equality rested on liberal notions of individuals, 
rights and representation by emphasizing the similarities between men and women rather than 
differences between them, while appealing to the state as the protector of individual rights. An example 
of such posts follows: 
 
            Justice, freedom, and equality are the pillars of today’s society. You are free to believe in 
whatever you want, but you don’t have the right to impose your beliefs on others. (The 
Women’s Cultural and Social Society, 2013) 
   
            Today marks the World Human Rights Day; an occasion celebrated annually around the world 
on December 10. This day has been chosen to honor the United Nations General Assembly 
resolution of December 10, 1948, on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was 
the first universal declaration of human rights. On this occasion and under the exceptional 
circumstances of the region and the world, we emphasize the moral and legal obligations of the 
international community towards the individual and collective rights guaranteed by the 
declaration, by which the state members of the United Nations have pledged to ensure that it is 
achieved in the face of continuing violations and discrimination that we are witnessing today. 
(The Women’s Cultural and Social Society, 2015) 
 
As we can see, the employment of the rights discourse serves a symbolic function as well as 
provides a powerful vocabulary for challenging wrongs. Feminist activists advocate for the extension 
of human rights because of the way they contribute to a culture in which justice is furthered as an ideal 
(Chinkin & Evans, 1998), but this goes with the assumption of the universality and neutrality of 




WCSS’s oppositional position towards a parliamentary proposal that sought to allocate monthly 
stipends to stay-at-home wives who don’t work outside of the home. The position taken by the WCSS 
towards this issue gives us an insight into how this organization ideologically views unpaid domestic 
work: that it is a private task allocated to women in the gendered division of labor of capitalism, which 
typically includes housework and childcare for women, that permeates multiple aspects of women’s 
lives (Parreñas & Boris, 2010). 
 
This issue also reflects feminism’s historically ambivalent and troubled relationship with 
domestic labor, which goes largely unseen, undervalued, unrecognized and unconsidered as work. The 
refusal of WCSS to consider state-sponsored compensation for domestic work stems from the premise 
adopted by the mainstream liberal strand of feminism that focuses on careerism. Compensation for 
domestic labor might disincentivize women from looking for jobs. Home-making further consolidates 
women’s confinement as well as subordination in the domestic sphere instead of pushing them to enter 
the “emancipatory” paid labor force. Without entering the paid labor force, they cannot become 
economic actors in their own right (Friedan, 1981). 
 
This also demonstrates that many women’s organizations have subscribed to the neoliberal 
economic logic, separating the household from commodity production while neglecting to consider 
domestic work as a labor process. The gendered division of labor in the home remains fundamentally 
unchallenged with no consideration that women continue to bear the burden of emotional labor and the 
care of the family to mitigate some of the pressures of the restructured, neoliberal economy. 
 
What can we deduce from this position is the lack of critique of the underlying gender 
relationships and class analysis when it comes to feminine domesticity, while women and their success 
are judged by male standards. A criticism that has been already raised in relation to the liberal strand of 
feminism is that it often supports neoliberal policies and the interests of a select group of elite women 
who predominantly belong to a middle and upper-class income level. Posts that referred to the rule of 
law and constitutional frames argued that women have a constitutional right to be treated equally with 
men according to the constitution and also aligned with the calls for a secular state that respects the 
democratic principles and the rule of law. This is manifest in the following extract: 
 
We respect the rule of law and we seek to change the non-constitutional laws. We envision 
Kuwait as a_secular and democratic state. (The Women’s Cultural and Social Society, 2013) 
 
We are part of a civil movement that believes in democracy and aims to: 




2. Promote active citizenship and democratic principles 
3. Raise awareness of rights and duties 
We are keen to protect freedom and democracy in our homeland. 
We envision Kuwait as a secular and democratic state.  
(The Women’s Cultural and Social Society, 2013) 
 
Democratic State Requirements: 
1. Well-managed governance. 
2. Respectful citizens and individuals. 
3. Clear separation of powers. 
4. Respected and fully implemented laws. 
5. Consciousness.  
(The Women’s Cultural and Social Society, 2013) 
 
The use of references to the constitution lends legitimacy to WCSS’s ideological positions and 
demands. Such posts transparently posed a strong critique of some of the Islamist members of 
parliaments who backed a bill to impose gender segregation in public universities. They also directed a 
critique to the Ministry of Justice, which publicized a recruitment call for the position of a legal 
researcher that explicitly required the candidates to be only males. WCSS has responded by stating that 
the recruitment call violates Article 29 of the Kuwaiti constitution and WCSS will do whatever it takes 
to restore justice to Kuwaiti women, including resorting to legal means.  
 
As with regards to examining WCSS’s position on intersectionality, apart from taking a liberal 
feminist approach to class and the issue of women’s participation in the labor force as discussed above, 
we found little data that would support our evaluation. I have managed to find some references to 
popular feminist figures such as American civil rights activist and poet Maya Angelou and Clare 
































This chapter dealt with analyzing the content of the Facebook pages that were specifically set up to 
mobilize for the driving campaign in Saudi Arabia, in order to shed some light on how these pages 
served as means for coordination, mobilization and feminist expression. An identical analysis with the 
Figure 6.21: WCSS and transnational figures (The Women’s Cultural and Social 





same aim in mind was carried out on the Facebook page of WCSS (that is the main women’s rights 
organization that launched the Ensaf campaign in Kuwait). This alternative strategy was pursued 
because there has not been any dedicated Facebook page that was specifically created for the Ensaf 
campaign per se.  
  
Using a qualitative content analysis of the individual posts by the administrators of the 
examined Facebook pages, the analysis revealed the multipurpose use of the embedded functionalities 
on Facebook which showed that the pages that were related to the driving campaign in Saudi Arabia 
have mainly served for spreading out feminist-related content as well as disseminating information. To 
elaborate, the qualitative analysis of the English-speaking WTD and the Arabic-speaking MRTD 
Facebook pages has indicated that both pages have converged on disseminating feminist-related 
content, as the majority of the coded posts have belonged to this aggregate category, which 
encompassed the sharing of general feminist-related news, featuring of news that highlight Saudi 
women’s achievements, providing an empowering and motivational content, as well as offering critical 
opinions from a feminist perspective. 
 
The analysis offered a great example of how Facebook can be used effectively to support a 
grassroots feminist campaign, enabled activists to expose their feminist viewpoints to the public and 
deconstruct the stereotypical image of Saudi Arabia. The findings also indicated that Facebook as a 
platform was pragmatically used as a low-cost channel for the circulation of information, through 
broadly reporting on events on the ground that could not pass print media filters, circulating articles 
that covered the campaign and feeding the information and videos to different media outlets, among 
others. While the exhaustive analysis of the content that was circulated by the WCSS’s Facebook page 
has shown that feminist-related posts as an aggregate category have constituted the majority of the 
overall coded content, which indicated that the WCSS had a more explicitly feminist agenda than 
merely being a service-providing women’s organization.  
  
It also emerged that the activities-related category contained posts that tackle the set of 
implemented programs and activities that were performed by the WCSS inside Kuwait or abroad. 
Furthermore, since I was particularity interested in  the “Ensaf” campaign and how it was mediated 
over Facebook, I found out that only a few posts (thirty-two to be exact) referred directly to the 
campaign. One of the main differences that sat the Kuwaiti case apart from the Saudi case in relation to 
the examined campaigns is that WCSS’ Facebook page have rarely posted calls of action or encouraged 
their followers to take part in any offline initiatives, or even posting summaries of the campaign, which 





It appeared that the WCSS Facebook page was primarily set up to promote its activities and 
events, rather than engaging and mobilizing the general public and their regular supporters, as it did not 
capitalize on the interactive nature of Facebook, as the entire discourse that related the campaign was 
close-ended and promotional in nature and there was not any attempt made by the WCSS reaching out 
to the audience, to ask questions, to recruit new members or activists, nor even to involve the page 
supporters in active dialogues about the campaign, apart from few posts that sought to occasionally 
greet the page-members during public holidays or occasions of celebration.  
  
Moreover, due to the fact that the majority of posts were coded as feminist-related, a further in-
depth qualitative content analysis was performed on them. Hence, I was interested in shedding some 
light on the ways feminism has been discursively constructed within these pages and to explore the 
multifaceted understanding of feminisms that are manifested over the relevant Facebook pages. What 
appeared from the analysis is the emergence of secular feminist discourse within the English-speaking 
WTD Facebook page, as evidenced by the posts that attempted to move away from Islamic 
references which are considered to be  responsible for restrictions on women’s lives, towards new 
forms of Saudi feminism that is based on the human-rights discourse inspired by the transnational flow 
of feminist ideas and politics which value women’s autonomy, emphasizing gender equality in all 
domains.  
  
Also, some attempts of demonstrating intersectional ties of feminist solidarity were relatively 
apparent in the page as exemplified by the posts that called for the protection of the domestic worker’s 
rights in the Arab Gulf and Lebanon and for abolishing discriminatory gender laws in Jordan. A 
different tendency was detected on the MRTD Facebook page, in which page administrators were more 
attentive to the tensions and changing meanings of “the secular” and “the religious” binary in terms of 
their frames of reference and the ways they intersect in the different modes of feminism. Many posts 
appeared to draw inspiration from Islam as a framework of reference and were open to the idea of 
reinterpreting and reconciling religious discourse about gender equality. Other posts emphasized on the 
often neglected point is that religious stipulations are not only mediated by cultural codes and customs 
which are often not actually rooted in religion per se, but are also, in most cases, subjectively 
interpreted by a male clergy who attribute misogynist tendencies to religion. 
  
These posts advocated for the necessity of reforming certain patriarchal claims and practices 
that were insinuated into Islam such as inheritance laws, the male guardianship system and men’s right 
to polygamy in order to counter conservative male interpretations and held Islam in its totality as a 
system that could accommodate women’s rights only if it was perceived and analyzed through the 
feminist lens. Meanwhile, the analysis of the feminist coded content of the Kuwait WCSS Facebook 
page revealed that the majority of posts had adopted a liberal feminist rights-based discourse to gender 




a secular rule. These findings were not surprising because of the WCSS long historical involvement 
within the Kuwaiti civil society sector as a liberal feminist organization that has an orientation that is 
quite different from that of the more conservative Islamist or tribalist associations. 
  
The posts that shared liberal feminist rights-based discourse to gender equality have referred to 
the liberal notions of individuals, rights by emphasizing the similarities between men and women rather 
than the perceived differences between them while the posts that referred to the rule of law and 
constitutional frames have argued that women have a constitutional right to be treated equally with men 
according to the constitution and also aligned with the calls for a secular state that respects the 
democratic principles and the rule of law. 
  
In essence, the findings demonstrate that feminism is not a phenomenon with a certain essence 
that is derived from an abstract model, rather it is a collective process of subjective constructions of 
meanings with uncertain outcomes that challenge the existing social order through gendered claims-
making and women-centered discourses. There was a great variety in the range of positions toward 
secularism and personal religiosity echoing by the different ways in which women shape their own 
version of feminism in a challenge to the patriarchal norms imposed on them in such complex settings 
where the secular and religious both intersect and diverge.  
  
Notwithstanding the particularities of national and cultural contexts, the analysis displayed great 
differences in terms of their vision of women’s roles the possibility of a new generation of feminists 
who seek to reconcile their feminism with faith-based politics, or work within secular frameworks to 
pursue self-reflexive engagement with these ideational approaches to feminism. This also confirmed 
the findings obtained in Chapter 2, which pointed out that women are empowered differently and 
cannot be taken as homogeneous collective affected by patriarchy in uniform ways and that Facebook 
was utilized to open up new spaces of feminist engagement, as it has provided previously excluded 
actors with the possibilities of engaging in the feminist scene and create counter-hegemonic discourses 




Chapter 7: The Manifestations of Feminist Activism on Twitter: Network- Centric Lenses 
 
During the earlier interviews that are documented in Chapter 4, many feminist activists stated that they 
heavily used Twitter in their mobilization activities to disseminate information and connect with each 
other. Activists genuinely believed this micro-blogging platform was a site for feminist solidarity, 
bridging discourse and drawing supporters from across all divides. However, relying only on activists’ 
accounts is not sufficient to reach solid and rigorous research findings; just because someone states that 
they used Twitter and that Twitter is a significant platform does not necessarily make it so. Thus, as 
informed by my relational theoretical framework— which pays equal attention to the agency of actors, 
discourse and network—here I seek to validate and strengthen the findings that I obtained in Chapter 4 
in relation to activists’ understanding and use of Twitter. 
 
By drawing on network theories and social movement theories, this chapter seeks to adopt a 
network-centric perspective to shed some light on the deployment of Twitter by feminist activists and 
organizations in the context of campaigns that took place in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. To do so, I will 
be mainly concerned with making sense of the embeddedness of the most active Twitter users in the 
relational context of the campaigns to answer the following research questions: (1) What are the central 
hubs in the Twitter networks of the campaigns in the earliest months of mobilization? And (2) What is 
the content that is being disseminated by the Twitter accounts that claim to be representative of the 
campaign? 
 
I will answer the first research question by mapping out the general structure of the online 
Twitter network that revolved around the identified campaigns to recognize the focal nodes that have 
been active in this mobilization process and uncover important features of the movement’s composition 
and communication patterns. Viewing the elements of social movements as components of a network 
can provide us with valuable insights not obtainable in any other way. Social network maps provide 
overviews of social spaces, highlighting subgroups and individuals that hold important positions within 
the network and capturing insights about their roles. 
 
Contemporary collective action dynamics are often manifested by individuals alongside 
organizational actors. By focusing on the positions and the attributes of nodes, it is possible to analyze 
how and how much personal agency is taking place in this sense. Thus, an evaluation of nodes’ 
prominence, the level at which an actor is involved in relationships with others, can help us to detect 
which actors are more central than others in the online relational context and whether they are single 





To address this particular question, this chapter will seek to connect social movement concepts 
with network centrality measures to provide a clearer picture of movements in the digital era. It will 
also identify the prominent users who are important to the core of the network and those who are in 
influential positions to disseminate content to a wide audience and community of Twitter users. I will 
answer the second research question by analyzing the content produced and circulated in the Twitter 
accounts that identified themselves as the official or organizational accounts of the campaign to gain a 
better understanding of their interaction with other activists, news media and the public. 
 
I intend to show how certain accounts on Twitter used tweets as the building blocks for 
connectivity—constructed, thematically linked networked action in 140 characters or less. I will also 
show how the content was utilized in the networked exchanges that took place, contributing to the 
literature concerning the structure and content of the Twitter-based networks in relation to feminist 
activism. Compared to the overall contribution of network approaches to the study of activism in 
general, this method can provide a balance between depth and breadth in the examination of activism 
over Twitter. Referring to networks provides us with clues to assess the social location of key actors 
and identify the general structural patterns from a relational perspective. Moreover, the content and 
social media linked in tweets revealed a sample of the organizational dynamics and information sources 
pertinent to particular movement ecology. 
 
 7.1 Twitter: A Particular Social Media Platform  
Twitter is a relatively recent social networking platform, released in 2006 as a micro-blogging site that 
would allow individuals to post short text updates of 140 characters or less to a network of others. The 
number of characters was later increased to 280. It has a directed “following” model, a form of 
subscription to others' Twitter messages. If user A is “following” user B, user B does not have to 
follow user A. This differentiates Twitter from other networking platforms, making it less prone to 
capturing pre-existing ties but instead enforcing bi-directionality (Takhteyev, Gruzd & Wellman, 
2012). 
 
This model makes Twitter more akin to blogs, where the costs of establishing a unidirectional 
tie by becoming a reader is similarly low; yet, “unlike the weak ties between bloggers and their readers, 
which most often stay invisible, Twitter ties can be easily observed and analyzed” (Takhteyev et al., 
2012, p. 74). The interactions take place in real-time, allowing users from across the world to post and 
exchange written and multimedia content through private and public messages. The types of tweets 
also carry different meanings. Tweets are messages that a user posts on his or her timeline. Retweets 
use to the forwarding function for distributing messages. Replies, on the other hand, are “markers of 
addressivity,” as they demonstrate a specific level of interest in notifying a response to a 





Mentions occur when a specific Twitter user is mentioned within the tweet by using the @user 
syntax. Hence, mentions and replies can be considered the most “intense” social relations because they 
denote specific attention to a particular Twitter user (Pavan, 2013, p.12). The content of a tweet 
typically contains text and hashtags. A hashtag is a keyword designated by a “hash” symbol (#) 
assigned to the information that describes a tweet and aids in searching (e.g. #Women2drive). The 
practice of using keywords to label tweets most likely parallels the use of “tags” to freely categorize 
web content or blogs; the inclusion of hashtags fulfills an organizational function to organize the 
discussions around certain topics or events (Kortuem, Kawsar, Sundramoorthy & Fitton, 2009). 
 
Hashtags can enlarge a message’s potential audience beyond the network of followers to a 
community of users interested in a topic or event. Tweets containing hashtags not only provide a 
macro-level of visibility for aggregated communication, but also define and identify an intended 
audience for communicative action because they can be searched for via open, searchable interface. 
Contrary to the “members-only” access to profiles that other digital platforms like Facebook permit, 
tweets are generally available to the public unless the individual user opts to set up a private, protected 
Twitter account (Boyd, Golder & Lotan, 2010). With such unique features, including effortless 
accessibility, Twitter generates massive amounts of data, up to 500 million tweets per day from 330 
million average active monthly users (Internet Live Stats, 2018). 
 
Thus, unsurprisingly, the volume of users, tweets and hashtags have made Twitter a favorable 
platform for quantitative and qualitative data analysis and academic research because it allows us to 
capture and analyze information flows, communicative practices and behavioral patterns of exchange. 
For instance, in a prior study of Twitter, Krishnamurthy and colleagues (2008) gathered data on nearly 
100,000 users to create a categorization of Twitter users, classifying them into broadcasters, 
acquaintances and evangelists based on the ratio of following-to-follower. Similarly, Java et al. (2007) 
used a sample of 1.3 million tweets from 100,000s of users to pinpoint the reasons why people use 
Twitter; they summarized uses as information sharing, information seeking and relationship building. 
 
Topics of discussion on Twitter can range from daily life updates and personal interests to links 
to current events and news stories. In fact, a study done in 2010 showed that more than 85% of popular 
topics mentioned on Twitter are headline news (Kwak, Lee, Park & Moon, 2010). Chew and 
Eysenbach (2010) found that news websites were the links most commonly shared among users. 
 
7.2 Twitter Usage by Activists and Organizations  
With hashtags and trending topics, Twitter has not only gained new functionalities, but became a 
popular organizing and communication platform for activists and concerned organizations alike. 




in 2009 (Mungiu-Pippidi & Munteanu, 2009), the Tunisian revolution of 2011 (Zuckerman, 2011), the 
Egyptian uprising (Attia, Aziz, Friedman & Elhusseiny, 2011) and the Occupy protests that took place 
in multiple cities around the globe (Tremayne, 2014). 
 
The exponential growth in Twitter’s popularity has been paralleled by increasing attention from 
a wide range of scholars. Extensive literature has discussed the added value of Twitter for social 
movements participants (Earl & Kimport, 2011; Shirky, 2008). A number of empirical studies explored 
the role of Twitter among activist communities (Penney & Dadas, 2014). It has been studied for its role 
in disseminating news (Bruns & Burgess, 2012), real-time logistical coordination in the Arab Spring 
(Lotan et al., 2011) and communicative possibilities as a facilitator in organizing crowds (Bennett and 
Segerberg, 2013). 
 
Lotan and his colleagues (2011) state that both the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions featured 
the prominent use of social media and Twitter, particularly by activists organizing the marches and by 
those disseminating news of the events locally and globally. Similarly, Howard et al. (2011) argue that 
the usage of Twitter in these uprisings has informed political discourse and preceded revolutionary 
events on the ground. In the same vein, Meraz and Papacharissi (2013) point out that Twitter allows 
decentralized actors to engage in horizontal conversational practices while enabling crowds to create 
their own thematic categories through hashtags to organize the conversation around specific themes or 
keywords (e.g. #ows, #15M and #greenrevolution). Penney and Dadas (2014) demonstrate in their 
qualitative study of Occupy Wall Street protesters that content circulation via Twitter was highly 
significant in enabling the widespread creation of counter-publics that can be critical of the power 
structures outside the mainstream media. 
 
In his analysis of network power, Castells theorizes that activist hashtags act in a similar way as 
occupied spaces have traditionally worked for social movements. He argues that they create a public 
space for deliberation “which ultimately becomes a political space, a space for sovereign assemblies to 
meet and to recover their rights of representation” (2012, p.11). When it comes to feminist movements, 
the work of Bear (2016) marks the emergence of hashtag feminism in relation to Twitter actions of 
#YesAllWomen, which is concerned with the digital sharing and storytelling of encountered examples 
of misogyny and violence against women. Peuchaud (2014) points out that feminists in Egypt use 
Twitter to report specific details and locations to map the extent of experienced sexual harassment. 
 
Overall, research shows that Twitter has been a significant political communication platform 
with diverse functions for communication, conversation and information distribution during diverse 
mobilizations (Lotan et al., 2011). Although the extent to which Twitter has benefited social 




(Howard 2010; Morozov 2011), only a few studies have provided empirical analyses of the 
fundamental changes in movement dynamics due to the use of Twitter (e.g., Bennett and Segerberg, 
2013; Earl et al. 2013). 
 
When it comes to the deployment of Twitter by organizations, recent research has begun to 
explore organizations’ digital media use of the inherent interactive features that networking platforms 
offer. Greenberg and MacAulay (2009) analyze Canadian environmental organizations’ use of the 
internet, including Twitter and demonstrate that the majority of them capitalize on the potential these 
platforms afford. Other relevant research on the deployment of organizations to Twitter is done by 
Lovejoy and Saxton (2012). The research Twitter use among the large nonprofits in the United States 
and point out that the platform was used as a one-way communication medium to enable networking 
and inform the stakeholders about their activities; Twitter was hardly utilized for engagement purposes, 
as only a small percentage of the tweets generated some form of conversation and engagement with 
stakeholders. Similarly, Waters and Jamal’s (2011) work on public communication of non-profit 
organizations on Twitter concluded that such organizations tended to deploy Twitter to broadcast 
information rather than build relationships. Guo and Saxton’s (2014) findings reveal that, although  
Twitter was a powerful communication tool for information dissemination, it was less prevalent in its 
role as a mobilization tool. Organizations’ tweets were being instrumentalized to publicize public 
events, direct action and facilitate grassroots lobbying less frequently than might be expected. 
 
Concerning feminist organizations, Fotopoulou (2016) researched the Women’s Resource 
Centre, a leading UK-based national umbrella organization for women’s charities. She claimed that 
Twitter proved to be significant for the WRC in multiple ways, especially when it came down to 
locating available funding opportunities and recruiting new members. Thus, empirical studies that have 
been conducted in relation to organizations’ use of Twitter have yielded mixed results, yet many of 
them acknowledged its important contribution to the failure of organizations as compared to individual 
activists to undertake cutting edge, creative activities that utilized the full capabilities and dialogic 
potentials of Twitter (Kim, Abels & Yang, 2012). 
 
7.3 Twitter in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
As already indicated in Chapter 4, the trend of finding refuge in social media platforms in Saudi Arabia 
is coupled with a high internet penetration rate—up to 80% of the country’s 32.9 million people 
(Freedom House, 2018). The usage of Twitter has flourished in Saudi Arabia despite it being monitored 
and censored (Noman, Faris & Kelly, 2016). While Twitter users constitute a fraction of the social 
media population, a 2015 study showed that 5.4 million Saudi Arabians use Twitter, generating an 
average of over 210 million tweets a month (The Social Clinic, 2015). Saudis also account for 29% of 
active Twitter users across the Arab world and are responsible for posting more than 32% of the overall 




Kuwait also ranks highly in terms of Twitter penetration in the MENA region. Aladwani (2015) 
cited statistics that Kuwaitis constitute 30% of all Arab Twitter messages, despite making up less than 
1% of the population of the MENA region. Kuwaitis have been the most active producers and 
consumers of Twitter content, posting an average 4.2 million tweets daily, the largest average of tweets 
per day in the region by a relatively wide margin (Salem, 2017). 
 
Concerning the demographics in the Saudi case, it has been reported that 51% of Twitter users 
are female and the majority of them are young (50% aged 18–34 and 23% aged 34–55) (The Social 
Clinic, 2015). Salem (2017), who analyzed the gender breakdown of active Twitter users, stated that 
men had outnumbered women on Twitter by 67% percentage points as for 2016. The Saudi government 
has acknowledged the widespread use of Twitter; many different official entities have started utilizing 
Twitter to speak directly to citizens and become more efficient and transparent (Alasem, 2015). The 
present ruler, King Salman, acquired a Twitter account in 2015, making him the first Saudi Arabian 
ruler to speak to his populace directly through digital media (Jones and Omran, 2015). Similarly, many 
media organizations, religious preachers, journalists and politicians have also shifted to Twitter to 
communicate with the public (Noman et al., 2015). 
 
Concerning Kuwait, Miller and Ko (2015) reported that Twitter had emerged as an integral part 
of the political scene. They investigated the wide usage of Twitter by Kuwaiti Members of Parliament 
starting from the 2012 parliamentary election and concluded that Twitter was used as an engagement 
medium rather than as an information-sharing platform between parliamentary candidates and their 
electorate. Similarly, Al-Sumait (2014) examined Kuwait's political actors’ attitudes towards Twitter 
adoption and found that it could help to augment communicative channels and create new venues for 
reaching the electorate. Furthermore, he emphasized that the fragmented nature of the opposition 
groups in the Kuwaiti political scene paradoxically allows significant openings for political discussion 
on Twitter; as the political battles are mostly among different factions and “rarely pose a direct threat to 
the monarchy itself” (p.12). 
 
The growth of Twitter in the Gulf States has inspired many to seek explanations for its 
widespread adoption. One crowd-sourced attempt took place on Twitter itself to answer this question, 
which used the hashtag #Why_did_Twitter_succeed_in_Saudi_Arabia and the hashtag’s Arabic 
equivalent. BBC trending (BBC Trending, 2014), a blog that monitors trending hashtags on Twitter, 
mentioned some of the answers that responded to the hashtag which included the ability for users to 
state on Twitter what they cannot say offline for fear of repression and the idea that Twitter is a 
democratic tool. Many have stated that Saudi Twitter users engage in conversations that would not 
have taken place publicly in the past. Unprecedented open criticism of the Saudi regime, as well as the 





Noman et al. (2015) argued that Twitter, along with Facebook, has replaced blogging as the 
main venue for Saudis for pubic discussions and facilitated opening up public space to engage in 
political and social discourse in a country that heavily restricts political speech, civic engagement and 
media freedom. The distinctive features of Twitter have also allowed it to serve as a unique discursive 
arena in which women can articulate their discontent about the status quo, particularly the restriction of 
movement that arises from being banned from driving and other practices that constrain them (Agarwal 
et al., 2015). 
 
In the same vein, it appears that Twitter's use has risen considerably in Kuwait. A sizeable 
proportion of the population has referred to Twitter as a platform for initiating political discourses 
(Aladwani, 2015), an essential source of news and a generator of public opinion in Kuwait after the 
Arab Spring (Kareem, 2012). Others stated that Twitter also became a space for Kuwaiti women to 
express their views regarding political, social and religious matters (Dashti, Al-Abdullah & Johar, 
2015). 
 
7.4 Method: Social Networking Analysis  
Following the dual focus of this chapter, I rely on two sets of complementary methods, a Social 
Network Analysis of Twitter data and a Qualitative Content Analysis. Social Network Analysis (SNA) 
has emerged as a key technique geared towards the analysis of social structures and investigation of 
their relational aspects (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Relational aspects have historically been an overly 
esoteric research topic performed only by professionals in highly specialized areas such as intelligence 
analysis. 
 
SNA is defined as “the application of the broader field of network science to the study of 
human relationships and connections” (Hansen et al., 2011, p. 4). It is a quantitative analytical method 
that traces the set of social relations among a group of actors representing individuals, groups, 
organizations, etc. and who assume a varying degree of influence. Growing interest and increased use 
of Social Networking Analysis has formed a consensus about the central principles underlying the 
network perspective. Graphically, nodes represent the involved actors, while edges mirror the 
relationships among them. Conceptually speaking, nodes can represent many things, including people, 
organizations and websites, while edges can depict friendship ties, follow relationships, hyperlinks or 
even e-mail exchanges. 
 
As individuals and organizations send mentions, retweets and replies, they create networks of 
information flow. SNA makes visible the otherwise invisible patterns of interaction to identify 
important nodes that are behind the exchange process (Cross, Parker, Prusak & Borgatti, 2003). Two 




actor and a set of alters who have ties to the ego surrounding it as well as full-scale networks that 
consist of relational ties among the actors. Within network analysis, once can calculate different 
measures of centrality, in which each centrality measure provides a different perspective on how 
important (central) a node or actor is within a specific network. Network metrics such as in-/out-
degree, betweenness, closeness and eigenvector centrality provide mathematically precise metrics for 
identifying important nodes based on network position (Borgatti, 2005). 
 
For instance, in-degree centrality calculates the number of incoming ties (Jalali, Mohammad & 
Park, 2017) that reflect the number of mentions and replies received by a particular node in this 
network. A higher score means that the particular node is popular because it is frequently mentioned 
and replied to by other nodes in the network, which typically signifies importance in a network 
(Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). Out-degree centrality indicates a node's connection to other nodes via 
tweets. The nodes that send tweets to many unique users will score highly on this particular measure. 
 
Betweenness centrality, on the other hand, calculates the likelihood of a particular node to act as 
a bridge between two other nodes. It refers to how often a node lies on the shortest path between any 
two interacting nodes in the network. Users who rank highly on betweenness centrality have the 
potential to influence others near them in a network (Friedkin, 1991). This influence may occur through 
direct or indirect pathways by facilitating, hindering or even transforming the form of communication 
between others (Newman, 2003). This framework is significant in understanding how influence flows 
through networks. Finally, Eigenvector centrality is a measure of the importance of a node in a network 
that assigns particular scores to all nodes based on the principle that being closest to high-scoring nodes 
contributes more to the score of the node in question than equal connections to low-scoring nodes 
(Stoddart & Tindall, 2010). 
 
7.4.1 Data Collection and the Visualization of the Twitter-based Network  
I first collected historical tweets using a Python script that was obtained from Github 
(https://github.com/Jefferson-Henrique/GetOldTweets-python) that was specifically written by 
Jefferson Henrique to obtain historical Twitter data. Accordingly, 74,766 Twitter messages were 
retrieved with their associated metadata; these tweets were under the #Women2Drive hashtag. The 
dataset included original tweets, replies and mentions from the period that coincided with the beginning 
of the mobilization in May 2011 until the end of December 2011. Table 7.1 illustrates the 







Type of tweet Percentage 








Table 7.1: The composition of retrieved tweets 
 
The network was created by 22,009 users who included the hashtag #Women2Drive in their 
tweets and 32,415 social ties (mentions, replies and retweets). The specific hashtag was chosen because 
it is one of the most active and prominently used hashtags that were included in both Arabic and 
English tweets. Once the tweets were retrieved, they were stored in a database in CSV format to be 
available for further analysis. To answer the first research question, the data was imported into 
NodeXL, a free and open-source network analysis and visualization software package that works with 
Twitter API. To make sense of the rich and complex dataset, I chose to employ social network mapping 
techniques to analyze the profiles of the core users who contributed to the #Women2drive Twitter-
based network. 
 
To visualize the network, a Harel-Koren fast multiscale graph was generated to get an overview 
of the entire network and to locate the position of influential nodes. A cluster using the Clauset-
Newman-Moore algorithm was also used to get a clearer picture of the density and shape of the cluster 
to which these influential nodes belonged. The network was directed, meaning that each link had a 
direction. It consisted of 22,009 nodes (i.e. unique accounts that tweeted the hashtag) along with 32,415 
distinct interactions among them as represented by the edges in addition to 42,351 duplicate 
connections. Edges in this context refer to the number of interactions between nodes within the network 
of Twitter users who are including the hashtag #Women2Drive. These interactions can be categorized 
into three different relationship types: mentioning, replying to a tweet and retweeting established 
content. 
 
Three network-level metrics are indicators of information flow characteristics that cover the 
density, modularity and centralization of the network. Network density captures the interconnectivity of 
individuals in a network and is represented as a ratio of the number of links present to the maximum 
number of links possible (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Density values can fall between 0 and 1 (Hansen 
et al., 2011). The extent to which a network is densely interconnected affects the rate of information 
flow within it. Carley (1991) demonstrated that interactions between individuals lead to shared 




implications for the stability of a group and its interactions with individuals outside its boundaries. 
Granovetter (1973) also noted that tightly interconnected individuals are typically connected by strong 
ties. Similarly, Coleman (1994) demonstrated that an important outcome of strongly embedded 
relationships is an increase in trust between individuals, which can lead to increased information 
transfer. The calculation of the density value shows us that the #Women2Drive network has a 0.126 
density value, indicating an extremely low density. Modularity, on the other hand, evaluates the quality 
of the divisions imposed on the network. Modularity values range between 0 and 1. The higher the 
modularity value, the more distinct or separated the clusters are; that is, the clusters are less 
interconnected. Thus, the modularity value of our network is 0.203, indicating low separation among 
clusters. 
 
Number of Nodes 22009 
Edges (unique) 28367 
Edges with weight >1 46399 
Total edges 74766 
Self loop 42351 
Reciprocated Vertex Pair Ratio 0.011 
Reciprocated Edge Ratio 0.022 
Density 0.125 
Modularity 0.203 
Table 7.2: Network’s overall metrics 
 
Furthermore, an evaluation of nodes’ centrality and more precisely of their in-degree, out-
degree and betweenness centrality measures (Borgatti, Everett & Freeman, 2002) can help us to 
identify who most involved in the network and thus has more prestige (Knoke & Burt, 1983). Indeed, 
as edges in our network are a mix of mentions, replies and retweets, actors who receive more ties will 
also be those who attract other nodes’ attention to a larger extent (Barash & Golder, 2010), hence 
displaying a higher communicative potential (Pavan, 2014). 
 
I have opted to adopt the in-degree centrality measure to indicate the unique or almost unique 
position of the central nodes in the #Women2Drive network and assess their contribution in order to 
answer the first research question at hand. Thus, Table 7.3 represents the top 30 accounts and their 










Manal_alsharif 516 Saudi feminist activist 
W2Drive 423 Online organizational account for the campaign 
Mashable 295 Online media website 
Monaeltahawy 243 International feminist activist 
Khulouds 231 Saudi feminist activist 
Ahmed 222 Saudi journalist 
Abualkhair 219 Saudi human rights activist 
Saudiwoman 204 Saudi feminist activist 
Ana3rabeya 152 Saudi feminist activist 
Essamz 146 Saudi journalist 
Hariri65 136 Saudi feminist activist 
RashaAlduwisi 123 Saudi feminist activist 
Free__Manal 122 Online organizational account for the campaign 
Maialshareef 117 Saudi feminist activist 
Azizayousef 109 Saudi feminist activist 
Maysaaamoudi 102 Saudi feminist activist 
WaleedALSaedi 97 Individual 
Shugairi 95 Saudi public figure 
CarlosLatuff 95 Political cartoonist 
Dima_Khatib 80 International journalist 
Maha1410 71 Saudi feminist activist 
Safarzo 70 Saudi feminist activist 
Fouzabd 65 Saudi feminist activist 
Balooot 63 Individual 
SultanAlQassemi 57 Emirati journalist 
TurkiAldakhil 55 Saudi journalist 
Guardian 51 British newspaper 
Acarvin 49 American journalist 
Omar9944 44 Individual 
Alarabiya 42 Saudi television channel 













Figure 7.1 visualizes the structure of the core of the #Women2Drive Twitter network, depicting 
30 core users, with the edges representing the replying to, mentioning and retweeting relationships 
among them and node size representing the levels of in-degree centrality, that is, the number of 
''mentions'' and ''replies to'' the users received. Due to the fact that being mentioned and replied to has 
been widely considered in the network analysis literature as a rough indicator of influence. 
Accordingly, the more frequently a participant was targeted by others via mention or reply to, the more 
central and the important the position that he or she takes (Xu, Sang, Blasiola & Park, 2014). 
 
The figure demonstrates that a few users are most connected and the nodes are not necessarily 
well connected to each other. Accordingly, among actors with the highest value for in-degree centrality 
as measured by the number of mentions and replies to received, I found Manal al-Sharif, who is the 
activist who started the driving campaign in 2011, was mainly responsible for disseminating campaign-
related content on Twitter. The next highest in-degree centrality was that of  the official Twitter 
account of the “Women to Drive” campaign “@W2Drive.” Other accounts that had high in-degree 
values included the account of the digital media website Mashable, which was frequently referred to 
during the campaign due to its extensive coverage of Women to Drive. Nevertheless, it was apparent 
throughout the visualization that this account did not engage in any replying to or mentioning 
relationships with the other core actors in the network. Its silence is not surprising due to its 
professional status as a reporting account that is mainly responsible for reporting news. 
 
The core of the network was also occupied by the prominent Egyptian-American feminist and 
journalist Mona Eltahawy, with a 243 in-degree value, followed by the account of the Saudi feminist 
activist Kholoud Saleh al-Fahed, who defied the driving ban. Other actors with high in-degree 
centrality measures included the Saudi journalist of The Financial Times Ahmed Al-Omran (@ahmed) 
with 222 references and Waleed Abualkhair (@abualkhair), a Saudi Arabian lawyer and human rights 
activist who is currently serving a 15-year prison term after being arrested in 2014. 
 
The account of the Saudi feminist activist Eman Alnafjan (@saudiwoman), the author of the 
Saudiwoman's blog followed. Alnafjan has also been in jail since May 25, 2018, due to her feminist 
activism. Nora Doaiji (@Ana3rabeya) is a Saudi feminist and researcher at Harvard University. Other 
key actors also included Essam al-Zamel (@essamz), who is jailed since September 2017, followed by 
the account of the Saudi feminist activist Najla Hariri (@hariri65) and @Free__Manal, an online 






Four additional accounts that belong to Saudi feminist activists were also included in the core of 
the network and belonged to Mai AlShareef; Aziza al-Yousef, a veteran women’s rights advocate who 
was also detained on May 15, 2018; Maysaa al-Amoudi and Rasha al-Duwisi. The Twitter account of 
Waleed al-Saedi belongs to an individual whose Twitter bio testifies that he is a Saudi national who is 
interested in politics and literature. He was also found within the network, followed by Ahmad al-
Shugairi, a Saudi media figure. It is also noticeable that this particular account did not make any 
relationships with the central actors surrounding it. Carlos Latuff CarlosLatuff, a Brazilian political 
cartoonist was also included in the network. In the 20th position was the account of Dima Khatib 
(@Dima_Khatib), a Syrian journalist who is currently the Managing Director of AJ+, award-winning 
digital news launched by Al Jazeera Media Network. 
 
What are the characteristics of these prominent nodes? And do they share some traits in 
common? The SNA revealed that a diverse set of actors have been actively engaged in the 
#Women2Drive network; about 10 out of the 20 actors who occupied a central position in the core 
network were feminist activists. The rest assumed different social and professional roles including 
human rights activism, journalism. Others simply shared a common interest in relation to human rights 
and women's activism. The diversity of the profiles of involved actors also indicated that some of the 
accounts were completely devoted to the campaign and that they can be referred to as true “issue-
professionals,” exemplified by the Twitter accounts that are specifically set up for the campaign, 
@Women2Drive and @ Free__Manal. The geographic distribution of this network hinted to the 
presence of a transnational dimension to the campaign. These high in-degree nodes were not only 
concentrated in Saudi Arabia, but in different geographic locations. This finding resonates with 
previous research that indicated that Twitter allows the formation of networked information flow and 
engagement within diasporic publics (Papacharissi and de Fatima Oliveira, 2012). 
 
What was also notable was men’s participation in the core of the network. Their inclusion 
indicates that the driving issue was not exclusively portrayed as a women's issue that would solely 
benefit women. This finding also problematizes the notion that men are often seen as a monolithic 
group that would directly benefit from the inequality at hand and therefore are reluctant to change the 
status quo. It is worth mentioning that removing peripheral and less prominent accounts may reduce the 
range of views and ideas represented in the map. The communities discussed above are not necessarily 
inclusive or representative of the entire #Women2Drive discursive network. Alternative points of view 
of less prominent accounts may not be captured in this chapter. However, I do not believe that this 
omission detracts in anyway from the analysis and observations in this chapter, which focuses 
primarily on the key actors in the core of the network and their intense interactions. 
 
One might raise the question, though, if centrality in the network is connected to the quality of 




approach in looking at retweets, which can provide useful insights. In this sense, the number of 
retweets can be thought of as a proxy for the quality of the content (Barash and Golder, 2011). Figure 
7.2 visualizes the same Twitter network by the in-degree value in relation to the retweet rate. The size 
of each node is reflective of the in-degree value, while nodes’ color corresponds to the number of 
retweets on a scale from black (fewer retweets) to red (more retweets). The location of each node 
relative to the others is based on the interaction decisions of all of the nodes in the network. In this way, 
one can think of the map as a picture of the pattern of influence and information flow in the network. 
 
By the frequency rate of retweeted central nodes, we can observe that central nodes are more 
often retweeted in comparison to others. In this sense, their influential position seems to be connected 








Figure 7.3: The Women2Drive twitter network, nodes are representations proportional to in-degree and 
number of retweets (created with NodeXL) 
 
While investigating the Kuwaiti Twittersphere and the Twitter accounts of the organizations 
and the actors who are involved in the “Ensaf” campaign, it was noted that there was not any use of 
hashtag related data that referred to the campaign at any way. Hence, I could not find any equivalence 
to the #Women2Drive hashtag in the Kuwaiti case, which was unfortunate since this poses challenges 
to the symmetry of this comparative study. I will later elaborate in the limitations section of my 
conclusion. 
 
Upon reflecting on this matter and the overall mode of organizations for both campaigns as 
discussed in Chapter 4, I accepted that the Saudi case is peculiar since it is a loosely, digital- based 
campaign to a large extent. Hashtagging offered an easy and inexpensive way for activists, particularly 
those who lack voices in mainstream media, to draw attention to issues they deem as important. The 
absence of campaign-related hashtag data in the Kuwaiti campaign is a finding in itself that points to 




towards the deployment of hashtags in this context. Also, I also sought to compensate for the lack of 
data in this particular section by conducting a Qualitative Content Analysis on the tweets of the 
accounts that were associated with the campaign for each of the Saudi and Kuwaiti cases. 
7.4.2 Qualitative Content Analysis  
Content analysis is a systematic, step-by-step procedure for examining information and content in 
written, spoken or audio-visual format (Neuman, 1997). It is widely considered as a methodological 
approach within which various approaches of textual and non-textual analyses can be applied. Content 
analysis can be used to identify, enumerate and analyze the occurrences of specific words, phrases or 
other meaningful patterns embedded in texts. By interpreting the frequency distributions and co-
occurrences of the single analytical units, this methodological approach allows for systematically 
drawing valid conclusions from data to the context of their use (Krippendorff, 2004). It therefore 
generates results that are valid, rigorous, reliable and replicable (Sampert & Trimble, 2010). 
 
This method can be conducted either in a qualitative or quantitative manner—although 
combinations of both are possible—where quantitative content analysis typically involves “systematic, 
objective, quantitative analysis of message characteristics” (Neuendorf, 2002, p. 1). Qualitative 
approaches to content analysis require a close reading of textual materials and the reticulation 
(interpretation) of given texts into new (analytical deconstructive, emancipatory, or critical) narratives 
accepted within particular scholarly communities. Consequently, the results that emerge from both 
approaches often take the form of frequency counts or categorized content or even typologies identified 
in the content. 
 
Anderson and Kanuka (2003) pointed out that content analysis is an appropriate method for 
online research. Given the type and amount of material available on Twitter, content analysis can 
provide an effective way to describe and summarize the content because it allows organizing the 
scattered information stream in a meaningful way and making inferences about the content at hand. The 
manner in which content analysis is applied can be as versatile as the versatility of the available 
methodological procedures. For example, the metrics of tweets can be evaluated by analyzing how 
many replies two particular accounts exchanged within a certain hashtag-based discourse or the most 
frequent phrases used by a certain cluster of users in the dataset. Qualitative Content Analysis can 
break down the linguistic features of discourses on Twitter. Using it, one might also be able to compare 
the topics that emerge on Twitter and the types of users who discuss similar or diverging topics. 
 
Taking these possibilities and the research questions that I previously identified into 
consideration, I opted for qualitative content analysis. Hsieh and Shannon (2005) categorized 
qualitative content analysis (CA) into three distinct approaches: conventional CA or the “inductive 




"manifest approach.” According to Kaid (1989), all three approaches adhere to the naturalistic 
paradigm and can be used to interpret meanings from the content of text data. In addition, he proposed 
a 7-step process to qualitative content analysis: (1) deciding on the research questions, (2) choosing the 
sample for analysis, (3) formulating the categories to be applied, (4) defining the coding process, (5) 
applying the coding procedures, (6) establishing the trustworthiness of data and (7) analyzing the 
overall findings of the coding procedure. The major differences between the approaches described 
above are the initial codes developed by the coder(s), which are generally determined according to the 
established research purpose. 
 
Because there is insufficient knowledge about the phenomenon I am examining—the usage of 
Twitter in relation to the driving and nationality campaigns—and bearing in mind the exploratory 
nature of my research, conducting inductive qualitative content analysis was considered the most 
appropriate approach. It will accommodate new, emerging, data-driven research categories of analyses 
which may not be apparent until immersed in the data as well as to develop the aspects of 
interpretation—the categories—as near as possible to the empirical materials. Elo and Kyngäs (2008) 
implied that a content analysis approach based on inductive data can be used if the researcher aims to 
develop a theory, as this approach allows the researcher to move from specific details to the general 
picture of the phenomenon. 
 
Accordingly, the adopted inductive qualitative content analysis will involve the following: 
purposive selection of content that is driven by the research questions; an iterative, open inductive 
approach to content coding (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2016), while keeping an eye on the context to 
increase the authenticity of interpretation and eventually findings that can potentially result in theory 
building, such as typologies. 
 
7.4.3 Sampling  
This section utilizes a purposeful sampling of the collected tweets. Purposeful sampling is widely used 
in qualitative research for the identification and selection of information-rich cases. Although there are 
several different purposeful sampling techniques, criterion sampling appears to be widely used. It 
involves identifying and selecting individuals or groups that are especially knowledgeable about the 
particular phenomenon of interest. 
 
Accordingly, a criterion sampling of all the tweets that are generated by @W2Drive and 
@Oct26drive took place. These two accounts were specifically chosen because of their status as issue-
specific Twitter accounts that were entirely dedicated to the campaign. Examining these accounts will 




Concerning the Kuwaiti case, the same sampling strategy was implemented in relation to the 
official account of the Women’s Cultural and Social Society (@WCSS_Q8) and the account of the 
grassroots “Kuwaiti Women without Borders” group (@KWWNLC), which is a relatively small 
account, that is currently not active, with an overall of 424 tweet messages and 590 followers. The 
tweets from all accounts were retrieved using R, an open-source programming language that can 
perform data mining related tasks such as data extraction, clustering and classification (Kosorus, 
Honigl & Kung, 2011). 
 
The usage of the twitteR package, whose main purpose is to provide an access to Twitter API, 
has resulted in retrieving 2,626 tweets in Arabic and English (original tweets, mentions and replies to, 
but not retweets) from the @W2Drive Twitter account. The tweets spanned the range from the creation 
of the Twitter account on May 6, 2011, to October 19, 2013, the date of the last tweet in that account. It 
is worth pointing out that the last posted tweet in @W2Drive account is a tweet that expressed the 
account’s support for the women who were initiating the new stage of the driving campaign in October 
2013, while inviting their followers to join the new campaign's Twitter account @Oct26driving and 
back up the new group’s campaigning efforts. 
 
Thus, 2,048 tweets (original tweets, mentions and replies to, but not retweets) in Arabic and 
English were also extracted following the same procedure from the @Oct26driving Twitter account 
starting from the date of the creation of the account, October, 9 2013 to the end of December 2015. 
Similarly, 1398 tweets were harvested from the @WCSS_Q8 account which covered the period from 
March 2012 till December 2014 in addition to 253 tweets (original tweets, mentions and replies to, but 
not retweets) from the @KWWNLC Twitter account from June 2013 until April 2014. All tweets that 
have been collected were later converted into a .CSV (Comma Separated Values) file for data cleaning 
and coding. 
 
7.4.4 Procedure  
When performing content analysis on Twitter data, tweets can be regarded as single sampling units 
(e.g., Krippendorff, 2004). In principle, defining a tweet as the sampling unit follows clear-cut formal 
means (syntax): a posting, restricted to 140 characters, which may include in-text URLs and attached 
visual materials, sent by a unique user at a particular moment. Thus, except for a few cases, tweets can 
also be regarded as units of meaning (semantics). 
 
The coding procedure took place without relying on predetermined categories. I have read every 
single tweet in the dataset, while qualitatively evaluating the associated keywords, phrases, images and 




descriptive labels, usually one or two words long that describe condensed meaning units (the tweets in 
our case). 
After this initial examination, certain general categories began to emerge from the data itself 
that resulted from sorting the initial codes into categories and grouping together those codes that were 
related to each other through their content or context. Others proved to be irrelevant. As the coding 
procedure resulted in a plethora of codes, I found it useful to assimilate smaller groups of closely 
related codes into subcategories that related to each other through their content and could then be 
grouped into categories. The coding relied on the constant comparative method (Strauss & Corbin, 
1998), whereby newly coded tweets were compared to those previously coded to ensure that the 
validity and integrity of emergent constructs held. This process was revised step-by-step through a 
feedback loop (Kohlbacher, 2006) as the categories that emerged went through multiple stages of 
revision. They were constantly modified, merged or even discarded as an outlier if other tweets could 
not be combined in the category. 
 
Relying on this approach allowed me to develop new insights from the data. Also, the inductive 
nature of this approach means that a potential outcome is theory building in the form of typologies 
(Zhang and Wildemuth, 2009), which characterizes the content and can also be used for exploratory 
research when little is known about the phenomenon being studied. 
 
7.5 The Results of the Qualitative Content Analysis  
The data analysis brought out about six major categories of tweets explained by another 25 
subcategories based on their relatedness. This process identified the following six broader categories of 
tweets: media-related, campaign-related, mobilization-related, action-related, feminist-related and 
public-outreach-related. Another category of tweets, others, was also identified but omitted in the 
analysis as it included posts not fitting in the other categories such as the sharing of general quotes or 
posting tweets that celebrated the Saudi national day. The general classification scheme for the tweets 
can be found in Appendix E, while Tables 7.4 and 7.5 below display the detailed breakdown of the 














A- Media related 20.1 14.2 
1- Local mainstream media coverage 6.6 2.6 
2- Regional mainstream media coverage 1.2 0.7 
3- International mainstream media coverage 2.3 2.2 
4- Alternative media coverage 2.6 2.9 
5- Campaign’s own alternative communication channel coverage 1.2 5.0 
6- Dissemination of local news 5.2 0.5 
7- Dissemination of international news 0.4 0.0 
8- Targeting influential media outlets 0.6 0.3 
B- Campaign related 10.7 23.4 
9- Providing information and updates about the campaign. 8.1 8.3 
10- The articulation of the campaign’s demands and claims. 1.2 7.7 
11- Raising criticism 1.4 7.4 
C- Mobilization related 9.5 11.6 
12- Call for on-ground action 2.7 1.0 
13- Call for online action 5.2 7.0 
14- Encouragement and moral support 1.6 3.6 
D- Action related 5.4 35.7 
15- Providing physical evidence of success 2.4 13.2 
16- Sharing personal testimonies. 1.4 17.3 
17- Demonstrating Saudi public figures’ support 0.6 2.8 
18- Demonstrating transnational support 1.0 2.4 
E- Feminist related 37.0 4.9 
19- Feminist critical posts 6.9 4.0 
20- Sharing general feminist-related news or articles 25.8 0.5 
21- Empowerment and motivation 4.3 0.4 
F- Public outreach 13.4 10.0 
22- Engaging in arguments and debates 3.6 2.9 
23- Answering users’ questions 8.7 5.9 
24- Users’ input 0.1 1.0 
25- Expressing gratitude 1.0 0.2 
G- Other 3.9 0.2 
Total posts 100.0 (2626) 
100.0 
(2048) 




































Table 7.5: The breakdown of the tweets per general category, sub-category. 
 
Category WCSS_Q8 KWWNLC 
A – Media related 24.3 19.3 
1- Local mainstream media coverage 5 10 
2- Regional mainstream media coverage 0.0 0.0 
3- International mainstream media coverage 0.0 0.0 
4- Alternative media coverage 2.9 1.7 
5- Campaign’s own alternative communication channel 
coverage 
2.1 2.5 
6- Dissemination of local news 14 4 
7- Dissemination of international news 0.0 0.0 
8- Targeting influential media outlets 0.3 1.1 
B – Campaign related 9.4 21.8 9- Providing i formation and updates about the campaign 3.2 12.2 
10- The articulation of the campaign’s demands and claims 4.1 3.1 
11- Raising criticism 2.1 6.5 
C – Mobilization related 12.5 10.4 
12- Calling for on- ground action 6 4.3 
13- Calling for online action 4.8 3.6 
14- Encouragement and moral support 1.7 2.5 
D – Action related 14.6 13.7 
15- Providing physical evidence of success 6.8 8.5 
16- Sharing personal testimonies. 0.0 0.0 
17- Demonstrating public figures support 7.8 5.2 
18- Demonstrating transnational support 0.0 0.0 
E – Feminist related 19.7 20.6 
19- Feminist critical posts 7.2 5.3 
20- Sharing general feminist-related news or articles 11.4 14.6 
21- Empowerment and motivation 1.1 0.7 
F – Public outreach 7 6.2 
22- Engaging in arguments and debates 3 1.5 
23- Answering users’ questions 2 3.2 
24- Twitter Users’ input 0.8 0.0 
25- Expressing gratitude 1.2 1.5 
G – Other 12.5 8 






We can see from Table 7.4 that in the case of the @W2Drive Twitter account, feminist-related 
tweets constituted the majority of the sample as they accounted for 37% of the overall content, 
followed by media-related category (20.5%) and the tweets that were under the public outreach 
category (13.4%). The fourth place was reserved for the tweets that were specifically related to the 
campaign (10.7%), followed by the mobilization-related category which accounted for 9.5%. The 
tweets that belonged to the action-related category made up about 5.4% of the overall collected data. 
The other category made up 1.9%. The picture was a bit different when it came to the @Oct26driving 
Twitter account. Action-related tweets accounted for the majority of tweets (35.7%), followed by the 
campaign-related category (23.4%), media-related category (14.2%) and then the mobilization-related 
category (11.6%). The tweets under the public outreach category constituted up to (10.0%) of the 
collected tweets, followed by the tweets that did not fit elsewhere and were under the other category 
(0.2%). 
 
It appears that both Twitter accounts converged on being media-focused as well as campaign-
focused because both of these categories were in their top four most prominent categories in terms of 
the classification of the tweets. It was noticeable that the content in the case of the  @W2Drive Twitter 
was more feminist-oriented, providing feminist-related content either by sharing general feminist-
related news or articles, providing empowering and motivational content and offering feminist critique. 
In comparison, the @Oct26Driving was more outcome-oriented, providing physical evidence of the 
success of the campaign, sharing personal testimonies from its supporters and demonstrating the local 
level and transnational support of the campaign. 
 
As far as concerned the Kuwaiti campaign, feminist related posts constituted the largest 
category of the tweets sent by @WCSS_Q8 (37%). The majority of the tweets that belonged to this 
general category included the circulation of general feminist news about women’s empowerment 
(25.85%). The media-related category, which included the circulation of news articles that covered the 
activities of WCSS, made up 14%. Almost a quarter of the tweets that were generated by @KWWNLC 
were about the “Ensaf” campaign (23.4%), which included providing information and updates about 
the campaign, articulating of claims and demands and raising criticism about the lack of political 
solution regarding nationality. Media-related content tackled the coverage of the campaign in local 
media and made up 19.3%. This data shows us that @KWWNLC was more involved in tweeting about 
the campaign than @WCSS_Q8, which is not surprising because @KWWNLC was dedicated entirely 








7.5.1 Media Coverage Tweets 
Concerning the driving campaign, both Saudi accounts played a role in closely monitoring the media 
coverage of the campaign. The subcategory of tweets that were concerned with disseminating 
campaign-related news from local mainstream media outlets constituted 6.6% of all tweets within the 
@W2Drive account and 2.6% in the case of the @Oct26Driving account. 
 
The coverage that originated from regional mainstream media made up 1.2% and 0.7% in each 
account respectively. The international mainstream media coverage sub-category, on the other hand, 
accounted for 2.3% and 2.2% of the tweets. These three sub-categories included the circulation of 
articles that reported individual stories of women driving on the roads in defiance the ban, the detention 
of some activists, statements by government officials about this issue and links to televised interviews 
with the activists in addition to commentary pieces that discussed the driving issue. The results 
indicated that both Twitter accounts sought to incorporate the coverage of the campaign from 
mainstream newspapers and outlets to fulfill the function of providing an effective news stream to their 
followers. As mentioned earlier in Chapter 6, most often, the process of getting media attention is 
difficult for activists due to the limited carrying capacity of traditional media outlets and government 
censorship as our Saudi cause indicates.  
 
Thus, circulating links about the campaign from accredited and widely read news outlets such 
as CNN, BBC and Aljazeera served the purpose of demonstrating the diffusion and increasing visibility 
of movement messages into the mediated public sphere. It also showed that the campaign managed to 
capture the attention of major local, regional and international press outlets. Some attention was paid to 
incorporating the coverage of the campaign by alternative media outlets into the accounts’ feeds, as 
they included high traffic blogs (Saudiwomanblog, Maialshareef.blogspot), WordPress and electronic 
journals (Sabq.com). About 2.6% of the collected tweets coming from the @W2Drive account 
belonged to this sub-category in comparison with 2.9% of the tweets in the @Oct26driving Twitter 
stream. 
 
A separate sub-category was dedicated to the tweets that were passing information from/and 
about the campaign's official communication channels such as its websites, Facebook pages and 
YouTube channel in the case of the Oct26driving campaign, which operated live stream broadcasts 
interviewing activists through its own YouTube channel 
(https://www.youtube.com/user/oct26driving/videos). The tweets that belonged to this category have 






We have changed the link to our Facebook page after it was blocked in Saudi. The new link is 
http://www.facebook.com/right2dignity #Women2Drive #Right2Dignity. (@W2Drive, 2012) 
 
The live stream broadcast will begin in half an hour with journalist and activist Maysa al-Amoudi 
through the campaign’s channel on YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/user/oct26driving. 
(@Oct26Driving, 2014)  
 
This move of leveraging the capabilities offered by commercial media platforms to the 
advantage of the movement points to the activists’ realization of the potential advantages of gaining 
autonomy through the establishment of movement-associated, media-mediated counter-publics 
(McDonald, 2015). They could also reclaim the affordances potentials provided in these platforms and 
to shift power away from journalists. These platforms provide a relatively open and interactive 
infrastructure for disseminating movement-oriented content; news, pictures and videos can be easily 
published and distributed as well as communicated beyond the traditional media outlets. The Twitter 
posts that shared other local news articles comprised 3.7% and 12.9% of the overall tweets. They 
usually contained hyperlinked URLs or quotes that referred to general topics related to the local Saudi 
context, ranging from traffic collisions to human rights violations. The sharing of other international 
news articles was less prominent in both cases (0.4% and 0%). 
 
Finally, the Twitter posts that were under the media outreach sub-category were those that 
targeted and interacted with influential media outlets or media figures for attention, usually in requests 
for reporting or retweets. Those tweets constituted 0.6% and 0.3% of the overall tweets in each 
account, respectively. What was striking in the Kuwaiti campaign was the complete absence of the 
transnational dimension when it came down to the reporting aspect of the campaign. So, while both 
@WCSS_Q8 and @KWWNLC featured media coverage of the campaign or the activities that were 
being carried out, all the reporting came from local news sources exemplified by Kuwaiti newspapers 
such as Alanbaa and TV channels such as Alqabas and Alrai Television. 
 
The findings indicate that mainstream media outlets remain an important source for the 
reporting dimension of movements and that they have not been replaced yet by digital media. Hence, 
the use of digital media by no means removes the former dependency of social movements on the 
media. What is typical, rather, is the increasing degree of differentiation within media infrastructures 
and the interdependencies of the overall media ecology, in which digital media plays a critical but not 






7.5.2 Campaign-related Tweets 
As regards the tweets that were under the campaign-related category, providing accurate information 
about the campaign has comprised 8.1% and 8.8% of the tweets in @W2Drive @Oct26Driving 
accounts, respectively. The articulation of the campaign’s related demands accounted for 1.2% and 
7.7%. I defined making claims as the articulation of political demands with specific content—the 
claim—and the public staging of this demand—claims-making (Lindekilde, 2013). Posts that posed 
direct criticism of the situation accounted for 1.4% and 7.4% of the total percentage of posts. 
 
The content analysis brought to light that Twitter was utilized as a first-hand account to provide 
precise information about the campaign, its objectives and the individuals behind it. It was also used to 
provide real-life updates that originated from the source, debunking any false information. The 
following extracts, which originate from the @W2Drive, account are examples of the tweets that 
sought to clarify the campaign’s objectives: 
 
The objective of our campaign is to end all forms of discrimination against women and to 
restore their rights, which have been limited by the current restrictive social traditions that are 
contrary to the Islamic Shari'a. (@W2Drive, 2011) 
 
           Our campaign is concerned with all women’s issues in the country [of Saudi Arabia]. For those 
who accuse us of dismissing more important women’s issues, we have one simple question: 
what have you done to address these important issues? (W2Drive, 2011) 
 
When it came to the articulation of political claims, @W2Drive denounced the arrests of 
women, appealed to the authorities to release the detained activists and published an annual periodical 
that stressed the necessity of lifting the driving ban. The @Oct26driving Twitter account issued 
statements demanding the independence of the judiciary system and the establishment of a suitable 
political climate that respects human rights. Examples are being presented below: 
 
We stress the need for an independent judiciary system and the implementation of procedural 
safeguards to protect women’s activists from facing sanctions that lack a legal basis. 
(@Oct26driving, 2014) 
 
The Kingdom is bound by the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights to guarantee the right of 




These examples demonstrate that Twitter was viewed as beneficial to the visibility of political 
claims on the premise that it could potentially offer better opportunities for non-institutional actors to 
participate in the political claims-making process and public debates, as mentioned in Chapter 5. 
Tweets were coded as critical if they expressed a critical introspection, opinion or evaluation. Satirical 
jokes and rhetorical questions were also included in this category. The proportion of critical posts was 
much higher in the @Oct26Driving account (7.4%) and sharper in terms of tone; they were also 
directly addressed to the government and/or religious establishment. In comparison, the critical Twitter 
posts in the @W2Drive account only accounted for 1.4% of all tweets. Extracts of critical tweets from 
@Oct26driving can be found below: 
 
$30 billion have been given to Egypt in the form of financial assistance package, while Saudi 
women remain confined and not able to move freely, needing to hire drivers which takes a toll 
on their budgets. Until when this will continue? (@Oct26driving, 2015)  
 
One question! How are we supposed to fight religious extremism when the government 
intimidates the activists who fight religious extremists with imprisonment and flogging 
charges? Such as [listing the name of the activists] Suad al-Shammari, Loujin, Maysa, Rafiq, 
and many others? (Oct26driving, 2015)  
 
The demands to allow women to drive have continued through the reigns of three kings, two 
Gulf wars, the revolutions of the Arab Spring and at every single time we are being told that the 
time is not right. When is the right time then? (Oct26driving, 2015) 
 
These tweets expressed disapproval of the decision to Egypt a $30 billion aid package to 
boost its economy while Saudi women waste their monthly budgets on hiring drivers to drive them to 
work. Moreover, some tweets questioned the willingness of Saudi Arabia in its efforts to counter 
terrorism; several tweets raised the question, “Why are the authorities harassing the ‘progressive’ 
figures who are actually fighting the manifestations of religious extremism in the Saudi society?” 
 
In the framing counter-terrorism as an issue of common interest for both parties, the state and 
the activists, lies an attempt to reach a consensus with the state by capitalizing on the state’s efforts to 
improve its image to the West and to promote itself as a modern society, especially after 9/11, when the 






Both @KWWNLC and @WCSS_Q8 used Twitter to disseminate information about the 
campaign, articulate the campaign’s demands and raise criticism. Viewing both accounts, it was clear 
that @@KWWNLC to a greater extent than @WCSS_Q8 attempted to explain the campaign and 
provide a clear picture of the campaign to the audience. This intention is exemplified by the following 
extracted tweets: 
 
We prefer to resolve this issue at a local level by reaching out to officials and raising awareness 
about its scope to the pubic through arranging local events and seminars. (@KWWNLC, 2014) 
 
We are going to publicize the campaign in various local media outlets. And if this doesn’t work 
out, we are going internationalize this issue in case we exhausted all our means to resolve it 
internally. (@KWWNLC, 2014) 
 
What was observable throughout was that the @WCSS_Q8 contained information about the 
organization’s activities, events or other news, facts, reports or information relevant to the 
organization’s stakeholders—more than the campaign itself. This content was expected due to the 
diversity of issues that are covered by this organization and the wide range of issues that it adopts, 
including fighting obesity in children, raising awareness about women’s health, organizing charity and 
fundraising for Palestinian children and displaced people inside Syria. @WCSS-Q8’s tweets publicized 
its social initiatives, transnational campaigns and local events. The articulation of claims was less 
prevalent on both accounts, which was surprising. The presence of basic political claims in the account 
of WCSS_Q8 concerned the necessity of democratic rule. While Criticism was not very prevalentt on 
these examined accounts, with the exception of one tweet by @KWWNLC that criticized the positions 
of parliamentary candidates who did not support granting women’s full citizenship rights. 
 
7.5.3 Mobilization- related Tweets 
Similar to communication on Facebook, communication on Twitter may catalyze mobilization, which 
was clear in the posts under the mobilization category. These posts were (1) calling for on-ground 
action; (2) encouraging online action or (3) providing encouragement and moral support to the 
participants, supporters and sympathizers with the campaign. The results concerning the @W2Drive 
and @Oct26driving accounts show that calls for participation in on-ground action were hardly 
explicitly mentioned in the tweets.  
 
The attempts to mobilize people through direct calls for action were relatively scarce in both 




context; opportunities for collective action are restricted because public protests and direct actions are 
prohibited by law in Saudi Arabia. Another alternative explanation is that women’s movements most 
often mobilize through gendered structures and frames in what Ferree and Mueller (2004) have 
“gendered repertoires of contention.” As a result, there is a good reason to assume that feminist 
mobilizations are more likely to use non-confrontational tactics or unobtrusive repertoires (Katzenstein 
1990; Taylor and Van Dyke 2004). 
 
Regardless of the reason, the few calls for on-ground action ranged from asking women to start 
visibly driving in the streets in challenge to the ban to filing individual lawsuits against the traffic 
directorate to writing direct letters to the king: 
 
For those who are willing to drive, the purpose of this action is not to drive discreetly to avoid 
being caught, but to declare your resistance to the ban publicly. Even if you get caught, it is 
recognition of the exercise of your right and your resistance. (@W2Drive, 2011) 
 
Don’t confine yourself by driving in the back alleys without being seen. This act needs 
witnesses. (@W2Drive, 2011) 
 
While analyzing the content of the Twitter posts that called for on-ground mobilization in the 
@Oct26Driving, I observed the occurrence of new type of on-ground action that did not pop up in the 
previous account: encouraging the male supporters of the campaign to stop using cars for one day in 
solidarity with women, while documenting their experience by using the campaign’s hashtag and the 
Arabic equivalent for #He_for_she hashtag. Again, men were perceived by the campaign as potential 
allies in this struggle. This also brought to light the evolution and diversification of the campaign’s 
tactics towards more innovative acts. Here, the line between on-ground and online action becomes 
increasingly blurry. What appears to be an on-ground act (men temporarily refraining from driving 
cars), is, in fact, an action that intersects with the mediated aspect of the campaign, especially if men 
opted to use the campaign’s hashtag. 
 
There was a larger volume of tweets that contained calls to action on the web; they comprised 
5.2% and 7.0% of the overall tweets. This sub-category contained a wide range of activities, including 
urging users to tweet about the campaign, participating in collective e-mail campaigns, circulating 
online petitions and initiating discourses around hashtags in which like-minded people can join: 
 






More than 70,000 signatures have been collected so far that demand to drop all charges against 
Manal Alsharif http://bit.ly/kg7EIL # Women2Drive #Sawagna #FreeManal. (@W2Drive, 
2011) 
 
As shown above, we can clearly see that activists tended to diversify their action repertoires 
besides introducing online dimensions of existing offline repertoires (e.g., petition signing or letter 
writing). The last sub-category was comprised of the tweets that sought to encourage others to persist 
in their support of the campaign: 
 
If Martin Luther King and Rosa Parks had been indifferent towards the injustices that they 
faced, African Americans would still be barred from entering white restaurants and being 
treated as full humans. (@Oct26Driving, 2014) 
 
The participation rate in the campaign is promising. People are no longer in support of the 
campaign because of the driving issue, but because they are genuinely interested in protecting 
human rights. (@Oct26Driving, 2014) 
 
These tweets attempt to provide encouragement and moral support to the participants, 
supporters and sympathizers of the campaign. There has been long-standing interest within social 
movements in the larger question of how social movements can arouse people’s motivation for 
participation once ideological affinity for the cause has been generated (Klandermans & Oegema, 
1987). Growing technologies have also been a topic of interest in regards to impacting the motivations 
of social movement participation. Social movements have increased access to people and an increased 
ability to publicize their cause through emerging technologies; it has been observed that new 
technologies could be a contributing factor in motivating individuals who might not have shown an 
interest in movements before (Garrett, 2006). 
 
Concerning the Kuwaiti accounts, a marginal number of tweets directed coordinated action or 
resistance tactics, which made up only 12.5% and 10.4% of the overall sample. There were not enough 
examples in my sample to make Twitter an important impetus for mobilization efforts as the posts were 
too infrequent to be considered representative of a larger trend of spreading action through Twitter. It 
was interesting to observe that the typologies of actions differed significantly in the Kuwaiti accounts, 
in which the call for online-actions was limited to calling for following the account or retweeting its 




Women without Borders” group or supporting parliamentary candidates who might be favorable 
towards legislating women-friendly policies once they reach parliament: 
Our group announces the opening of membership to those wishing to join. Please communicate 
with @kalhendi or @Omfahad_1960. Thank you. (@KWWNLC, 2013) 
 
After closely monitoring the performance of the Members of Parliament in the past period, our 
group has announced that it supports some upcoming candidates. Our choice was difficult as 
many former deputies have failed us and didn’t serve well our cause. (@KWWNLC, 2013) 
 
It was interesting to observe that the @KWWNLC account called people to avoid sit-ins or 
demonstrations and take the approach of discretion and working within the existing legal frameworks, 
as can be seen in the following summary of a series of tweets that tackled this matter: 
 
Despite the injustice and blatant discriminatory behavior against Kuwaiti women who are 
married to non-Kuwaitis, we as a group reject any calls that would endanger people's lives. 
Thus, we ask you not to join any demonstrations or sit-ins, as it is better to address our claims 
through the existing legal frameworks. The constitution has guaranteed to regulate our civil 
matters. (@KWWNLC, 2013) 
 
7.5.4 Action related Tweets 
Social movements typically address their message simultaneously to two distinct targets, the state and 
the general public. On the one hand, they press the authorities for recognition in order to get their 
demands met, at least in part. On the other hand, they seek to obtain public support and try to sensitize 
the population to their cause, making the attention of public opinion extremely important (Taylor, Kent 
& White, 2001). 
 
Given the national context in the case of Saudi Arabia, the limited supply of information under 
an authoritarian regime means that individuals can expect to pay high personal costs (arrest, 
incarceration, legal action) if they take part in unsuccessful movements. The key challenge for the 
formation of a successful movement is that potential sympathizers will only join the movement if they 
are convinced that others will do the same. Twitter can be helpful in terms of providing individuals 
with information that allows for a better calculation of their “individual risk threshold;” the responses 
and reactions to the movement may trigger informational cascades that inspire those who are on the 





By circulating tangible evidence that displays the positive reactions the campaign has received 
so far in the form of photo or video evidence of individuals who responded positively to the on-ground 
calls of the campaign (2.4% and 13.2%), movements demonstrate the social support that the campaign 
is enjoying and possibly alter people’s perceptions about the political opportunity structure in place that 
is connected to their rationale for acting. Of course, the opportunities and threats in the context of 
social movements are not objective categories per se, “but depend on the kind of collective attribution 
that the movement gives” (McAdam et al. 2001, p. 45). 
 
The sharing of personal testimonies accounted for 1.4% and 17.3% of the overall tweets in 
@Women2Drive and @Oct26Driving, respectively. These written, audio or visual testimonies were 
mainly concerned with providing first-hand accounts about women’s real experiences with the ban and 
the daily struggles that accompanied it. These testimonies reflect an awareness of public opinion when 
it comes to the outcomes of social movements. While it seems rather obvious that movement related-
action raises the awareness of the population over certain political issues, outpourings of support in 
public opinion can also help movements to reach their goals by making decision-makers more 
responsive to their demands; several scholars have stressed the role of public opinion in legislative 
change (e.g., Costain & Majstorovic, 1994), though not always related to the direct impact of social 
movements. 
 
Tweets that sought to demonstrate solidarity statements coming from elites accounted for 0.6% 
and 2.8%, respectively. I conceptualized elites as high-profile, influential figures who were well known 
in the public sphere. Thus, obtaining their support could be helpful in increasing the legitimacy of the 
campaign in the eyes of their supporters. Examples of such tweets can be read below: 
 
The Saudi Princess Ameera Altaweel announces that she will drive her own car in defiance of 
the ban. #Women2Drive #SaudiWomen #WomenRights #KeepDriving. (@W2Drive, 2011) 
 
The Saudi religious clerk Salman Alawdah backs up women's driving http: // 
youtu.be/EM6xU_rXmwA. (@W2Drive, 2011) 
 
Lastly, some tweets were devoted to demonstrating evidence of transnational solidarity actions; 
these tweets accounted for 1.0% and 2.4% in each account, respectively. This sub-category is 
concerned with showing the transnational impact of the campaign that transcends the local scope, 
where solidarity is forged on the basis of activism against the material realities of gender 
discrimination. In connection to that, some researchers have argued that Twitter in particular has 
facilitated the development of “weak ties” that allow activists to reach to new constituencies and 




by the transnationally inflected protest actions taking place at the conjunction of digital spaces and 
street protests in support of lifting the ban (Valenzuela, Correa & Zúñiga, 2018). Concerning the 
“Ensaf” campaign, the action-related tweets comprised 14.6% and 13.7% of the overall tweets, 
respectively. They were mainly concentrated on providing evidence of the progress of the campaign in 
terms of taken actions, such as updating their followers with the latest meetings with deputies, 
minsters: 
 
Our group is very thankful for receiving the invitation of the candidate of the first constituency Dr. 
Masouma al-Mubarak, whom we met and who listened to our demands. We wish good luck to 
everyone. (@KWWNLC, 2013)  
 
The General Coordinator of the Kuwaiti Women without Borders group, Alia al-Dulaimi, has 
contacted the managing director of the Association of Social Workers and Board Member Dr. 
Sana al-Asfour. A date has been set for a meeting regarding Kuwaiti women citizenship rights. 
(@KWWNLC, 2014) 
 
7.5.5 Feminist-related Tweets  
For @W2Drive and @Oct26Driving, the tweets that belonged to the feminist-related category 
contained links to general feminist news (25.8% and 0.5%), posed feminist critiques (6.9% and 4.0%) 
or sought to empower and motivate women (4.3% and 0.4%). The messages that posted general 
feminist-related news contained links to articles and commentaries that discussed a wide array of topics 
including women’s political participation, their role in the labor force, equal citizenship, and gender-
based violence as well as sexism and misogyny. I defined feminist critique as making judgments about 
things with reference to a certain standard (Humm, 1986). The tweets that were coded as feminist 
critique centered primarily on criticizing the ban of driving, the male guardianship system and the lack 
of codified personal status law: 
 
            Women’s fate, regardless of their age, still hangs in the hands of their fathers/husbands/male 
judges, while the Ministry of Justice is still discussing the codification of personal status law. 
(@W2Drive, 2012) 
 
            Most of the Saudi decisions on women’s rights are in sum: preventing women from halal 





We can see that the focus of the coded tweets is on the localized core feminist issues, such as 
inclusion and the access to the justice system, oppressive practices found in the male guardianship 
system and violence against women. These are large-scale social issues that should be understood as 
systemic rather than isolated phenomena. For the @WCSS_Q8 account, the tweets the disseminated 
feminist related news concentrated on the achievement of Kuwaiti women such as Kuwaiti women 
being appointed as judges for the first time and news associated with international women’s days: 
 
The Administrative Court overturns the Ministry of Justice’s decision to allow only males to 
apply for the post of the prosecutor. (@WCSS_Q8, 2014) 
 
Photos for the celebrations that took place in the headquarters of the Office of the United 
Nations in Kuwait on the occasion of International Women’s Day under the theme “Equality for 
Women.” (@WCSS_Q8, 2014) 
 
Some tweets also posed criticism of discrimination against women in public office, particularly 
women’s in the case of a governmental job application ad that specified men are only the ones who 
should apply for the job, as well as blatant institutionalized discrimination. Only a few tweets included 
motivating content. Those that did express enthusiasm for the recent decision that allowed women to be 
appointed as prosecutors, empowering women and women not allowing anyone to take away their 
rights from them. 
 
7.5.6 Public Outreach  
The tweets that were evaluated for public outreach were based upon four sub-categories: conversational 
tweets (3.6% and 2.9%), answering to users’ questions (8.7% and 5.9%), asking for users’ input and 
feedback (0.1% and 1.0%) and expressing gratitude (1.0 and 0.2%). This category has mostly contained 
tweets with an @ symbol or a question mark, any direct question (Naaman et al., 2010) and any tweet 
link to a poll. 
 
The analysis indicated that conversational tweets have represented live discussions and debates 
with Twitter users, in which arguments and counter-arguments were expressed and exchanged. 
Accommodating users’ questions also constituted a separate sub-category on its own, where the 
administrators of the accounts made an effort to provide answers to users’ questions and queries. These 
responses give the perception of reciprocity between account administrators and their followers. 
Asking for users’ input was composed of the tweets that sought to get users’ opinions and/or feedback 




situations that they might have encountered as a result of the driving ban, how many of the women had 
a valid driving license that was issued abroad and what ways express their discontent with the status 
quo. 
The final sub-category was mainly concerned with expressing gratitude and appreciation to the 
supporters of the campaign. Overall, I found that the public outreach category sought to fulfill the 
function of facilitating interaction between the account administrators, Twitter users and the 
development of a discursive community. As regards the Kuwaiti accounts, the majority of tweets that 
belonged to this category included broad rhetorical slogans and statements or sending greetings to 
women on Mother’s day or the month of Ramadan, making up 7% and 6.2% of the collected tweets for 
the WCSS and “Kuwaiti Women without Borders” accounts, respectively. 
 
Given that it is common to use Twitter in a conversational manner with commentary under 
tweets, it is surprising that this functionality was rarely used in the case of the Kuwaiti groups and 
organizations. Both failed to engage users in debates and discussions about the nationality issue; thus 
the interactivity dimension emerged as less significant than expected because there were few attempts 
to start a conversation with the audience or initiate interactive discourses. 
 
7.6 Conclusion:: What Can we Infer from the Results?   
My inquiry is motivated by the conviction that analyzing the tweeted messages can provide us with rich 
information concerning the context, content and dynamics of the campaigns that took place in Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait. Taking the example of the “Women to Drive” campaign, analyzing the content of 
the tweets allows us to address the question of who is involved in the campaign, as there have been a 
series of tweets aimed at revealing the identities of individuals who were part of the original Women to 
Drive campaign in 2011. 
 
These tweets stated that 42 Saudi citizens (33 female and 9 male activists) were involved with 
the core of the network. They were divided into three teams: (1) a team of consultants to guide the 
other members of the campaign and give advice on matters concerning access to media and legal 
channels; (2) a planning and implementation team to draft an awareness plans, write reports and 
communicate with officials and lastly (3) a media and communication team to spread awareness about 
the demands of the campaign throughout social networking sites and other media channels. 
 
The members of the campaign were Areej Al-majed, Alaa Al-ghamadi, Emthethal Al-otabi, 
Amjad Al-omari, Ameena Al-enzi, Eman Al-omar, Eman Al-enzi, Dr. Badriya Alboshar, Bashayer 
Abdullah, Thani Al-gehani, Hosni Al-shrif, Dana Al-faqeeh, Rasha Al-dowasi, Rasha Al-malaki, 
Rawan Kurdi, Sara Al-saif, Souood Al-dosari, Talal Al-ateeq, Abdullah Al-alami, Abed Almohsen Al-




Mariam Al-balousi, Manal Al-sharif, May Al-sharif, Maisaa Al-amoudi, Maisaa Al-manea, Najlaa 
Hariri, Nawal Al-zoori, Noora Al-rooqi, Noora Mansoori, Noora Abdulkarim, Hatoon Al-rasheed, 
Hadeya Al-mahana, Hend Al-zahed, Hanadi Al-rasi, Haya Al-hajeelan, Wael Al-roomi and Yazeed Al-
harbi. 
 
It was also emphasized that the campaign was administered and run by Saudi nationals and that 
none of the organizers referred to any “external” organization or entity. Nonetheless, if non-Saudis 
opted to support the campaign, then we are open to welcome them. Portraying the campaign as entirely 
Saudi revealed a cautionary position when it comes came to the leadership and ownership aspect. This 
caution is also indicative of the “back-then” and current resurgence in nationalist discourse in the 
public sphere, in which feminists’ potential involvement with foreign alliances, presence abroad or 
even dealings with foreign media is often met with suspicion or accusations of treason and disloyalty to 
the state. 
 
The tactic of declaring the “sovereignty” of the campaign—at least on a discursive level—
seems to be used to legitimize the campaign in the eyes of those who might be skeptical of it. 
Sovereignty claims also assured the audience that the campaign did not aim to endanger the national 
fabric of the country, but was an integral part of it instead. The tensions over who belongs to the 
movement and who does not, also hint at the consequences of the deployment of nationalist discourse, 
not only as a part of the political project but also as a cognitive, affective discursive category. The 
major part of Yuval-Davis’s work describes “politics of belonging” as “the dirty work of boundary 
maintenance,” separating the world into “us” and “them” (Yuval-Davis, 2007). Her contribution shows 
that the construction of monolithic, single collectivities through nationalist narratives is a central 
instrument in the nationalist repertoire to legitimize the exclusion of the “other.” Thus, the question of 
belonging becomes a strong marker not only of collective and individual identities, but also of 
distinction and social exclusion within social movements. It could be instrumental in undermining the 
transnational feminist solidarity aspect in our case. 
 
As with regards to men’s relationship with the campaign, men’s relationship to feminism in 
general is complex and contested (Bryson, 1999). There is much debate about what men can and should 
contribute to the feminist project that is underpinned by different understandings of feminism. Beliefs 
about men’s relationship to feminism also rest on particular assumptions about the nature of gendered 
power relations. Consequently, men have responded in various ways to feminist movements, engaging 
in forms of gender politics from pro-feminist support to reassertion of male power through “men’s 





At the “pro-feminist” end of the spectrum, men occupy a range of different positionings based 
on varied feminist beliefs and commitments (Holmgren & Hearn, 2009). In addition to how they 
position themselves, men are positioned differently by others. Some feminist women have welcomed 
them as allies (Hooks, 2000), while others have viewed them with suspicion and feared that their 
involvement would lead to the co-optation of the movement (Hester, 1984). As with regards to the 
women’s to drive campaign in relation to the “man question” in the movement, the group was open in 
addressing men as supporting allies who remained accountable to feminist women, while emphasizing 
the important role they played, as shown by the following tweets: 
 
A question has been raised about the role of men in this campaign. We want to make it  clear 
that many men have stood up and supported the campaign because empowering women leads to 
empowering our nation. (@W2Drive, 2012) 
 
Men are part of this campaign and part of every other campaign for reform. We appreciate the 
supportive role played by our fathers, husbands, brothers, sons and media figures. (@W2Drive, 
2012) 
 
Thus, it was perceived that men’s and women’s interests were not inherently contradictory and 
that men could support the movement. Support for the movement challenged their own power and 
privilege, a situation that is replete with struggles and pitfalls, “positional dilemmas and ambivalences” 
(Holmgren and Hearn, 2009, p. 412). The findings also highlight the blurring boundaries between 
conventional and alternative media and how social movements intertwine with various media outlets 
from mainstream to alternative, from the press to the web. This observation goes in line with Mattoni’s 
(2012) elaboration on the media environment as a complex and fluid set of relations among subjects 
and objects, social actors and technologies. 
 
She also asserted that the media environment is not something external to the daily lives of 
media and non-media individuals. Rather, it is continuously created and re-created through complex 
interactions. Social movements scholars interested in understanding the role of media in mobilization 
should bear in mind the complexity of communication flows that shape contemporary, media-saturated 
movements. The media environment should, therefore, be perceived as an open, unpredictable and 
controversial space of mediatization and communication, made up of different layers that continuously 
combine with one another due to information flows circulating within the media environment itself 
(Terranova, 2004). 
 
The analysis of the Saudi campaign also demonstrated that the interactive and participatory 




circumvent the gatekeepers of traditional media, allowing them to take control of their own messages in 
terms of production, content and dissemination (Kahn & Kellner, 2004). Hence, activists are 
increasingly creating their own alternative forms of communication that serve as communication 
channels for activists and an actual “field” of activism itself (Lievrouw, 2011). The various practices 
that activists enact to produce and diffuse their alternative knowledge were apparent, as was the 
heterogeneity of media practices enacted by and within movements. Activists develop multiple media 
practices that frequently overlap, in which trans-media mobilization involves engaging the social base 
of a movement in participatory media, making practices across multiple platforms to communicate 
directly with other potential activists, specific groups and the general public. 
 
The findings also demonstrate that media platforms converge on the practice of sharing and 
cross-promoting content from a variety of media platforms. Visual images of one medium easily 
overwhelm other media. Pictorial material of television news is easily usable as a visual 
communication in the press or when alternative media are becoming producers and transmitters of 
content or even the primary news sources for traditional media. 
 
There is a complex relationship between social movements actors and mainstream media 
(especially state-owned media platforms). The press might marginalize or overlook the claims of the 
activists (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993), but mainstream media remains an important source for the 
dissemination of movement-related information and for the demonstration of legitimacy of the claims 
and impact of the movement. The two types of media reinforce each other and will continue to coexist. 
Concerning the analysis of the feminist tweets in the Saudi case, while not explicitly thematized as 
knowledge-related practices, social movement studies have often dealt with practices oriented to the 
production of knowledge and cognitive resources that tend to vary, in the actors that carry them as well 
as the location and mode of production, according to the main object they address. 
 
Despite these multiple and rich expressions of knowledge-practice, social movements’ visibility 
in public and academic debates is still confined to media-captivating mobilizations, concrete and 
measurable peak victories or moments when physical repression is suffered and sustained. Another 
reflection that emerged from the findings concerning both of the Saudi and Kuwaiti cases is the 
feminist production of knowledge over Twitter when it comes to the visibility of feminist content; 
social movement theories can be beneficial in making visible different goals and effects of knowledge 
production. Della Porta and Pavan (2017) advocated for the value of viewing the continuous circulation 
and networked nature of heterogeneous knowledge that can be generated by these movements. We 
need to acknowledge that movements, including the feminist movements, produce, process and diffuse 
knowledge. The production of knowledge on possible alternatives often combines local knowledge 





Building on the rich literature on the nexus between movements and knowledge, della Porta and 
Pavan outlined the peculiarities of movement knowledge. “Repertoires of knowledge practices” are the 
set of organizational practices that foster the coordination of fragmented, local and highly personal 
experiences and rationalities within a shared cognitive system. These repertoires provide movements 
and their supporters with common ground for making claims and acting collectively to produce social, 
political and cultural changes. So, in fact, rather than only engaging with the macro-political 
dimensions, knowledge-practices appear to work as much on the level of the micro-political, a level of 
analysis and intentional and ongoing critique (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). Hence, produced outside of 
institutional spaces, movements’ knowledge can be considered as inherently “local,” grounded in social 
origins and experiences. 
 
Connecting this concept with the findings of the qualitative content analysis, it might be useful 
to think of the “Women to Drive” and the “Ensaf” campaigns as a context and space for feminist 
knowledge production. It might also be useful to address knowledge practices as a meaningful part of 
contemporary progressive activism, especially at a time when feminist scholars have described online 
discursive feminist activism as a departure from conventional modes of doing feminist politics; this 
scholars argue that it represents a new moment or a turning point in feminism in a number of ways, but 
also promotes dynamic new engagement within feminism itself. Thus, we should look beyond the 
#Women2Drive hashtag’s ephemeral moment of virality, in which the aggregation of feminist claims 
and critique resulted in a searchable rich archive of experiences.  
 
The campaign presents a case for examining the renewed feminist politics that intersect with the 
use of digital platforms today. It apperars that digital platforms can facilitate the dissemination of 
feminist claims and shape new modes of discourse about gender. They also allow for substantive and 
self-reflexive engagement with feminist discourses that echo locally rooted “lived experiences” that 
emphasize the experiences of women and the challenges they face on a constant basis. The feminist 
production of knowledge, in its form, content and production process across the online/offline 
boundary, also points to the structural nature of patriarchy. It links the specific, local stories of 
individual women (such as the limitations of mobility exemplified in our case) to larger narratives of 
gender inequality, while making visible the scale of gender oppression. It allows feminist subjectivity 
to make its mark on knowledge-production and empowers women to take control of the sociocultural 
narratives associated with their identities and position. 
 
It might be useful to think of feminist knowledge production as a process of collective, but 
subjective construction that is transmitted within and outside collective endeavors with uncertain 
outcomes. Moreover, by arguing—as we do—that when we recognize movements as spaces and 
processes in which knowledge is generated, modified and mobilized by diverse actors, we gain 




The second part of the analysis analyzed how the “Ensaf” campaign unfolded over Twitter to test the 
claim that digital media help organizations to effectively engage with their existing or potential 
stakeholders by fostering dialogic interactions and mobilizing supporters in near-real time (e.g., 
Greenberg & MacAulay, 2009). 
 
The findings of the content analysis gave us a sense of how established feminist organizations 
and groups use Twitter and revealed that the examined feminist organization pay varying degrees of 
attention to the various potentialities of Twitter. Overall, groups use Twitter mostly for spreading 
information or circulating existing information. Thus, it turned out the use of Twitter for mobilizing 
online and socializing users was particularly limited. Accounts such as WCSS’s failed to leverage the 
core dynamic, interactive features such as using hashtags for campaigning purposes or building 
dialogic relationships and engaging in two-way communication with the audience. That failure 
highlighted the tension between instrumental and dialogical logic of usage; the mere creation of an 
interactive social networking profile is not sufficient for dialogic communication. 
 
For instance, WCSS used Twitter to a large extent as a platform for Public Relations purposes. 
It used its Twitter account to feature its activities and existing programs for self-presentation to the 
general public in a way considered by activists as “electronic business cards” reflecting and 
representing their identity and past history (Mosca & della Porta, 2009). This finding aligns with the 
findings of other studies (Kingston & Stam, 2013), which reached the conclusion that organizations are 
less likely than individual activists to undertake cutting edge, innovative activities that utilize the 
potential of digital media. The data also shows that the feminist campaign in Kuwait operates with a 
different logic than the driving campaign in Saudi Arabia. Much more attention was given to digital 
media and its embedded functionalities in the latter case. On another note, the analysis also brought up 
that the campaign in Kuwait was targeting locals within Kuwait and did not rely on the transnational 




Chapter 8: Conclusions 
 
Following the widespread enthusiasm about the role of digital media in uprisings worldwide such as 
those in Egypt and Tunisia, many scholars have celebrated digital feminist activism as a turning point 
for feminism as a social movement in the MENA region and beyond. Particularly because of its 
apparent horizontality and capacity to facilitate productive dialogues, these researchers argue that 
digital activism represents a new mode or a turning point for feminism in a number of ways. 
 
Yet, the Gulf States have been absent in the discussions that celebrated digital media as a new 
source of empowerment for feminist activists due to the common assumptions that presume the absence 
of feminist movements in this region altogether. Correspondingly, this Ph.D. thesis adopts a 
comparative interdisciplinary perspective that aims to bridge central concepts in social movement 
studies with media and communication studies in order to situate, rather than exceptionalize, the 
current configuration of Gulf feminisms as part of a complex fabric of feminist action in the forms of 
activism, alliances and mobilizations that take place within different arenas, including the digital 
sphere. 
 
The thesis begins with a key concern to explore the ways in which activists and organizations 
have utilized digital media. It reflects on the role of digital media in contemporary feminist activism by 
taking the case study the “Women to Drive” campaign in Saudi Arabia and the “Ensaf” campaign in 
Kuwait. It adopts an integrated, relational approach that is centered around discursive opportunities 
structures, networks and actors’ agency. In doing so, I intend to contribute to a growing body of critical 
research on digital-mediated communications and feminist activism in which countries like Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait with their own social and political particularities have been insufficiently examined. 
Thus, in this concluding chapter, I discuss the major findings of my Ph.D. project, as well as their 
theoretical relevance. In the process, I also elaborate on my study’s main limitations and explain the 
possibilities for future research. 
 
 
8.1 Major Findings 
The four analytical chapters of this thesis have provided empirical evidence in response to four main 
research questions directing the overall direction of this research on feminist activism in Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait: (1) What are activists’ perceptions and experiences while carrying out feminist activism? 
(2) How do we capture the salience of the claims made by activists and the publicly visible side of their 
involvement in the mediated public sphere? (3) How did activists and feminist organizations deploy 
Facebook during feminist campaigns? (4) Who are the main actors involved in networked action on 





In response to the first research question, Chapter 4 sought to adopt an actor centric approach to 
uncover activists’ perceptions and beliefs that accompany their on-ground and online practices in order 
to better understand their sense-making of feminist activism as an agentic practice. The chapter was 
therefore organized into four main sub-sections that covered the interviewees’ reflections on the overall 
configurations and the intra-movement dynamics of the feminist movement; groups’ modes of 
organizing; the ways in which activists define their involvement and the array of actions that they have 
deployed during the campaigns. 
 
The interview data revealed that the activists viewed the contemporary Saudi feminist 
movement as a plural field of contesting perspectives that have been embroiled in profound 
disagreements over a variety of issues, rather than a unified body of thought and practices. While 
plurality is a positive phenomenon, it can also lead to a level of contentiousness that may hinder 
solidarity among different groups. Nonetheless, it emerged that for some, such differences did not 
hinder mutual practical support other nor block the mobilization potential. Instead, they gave way to 
possible cross-fertilization between the claims of different actors that called for the lift of driving ban. 
 
Thus, it came to light from activists’ accounts that the ban on driving brought together women 
from different backgrounds and classes who, in spite of their heterogeneity, managed to produce a 
crucial sense of shared interests and build common understandings of the contentious issue at hand. 
Concerning the mode of organization aspect of the campaign, the interviewees disclosed that they 
generally operated through a decentralized and leaderless network of activist groups and individuals by 
relying on social networking platforms to coordinate and promote their cause. Platforms such as 
Facebook and Twitter actually fulfilled the functions of independent civil society organizations, which 
are currently severely restricted in Saudi Arabia, making it difficult to channel activism into 
institutionalized structures and settings. 
 
The findings of Chapter 4 have also contributed to problematize the idea that digital media as 
non-hierarchical modes of communication have largely replaced the traditional modes of organization 
in social movements. Compared to traditional modes, digital mead lack features such as the existence 
of identifiable leaders or persistent collective identities; some testimonies drew attention to the fact that 
in some cases prominent activists acquired a disproportionate degree of influence, especially on Twitter 
and came to fulfill many of the functions traditionally related with social movement leaders. 
 
The interviews revealed that most of the respondents were more than willing to identify as 
feminists. However, it emerged from the data that plural and heterogeneous visions of feminism 
emanated from the identity and subjectivity of women themselves. The interviewed activists embodied 
different strands and ideologies, rather than one coherent approach to feminism with shared tenets; 
their feminisms were informed by differences of political ideology, class, generation and ways of 




converged on the embrace of feminism as a set of attitudes and actions that support gender equality and 
the advancement of women. 
 
The respondents did not only define and engage with feminism in multiple ways, but also used 
online spaces and digital platforms in different capacities with varying levels of engagement, ranging 
from targeting specific media infrastructures and institutions to gain coverage to engaging in self 
mediated activism, employing different media platforms to promote a cause. When it came down to 
their relationships with technology and the role that digital networking platforms play in their 
understandings and practices of feminism, the interviewees seemed guided by strong visions of social 
change in which digital and network communications featured prominently. Many of them perceived 
digital platforms as allowing a more accelerated and nuanced form of feminist activism. 
 
And finally, when asked about the employed tactics, it came forward that activists engaged in 
multiple forms of action via social media and beyond and developed sophisticated, interrelated 
practices of hybrid synchronization between online and offline action to create and spread content, 
organize, mobilize constituents, promote particular hashtags, spread feminist consciousness and 
document events. Yet not all the testimonies were optimistic. Some activists reflected on their 
experiences with cyberbullying and surveillance and demonstrated an understanding of the double 
functions of digital media as sites of empowerment on the one hand and of surveillance on the other 
 
Hence, I understood the deployment of digital media for feminist activism as a complicated 
process. While digital networking platforms continue to mimic discrimination seen in the offline world 
through the replication of gendered power relations, it simultaneously offers new possibilities to 
participate in feminist related actions. Interviewing and obtaining reflections of the adherents of the 
Kuwaiti feminist movement was also carried out. Interviewees brought up the tensions and 
contradictions within the movement and criticized the predominance of elitist feminism. These tensions 
made reaching a frame unity and consensus in advocating for their objectives a challenging task. Yet 
the activists seemed committed to finding common paths to solidarity through collaborating on the 
issue of nationality, which has found resonance with the civil sector in Kuwait due to its urgency. 
 
Concerning the organizational structure of the movement, the respondents commented on the 
fact that the Kuwaiti feminist movement has operated within institutionalized parameters since the 
early 1960s in the forms of organizations and structures in the pursuit of voice and recognition. Yet, it 
emerged that women’s professional organizations are no longer the only available means for feminist 
activists as informal voluntary groups are on the rise, especially in the post- Arab Spring era. 
 
When asked about their feminist identifications, the Kuwaiti feminist activists demonstrated 
independent trajectories of feminist beliefs and varying ideological positions (e.g., secular, religious, 
modern) that are incredibly complex and potentially contradictory. Some of them located themselves at 




compatibility between religion and the main ideas and ideals of feminism. Few even turned to digital 
activism and drew on the opportunities that the internet and social networking platforms provide to 
embrace new understandings of feminist activism. 
 
However, unlike the Saudi interviewees, many Kuwaiti respondents expressed hesitation 
towards completely relying on digital media to advocate for their causes as they believe they are better 
addressed through institutional channels; digital media can be a complementary component of the 
campaign to augment its connective capabilities. This admission shows that, despite the dissatisfaction 
felt by Kuwaiti activists in relation to the continuation of the status quo, the majority of them still 
believe in the relevance of institutionalized feminist politics as the accepted ways of doing things. 
 
When the respondents were asked about the employed tactic repertoires in relation to the 
“Ensaf” campaign, they revealed that they utilized a wide array of action which included advocating for 
specific policies, resorting to legal and institutional channels, filing periodic reports to transnational 
organizations such as the United Nations, organizing public seminars. They also took advantage of 
social networking platforms to articulate their claims, but perhaps to a lesser degree than Saudi 
activists. Chapter 4 illuminated that both of the campaigns that I examined belong to a heterogeneous 
feminist movement. Within each movement, there were differences in emphasis on the approaches to 
feminist activism, depending on an individual woman’s positions. Nonetheless, at certain times, 
specific issues surfaced that might constitute the focal point around which women gather and activism 
occurs. 
 
Moreover, feminism constitutes a multivalent and contested site for negotiations with the 
present conditions, simultaneously offering visible resistance, cooperation, contentious action and 
immediate opportunities for the articulation of gender-related claims. Digital feminist activism, 
therefore, represents a new iteration of feminist activism, offering new means on which feminist 
activists can capitalize. Similar to feminist activism at large, digital activism is based on critical 
reflections of structural inequalities and may have much to offer the overall movement. 
 
The rise of digital feminist activism is also linked to the advent of a new generation of digitally 
skilled women. As Chapter 4 demonstrates, these women deploy a variety of feminist efforts whether 
digital media is deployed as a replacement to activists’ restricted on the ground activism as in the Saudi 
case or as a complementary component to their institutional means of activism as in the case of Kuwait. 
In either case, women were active agents and constituted intersecting forces fully capable of disrupting, 
subverting, resisting and appropriating a wide ecology of digital media platforms. 
 
In Chapter 5, I examined the salience of the topic of female driving and discriminatory 
citizenship laws in the Saudi and Kuwaiti mediated public spheres. I conducted Political Claim 




different actors who were involved, the action repertoires they used and the framing process at different 
points in time, before and during the mobilization. 
 
Concerning the Saudi case, the findings of the PCA pointed out that the topic of women’s 
driving was extensively covered in the Saudi press in the year of 2011, which coincided with the 
driving campaign, in comparison to the year before. The absence of state actors from the discussions in 
Saudi newspapers was also notable observation. It reinforced the claim that the ban on driving was a 
societal issue that has little to do with state policies. Intuitively the usual addresses of public claims are 
often state actors. The most noticeable target of claims in this case, as mentioned in the press, was 
“society.” Society served as the main addressee for more than half of the reported claims. Besides the 
depoliticalization of the issue of women’s driving, the absence of civil society actors and the 
emergence of grassroots action was also reflected in the findings; feminist activists constituted a new 
category of claim makers in 2011, although they didn’t constitute more than 8% of the overall 
claimants in that year. This low percentage is indicative of the difficulties that activists face to having 
their voices included in mainstream media. 
 
As with regards to the framing process in the Saudi mediated public sphere, the analysis 
demonstrated the relatively low number of reported emancipatory and feminist supporting frames in the 
Saudi press. The topic of women’s driving was rarely featured within a women’s rights lens; this 
absence could be attributed to the fact that the adoption of women’s rights-based discourses is often 
criticized for being anchored in the Western, liberal tradition. Concerning the “Ensaf” campaign in 
Kuwait, evidence from Political Claims Analysis points to the extensive politicization of the nationality 
issue in the Kuwaiti public domain, especially during the year of 2013. 2013 coincided with Kuwait’s 
third parliamentary elections since February 2012, which led many parliamentary candidates and 
politicians to adopt the nationality issue in their pre-election policy agendas to appeal to potential 
female voters. This also explains the counter-intuitive results that I obtained, which indicated that the 
issue of female citizenship rights was more heavily covered in the year that preceded the campaign. 
 
The empirical data of the chapter also pointed to the predominant role that is taken by the civil 
society sector in pushing for a solution for full citizenship rights for Kuwaiti women. Frequent usage of 
constitutional and institutional frames appeared to trigger the highest rate of framing efforts through 
reference to the “rule of law.” Kuwaiti activists frequently argued that women have a constitutional 
right to be treated equally with men according to the constitution and to be considered as equal citizens. 
 
The overall findings of Chapter 5 are significant in the sense that they offer a glimpse into the 
context, structural constraints and dominant ideological framework within which women carried out 
their activism. They also draw attention to how women’s activism is predominately portrayed in 
broader society and presented to the local and international audience. Additionally, the effort of 
different social actors and pressure groups to become visible in the public mediated sphere was also 




digital media to inform their public independently, they still competed to push their issues into 
conventional media agenda in order to reach a broader audience and make them aware of the main 
issues at hand.  
 
Transitioning to Chapter 6, I follow the premise that by ignoring the voices of non-institutional 
actors, especially those from counter-hegemonic movements, conventional media structures have 
unknowingly allowed digital activism to flourish (Cammaerts, 2012). It is not coincidental to see actors 
who are not well represented in the media (as indicated in the previous chapter) to turn to other 
alternative platforms. Certain platforms do indeed amplify the voices of individuals and groups 
otherwise isolated from each other and dismissed by mainstream media and political organizations, as 
seen specifically in the Saudi campaign. 
 
Hence, Chapter 6 first deals with analyzing the content of the driving campaigns’ related 
Facebook pages in order to shed some light on how these pages served as means for feminist 
expression, claims-making, coordination and mobilization. It also illuminates the local appropriations 
and discursive references that occurred through Facebook in relation to the campaign. Because there 
was not a dedicated Facebook page specifically created for the Kuwaiti “Ensaf” campaign, an analysis 
of the Facebook page of the WCSS—the main civil society organization that launched and advocated 
for the nationality campaign—was carried out. Campaigning efforts were included within its official 
Facebook page. 
 
The development of content overtime on Facebook was traced, followed by an analysis of the 
posts which were published by the page’s administrators. The analysis for the Saudi campaign revealed 
the emergence of four main categories of posts: information-related, mobilization-related, feminist-
related and emotional-related and user engagement. The analysis for WCSS showed the emergence of 
four main categories of posts: information-related, activities-related, feminist-related and user 
engagement. 
 
The findings of the qualitative content analysis of two Facebook pages that were dedicated to 
the driving campaigns revealed that both of the Facebook pages converged on disseminating feminist-
related content, which constituted the largest category of coded posts. This category included sharing 
general feminist-related news, featuring news that highlight Saudi women’s achievements, providing 
empowering and motivational content as well as offering feminist critique. It also indicated that both 
Facebook pages played an informative role, through broadly distributing and circulating information 
and that Facebook was instrumentally used as a low-cost channel for the circulation of information and 
sharing real-life updates about the campaign. 
 
The exhaustive analysis of the content disseminated by WCSS revealed that the organization 
did not entirely embrace the full capacities offered by Facebook or incorporate the interactive elements 




audience, ask questions, recruit new members or activists or even involve the page supporters in active 
online discussions to transform them from it passive supporters into active participants. The 
affordances of Facebook (such as likes, shares and events) were not used in a novel way to form online 
based tactics or mobilize and organize the supporters of the campaign into action; the administrators of 
the page rarely posted calls to action, encouraged their followers to take part in any offline activities or 
even detailed the campaign’s evolution and progress. 
 
Due to the predominance of feminist-related posts, an examination of the empirical materials 
that are centered on the representations and manifestations of feminism took place to explore the 
multifaceted understanding and constructions of feminisms that are manifested over Facebook. What 
emerged from the analysis was filled with feminist discourses that echoed locally rooted “lived 
experiences” and emphasized the experiences of women. Secular feminist thought coexisted beside the 
Islamic reformist stance of feminism, which is open to the idea of reinterpretation of religion and 
reconciles the religious discourse about gender equality; the pages demonstrated self-reflexive 
engagement with these ideational approaches to feminism. 
 
In the same vein, while analyzing the content of the feminist-related posts on the WCSS page, it 
was notable that the majority of posts adopted a liberal feminist, rights-based discourse on gender 
equality and referred to the rule of law and constitutional frames while advocating for a secular rule. 
Overall, Chapter 6 demonstrated that Saudi feminist activism’s public communication was enhanced by 
the deployment of platforms such as Facebook through two major opportunities. First, the deployment 
of this platform enabled activists to disseminate information that could not pass print media filters, 
which was touched upon in Chapter 5. Second, it enabled activists to expose their feminist viewpoints 
to the public. 
 
For Saudi feminists, it appeared that the multipurpose use of the embedded functionalities 
allowed them to foster feminist efforts to spread information about feminist causes and other social 
justice issues. They were able to question given social orders and open up new spaces of engagement 
because platforms like Facebook seem to have provided previously excluded and marginalized non-
political actors with the possibilities of engaging in the feminist scene in a way which contrasts with 
the difficulties encountered in trying to be heard via mainstream media. With regards to the Kuwaiti 
case, the analysis uncovered that, although social media platforms provided the potential for the 
engagement of gendered issues and concerns, WCSS did not fully capitalize on its full functionalities 
and did not manage to encourage bilateral communication between the group and its audience. The 
chapter also demonstrated that feminism is not a phenomenon with certain essences, but is it a process 
of collective but subjective constructions with uncertain outcomes that challenges the existing social 
order through gendered claims-making and women-centered discourses. 
 
Finally, Chapter 7 adopted a network-centric approach that connected social movement concepts with 




making sense of the embeddedness of the most active Twitter users in the relational context of the 
campaigns. The Social Networking Analysis revealed that a diverse set of actors was actively engaged 
in the Women to Drive Twitter network. About ten out of the 20 actors who occupied a central position 
in the core network were feminist activists, while the rest took different professional roles, including 
human rights activists, journalists, a political cartoonist, public figures, individuals and general media. 
“Issue-professional” accounts were specifically set up for the campaign, including @Women2Drive 
and @ Free__Manal Twitter accounts. What these core accounts shared was their interest in the issues 
that relate to women’s rights and human rights in general. 
 
What was also observable was the participation of men in the core of the campaign. The driving 
issue was not exclusively depicted as a “women’s issue” that would solely benefit women. Instead, 
men took part in it. The findings also illustrated that it might be useful to look beyond the 
#Women2Drive hashtag’s ephemeral moment of virality. The aggregation of feminist claims and 
critique resulted in a documented archive of experiences and claims, presenting a case for examining 
the renewed feminist politics arising from the conjunction of digital platforms and activism today. As 
regards the Kuwaiti case, it was noted that the campaign didn’t launch any Twitter hashtag to mobilize 
for the campaign, which is an interesting fact in itself. The content analysis of the tweets revealed that 
Twitter was not used as a mobilization platform. 
 
 
8.2 Theoretical Implications 
This part takes the contribution to the existing knowledge one level further. Aggregating the findings of 
the way feminist activists in Saudi Arabia and feminist organizations in Kuwait have utilized digital 
media, this section provides insights on the grand theories that were denoted in the theoretical 
framework chapter to better situate the theoretical implications of this Ph.D. thesis. This thesis 
contributes to the existing theoretical debates on the nexus between feminist activism and digital 
technologies by proposing the an integrated relational approach that moves beyond the technological-
centric lenses that imply a universal manner of using certain platforms and the mere constructivist 
approaches that often privilege the very act of activism but potentially lose sight of the specificities and 
affordances of digital media platforms. 
 
By placing these three interrelated dimensions—discourses, networks and actors’ agencies—at 
the core of my theoretical framework and incorporating them into the analysis, I sought to prioritize a 
relational approach to examine how digital media platforms are connected to the contemporary forms 
of feminist activism in the Arab Gulf States. The proposed relational approach therefore accounts for 
the multiplicity of dimensions underpinning feminist activism and the dialectical interplay between 
technology-mediated practices. 
 
Concerning the first dimension that revolves around the agency of feminist actors, I devoted my 




standpoint of feminist activists concerning the material and socially situated aspects of carrying out 
feminist activism. This dimension, therefore, aimed to reposition feminist activists, their acts and their 
subjectivities from the margin to the center, highlighting by that the hybrid dynamics between 
technologies and actors that are often missing in this field of research. By examining this dimension, I 
have managed to get a grasp of activists’ motivations and tactics leading up to the visible representation 
of feminist action and offer a more nuanced understanding of their sense-making of feminist activism 
as an agentic practice.  
 
To elaborate, focusing on activists’ agency has allowed me to uncover their perceptions and 
experiences in carrying out feminist action and encapsulate their insights. Throughout the interviews, it 
emerged that activists differed in terms of their personal motives for becoming actively engaged in 
activism, priorities, their proclaimed objectives and their level of engagement in feminist action. For 
instance, when the Saudi activists were asked about the employed tactics that they utilized, it came 
forward that they had been engaged in multiple forms of action to make visible the imperceptible 
aspects of the ban on driving and ensure that their claims were seen, read and widely circulated. 
Activists’ testimonies also revealed that for Saudi feminist activists, digital media platforms not only 
extended their existing tactics, but rather constituted the central locus of activism, due to the existing 
restrictions on women’s organization through institutional means. 
 
So, while Saudi activists acknowledged the pivotal role of digital media into the development 
and continuity of the Saudi feminist movement, the majority of Kuwaiti interviewees put an emphasis 
on formalized women’s organizations as enduring structures to pursue sustainable social change. The 
comparison between the two cases has demonstrated that Kuwaiti activists have relied on to a lesser 
extent on digital media for mobilization and to get their message across, as they assigned a 
complementary role to digital media in their feminist efforts that included policy advocacy and 
addressing legal and institutional channels. 
 
The findings that emerged in this thesis concerning the Saudi case support the theoretical 
arguments that digital media can assist in feminist campaigns in the MENA region as well as in the 
struggle against patriarchy and in favor of improving women’s rights (e.g., Gheytanch and Moghadam 
(2014); Lim (2018); Newsom, 2014) and that it facilitated for them the creation of distinctive forms of 
tactical repertoires that were made possible only through digital platforms. While the findings in the 
Kuwaiti case further debunk the view that digital media are used in a universal manner to promote 
sociopolitical change everywhere. 
 
Hence, I believe that utilizing the actor’s agency dimension has allowed me to examine feminist 
activism as a deeply situated act that materializes within and in response to specific societal 
arrangements and does not exist independently from the existing larger sociopolitical structures. This 
attention is conceptually crucial for realizing a more nuanced understanding of feminist activism and 




voices and portrays them as active agents beyond the reductionist accounts that present them as 
passive, misguided subjects. Meanwhile, the second dimension which is rooted in the discursive 
opportunity structures theory was utilized to account for the role of digital media in feminist 
contention, in terms of examining if digital media platforms provide somewhat better opportunities for 
marginalized feminist actors who have no voice in the bourgeois mediated public sphere to carry out 
feminist action than is possible through the available traditional mass media outlets. 
 
Accordingly, the dialectic relationship between the strategies of visibility and discursive content 
enacted by feminist activists and organizations in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were critically explored to 
shed some light on how feminist discourses are articulated within digital media and the mediated public 
sphere as well as to unpack the variations in how feminist references claims are discursively 
constructed and negotiated. Through focusing on this discursive dimension in relation to the driving 
campaign, it was brought up that an important part of the significance of digital media platforms to 
feminist activism- lies primarily in providing activists who could hardly maintain visibility through 
traditional media with the ability to create counter-hegemonic discourses. It also facilitated the process 
of engaging with the multifaceted understanding of feminisms that are manifested over the relevant 
Facebook pages. For instance, the findings captured in Chapter 6 demonstrated the feminist centered 
discourses that rose with the driving campaign are being articulated within a wider set of feminist 
claims and demands that do not end with women’s mobility rights. Such feminist claims and discourses 
appeared to be derived from different feminist frames of references, including secular feminist thought 
and Islamic-reformist stance of feminism. 
 
While the analysis of the feminist coded content of the Kuwait WCSS Facebook page revealed 
that the majority of coded feminist-related posts had adopted a liberal feminist rights-based discourse to 
gender equality and constantly referred to the rule of law and constitutional frameworks while 
advocating for a secular rule, which was not surprising due to the WCSS’s position within the feminist 
scene as a liberal feminist organization that carries an orientation that is quite different from that of the 
more conservative Islamist women’s rights organizations. 
 
Utilizing this dimension also raised the question of what counts as activism and reinforced the 
argument that much feminist activism – as seen in the Saudi case- takes place at the level of discourse 
and the act of making gendered related claims. Feminist activism does not just need resource 
mobilization to undertake its actions, but also entitles some discursive work, which involves “the 
efforts to reinterpret, reformulate, rethink and rewrite the norms and practices of society… its 
[discursive politics’] premise is that conceptual changes directly bear on material ones” (Katzenstein, 
1998, p.17).  
 
The discursive dimension appeared to be the key aspect of the driving campaign and the 




movement theories, which are more accustomed to thinking of feminism as merely visible protest, 
privileging that one mode of organizing over others.  Such traditional theoretical accounts also insist on 
the use of disruptive actions as markers of social movements and cling to the taxonomy of contentious 
political approaches and the protest waves paradigms. These paradigms might not necessarily be 
applicable in different settings, especially authoritarian and semi-authoritarian countries where public 
feminist activity can be potentially a very high cost/high-risk activity.  
 
Lastly, by paying attention to networks, I sought to bridge some key social movement concepts 
with network centrality measures to shed some light on feminist activism in the digital era and draw 
inferences from the relational dimension between networks, content and ties that govern the 
deployment of digitally mediated practices. In terms of the added value of this dimension, viewing 
some elements of the examined feminist campaigns as components of a network can provide us with 
interesting insights not obtainable in any other way. As this dimension re-directs the focus from 
individual traits to relational ties between social actors, points to the larger network of relations 
involved in a particular phenomenon and provides valuable insights about the focal nodes which have 
been active in this mobilization process, uncovering by that important characteristic of the campaign’s 
composition. 
 
To capitalize on the contributions that are offered throughout applying this dimension, I guided 
my research inquiry into the direction of examining the deployment of Twitter by feminist activists and 
organizations in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, in order to capture the essence of the central hubs involved 
at the core of the examined networks, as well as the content that these networks of exchange produce 
for public dissemination and outreach. Hence, my efforts concentrated on evaluating the nodes’ 
prominence of the key users who hold important positions within the core of the Twitter networks of 
the campaigns in the earliest months of mobilization, capturing insights about their roles in the 
relational context of the campaigns and analyze the content that is produced and disseminated by the 
Twitter accounts that claim to be representative of the campaigns. 
 
In essence, I believe that the utilized integrated relational approach offers an important 
contribution to the discussions surrounding the nexus between feminist activism and digital 
technologies, both empirically and in terms of theoretical interventions, paving the way for us as  
researchers to bridge the existing separation between structures, networks and actors’ agency that has 
so far characterized research in this particular domain. I also believe that it has wider applicability 
beyond the circumscribed context of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait that are viewed as critical cases 
illustrative of broader trends that can exist in other settings and contexts.  
 
8.3 Limitations  
While I acknowledge that conducting comparative research has its outstanding merits, I will elaborate 
here on the challenges and limitations that resulted from my application of the comparative approach. 




equivalence at all levels in order to make sure that the comparison is characterized by equally precise 
and equally comprehensive attention paid to all the units compared. 
 
I was also faced with the issue of data unavailability in some instances (Chapter 7). No 
equivalent Twitter hashtag data was available in the Kuwaiti case, which was a finding in itself: 
activists and organizations who were involved in the “Ensaf” campaign did not create campaign-related 
hashtags and did not capitalize on the hashtag function on Twitter. When faced with challenges of this 
kind, I attempted to follow Holtz-Bacha and Kaid’s (2011) advice to ensure the “harmonization of the 
research object and the research method” (p. 397-398) for the sake of guaranteeing the best levels of 
comparability. Relying on triangulation that can reduce the asymmetry as can making proper 
adjustments to the detected differences once realized. 
 
Moreover, due to the peculiarity of the Saudi case, I felt that I treated it in some instances as the 
comparative reference point in this research. Also, since I adopted a comparative perspective, I found it 
challenging to deal with asymmetrical data sources and information.  Additionally, although the 
breadth of access afforded by retrieving online data can be extremely beneficial to the researcher, 
harvesting digital data must always be tempered by an awareness of the different types of limitations 
produced by online retrieval methods. There were also unavoidable limitations to my method of 
retrieving Twitter data, as I faced the practical challenges of data accessibility due to Twitter’s strict 
API policies. These policies put researchers like me at the mercy of the changing limits and access 
policies of social media platforms. At any time, the retrieved results are capped at 1% of the overall 
real-time Twitter traffic volume. 
 
Thus, I found it challenging to access historical data as I was not provided with any institutional 
access to data services providers, nor did I have the financial recourses on my own to purchase Twitter 
data. This issue is common among researchers who are without sufficient financial resources to pay 
premium data costs. Puschmann and Burgess (2013) provided a detailed account of the consolidated 
control over data as a business asset changes, while Bruns and Burgess (2016) drew attention to the 
impact of severe data access restrictions and tight API policies on academic research. Consequently, 
limitations of relying on Twitter relate to the representativeness of such data, as the nature of APIs and 
retrieval algorithms are far from being neutral entities and indeed affect the retrieved data at hand (Van 
Dijck, 2013). Thus, Twitter data collected via the APIs carries implications regarding 
representativeness and the characteristics of the data as a sample of a larger population. 
 
There are also additional limitations concerning the completeness of datasets and how 
representative data is of all Twitter users who participate in a conversation. As noted by Bonilla and 
Rosa (2015), data for research on Twitter hashtags, for example, maybe incomplete as users might 






8.4 Possible Future Research Avenues 
This thesis has opened up many potential avenues for future investigation about feminist activism. 
First, as mentioned already in the introduction, the current study is among very few academic, 
empirically grounded works on activists’ and organizations’ usage of digital media technologies in the 
context of the Arab World. Hence, I believe that there is a promising research opportunity that comes 
along with conducting further research on feminists movements in this context, or to research about the 
Arab Spring as a trajectory on women’s digital mobilization and beyond across the MENA region.  
Moreover, since I have applied a relational approach to the study of feminist activism, I hope 
that I have provided a strong case for future research to adopt the same approach that can extend to 
other contexts, time periods and typologies of women’s movements that operate in different contexts. 
The empirical findings of the chapters in the thesis could also be further supplemented and 
solidified by future research on other dimensions. For example, while the findings of Chapter 5 
supplied evidence of the salience and resonance of activists’ online campaigns in the print media 
agenda, more explicit research could be done on the two-way spillover of content and the online-offline 
transition of issues. The spillover of women-related content from traditional media into activists’ online 
sites would also be an intriguing area of inquiry. Thus, future inter-media or cross-platform research 
might be carried out to examine the online-offline dynamical transition of issues and frames. 
And finally, since I did not have the chance to examine the resonance of feminist discourse on 
digital media platforms, I believe that further research could move the debate forward by investigating 
the public engagement and resonance of the mediated feminist discourses, which would be of great 
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My Right To Dignity. (2012, July 11). Is there anything in our religion that states that women are the 
root of all evil and sins? Or that women are blindly following their emotions and desires 
without using their minds or morals? Please help me to figure this out.. [Facebook status 
update- translated from Arabic]. Retrieved from 
https://www.facebook.com/woman2drive/photos/a.254691737934755/367968023273792/?type
=3 
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dispute among many religious clerks including ibn Taymiyyah, ibn Kathir regarding whether 
God sees women .. [Facebook status update- translated from Arabic]. Retrieved from 
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Abdullah palace in Riyadh to protest the appointing of women in Shoura council. What do you 
want to say to those cowards? [Facebook status update]. Retrieved from 
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The Women's Cultural and Social Society. (2015, September 22). Quotes and references to Maya 
Angelou [Facebook status update- translated from Arabic]. Retrieved from 
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he 
The Women’s Cultural and Social Society. (2015, September 30). Quotes and references to Clare 
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been chosen to honor the United Nations General Assembly resolution of December 10, 1948, 
on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.. [Facebook status update- translated from 




Twitter Data- Quoted Tweets 
 
@KWWNLC. (2013, July  3). Despite the injustice and blatant discriminatory behavior against 
Kuwaiti women who are married to non-Kuwaitis, we as a group reject any calls that would 
endanger people's lives. Thus, we ask you not to join any demonstrations or sit-ins, as it is 
better to address our claims.. [Tweet- translated from Arabic]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/KWWNLC/status/352486983798493184 
@KWWNLC. (2013, July 6). Our group is very thankful for receiving the invitation of the candidate of 
the first constituency Dr. Masouma al-Mubarak, whom we met and who listened to our 
demands. We wish good luck to everyone [Tweet- translated from Arabic]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/KWWNLC/status/353600691345948672 
@KWWNLC. (2013, July  27). After closely monitoring the performance of the Members of 
Parliament in the past period, our group has announced that it supports some upcoming 
candidates. Our choice was difficult as many former deputies have failed us and didn't serve 
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well our cause.. [Tweet- translated from Arabic]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/KWWNLC/status/412283249974207809 
@KWWNLC. (2013, December  15). Our group announces the opening of membership to those 
wishing to join. Please communicate with @kalhendi or @Omfahad_1960. Thank you [Tweet- 
translated from Arabic]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/KWWNLC/status/412283259977207809 
@KWWNLC (2014, February 6). We are going to publicize the campaign in various local media 
outlets. And if this doesn’t work out, we are going internationalize this issue in case we 
exhausted all our means to resolve it internally [Tweet- translated from Arabic]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/KWWNLC/status/431334688557637632 
@KWWNLC (2014, February 6). We prefer to resolve this issue at a local level by reaching out to 
officials and raising awareness about its scope to the pubic through arranging local events and 
seminars  [Tweet] - translated from Arabic. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/KWWNLC/status/431334406888779776 
@KWWNLC. (2014, February  8). The General Coordinator of the Kuwaiti Women without Borders 
group, Alia al-Dulaimi, has contacted the managing director of the Association of Social 
Workers and Board Member Dr. Sana al-Asfour. A date has been set for a meeting regarding 
Kuwaiti women citizenship rights  [Tweet- translated from Arabic]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/KWWNLC/status/432193398515462144 
@Oct26driving (2014, January 2). The live stream broadcast will begin in half an hour with journalist 
and activist Maysa al-Amoudi through the campaign's channel on YouTube. 
https://www.youtube.com/user/oct26driving. [Tweet- translated from Arabic]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/oct26driving/status/415750526169399296 
@Oct26driving. (2014, February 17). We stress the need for an independent judiciary system and the 
implementation of procedural safeguards to protect women’s activists from facing sanctions 
that lack a legal basis  [Tweet- translated from Arabic]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/Women2Drive_/status/113492166474608640 
@Oct26driving (2014, April 12). The Kingdom is bound by the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights to 
guarantee the right of movement for all of its citizens without discrimination based on sex 
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[Tweet- translated from Arabic]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/oct26driving/status/540304028539035649 
@Oct26driving (2015, January 9). One question! How are we supposed to fight religious extremism 
when the government intimidates the activists who fight religious extremists with imprisonment 
and flogging charges? Such as [listing the name of the activists] Suad al-Shammari, Loujin, 
Maysa, Rafiq, and many others?  [Tweet- translated from Arabic]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/oct26driving/status/553532353469890562 
@Oct26Driving. (2014, July  8).  The participation rate in the campaign is promising. People are no 
longer in support of the campaign because of the driving issue, but because they are genuinely 
interested in protecting human rights. [Tweet- translated from Arabic]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/oct26driving/status/486563709771603969 
@Oct26Driving. (2014, December  28). If Martin Luther King and Rosa Parks had been indifferent 
towards the injustices that they faced, African Americans would still be barred from entering 
white restaurants and being treated as full humans. [Tweet] - translated from Arabic. Retrieved 
from https://twitter.com/oct26driving/status/549131459580022784 
@Oct26driving. (2015, March 18). The demands to allow women to drive have continued through the 
reigns of three kings, two Gulf wars, the revolutions of the Arab Spring and at every single time 
we are being told that the time is not right. When is the right time then?  [Tweet] - translated 
from Arabic. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/oct26driving/status/578192593193807873 
@Oct26driving. (2015, December 16). $30 billion have been given to Egypt in the form of financial 
assistance package, while Saudi women remain confined and not able to move freely, needing 
to hire drivers which takes a toll on their budgets. Until when this will continue?  [Tweet- 
translated from Arabic]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/oct26driving/status/676985858445156358 
@WCSS_Q8. (2014, March  19). Photos for the celebrations that took place in the headquarters of the 
Office of the United Nations in Kuwait on the occasion of International Women's Day under the 




@WCSS_Q8. (2014, April  24). The Administrative Court overturns the Ministry of Justice’s decision 
to allow only males to apply for the post of prosecutor [Tweet- translated from Arabic]. 
Retrieved from https://twitter.com/WCSS_Q8/status/460705042035933184 
@W2Drive.  (2011, June 6). More than 70000 signed a petition 2drop all charges against 
@manal_alsharif http://bit.ly/kg7EIL #Women2Drive #FreeManal #Sawagna #KSA #News 
[Tweet- translated from Arabic]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/Women2Drive_/status/77512884074196992 
@W2Drive.  (2011, June 17). Don't confine yourself by driving in the back alleys without being seen. 
This act needs witnesses [Tweet- translated from Arabic]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/Women2Drive_/status/81765716260425728 
@W2Drive.  (2011, June 17). For those who are willing to drive, the purpose of this action is not to 
drive discreetly to avoid being caught, but to declare your resistance to the ban publicly. Even if 
you get caught, it is a recognition of the exercise of your right and your resistance [Tweet] - 
translated from Arabic. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/Women2Drive_/status/81765388509118464 
@W2Drive. (2011, June 22). The Saudi Princess Ameera Altaweel announces that she will drive her 
own car in defiance of the ban. #Women2Drive #SaudiWomen #WomenRights #KeepDriving 
[Tweet- translated from Arabic]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/Women2Drive_/status/83270644460040192 
@W2Drive. (2011, June 22). The Saudi religious clerk Salman Alawdah backs up women's driving 
http: // youtu.be/EM6xU_rXmwA [Tweet- translated from Arabic]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/Women2Drive_/status/115190966285123585 
@W2Drive. (2011, September 13). Our campaign is concerned with all women's issues in the country 
For those who accuse us of dismissing more important women's issues, we have one simple 
question: what have you done to address these important issues? [Tweet- translated from 
Arabic]. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/Women2Drive_/status/114668544695861248 
@W2Drive. (2011, September 13). The objective of our campaign is to end all forms of discrimination 
against women and to restore their rights, which have been limited by the current restrictive 
social traditions that are contrary to the Islamic Shari'a [Tweet- translated from Arabic]. 
Retrieved from https://twitter.com/Women2Drive_/status/113492166474608640 
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@W2Drive.  (2011, September 27). A Saudi hashtag #women2king has been launched. It might help 
Saudi women to speak up [Tweet- translated from Arabic]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/Women2Drive_/status/118684015304769538 
@Women2Drive. (2012, April 12). Most of the Saudi decisions on women's rights are in sum: 
preventing women from halal  actions so that men do not fall into haram  actions. [Tweet- 
translated from Arabic]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/W2Drive/status/111679016481722370 
@W2Drive. (2012, July 8).  We changed the link to our facebook page after it has been blocked in 
Saudi.The new link is http://facebook.com/right2dignity #Women2Drive #Right2Dignity 
[Tweet- translated from Arabic]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/Women2Drive_/status/222037923606966272 
@W2Drive. (2012, July 19). Women’s fate, regardless of their age, still hangs in the hands of their 
fathers/husbands/male judges, while the Ministry of Justice is still discussing the codification of 
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is sponsored by the Kuwaiti government, November 4, 2018. 
 
Interview 16 – Skype interview with Khalood al-Hindi, from the “Kuwaiti Women without Borders” 
group, December 11, 2018. 
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The Codebook for the Political Claim Analysis 
 
 
Defining Political Claims  
PCA originates within the field of social movement studies and is generally associated with Ruud 
Koopmans (Koopmans and Statham 1999a, Koopmans and Statham 1999b, Koopmans and Statham 
2002, Koopmans 2002, Koopmans and Erbe 2004, Koopmans et al 2005, Koopmans 2007). It has been 
developed to bring together the two relevant methodological strands of social movement studies, 
Protest event analysis (PEA) and (qualitative) frame analysis (Snow et al. 1986; Gamson & Modigliani 
1989), as it tries to establish the missing link between actors and contents by employing a distinct set of 
methods, particularly a classification of actors as well as frames on a one-dimensional pro/contra scale 
and time series graphs of discourse activity. 
Hence, it was firstly proposed by Koopmans and Statham (1999) to overcome the weaknesses of 
protest event analysis and to expand its scope by collecting data not just on the actors and forms of 
action, but also on the interpretations by actors involved in political encounters. Thus, it takes as the 
central focus instances of claims-making, where claims-making refers to ‘a unit of strategic action in 
the public sphere that consists of a purposive and public articulation of political demands, call for 
action, proposals, criticism or physical action that addresses the interest of the claimants and/or other 
collective action’ (Koopmans et al, 2005). Thus, claims must be the result of purposive action and 
political in nature. 
Accordingly, the act of claims making is normally broken down into such elements as: a claimant, an 
actor who makes a demand, proposal, appeal or criticism; an addressee, who is the target of the 
criticism or support; an object actor, whose interests are affected by the claim; and finally the 
substantive content of the claim, which states what is to be done (aim) and why (frame) (Koopmans & 
Erbe, 2002). 
Consequently, each time an actor makes a claim, this action or statement is manually coded along with 
various other variables containing information about the actor, the context, addressees, opponents, 
aims, and frames, among others. Consequently, the main objective of PCA is to “trace the shifting 
alliances and oppositions between actors that evolve in the dynamic process of a political conflict” 
(Koopmans & Statham, 1999).In that regards, I draw on the PCA codebooks developed for large-scale 
comparative European projects, notably, The Transformation of Political Mobilization and 
Communication in European Public Spheres (Europub) (Koopmans 2002), Mobilization on Ethnic 
Relations, Citizenship and Immigration (MERCI) (Koopmans et al. 2005), Finding a Place for Islam in 
Europe: Cultural Interactions Between Muslim Immigrants and Receiving Societies (EurIslam) 
(UNIGE 2010), Support and Opposition to Migration: A Cross-National Comparison of the 
Politicization of Migration (SOM) (Berkhout and Sudulich 2012), Multicultural Democracy and 
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Immigrants’ Social Capital in Europe: Participation, Organisational Networks, and Public Policies at 
the Local Level (Localmultidem) (Palacios and Morales 2013).1 
 
However, PCA has come under criticism for its reliance on newspaper data, which makes it vulnerable 
to selection, description and researcher bias (Mugge 2012). Due to editorial preferences, contentious 
and large-scale events are more likely to be covered (Ibid). Moreover, there may be errors in the 
reporting of events, and researchers may interpret codes differently regardless of the sophistication of 
the codebook (Ibid). Mugge (2012) suggests combining newspaper data with ethnographic research to 
tackle these three biases and provide more depth. Thus, this project does not rest wholly on PCA and 
this codebook therefore only assists in one part of the data collection effort.  
 
Newspapers as Sources 
Taking news as the important source of empirical data for identifying which specific issues are salient 
at a given time, and within a given country is a useful starting point for our proposed method. Hence, 
when aggregated, this combination of salient issues will provide an empirically based measure for the 
‘public discourse’ within a country, at a specific time and place. 
Moreover, newspapers are one of the most important sources for retrieving information on significant 
topics and events. Compared to other media, such as Television, Radio, or Internet, newspapers 
produce a more detailed and more (cross-nationally) standardized format, and contain more of the type 
of elaborated political information that we aim to retrieve. There are also practical considerations. 
Newspaper sources also allow us to cover earlier periods, enabling the actual recording and coding in 
different countries to take place at different paces. 
Thus, to determine the extent of the public discourse, claims will be recorded by coding newspapers. 
Hence, for the three countries in my case selection, I selected three daily national newspapers, one in 
English, in addition to two quality daily national newspapers in Arabic, preferably one left- and one 
right-orientated, or more conservative to more liberal. This is to have a broader overview of different 
political opinions and views.  
Focusing on the (part of the) public discourse represented in the newspapers does not imply that these 
are the only arenas where claims are presented. In particular, some actors are less dependent upon the 
mass media, as they enjoy direct access to decision makers; others are less able to influence the mass 
media and therefore need to resort to alternative communication channels, where the PCA will be 
conducted later on.1 
                                                
 




Unit of Analysis  
Similarly to the previous PCA codebooks, my unit of analysis is instances of claims-making, not 
articles. Hence, I also adopt Koopmans’ definition of a claim as ‘a purposive and public articulation of 
political demands, calls to action, proposals, criticisms or physical attacks, which actually or 
potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the claimants, and/or other collective actors’ (2007). 
Therefore, all acts were included in the data which involved demands, criticisms, or proposals relating 
the matters which are linked to the selected campaigns. 
Such a unit of strategic action may involve several actors acting in concert, it may extend over several 
days or even longer, and it may involve coordinated action over a larger geographical area 
simultaneously. An instance of claim-making is NOT identical with individual statements. E.g., at a 
press conference a speaker may make several statements, perhaps even on completely different topics. 
Nevertheless, this is one instance of claim-making because both statements are made in the context of 
one strategic action in the public sphere.  
An individual or collective subject must be present in order for a statement/action to count as an 
instance of claim-making. The subject may not be missing in the case of verbal statements. 
Additionally, simple attributions of attitudes or opinions to actors by the media or by other actors do 
not count as claim-making. Neither do speculations about opinions or actions of others.  
Moreover, in his codebook for the Europub project, Koopmans (2002) breaks down a claim into seven 
main components, for each of which a number of variables have been constructed. 
1. Location of the claim in time and space (WHEN and WHERE is the claim made?) 
2. Claimant (WHO makes the claim?) 
3. Form of the claim (HOW is the claim made?) 
4. Addressee of the claim (AT WHOM is the claim addressed?) 
5. Substantive issue of the claim (WHAT is the claim about?) 
6. Object actor (FOR/AGAINST WHOM is the claim?) 
7. Justification for the claim (WHY should this action be undertaken?) 
In a simple form: at a time and place (1) an event occurs, where an actor (2) mobilizes a speech act (3) 
that raises a claim about an issue (4) which addresses another actor (5) calling for a response, on the 
basis of a justifying argumentation (6). The claim is made with reference to a public constituency, 
whose interests are affected (7).  
Compared to traditional media content analysis methods, this approach captures more detail on the 
interactive and argumentative structure of public communication. By focusing on actors, their speech 
acts and issues, the concept of ‘event’ is expanded beyond description of ‘what happened’ to a focus on 
the ‘meaning that was attributed to what happened’. This approach retrieves data on the public 
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discourses around events. Importantly, it codes precisely the type of information on the values and 
meanings attributed by collective actors to events. 
Nonetheless, Koopmans (2002) acknowledges that it is not always possible to retrieve information on 
all seven aspects, and that as such, the minimum information needed is that on the form of the claim, 
substantive issue, object actor or justification. I thus follow Koopmans in coding claims that contain 
this minimum level of information. Hence, it is important to note that claims tend to be incomplete and 
consist of only several of the abovementioned aspects.  
 
Sampling Procedure 
As with regards the practical steps in relation to the procedure of sampling, I have selected specific 
newspapers to locate and code claims pertaining to 3 women’s related campaigns: the women’s to drive 
campaign in Saudi Arabia, the personal status law campaign in Bahrain, and the campaign for 
nationality law in Kuwait. For the Arabic newspapers, I used the built-in search query function in the 
official website’s of the selected newspapers, and for the English newspapers, I used ProQuest, which 
is among many other things, a digital news archives service, which provides a single source for 
newspapers, reports, and datasets along with millions of pages of digitized historical primary sources. 
Moreover, I complemented this by conducting a further data retrieving procedure through the 
restricted domain search feature which is available through Google. 
 
The electronic search procedure for the Arabic content newspaper is described below: 
1- Go to the official website of each newspaper. 
2- Enter the relevant keywords in the search bar.  
3- Select the appropriate date ranges if this feature was available, otherwise manually check 
the date of the article.  
4- Start determining if each article contains relevant claims. 
 
While, the electronic search procedure for the English content is described below: 
1- Go to ProQuest. 
2- Click on the publication section, enter the name of the selected newspaper, pick it as a 
source and then search within it.  
3- Enter the relevant keywords in the search bar. 
4- Use OR connectors, to broaden a search and retrieve records containing any of the 
words it separates, as well as truncation to include word variations. 
5- Select the appropriate date ranges.  




The Identification Process of Claims and Articles  
The coding procedure begins by identifying and retrieving articles that are relevant for coding. Instead 
of reading through each newspaper article, checking the headline, the photos (if present), and reading 
the first 200 words plus headline of the main text would suffices (of course, if it is perfectly clear from 
headline and lead that the article is not relevant, then reading the first 200 words is not necessary 
either).  
Moreover, if the 200 word-limit falls in the middle of a sentence, the rest of that sentence should still 
be included in determining whether the article should be added to the sample or not. If this body of text 
contains a reference to one of the seven elements, the article should be coded. In all other remaining 
cases (even if there is a reference to one of our topics further down in the article text), the article should 
be disregarded.  
In applying the 200 words-rule, it is of course not the idea to start counting words for each article. The 
most efficient way to go about this is to determine how many lines of text in the article correspond to 
about 200 words; that way counting the lines suffices.  
The next step involves identifying if the article contains any claims which are related to my main topics 
under consideration. This is best done on a copy or printout of the article, where it is possible to mark 
and number the claims. If the article contains no claims, neither by third actors, nor by the journalist or 
guest commentator, then the coding takes places on the article level only.  
Additionally, like the prior work which has been conducted on PCA, I conceptualize a claim as being 
the result of purposive strategic action on the part of the claimant(s), and political in nature. Thus, to 
code instances of claim-making, I similarly draw the following conditions: 
 
• The text must include a reference to an ongoing or concluded physical or verbal action in the 
public sphere. This includes attributions of positions, activities or opinions to actors by 
journalists. However, attributions of a claim by other political actors do not count as claim-
making on the part of the actor to whom it is attributed.  
• I do not count the presentation of survey results as an instance of claims-making, unless they are 
used by the organizers of the survey to make a political point (e.g. to formulate demands or 
criticize other actors). However, in this case, either the journalist reporting this, or the 
organizers of the survey are the claimants, not those part of the survey sample. Additionally, 
interviews with random people by journalists are treated like surveys, and therefore, the 
statements by these random citizens are not strategic claims by the respondents.  
• Claims are usually phrased in active terms and include terms such as “said”, “stated”, 
“demanded”, “criticized”, “published”, “voted”, “wrote”, “demonstrated”, “decided”, “arrested” 
etc. Nouns referring to such actions include: “statement”, “letter”, “speech”, “decision”, 
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“petition”, etc. The occurrence of such verbs or nouns indicating action is a precondition for the 
coding of a claim. Simple attributions of attitudes to actors by others so not count as claim-
making. Additionally, statements that only refer to speculations about the attitudes and actions 
of others are not coded. Finally, verbal statements by anonymous actors, for which neither the 
name nor the institutional affiliation, nor their social group, are detailed, are not coded as 
claims. 
• Since claims must be political, they must relate to collective social problems and solutions to 
them, and not refer to individual strategies of tackling isolated problems.  
• Journalist claims in such articles may be coded if they qualify as claims. 
• A single instance of claim-making may consists of various claims. An actor can thus make 
multiple claims at a time, each of which requires separate coding. For instance, if an actor 
formulates three different demands to three separate addressees, three claims should be coded. 
Claims cannot have multiple addressees as those should be coded as new claims, as described in 
the previous point.  
 
• A claim can be made by multiple actors if the claimants act in concert, the claim takes place at 
the same location in time and place. However, exceptions include: a) substantially identical 
statements by the same actor on different days or in different localities, b) if speakers in the 
same location in space express substantially different and strategically incompatible claims, 
these are coded as separate claims, c) part of peaceful demonstration breaking away from the 
march. However, if there is temporal or spatial continuity between actions, then these should be 
coded as one instance of claim-making (e.g. ongoing hunger strike involving the same 
claimants and aims, actions by the same actors with the aims in different localities on the same 
day).  
 
• A claim should at the minimum have information on the form, issue, object actor, or 
justification (i.e.frame) to be coded. While, missing values are coded as 999. 
 
In sum, a claim may: a) involve several subject actors acting in concert, b) have only one addressee, c) 
extend over more than a day, and d) simultaneously cut across geographical areas. The process of 
identifying claims is similar to Haunss and Kohlmorgen (2008: 8): the first step involves identifying if 
the article contains any claims relating to the issues which are relevant to the campaigns which are 
included in my my case selection. This is done on a printout of the article, where I can mark and 
number the claims. If there are no relevant claims, the coding stops at the article level.  
 
Therefor, instances of claims-making have been included irrespective of their form, and range. Actors 
making claims have been coded regardless of their type, which means that my sample included civil 




Missing Values  
Unless otherwise indicated, the zero code has a substantive meaning 'no' or 'none', or sometimes 
‘neutral’ and should not be used for missing information. The codes 9, 99, 999, 9999, etc. (depending 
on the number of reserved digits for the variable) are reserved for 'missing' or 'unknown' values . They 
should only be used where there is a strong suspicion that the correct coding is not 'no' or 'none' even 
though the newspaper article does not contain the information.  
Summary of Variables  
The tables below provide a summary of the variables included in the analysis. Further description is 
provided in the following sections.   
 
















The date of publication of the 
article 
ARTDATE  
Title Heading or title of article 
 
ARTTITLE 
Name of publication Name of publication containing 




Genre  Journalistic genre of news 
source containing the article 
 
ARTGENRE 




Main topic Is one of our themes the main 
topic of article 
ARTMAINTOP 




Claim-level Variables  
 
Concept  Description Variable(s) 
 
Location & Date 
 
Where and when does the 






Subject Actor  
 













How is the claim made? 
 
FORM 
Addressee, Opponent and At whom is the claim  
                                                
 
2 x is not used in the naming of variables, but is replaced by numbers, to identify whether the variable 
refers to the first/second/third subject actor etc. This is the same for other categories. 
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Supporter  directed? Who 









































1) x is not used in the naming of variables, but is replaced by numbers, to identify whether the 
variable refers to the first/second/third subject actor etc. This is the same for other categories. 
 Description of the Article -level Variables  3 
 
Variable name: ARTID 
Variable label: Article Identification Number 
Note: Assigned automatically when a new article is coded. 
 
Note: running count per year and per newspaper 1-9999; restart with 1 in a new year or for another 
newspaper. A unique identification number for each article will be composed afterwards from PAPER, 
AYEAR, and ARTID. The number only serves identification purposes in the data file and on paper or 
electronic copies of the article. It is therefore no problem if there are gaps or 'jumps' in the count of 
article numbers. E.g., if you decide to delete a coded case, you can do so without altering the numbers 
of other cases. Note that continuations of an article on a different page are still considered as part of the 
same article.  
 
Variable name: ARTDATE 
Variable label: Date of publication of article 
Note: dd/mm/yyyy 
 
Variable name: ARTTITLE 
Variable label: Heading or title of article 
Note: String variable  
 
Variable name: ARTPAPER 
Variable label: Name of the newspaper containing the article  
                                                
 
3 Unless otherwise stated, all variables are numeric. 
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Note: Numeric value 
Value labels: 
1 = Al-Riyadh newspaper 
2 = Al-Jazirah newspaper 
3 = Arab News newspaper  
4 = Alanbaa newspaper  
5 =Alrai newspaper   
6 = Kuwait Times newspaper 
 
Variable name: ARTGENRE 
Variable label: Journalistic genre of news source containing the article 
Value labels:  
1 = news article (i.e. day to day coverage of events) 
2 = Background article (e.g. correspondents’ background report, analysis, feature,  documentation)   
3 = Interview (of the newspaper itself; references to interview statements drawn from other sources are 
coded as 1 or 2)   
4 = opinion/commentary piece by a guest author/columnist/other media actor 
 
Filter variable: Variable name: ARTSELECT 
Variable label: Does the article contain relevant claims? 
Value labels:  
0 = no (stop coding) 
1 = yes, but only already coded ones   
2 = yes, include new claims ( continue to claim-level variables) 
Note: if an article contains claims, but those were already coded in another article, they are not coded 
again. The article is then treated similarly to articles that do not contain claims at all. For articles 
containing claims, information on main actor, topic, and scope of the article can be derived from the 
main claim (the first coded claim in the article, defined as “the claim around which the information (in 
as far as relevant to our seven fields) in the article is organized”, see further below under CID). This is 
not only economical and avoids double coding of the same information, but also allows us to link the 
full detail of the claim coding to the article level: e.g., information on addressees, frames, forms, etc.  
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IF 2 > END OF ARTICLE LEVEL CODING: IF 0 or 1 > ON TO ATOPIC  
Variable name:  ARTMAINTOP 
‘Is one of our themes the main topic of article?’  
0= no  
1 =yes  
Variable name: ARTTOPIC (only for ARTTOPIC =10, string variable)  
 
Variable label: Main form of topics addressed in article  
Value labels: 
1= Women’s driving 
2 =Women’s mobility 
3= Women’s rights in general  
4= Women’s empowerment 
5= Women’s married to foreigners 
6= Nationality law 
7= Other 
 
End of article level coding  
 Description of claim-level Variables 
 
1. Identification and Location  
 
Variable name: CLAIMID  
Variable label: Identification number of the claim  
Note: Automatically assigned, hierarchically related to ARTID, and count (1-99) within each article.  
The main claim of the article gets CLAIMID=1. Subsequent claims within the article get 
CLAIMID=2,3, etc. Each claim is coded in only one article. If the main claim of an article has already 
been coded in another article, but the article contains other claims that were not coded yet, the second 




Variable name: CLAIMDESCR 
Variable label: description of claim 
Notes: String variable that contains at least the main actor(s), form, addressee, object actor and frame if 
available.  
 
Variable name: CLAIMLOC (only for CLAIMLOC =8, string variable) 
Variable label: Location where the claim is made 
Value labels: 
1 = Saudi Arabia  
2 = Kuwait 
3 = Other Arab Gulf states 
4 = Other Middle Eastern countries 
5 = EU 
6 = North American country  
7 = Other  
  
Variable name: CLAIMDATE 
Variable label: Date of claim 
Note: dd/mm/yyyy 
 
Note on the coding of the date in the absence of explicit information in the article: If the article does 
not mention the date of a claim, the default option is to code it on the day before the newspaper issue 
(i.e., "yesterday").  
 
2. Subject actors 
The subject actor or claimant is the most important part of the claim, without it cannot exist. Here, I 
coded the functional type (government, civil society etc.), the scope (local, regional etc.) and the name 
of the actor. This information is registered in a separate list which is used for subsequent data entry. 
This should improve consistency across claims and increase coding efficiency.  
 
Variable name: ACTOR1NAME (ACTOR2NAME, ACTOR3NAME) 
Variable label: Full name of the actor. Format: Huda, Alsahi, etc.  




Variable name: ACTOR1ORG (ACTOR2ORG, ACTOR3ORG) 
Variable label: Organizational affiliation of first subject actor  
Value labels: string variable  
 
Variable name: ACTOR1SUM4 (ACTOR2SUM, ACTOR3SUM) (only for ACTORxSUM =8, 14, 
20, 29, 36 ,  42, 48, 54, 61,63,64, 65, 75,  string variables) 
Variable label: Summary of first subject actor  
Value labels:  
1. = None (only used for second and third actors) 
2. = Whole polities (if names of whole polities like ‘Saudi Arabia’, ‘Kuwait’, ‘ ‘the EU’ are 
used) 
3. = Parliamentary candidates 
4. = Head of states/ crown prince/King 
5. =Saudi government/executive  
6. = Kuwaiti government/executive  
7. =Other GCC states governments/executives 
8. =Middle Eastern governments/executives 
9. = Foreign government/executive – govs  
10. = Saudi legislatives 
11. = Kuwaiti legislatives 
12. =Other GCC states legislative 
13. =Middle Eastern legislative 
14. = Foreign legislatives  
15. = Saudi judiciary  
16. = Kuwaiti judiciary  
17. =Other GCC states judiciary 
18. =Middle Eastern judiciary 
19. = Foreign judiciary 
20. =Saudi police and internal security agencies   
21. =Kuwaiti police and internal security agencies   
                                                
 
4 If a claim has more than one actor, I apply the following priority rules used in the Europub project: 1) actors 
mentioned as leaders/spokespersons/organisers take precedence, 2) organisations have priority over unorganised 
collectivities, 3) active actors or speakers have priority over passive audiences. If there are several actors and 
none has priority according to these criteria, the order with which they are mentioned in the article decides. If 




22. = Saudi state executive agencies specifically dealing with women 
23. = Kuwaiti state executive agencies specifically dealing with women 
24. = Other GCC states executive agencies specifically dealing with women 
25. = Middle Eastern states executive agencies specifically dealing with women 
26. = Foreign state executive agencies specifically dealing with women  
27. = Intergovernmental organisation specifically dealing with women 
28. = Saudi opposition/ activist  
29. = Kuwaiti opposition / activist  
30. = Other GCC states opposition 
31. = Middle Eastern opposition    
32. = Foreign political party 
33. = Saudi media and journalists  
34. =Kuwaiti media and journalists  
35. = Other GCC countries media and journalists  
36. = Middle Eastern media and journalists 
37. = Foreign media and journalists 
38. = Saudi think tank/researcher/intellectual / public figure 
39. = Kuwaiti think tank/researcher/intellectual/public figure 
40. = Other GCC states think tank/researcher/intellectual/ public figure 
41. = Middle Eastern think tank/researcher/intellectual/ public figure 
42. = Foreign think tank/researcher/intellectual/ public figure 
43. = Saudi women’s NGO 
44. = Kuwait women’s NGO 
45. = Other GCC states women’s NGO 
46. = Middle Eastern women’s NGO 
47. = Other national women’s NGO 
48. = Transnational women’s NGO 
49. = Saudi human rights NGO/ general NGO/ Association 
50. = Kuwaiti human rights NGO/ general NGO/ Associsation 
51. = Other GCC states human rights NGO 
52. = Middle Eastern human rights NGO 
53. = Other national human rights NGO 
54. = Other transnational human rights NGO 
55. = Other civil society organizations and groups  
56. = Saudi cybergroup/campagin 
57. = Kuwaiti cybergorup/campagin 
58. = Saudi religious figure/s 
59. = Saudi religious organisation 
60. = Kuwaiti religious figure/s  
61. = Kuwaiti religious organisation 
62. = Other type of organisation 




64. Individuals  
65. 65/another actor 
999 =Missing value  
 
Variable name: ACTOR1TYPE (ACTOR2TYPE, ACTOR3TYPE) 






4= Religious Figure 
5=State instiuations/ figures 
6= organization / NGos/ commitee 
7= named spokesperson(s) for organization/institution 
8= unorganized collective  -group members  
9=Intellectuals/ judges/ public figures/candidates 
10=Others 
Note 0= N/A if there is not second and/or third subject actors 
Variable name: ACTOR1SCOPE (ACTOR2SCOPE, ACTOR3SCOPE) 
Variable label: Scope of first actor  
Note: The notion of “scope” refers to the organizational extension of the organization or institution. In 
the case of non-organized collective actors (e.g., 'protesters') it refers to the scope of mobilization. The 
scope of the claim 
Value labels: 
0=N/A  
1 = transnational (e.g. intergovernmental organizations such as the UN, EU, Arab League)  
2 = translocal (e.g. diaspora organizations) 
3 = national (national-level organizations, political societies, etc.) 
4 = regional (regional branches of national organizations) 
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5 = local (local governments, local women’s NGOs, etc.) 
999 = unclassifiable  
 
3. Form of Claims 
Claimsmaking includes a broader range of behaviours than that is commonly understood as ‘a political 
claim’. This is important when identifying claims in newspaper articles; for instance, parliamentary 
motions, executive action and think-tank reports are all acts of claimsmaking.  
 
Variable name: FORM  
Variable label: form of claim 
Note: if there are several forms of action, the following priority rules apply: 1) political decisions and 
executive action have priority; 2) the category verbal statement is only used if none of the other 
categories applies; 3) among protest forms, the more radical (confrontational, violent) ones have 
priority over moderate ones (demonstrative, petitioning). If these criteria still not allow a decision, the 
order in which the forms are mentioned decides.  
Value labels: 
 
1 Formal political actions and decisions  
 (only for FORM = 109, string variable)  
 
101 = Royal Decree  
102 = legislation (proposal)   
103 = Parliamentary vote  / passage 
104 = parliamentary motion (non-legislative)  / QUESTION 
105 = resolution/ RULING COURTS (political societies, etc.)   
106 = ruling (courts)  / COMITTE REPORT  
107 = binding agreement (among several parties)  / agreement  
108 = Administrative decrees / decisions (e.g. management or personnel decisions like 
resignation/dismissal from/appointment to office)  




 2 Executive Action  (only for FORM = 203, string variable)  
 
201 = financial and other material support  
 
202 = repressive measure (e.g. arrest, ban, raid) 
 
203 = other  
 
3 Judicial Action5  (only for FORM = 305, string variable)  
 
301= criminal lawsuit   
302 = civil lawsuit   
303 = administrative lawsuit   
304 = constitutional lawsuit   
305 = other  
4 Verbal Statements   (only for FORM = 412, string variable)  
 
401 = non-specified statement  
 
402 = press statement/conference/release 
 
403 = public speech  
 
404 = interview 
 
405 = public letter or or newspaper article  
                                                
 
5 Appeals to the judiciary, not actions by the judiciary. 
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406 = other publication (book, research report, leaflet, etc.)/ Ongoing project  
 
407 = graffiti  
408 = presentation of survey/poll results/ report recommendations 
 
409 = campaigning 
 
410= meetings (conventions, campaign meeting, etc.)  
411= Online action (Twitter, website) 
 
412 = other verbal statement  
 
5 Meetings  (only for FORM = 505, string variable)  
 
501=   state-political meeting (e.g., summits, state visits) 
502=   party convention/congress   
503=   parliamentary session/debate  / Committee in Parliament  
504=   election campaign meeting   
505=  other conferences/meetings/assemblies  
 
6 Petitioning / lobbying (only for 603 = 8, string variable)  
 
601 = petition/signature collection  
 
602 = letter   
 




7 Street politics’/ Challenging acts  (only for FORM = 707, string variable)  
 
701 = public assembly  
 
702 = march, demonstration (legal and non-violent) 
 
703= strike 
704= confrontational protests 
705= Challenging act  
706 = cyber protest 
707= other  
4. Addressee, Opponent and Supporter6 
A claim potentially constitutes a relationship between actors. The subject actor could call upon, 
criticize or support, other political actors. When it does so, this actor is the addressee of the claim. The 
subject actor relates to the addressee in the public discourse, so the addressee need not be involved in a 
material sense. Addressee are explicitly mentioned in the article and must be concrete organized actors, 
potentially making counter claims. The type of relationship (supporting, opposing) is coded, and the 
same variables as with the subject actor are coded (name, scope, etc.) 
 
In this section, I adopt the Europub’s classification of three types of addressees/indirect object actors:  
 -  the addressee of the claim in the narrow sense of the word, referring to the actor who is held 
responsible for implementing the claim or at whom the claim is directly addressed in the form of a call 
or appeal to do or leave something;   
 -  the opponent/criticized actor identified in the claim, referring to the actor who is seen as standing 
in the way of the claim's realization or advocating a position contrary to that of the claimant;   
                                                
 
6 I follow previous codebooks in distinguishing between the identified addressee, opponent and supporter of 
claim. I use the definitions provided by Haunss and Kohlmorgen (2008: 29) in their codebook. The address 
refers to “the actor at whom the claim is directly addressed in the form of a call or appeal to do or leave 
something.” The opponent/criticised actor refers to “the actor who is seen as standing in the way of the claim’s 
realisation or advocating a position contrary to that of the claimant”. The supported actor refers to “the actor who 




-  the supported actor, referring to the actor who is seen as contributing to the claim's realization or 
advocating a position congruent with that of the claimant.   
If there are more than one addressee, criticized actor or supported actor, the following priority rules 
apply: (1) organizations or institutions (or their representatives) have priority over unorganized 
collectivities or groups; (2) state actors have priority over non-state actors. If these rules do not allow a 
decision, use the order in which the addressee or criticized actor are mentioned, unless it is possible to 
find a priority rule according to other information in the article.  
Variable name: ADRNAME 
Variable label: personal name of addressee 
Note: string variable  
 
Variable name: ADRORG 
Variable label: name or organisation addressee is affiliated with  
Note: string variable  
Variable name: ADRSUM 
Variable label: summary addressee of claim 
Value labels: same as ACTOR1SUM 
 
Variable name: ADRSCOPE 
Variable label: scope of addressee 
Value labels: same categories as ACTOR1SCOPE 
 
Variable name: ADREVAL 
Variable label: evaluation of addressee  
Value labels:  
-1 = criticism 
0 = neutral 
1 = support  
99= N/A 




Variable name: OPPNAME 
Variable label: name of opponent actor of claim 
Note: string variable  
 
Variable name: OPPORG 
Variable label: organizational affiliation of opponent actor of claim  
Note: string variable  
 
Variable name: OPPSUM  
Variable label: summary of opponent actor of claim  
Value labels: Same categories as ACTOR1SUM 
 
Variable name: OPPSCOPE 
Variable label: scope of opponent actor of claim 
Value labels: same categories as ACTOR1SCOPE 
 
Variable name: SUPPNAME 
Variable label: personal name of supported actor  
Note: string variable  
 
Variable name: SUPPORG 
Variable label: name or organisation supported actor is affiliated with  
Note: string variable  
 
Variable name: SUPPSUM 
Variable label: summary supported actor of claim 
Value labels: same as ACTOR1SUM 
 
Note: If a claim has several supported actors, the priority rule is that organizations, institutions or 
representatives thereof have priority over unorganized collectivities or individuals. If there are several 
supported actors or no supported actor at all who have priority according to this criterion, the order in 
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which they are mentioned in the article decides (with, again, the main headline as the start of the 
article).  
 
Variable name: SUPPSCOPE 
Variable label: scope of supported actor of claim 
Value labels: same categories as ACTOR1SCOPE 
 
5. Aims/Topic 
A claim can only deal with a single topic (only one category allowed). Topics should be understood as 
issues. That is, actors can position themselves on different sides of the issue. This enables the coding of 
positions as mentioned below. 
Subject actors, contextualized by journalists, construct the scope of the topic, the level of government 
responsible in terms of actors involved and persons affected. This is coded under the ‘scope of the 
issue’.  
 
Variable name: CLAIMTOPIC 
Variable label: Topic of claim 
Value labels: same categories as ARTTOPIC 
 
Variable name: SCOPEISSUE 
Variable label: scope of claim 
Value labels: same as ACTOR1SCOPE 
 
Variable name: ACTORPOSITION 
Variable label: position of claim towards issue 
EX: Relation of issue position (aim) towards ----  
-1 = Criticism 
0 = Neutral 
1 = Support  
99= N/A 




Variable name: STATUSQUO 
Variable label: preference of claimant for change of policies or political practices  
Value labels:  
-1 = policies or political practices regarding the related women’ issues should become more restrictive  
0 = policies or political practices regarding the related women’ issues should not change (i.e. defends 
status quo) 
1 = policies or political practices regarding the related women’ issues should improve  
999 = claim does not refer to policies or political practices  
 
6. Object Actor 
In case a claim becomes reality, it is likely to affect the interests of certain political actors or a specific 
section of society. Those affected are object actors. By making a claim the subject actor thus constructs 
a material relationship with the object actor. This relationship need not be explicitly mentioned in the 
newspaper article. Further, the object actor may be an unorganized section of society . The object actor 
categories include a broader range of categories than the subject actor categories. Whether object actors 
are affected negatively or positively is coded under OBJEVAL.  
Variable name: OBJACT1 (OBJACT2, OBJACT3) 
Variable label: First object actor whose interest is, or would be affected by the claim if it were to 
become reality  
Value labels:  
 
0 = no object actor  
1= unspecified broad category of actors (i.e. “the general public”, “public interests”) 
2 = organized political actor (i.e. political societies , women’s NGO) 
 
3  women  
301 = women in general  
302 = women from a particular religious group 
303 = women from a particular area 
304 = women from a particular social class 





4  men  (only for OBJACTx = 4, string variable)  
 
401 = men in general  
402 = men from a particular religious group  
403 = men from a particular ethnic/cultural group  
404 = men from a particular social class  
405 = men from a particular social status  
 
5 = other sections or groups in society  
6 = the family  
 7 = no object actor specified or implied  
 
Variable name: OBJACTOR1ORG (OBJACTOR2ORG, OBJACT3ORG) 
Variable label: name of organization first object actor is affiliated to  
Note: only code if OBJACT1 = 1, string variable  
 
Variable name: OBJACT1SCOPE (OBJACT2SCOPE, OBJACT3SCOPE) 
Variable label: scope of first object actor  
Value labels: same categories as ACTOR1SCOPE 
 
Note: Add “.” If  there is only one object actor, which means that OBJACT2, OBJACT3 don’t 
exist hence the scope of the  object actors which is illustrated by the variables “OBJACT2SCOPE, 
OBJACT3SCOPE” don’t exist  
 
Variable name: OBJACT1VAL (OBJACT2VAL, OBJACT3VAL) 
Variable label: effect of claim on first object actor  
Value labels:  
 
-1 = criticism 
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0 = neutral 
1 = support  
99= N/A 
999= Unclassified  
 
Note: Add “.” If  there is only one object actor, which means that OBJACT2, OBJACT3 don’t 
exist hence the effect of claim on first object actor which is illustrated by the variables 





In order to justify their position, subject actors may provide arguments. Following Habermas (1993), 
these may be instrumental, identity or moral arguments. These are coded under the FRAME variable 
which further includes various sub-categories (partially derived from Helbling et al. 2008). These 
arguments may be attributed by journalists to subject actors but should always be mentioned in the 
article. Coders need not evaluate whether the arguments are convincing or not. Subject actors may 
combine different types of arguments. Up to two categories are coded. Certain rhetoric or language 
(form) used may be different from actual, substantive arguments (content) made.  
 
Variable name: FRAME1 (FRAME2, FRAME3) 
Variable label: first justification or argument given or implied by the subject actor with respect to the 
claim 
Value labels:  
0 = no argument provided  
 
1 Instrumental/pragmatic frames 
11 = Public interest  
12 = Economic  
13 =  Necessity 
14 = Social-political interest  
15 = Normalization argument  
16 = Infrastructural 
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17 = Safety / dangerous consequences  
18 = International reputation  
19 = Other cost/benefit arguments  
 
2 Arguments about collective identity  
21 national identity (general) 
      211 = specific national traditions  
212= Sub national traditions 
22 cultural traditions and norms  
      221 = specific norms part of the social structure of the community  
      222 = family-related norms / gender roles 
      223 = religious identity and norms  
 
3 Arguments about universal moral principles and rights (including legal arguments) 
 
31 human rights  
      311 = individual civil rights/  
      312 = freedom of choice/ expression  
      313 = equal treatment 
      314 = religious rights  
      315 = women’s rights / emancipation 
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The Findings and the Descriptive Statistics of the Political Claim Analysis 
 
 
The Saudi Case: Claim level Variables 
 
Actors (main claimants) 
 
 





When analyzing the distribution of the main claimants, who make a demand, proposal, appeal, or 
criticism; it appeared that the claim makers who are the most prominent in the Saudi press are those 
who are involved with the media and journalism sector, as they were the most dominant aggregate 
category of claim makers both in 2010 (33.33%) and 2011 (48.38%) respectively. Their dominance 
could be attributed to their prior involvement with the newspapers at hand, which often makes the 
process of inserting claims easier and more accessible.  
 
While the category of unorganized individuals, which was mainly composed of ordinary individuals 
who were interviewed for their opinions in the newspapers came in the second place, as they 
constituted (25.00%) of the total claim makers on average. While the category of 
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researchers/intellectuals came in third place and contributed one-tenth (10.50%) of all claims made in 
2010 and 2011 combined. Cyber activists on the other hand only accounted for 5.43% of the overall 
average sample, due to their involvement in 2011 with the “Women to Drive” campaign.  
 
It is noticeable though that government and states actors category (which includes the legislative and 
executive branches of government, the judiciary, public administration, the police department, as well 
as individual politicians) was less visible in comparison to the other categories as it merely constituted 

















C.3 Forms of action by broad actor categories (on average) 
	
	
If one disregards the claims made by the press, which are often by definition newspaper articles, that 
constituted 43.47% of the overall verbal statement category, verbal statements remain the most widely 
used form of action employed by different actors categories such as individuals, and researchers and 
intellectuals who rely on verbal interviews with media sources, press releases, and non-specified 
statements, which read “as XY said, stated, criticized, supported, claimed, etc” without any further 
details.  The remaining forms of claims consisted of challenging acts such as the act of driving itself as 
a micro-act of resistance, in addition to cyber protests (10.50%) on Facebook and Twitter. While 
petitioning, on the other hand, constituted only 3.62 % of the overall reported forms of action.  
 
It not surprising to observe though the low number of reported political actions and decisions as acts of 
claims-making (0.72%), due to the attributed “depoliticized” label which is attached to the campaign, 
in which politicians tend to distance themselves from it, leaving it to society. The overall composition 
of public claims-making in national newspapers, tell us that the general picture of the Saudi public 
sphere is that protest action is almost nonexistent and political resistance seems to be limited to 
discursive action, cyber protests and micro challenging acts of resistance. This choice of action 
repertoire obviously depends on the power and resources of individual actors, which are confined to 
verbal action anyway. And also aligns with the characteristics of the campaign in hand and the political 
climate that shapes the collective action repertoire, as it tends to be not conformed to confrontational 












In about 96.37% of all cases, claim makers addressed other individuals or organizations, either by 
asking them to take action or to stop a specific action, by holding them responsible for implementing 
the claim, or even by supporting or criticizing them. All these forms are summarised here as direct 
addressees in general.  The usual addressee of a public claim is often state actors and the institutions 
that are attributed to the executive powers by the constitution. However, due to the “depoliticalized” 
nature of the issue of women’s driving , the most noticeable target of political claims was “society” 
which served as the main addressee for 55.80% of all cases, as it was considered the main target of 
claim both in 2010 (36.67%) and 2011 (65.05%). 
 
While, the government only accounted for (26.45%) of all the claims made on an average level, which 
could be attributed to the characteristics of the media system in Saudi Arabia in which direct criticism 
of, or demands on, the government side are rarely featured in the press. Moreover, in about 5.43% of 











Claim makers can address other actors in a neutral way, or with a positive or negative evaluation of the 
addressee. Hence, for each actor or actor category, it is possible to calculate the mean evaluation based 
on all cases in which this actor is addressed by others. The value can range between very negative (-1) 
to very positive (+1); in which the mean is 0.0 when either the actor is always addressed in a neutral 
way (if the standard deviation is zero) or when positive and negative evaluations of this addressee are 
equally present (if the standard deviation is high). 
 
Echoing that, the overall pattern of claims-making in the Saudi press is that criticism of other actors 
(mostly of society) is more frequent than support (the mean for all addressees being -0.28). However, 
given the low number of cases, these figures only have an indicative value. In general, it can be said 
that society has a more negative image (-0.41) with a standard deviation of 0.78 than state actors (0.08) 
with a standard deviation of 0.86. While religious figures/organizations who possess extreme views and 
ideologies were also addressed negatively (-0.46). Moreover, it is worth noting that both the categories 









C.6: The position regarding women’s driving 
 
 
C.7: The position regarding women’s driving by actor type (on average) 
 
Table C.7 shows us that the overall position towards women’s driving as reported by the Saudi press is 
generally positive, where – on average– support far exceeds criticism (77.54). While 8.33% of the 
actors remained neutral. Moreover, the most dominant aggregate actors category which exhibited 










Meanwhile, Table C.8 shows that almost the whole range of involved actors took an overall pro 
women’s driving position,  as the overall position towards women’s driving constituted a positive mean 
value of (0.64). However, the most obvious actors defending the cause are activists with (1) mean 
value, in addition to researchers and intellectuals (0.85), and media and journalists (0.72). While 
government and state actors remain somehow more cautious in their approval of women’s driving 
(0.06). It is also noticeable that women’s NGOs and Human Rights NGOs make little appearance in the 














C.9: Presence of frames  
 
 
In the claims structure, frames are defined as the justification of a claim by its author, i.e. the answer to 
the question why the claim is made or why it should be implemented. In that sense, the codebook 
introduces five broad types of frames: 1- Instrumental/pragmatic related frames; 2- Collective identity 
related frames; 3- Emancipation and Human rights related frames; 4- Moral principles related frames; 
5- Constitutional and institutional related frames, in addition to other types of frames. Consequently, 
about 89.1% of the selected articles contain frames in relation to women’s driving.  
 
 






The table above exhibits that on average and for all actor types, instrumental/pragmatic related frames 
such as public interest, economic, sociopolitical interest, and necessity-based frames managed to 
trigger the highest rate of framing efforts in public debate (40.52%), followed by collective identity-
based frames (31.15%) like specific national traditions, and specific norms part of the social structure 
of the community. The aggregate category of Emancipation and Human rights related frames such as 
Individual civil rights, freedom of choice, emancipation and women’s rights, came third and accounted 
for 15.45% of the overall sample.  
 
Moreover, media and journalists are the actors that make most often use of frames, precisely (46.8%) 
of all cases, followed by individual actors (22.4%). Both actor types do not hold own decision-making 
power and therefore depend more on the usage of frames for convincing, or at least by influencing 
public opinion. It should also be noted that media are the only claim makers who decide themselves on 
the final output of their claim in the mass media. Other involved actors may have used frames in their 





























































C.12: The most often used frames 
 
 
C.13: The most often used frames by those who supported the campaign 
 
Table C.12 and Table C.13 demonstrate the most frequent used frames that were utilized in the framing 
process, where we can see that the actors relied more on the normative and identity-based frames (the 
frames that both refer to specific norms part of the social structure, and religious identity and norms) to 
justify their positions. Moreover, frames can be used in different ways, for instance, they can reflect 
what allowing women to drive stands for in the view of the speaker, or what it does not stand for but 
ought to for example. Hence, in the coding procedures, the direction that a specific frame  and the 
actors’ positions should be taken into account to determine if the frame is being used to support/oppose 




Hence, when one examines how those specific frames were used to justify the support for women’s 
driving, the most frequent frames were defensive in nature that sought to confirm that driving already 
conforms with the existing societal norms that govern the behavior of women societies, in addition to 
the frames that justify that women’s driving is not religiously forbidden in Islam and that there is no 
religious justification behind it. Whilst, we can observe the relatively small role of frames that are 
directly considered to be  emancipatory and related to women’s rights in nature  (8.69%), which might 
be an indication of a general reluctance and scepticism that define the attitude towards featuring human 
rights and therefore, women’s rights-based discourses in the Saudi press, due to the fact that the 





























The Kuwaiti case: Actors (main claimants) 
 
 





Evidence from the political claims-making analysis can determine which types of actors are being 
featured in the public domain. Table C.14, overleaf, shows which actors appear making claims about 
the nationality issue in the Kuwaiti public sphere. Hence, in 2013 state actors accounted for (39.67%) 
of the total claim makers while parliamentary candidates constituted (36.36%) of the main claimants in 
the same year, followed by women’s and human rights NGOs (7.44%). While in 2014, government and 
state actors such as ministers and MPs were responsible for the majority of claims (38.18%), followed 
by parliamentary candidates, activists and individuals who accounted for (14.55%) of the claims made 
respectively.  
 
Turning to look at the claims made by journalists and media establishments, it is apparent that few 
claims have been made by media and journalists in general (2.27%), which makes us conclude that the 
nationality issue was not an issue field where media actors played a major role in print media coverage 
over the two years sampled here, which contrasts with the results that we have obtained in the Saudi 
case, in which media and journalists played a significant role as they constituted (43.47%) of the main 







C.15: Forms of action 
 
 
As Table C.15 indicates, when media coverage of the issue of female citizenship rights is analyzed, 
verbal statements – whether the exact form (press release, public speech, etc.) appear as the most 
dominant forms of action (63.63%) in 2013 and 2014 combined. Moreover, a higher proportion of 
‘political actions and decisions’ is found (22.73%) which mainly consists of legislations, proposals, 
parliamentary motions and amendments, followed by ‘ meetings’ (11.93%) which are mostly 
constituency meetings with the voters. Additionally, few petitioning events were reported, constituting 

















C.16: Forms of action by broad actor categories (on average) 
 
 
Due to the politicized nature of the issue, it is unsurprising that state actors appear as making political 
decisions more frequently than the other types of actors since this is a key part of their political role. 
The proportion of ‘political decisions’ made by state actors though is higher in the Kuwaiti case than 
the Saudi case, which only accounted for (0.72%) of the reported actions. Moreover, verbal statements 
remain the most widely used form of action (63.60%) employed by different actors categories such as 
government, parliamentary candidates, activists, and women’s NGOs who tend to rely on verbal 
interviews with media sources, press releases, and non-specified statements. The remaining forms of 
claims consist of formal meetings arranged by state actors and legislative committees (5.11%), and 
parliamentary candidates with the constituency (3.40%). While petitioning, on the other hand, 

















C.17: The classification of addressees 
 
 
Table C.17 points out to the types of actors targeted by claims about the nationality issue in the Kuwaiti 
public sphere. Hence, the findings show that in 2013 alone, almost (90.08%) of the targeted addressees 
were state or governmental actors, while government actors accounted for (80.00%) of the addresses in 
2014, followed by society (14.55%). Meanwhile, the presence of civil society actors is extremely low, 
as very few claims were addressed to non-state actors, such as women’s NGOs or other civil society 



















Claim makers can address other actors in a neutral way, or with a positive or negative evaluation of the 
addressees. Hence, for each actor or actor category, it is possible to calculate the mean evaluation based 
on all cases in which this actor is addressed by others. The value can range between very negative (-1) 
to very positive (+1); in which the mean is 0.0 when either the actor is always addressed in a neutral 
way (if the standard deviation is zero) or when positive and negative evaluations of this addressee are 
equally present (if the standard deviation is high). Echoing that, as indicated by Table C.18, on average 
addressees are evaluated on balance in a slightly negative way as the mean for all addressees being (-
0.02). Where government and state actors were particularly more likely to be criticized (-0.07). 
However, given the low number of cases, these figures only have an indicative value. In general, it can 
be said that the government has a more negative image (-0.07) with a standard deviation of 0.83 than 
society (0.71) with a standard deviation of (0.84), while other actors very rarely become the targets of 














C.19: The position regarding the nationality issue 
 
 
C.20: The position regarding the nationality issue by actor type (on average) 
 
 
The above tables indicate that the overall position towards the nationality issue as reported by the 
Kuwaiti press is generally positive, where – on average– support far exceeds criticism (97.16%). While 
(1.70%) of the actors remained neutral. Moreover, the most dominant aggregate actors category which 








C.21: The overall position regarding the nationality issue 
 
 
Analysis of the positions taken by various types of actors towards the nationality issue gives a measure 
of what degree of consensus or conflict exists between the different actors in the Kuwaiti public sphere. 
Nevertheless, the above table indicates that almost the whole range of involved actors took an overall 
pro campaign position, as the overall position towards the nationality constituted a positive mean value 


















C.22: Presence of frames 
 
The efforts of political actors to influence how different actors interpret political issues and events have 
become a central focus of social science research in recent years, which led to the emergence of the 
framing perspective.  Frames thus define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgments and 
suggest solutions (Entman, 1993). In line with this, Benford and Snow view frames as “interpretative 
schemata that simplify  the world by selectively encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and 
sequences of actions,” thus allowing individuals to locate, perceive, identify and label events within 
their living space or the world at large (Snow and Benford,  1992). Accordingly, in recent years, 
framing and counter-framing processes in the media (e.g. Berinsky and Kinder 2006; Sieff 2003) have 
become a central object of analysis. Echoing that, table C.22 illustrates that in about 89.20% of the 

























The above table exhibits that on average and for all actor types, constitutional and institutional related 
frames managed to trigger the highest rate of framing efforts in public debate (35.52%), followed by 
Emancipation and Human rights (29.18%). Examples of  the constitutional and institutional related  
frames that were particularly dominant in the coded sample was the constant reference to the ‘rule of 
law’, and the rights of ‘active citizens’, while the emancipatory frames that were found in the data 
included direct references to ‘women’s rights’,‘and ‘equal treatment’.Moreover, the table also shows 
the kinds of actors using frames to discuss the nationality issue.  As it turned out that the vast majority 
of claims with included frames about the campaign (94 of a total 281) stemmed from parliamentary 
candidates who appear to make the most often use of frames, precisely (33.45%) of all cases, followed 






















C.25: The most often used frames 
 
The above tables reflect the most frequent used frames that were employed in the framing effort, where 
we can clearly observe that in general, the majority of actors have relied on framing their claims within 
the rule of law rubric, which comes as no surprise since the most of the actors are considered to be 
whether state actors or aspiring  parliamentary candidates. Moreover, what followed next was the 
frames that endorsed “equal treatment” between the two genders and called for the abolishment of 
gendered nationality laws. While the claims which primarily addressed state actors have called for 


















The General Classification Scheme for Facebook posts 
 
 
D.1: General Classification Scheme for Facebook posts in the Saudi case 
 
Category Explanation Example- Translated 
A- Information-related 
1- Providing/sharing 
campaign-related news or 
information 
Conveying factual information 
relating to the causes of the campaign 
and its recent updates, as well as 
references to various news sources 
covering them. 
More than 3,000 nationals of the Kingdom 
including prominent writers and academics 
have endorsed a study that recommends lifting a 
ban on women driving. 
2- Sharing and 
commenting on 
news articles covering 
domestic issues 
Disseminating and citing the 
coverage of Saudi-related news and 
articles in local and international 
media outlets. 
Raif Badawi is a Saudi human rights activist 
and freethinker who is facing the death penalty 
for apostasy! Welcome to the stone age! 
3- Sharing and 
commenting on 
news articles covering 
other countries or 
international issues 
Disseminating and citing the 
coverage of other countries or 
international news and articles in 
local and international media outlets. 
The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has been 
ruling Egypt for 9 months so far. Egyptians 
have revolted against poverty, injustice and 
corruption. They were hoping for a bright future 
and then they have trusted the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Check this video! The MPs were 
beating some protesters and then that pig has 




Posting explicit calls for on-ground 
action and protests.   
Plz Drive. We hope the international media will 
cover our campaign this year too. 
2- Online action 
Posting explicit calls for online action 
such as: sending collective e-mails 
and signing online petitions.  
This is the Saudi Shura Council’s email 
(webmaster@shura.gov.sa). Let’s take action 
and send so many emails to them with “Let 
women drive in Saudi Arabia” in English. You 
can send it in Arabic, too. I will appreciate any 
kind of help from you guys so I can know that 
I‘m not wasting my time on Facebook. Thanks. 
3- Transnational solidarity 
and support  
Calling for transnational acts of 
solidarity or sharing some performed 
transnational acts of solidarity in 
relation to how the international 
audience had perceived and 
This year we need you to help us honk for us 
around the Saudi embassy or consulate in your 
country. Please check this event and share it 
with your friends. Thank you.  
 
 378
responded to the campaign. 
C- Feminist-related 
1- Sharing general 
feminist-related news or 
articles 
Disseminating and citing the 
coverage of general feminist-related 
news and articles in local and 
international media outlets. 
Juffali Automotive Company says it has trained 
13 Saudi women to assemble trucks for 
Mercedes-Benz and its Jeddah partner, marking 
a breakthrough in having women work in a 
male-dominated jobs in the Kingdom. Thanks 
for the support. Way to go ladies.  
http://www.arabnews.com/news/452233 
2- Saudi women’s 
achievements 
Conveying factual information 
relating to some examples of Saudi 
women who made notable 
achievements in the Saudi society, as 
well as references to various news 
sources covering their success.  
Raha Moharrak, a 25-year-old graduate student 
from Jeddah, has made history by becoming the 
first Saudi woman to reach the world’s highest 
peak, Mount Everest. She said convincing her 
family to agree to her climb was as great a 





Posting of content that seeks to 
empower women and increase their 
capacity as individuals. 
 
They tell us we are too delicate to drive cars… 
that we are too precious to travel alone… too 
pretty to play rough sports. We are queens. 
Queens who have been deprived of the right to 
make our own decisions. Have you ever heard 
of a queen without authority? Well, they exist in 
Saudi Arabia. We will drive on December 28.   
4-Feminists critical posts  
Providing critical opinions or 
evaluation of certain political, 
societal, religious and ideological 
aspects in society from a feminist 
perspective.  
 
Customs and traditions are nothing but a set of 
imposed laws that are imposed by an older 
generation who violated them tremendously. 
D- Emotional-related and user engagement 
 
1- Expressing gratitude 
Expressing gratitude and appreciation 
to the supporters of the campaign.  
A thank you letter to all the supporters of this 
campaign.  
2- Expressing solidarity 
Offering moral support and solidarity 
to women in general, and/or the 
supporters of the campaign.  
Our thoughts are with our brave mothers and 
sisters in Gaza. 
3- Occasional greetings  
Interacting with the users by posting 
occasional greetings to them during 
specific occasions such as the new 
year or the Eid.  
Happy holidays and winter solstice. I’m glad we 
all survived this time. :) 
4- General quotes  
Sharing quotations from a text or a 
well-known public figure, usually 
with acknowledgment of the source. 
"Rights are not given to those who are silent. A 
person must make a noise in order to get what 





D.2: General Classification Scheme for Facebook posts in the Kuwaiti case 
 
 
Category Explanation Example 
A- Information-related 




Providing factual information about 
WCSS, its objectives, and historical 
involvement in the Kuwaiti civil 
society and beyond. 
Photos from the archives of WCSS that date 
back to 1969, including the first ever WCSS 
women's delegation to Abu Dhabi to get to 
know the status of women in the United Arab 
Emirates. 
2- Visiting delegations and 
collaborations 
Disseminating information 
about the recent visiting 
delegations to the headquarters 
of WCSS (high-profile 
representatives, international 
visitors, officials, advisers) and 
the outcomes of these visits, 
either in the form of signing of 
agreements or planned future 
collaborations 
Mr. Jacques Lang, the former Minister 
of Culture of France and Chairman of 
the Arab World Institute, visited the 
headquarters of WCSS, where he was 
welcomed by Lulouh Al Mulla, the 
chairperson of the Board of Directors 
and Faeza Al-Awadhi, a board member 
of WCSS. Together, they discussed the 
best ways to promote women's rights 
in the region. 
3- WCSS in the media 
Citing and disseminating the 
coverage of the activities conducted 
by WCSS, or interviews given by 
some members of WCSS to the local 
media outlets. 
Read about the Golden Jubilee celebration of 
WCSS in today's newspapers. 
B- Activities-related 
1- Localized activities  
 
Disseminating information about 
WCSS’s efforts in providing social 
services to the local community in the 
arenas of healthcare, childcare and 
care for people with disabilities. 
 
Take a look at the Women's Social and 
Cultural Society’s new project regarding 
Alzheimer's Disease Awareness Month 
http://youtu.be/YTBMmE6yB1Q 
2 - Transnational activities 
 
Disseminating information about 
WCSS’s efforts in providing aid and 
support to several transnational 
causes in Palestine, Syria and Sudan, 
such as: building up schools and 
The participation of Mrs. Lulwa Al Mulla, the 
Chairperson of the Women's Cultural and 
Social Society, at the third donors conference 
to support the humanitarian effort in Syria on 
March  31, 2015 at Bayan Palace in Kuwait. 
The conference was opened by His Highness 
 
 380
supporting refugees. the Amir of Kuwait Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad 
Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, followed by the speech of 
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. 
C- Feminist-related 
1- Promoting women’s 
rights 
Promoting women’s enjoyment of 
their rights in the political, economic 
and social arenas. 
As part of WCSS efforts to raise the political 
and legal awareness of Kuwaiti women and 
enable them to exercise all their full civil and 
political rights, WCSS has been committed 
towards the implementation of the Warkati 
Project (to promote women's rights and legal 
empowerment). 
2- Capacity building and 
empowerment 
Introducing actionable strategies and 
work plans that aim to empower 
women and increase their capacity as 
individuals. 
Aspire Woman in collaboration with Women 
Cultural & Social Society, is inviting you to 
attend the women’s empowerment event under 
the title “Aspire Woman: The Power Within.” 
Women from various age groups and 
backgrounds come together to inspire women 
about entrepreneurship and the use of 
Information Technologies in running a 
successful business. The event will be held at 
WCSS’s Auditorium on  April 15 at 5:00 pm. 
3- Ensaf campaign 
 
Disseminating information and 
updates about the series of 
campaigning efforts which were 
employed in relation to the Ensaf 
campaign. 
Mrs. Lulwa Saleh Al Mulla, the chairperson of 
WCSS, discusses the sufferings felt by 
Kuwaiti women married to non-Kuwaiti 
citizens. These women are discriminated 
against and excluded from getting the basic 
rights that are enjoyed by their Kuwaiti sisters 
who are married to Kuwaitis. Since 1993, 
WCSS has adopted this issue and is still 
fighting on women's side so they can obtain 
their full rights as guaranteed by the Kuwaiti 
Constitution. 
4- Combating Violence 
against women 
 
Highlighting the measures and 
actions that are taken by WCSS to 
work on the prevention of all forms 
of violence against women. 
 
Join us today in the first Walkathon to stand up 
against violence against women. Standing 
against violence is a protection for you and the 
generations to come. Your family members 
might be exposed to it while you do not know! 
Do not stay silent. Participate with us and send 
the world a message about your rejection of 
violence. 
5- Feminists critical posts 
Providing critical opinions or 
evaluation of certain political, 
societal and ideological phenomena 
in society from a feminist 
perspective. 
 
Luluah Mulla: Where are the MPs who were 
chasing women's votes when they needed it in 
the elections!! http://t.co/Wu7Iemfl8Y 
D- Users engagement 
 
 381 
1- Occasional greetings  
Interacting with the users by posting 
occasional greetings to them during 
specific occasions such as the new 
year or the Eid. 
 
The Women's Cultural and Social Association 
congratulates you all for the Happy Eid al-
Adha. May god bless everyone with well-































The General Classification Scheme for Twitter Posts 
 
 
E.1: General Classification Scheme for Twitter Posts for the Saudi accounts 
 
Category Explanation Example 




of the campaign. 
Disseminating and citing the 
coverage of the campaign in 
local media outlets. 
Manal's 1st TV interview since her release from prison will air 






of the campaign. 
Disseminating and citing the 
coverage of the campaign in the 
regional media outlets.  
Watch Manal AlSharif interview today on AlHurra channel w/ 






of the campaign.  
Disseminating and citing the 
coverage of the campaign in 
international media outlets.  
 
Noura Mansouri and Muna AbuSulayman both are live on BBC 






of the campaign.  
 
Disseminating and citing the 
coverage of the campaign in in 
alternative media platforms 
such as blogs and electronic 
newspapers. 










Disseminating and citing the 
coverage of the campaign in the 
campaign’s specific alternative 
media platforms such as the 
campaign’s Facebook pages. 
The official Facebook page for My Right to Dignity Initiative 




A2- Other media-related practices 
6-Dissemination Disseminating and citing the coverage of Saudi-related news 




of local news. 
 







Disseminating and citing the 
coverage of other international 
news and articles.  







Targeting influential media 
outlets with news about the 
campaign in order to report it.  
@CNN Saudi Women will hit the street driving their cars on 







the campaign.  
Conveying factual information 
relating to the campaign and its 
causes.  
Around 30% to 60% of the Saudi average class salary goes on 
foreigner drivers! #Women2Drive #Saudi #KSA #WomenRights 







Explicit articulation of 
campaign’s demands in the 
public sphere.  
 
Press Release-A year passes on the 1st lawsuit against the #Saudi 








Raising criticism about the 
injustices resulting from the 
ban on driving.  
https://twitter.com/W2Drive/status/68629346474131456 
C- Mobilization-related 
12- Calls for on- 
ground action. 
Posting explicit calls for on-
ground action and protests. 
Looking 4 volunteer female drivers 2 teach other women how to 




13- Calls for 
online action. 
Posting explicit calls for online 
action such as: sending 
collective e-mails, and signing 
online petitions. 
Do you support #Saudi women and their right in driving? Add 
this twibbon to your avatar. http:// twibbon.com/join/women2dri 









Providing encouragement and 
moral support to the 
participants, supporters and 
sympathizers with the 
campaign.  
@DaphneAbuSulaym Manal paid her freedom 2 inspire women 
around the world.Don't let that 2 go 4 a waste. It is the time for 
women to speak up 
 
https://twitter.com/W2Drive/status/79687904913391616 




Providing persuasive tangible 
evidence of the success of the 
campaign either in the form of 
photo or video evidence of 
women who responded 
positively to the calls of the 
campaign. 
A video of Saudi woman driving near 2 the police car for a few 
minutes without any arrest or detention http:// 






Providing first-hand written 
testimonies about the acts of 
resistance performed by 
individuals.  
The 1st episode of @RayanAlduwaisi and his one week 







figure support.  
Demonstrating acts or 
testimonies of solidarity from 
influential public figures. 








Showing transnational acts of 
solidarity, in relation to how 
the international audience had 
perceived and responded to the 
campaign. 
Another #Rally to be held in front of the #SaudiEmbassy #US 
#Washington #DC supporting #Women2Drive in #Saudi on 
#Jun17 http:// on.fb.me/m3sLVQ 
 
https://twitter.com/W2Drive/status/79618596883542016 
E- Feminist related 
19- Feminist 
critical posts.  
Providing critical opinions or 
evaluation of certain political, 
societal, religious and 
ideological aspects of society 
from a feminist perspective.  
You know there's something wrong in the society when one of 






related news or 
articles. 
 
Disseminating and citing the 
coverage of general feminist-
related news and articles in 
local and international media 
outlets. 
A conversation about #Islamic #Feminism ; featuring 
@EbtihalMubarak & @monaeltahawy http:// 










Posting content that seeks to 
empower women and increase 
their capacity as individuals. 
Motivation is what gets you started. Habit is what keeps you 
going."~Jim Rohn #saudiwomen #w2drive #women2drive" 
 
https://twitter.com/W2Drive/status/111780811010871296 




Engaging in debate with 
Twitter users in which 
arguments and counter-
arguments are expressed and 
exchanged. 
@HaifaAlroqi true patriotism are ppl like Loujain &Maysaa who 
risk their freedom & jobs for future of fellow citizens 
 
https://twitter.com/oct26driving/status/558460469275394049 
23- Answering to 
users questions.  
Providing the necessary 
answers to the questions 
proposed by Twitter users.  
@dakota29160785 they haven't been released but their families 
were allowed to see them. 
 
https://twitter.com/oct26driving/status/540943053033201664 
24- Users input. 
 
Asking for users input and 
feedback about certain issues.  
Here You Can Write Your Comments Of Support Or Even 






Expressing gratitude and 
appreciation to the supporters 
of the campaign. 





E.2: General Classification Scheme for Twitter Posts for the Saudi accounts 
 
 
Category Explanation Example 




of the campaign. 
Disseminating and citing 
the coverage of the 
campaign in local media 
outlets. 
The president of the Kuwaiti Women Without Borders group Mrs. 
Khalood al-Hindi will be a guest on Al-Kut Channel with Ahmed Rifai 









of the campaign. 
the coverage of the 
campaign in the regional 




of the campaign.  
Disseminating and citing 
the coverage of the 
campaign in international 





of the campaign.  
 
Disseminating and citing 
the coverage of the 
campaign in in alternative 
media platforms such as 






Disseminating and citing 
the coverage of the 
campaign in the 
campaign’s specific 
alternative media 
platforms such as the 
campaign’s Facebook 
pages. 
If you are on Instagram please make sure to follow us on @wcss_q8, 





A2- Other media-related practices 
6-Dissemination 
of local news. 
 
Disseminating and citing 
the coverage of Kuwaiti-
related news and articles. 
Read Lulwa al-Mulla’s interview with Alnahar newspaper on the 
relationship between the legislative and executive authorities in the 








Disseminating and citing 
the coverage of other 






media outlets with news 
about the campaign in 
order to report it.  
We talked to the reporters and we shared our demands to them as well 
as our concerns about the fate of our children. Our ultimate goal is to 









the campaign.  
information relating to 
the campaign and its 
causes.  
Women's Cultural and Social Society on the occasion of the launch of 








Conscious articulation of 
campaign’s demands in 
the public sphere.  
 
We are demanding to amend Article II of the Kuwaiti Nationality Act 
to ensure the implementation of the principles of justice, equality and 






Raising criticism about 
the injustices resulting 
from the current 
citizenship laws.  
Women are still facing unjust, arbitrary discriminatory laws that are 





12- Calls for on- 
ground action. 
Posting explicit calls for 
on-ground action. 
We are pleased to invite you to attend the first public seminar that will 




13- Calls for 
online action. 
Posting explicit calls for 
online action. 
This is our official account @KWWNLC. Please add us, follow us, 









and moral support to the 
participants, supporters 
and sympathizers with the 
campaign.  
We are asking everyone who is concerned with the issue of women's 
equal citizenship to cooperate with us, in order for us to be united in 
achieving our justifiable demands.  
 
https://twitter.com/KWWNLC/status/410398031520231424 





tangible evidence of the 
progress of the campaign.  
This week has been very eventful, in which some of our group 
members have visited the National Assembly and held meetings with 










written testimonies about 
the acts of resistance 









Demonstrating acts or 
testimonies of solidarity 
from influential public 
figures  
Today we met Mr. Mohammed al-Hamidi, the Deputy President of the 
Kuwaiti Human Rights Association. During the meeting Mr. al-Hamidi 









acts of solidarity, in 
relation to how the 
international audience 
had perceived and 
responded to the 
campaign. 
N/A  
E- Feminist related 
19- Feminist 
critical posts.  
Providing 
critical opinions or 
evaluation of certain 
political, societal, 
religious and ideological 
aspects of society from a 
feminist perspective.  
Please read our joint statement with the other civil society 
organizations and groups against the Ministry Of Social Affairs and 







related news or 
articles. 
 
Disseminating and citing 
the coverage of general 
feminist-related news and 
articles in local and 
international media 
outlets. 
A new achievement for Kuwaiti women. Trained pilot Muneera 
Bouaerki joins the Kuwaiti airways, making her the first female pilot 







Posting content that seeks 
to empower women and 
increase their capacity as 
individuals. 
N/A 






Engaging in debate with 
Twitter users in which 
arguments and counter-
arguments are expressed 
and exchanged. 
@bosammy @poshahantos Everybody who believes that the 
Constitution equates women and men with rights and duties should 




23- Answering to 
users questions.  
Providing the necessary 
answers to the questions 
proposed by Twitter 
users.  
 @AwaTiFALReFaie The organization organizes many activities and 
events, and it publishes announcements in the press. Our work is well 




24- Users input. 
 
Asking for users input 
and feedback about 
certain issues.  
In case of any inquiry about the conference we are pleased to receive 
your inquires on our e-mai address l Wcss.sec@hotmail.com and we 






Expressing gratitude and 
appreciation to the 
supporters of the 
campaign. 




G- Other.    
 
 
 
 
 
